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  1. added 2018-10-05
    A Probabilistic Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):1-25.
    There are three well-known models of how to account for perceptual belief within a probabilistic framework: (a) a Cartesian model; (b) a model advocated by Timothy Williamson; and (c) a model advocated by Richard Jeffrey. Each of these models faces a problem—in effect, the problem of accounting for the defeasibility of perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge. It is argued here that the best way of responding to this the best way of responding to this problem effectively vindicates the Cartesian model. (...)
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  2. added 2018-10-04
    Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest: uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided: disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. Surprisingly, it is very difficult to vindicate both (1) and (2). But diagnosing why this is so leads to (...)
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  3. added 2018-10-04
    Higher-Order Uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays.
    You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. I defend three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed in terms of higher-order uncertainty. The central question becomes how your first- and higher-order opinions should relate—a precise question that can be embedded within a general, tractable framework. Second, this question is nontrivial. Rational higher-order uncertainty is pervasive, and lies at the foundations of the epistemology of disagreement. Third, the answer is (...)
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  4. added 2018-08-19
    The Legitimate Route to the Scientific Truth.Joseph Krecz - manuscript
    We leave in a beautiful and uniform world, a world where everything probable is possible. Since the epic theory of relativity many scientists have embarked in a pursuit of astonishing theoretical fantasies, abandoning the prudent and logical path to scientific inquiry. The theory is a complex theoretical framework that facilitates the understanding of the universal laws of physics. It is based on the space-time continuum fabric abstract concept, and it is well suited for interpreting cosmic events. However, it is not (...)
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  5. added 2018-03-22
    On the Martingale Representation Theorem and on Approximate Hedging a Contingent Claim in the Minimum Deviation Square Criterion.Nguyen Van Huu & Quan-Hoang Vuong - 2007 - In Ta-Tsien Li Rolf Jeltsch (ed.), Some Topics in Industrial and Applied Mathematics. Shanghai, China: World Scientific. pp. 134-151.
    In this work we consider the problem of the approximate hedging of a contingent claim in the minimum mean square deviation criterion. A theorem on martingale representation in case of discrete time and an application of the result for semi-continuous market model are also given.
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  6. added 2017-03-06
    Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity.Thomas Icard - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):863-903.
    Subjective probability plays an increasingly important role in many fields concerned with human cognition and behavior. Yet there have been significant criticisms of the idea that probabilities could actually be represented in the mind. This paper presents and elaborates a view of subjective probability as a kind of sampling propensity associated with internally represented generative models. The resulting view answers to some of the most well known criticisms of subjective probability, and is also supported by empirical work in neuroscience and (...)
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  7. added 2016-12-08
    Can It Be Rational to Have Faith?Lara Buchak - 2012 - In Jake Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. pp. 225.
    This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...)
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  8. added 2016-12-08
    Dynamic Update with Probabilities.Johan van Benthem, Jelle Gerbrandy & Barteld Kooi - 2009 - Studia Logica 93 (1):67 - 96.
    Current dynamic-epistemic logics model different types of information change in multi-agent scenarios. We generalize these logics to a probabilistic setting, obtaining a calculus for multi-agent update with three natural slots: prior probability on states, occurrence probabilities in the relevant process taking place, and observation probabilities of events. To match this update mechanism, we present a complete dynamic logic of information change with a probabilistic character. The completeness proof follows a compositional methodology that applies to a much larger class of dynamic-probabilistic (...)
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  9. added 2016-06-24
    Deductive Probability Arguments.C. J. Ducasse - 1953 - Philosophical Studies 4 (2):29 - 31.
  10. added 2016-03-16
    Probabilistic Consistency Norms and Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
    In addition to beliefs, people have attitudes of confidence called credences. Combinations of credences, like combinations of beliefs, can be inconsistent. It is common to use tools from probability theory to understand the normative relationships between a person’s credences. More precisely, it is common to think that something is a consistency norm on a person’s credal state if and only if it is a simple transformation of a truth of probability. Though it is common to challenge the right-to-left direction of (...)
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  11. added 2016-01-25
    Probability in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Lev Vaidman - 2011 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 299--311.
    It is argued that, although in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics there is no ``probability'' for an outcome of a quantum experiment in the usual sense, we can understand why we have an illusion of probability. The explanation involves: a). A ``sleeping pill'' gedanken experiment which makes correspondence between an illegitimate question: ``What is the probability of an outcome of a quantum measurement?'' with a legitimate question: ``What is the probability that ``I'' am in the world corresponding to that (...)
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  12. added 2016-01-25
    Subjective Probability Weighting and the Discovered Preference Hypothesis.Gijs van de Kuilen - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (1):1-22.
    Numerous studies have convincingly shown that prospect theory can better describe risky choice behavior than the classical expected utility model because it makes the plausible assumption that risk aversion is driven not only by the degree of sensitivity toward outcomes, but also by the degree of sensitivity toward probabilities. This article presents the results of an experiment aimed at testing whether agents become more sensitive toward probabilities over time when they repeatedly face similar decisions, receive feedback on the consequences of (...)
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  13. added 2016-01-25
    A Problem for Popper : Corroboration and the Logical Interpretation of Probability.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - unknown
    How are we to understand the use of probability in Popper’s corroboration function? Popper says logically, but this raises a problem that becomes apparent when his views on logical probability are compared with those of Keynes. Specifically, Popper does not make it clear how we could have access to, or even calculate, probability values in a logical sense. For first, he would likely want to deny the Keynesian distinction between primary and secondary propositions, and the underlying notion of knowledge-by-acquaintance with (...)
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  14. added 2016-01-25
    A Theory of Physical Probability.Richard Alexander Johns - 1999 - Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
    It is now common to hold that causes do not always determine their effects, and indeed theories of "probabilistic causation" abound. The basic idea of these theories is that C causes E just in case C and E both occur, and the chance of E would have been lower than it is had C not occurred. The problems with these accounts are that the notion of chance remains primitive, and this account of causation does not coincide with the intuitive notion (...)
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  15. added 2016-01-18
    Logical Questions Behind the Lottery and Preface Paradoxes: Lossy Rules for Uncertain Inference.David Makinson - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):511-529.
    We reflect on lessons that the lottery and preface paradoxes provide for the logic of uncertain inference. One of these lessons is the unreliability of the rule of conjunction of conclusions in such contexts, whether the inferences are probabilistic or qualitative; this leads us to an examination of consequence relations without that rule, the study of other rules that may nevertheless be satisfied in its absence, and a partial rehabilitation of conjunction as a ‘lossy’ rule. A second lesson is the (...)
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  16. added 2016-01-18
    Bovens and Hartmann on Coherence.Wouter Meijs & Igor Douven - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):355-363.
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  17. added 2015-10-15
    Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one's evidence. In this book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it--roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition (...)
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  18. added 2015-09-16
    Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments Without Logical Omniscience.Gregor Betz - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1117-1137.
    Science advances by means of argument and debate. Based on a formal model of complex argumentation, this article assesses the interplay between evidential and inferential drivers in scientific controversy, and explains, in particular, why both evidence accumulation and argumentation are veritistically valuable. By improving the conditions for applying veritistic indicators , novel evidence and arguments allow us to distinguish true from false hypotheses more reliably. Because such veritistic indicators also underpin inductive reasoning, evidence accumulation and argumentation enhance the reliability of (...)
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  19. added 2015-09-15
    A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Those who model doxastic states with a set of probability functions, rather than a single function, face a pressing challenge: can they provide a plausible decision theory compatible with their view? Adam Elga and others claim that they cannot, and that the set of functions model should be rejected for this reason. This paper aims to answer this challenge. The key insight is that the set of functions model can be seen as an instance of the supervaluationist approach to vagueness (...)
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  20. added 2015-09-10
    The Phylogeography Debate and the Epistemology of Model-Based Evolutionary Biology.Alfonso Arroyo-Santos, Mark E. Olson & Francisco Vergara-Silva - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (6):833-850.
    Although there is increasing recognition that theory and practice in science are often inseparably intertwined, discussions of scientific controversies often continue to focus on theory, and not practice or methodologies. As a contribution to constructing a framework towards understanding controversies linked to scientific practices, we introduce the notion of borrowed epistemic credibility, to describe the situation in which scientists exploit fallacious similarities between accepted tenets in other fields to garner support for a given position in their own field. Our proposal (...)
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  21. added 2015-03-30
    Philosophy and Probability.Timothy Childers - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Probability is increasingly important for our understanding of the world. What is probability? How do we model it, and how do we use it? Timothy Childers presents a lively introduction to the foundations of probability and to philosophical issues it raises. He keeps technicalities to a minimum, and assumes no prior knowledge of the subject.
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  22. added 2015-03-30
    Existential and Epistemic Probability.David Hawkins - 1943 - Philosophy of Science 10 (4):255-261.
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  23. added 2015-03-09
    Popper's Measure of Corroboration and P(H|B).Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs029.
    This article shows that Popper’s measure of corroboration is inapplicable if, as Popper argued, the logical probability of synthetic universal statements is zero relative to any evidence that we might possess. It goes on to show that Popper’s definition of degree of testability, in terms of degree of logical content, suffers from a similar problem. 1 The Corroboration Function and P(h|b) 2 Degrees of Testability and P(h|b).
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  24. added 2015-01-07
    The Need for an Epistemology.John L. Pollock - unknown
    It is argued that we cannot build a sophisticated autonomous planetary rover just by implementing sophisticated planning algorithms. Planning must be based on information, and the agent must have the cognitive capability of acquiring new information about its environment. That requires the implementation of a sophisticated epistemology. Epistemological considerations indicate that the rover cannot be assumed to have a complete probability distribution at its disposal. Its planning must be based upon “thin” knowledge of probabilities, and that has important implications for (...)
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  25. added 2014-04-02
    Is What is Worse More Likely?—The Probabilistic Explanation of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.Nikolaus Dalbauer & Andreas Hergovich - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):639-657.
    One aim of this article is to explore the connection between the Knobe effect and the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE). Additionally, we report evidence about a further generalization regarding probability judgments. We demonstrate that all effects can be found within German material, using ‘absichtlich’ [intentionally], ‘wissen’ [know] and ‘wahrscheinlich’ [likely]. As the explanations discussed with regard to the Knobe effect do not suffice to explicate the ESEE, we survey whether the characteristic asymmetry in knowledge judgments is caused by a differing (...)
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  26. added 2014-04-02
    Why Are There No Objective Values?Gebhard Geiger - 1995 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):35-62.
    Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed (...)
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  27. added 2014-03-31
    Towards a Rough Mereology-Based Logic for Approximate Solution Synthesis. Part.Jan Komorowski, Lech T. Polkowski & Andrzej Skowron - 1997 - Studia Logica 58 (1):143-184.
    We are concerned with formal models of reasoning under uncertainty. Many approaches to this problem are known in the literature e.g. Dempster-Shafer theory [29], [42], bayesian-based reasoning [21], [29], belief networks [29], many-valued logics and fuzzy logics [6], non-monotonic logics [29], neural network logics [14]. We propose rough mereology developed by the last two authors [22-25] as a foundation for approximate reasoning about complex objects. Our notion of a complex object includes, among others, proofs understood as schemes constructed in order (...)
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  28. added 2014-03-28
    How to Set a Surprise Exam.Ned Hall - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):647-703.
    The professor announces a surprise exam for the upcoming week; her clever student purports to demonstrate by reductio that she cannot possibly give such an exam. Diagnosing his puzzling argument reveals a deeper puzzle: Is the student justified in believing the announcement? It would seem so, particularly if the upcoming 'week' is long enough. On the other hand, a plausible principle states that if, at the outset, the student is justified in believing some proposition, then he is also justified in (...)
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  29. added 2014-03-28
    How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.Malcolm Forster & Elliott Sober - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-35.
    Traditional analyses of the curve fitting problem maintain that the data do not indicate what form the fitted curve should take. Rather, this issue is said to be settled by prior probabilities, by simplicity, or by a background theory. In this paper, we describe a result due to Akaike [1973], which shows how the data can underwrite an inference concerning the curve's form based on an estimate of how predictively accurate it will be. We argue that this approach throws light (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-24
    A Gruesome Problem for the Curve-Fitting Solution.S. DeVito - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):391-396.
    This paper is a response to Forster and Sober's [1994] solution to the curve-fitting problem. If their solution is correct, it will provide us with a solution to the New Riddle of Induction as well as provide a basis for choosing realism over conventionalism. Examining this solution is also important as Forster and Sober incorporate it in much of their other philosophical work (see Forster [1995a, b, 1994] and Sober [1996, 1995, 1993]). I argue that Forster and Sober's solution is (...)
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  31. added 2014-03-23
    From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.
    We generalize the Kolmogorov axioms for probability calculus to obtain conditions defining, for any given logic, a class of probability functions relative to that logic, coinciding with the standard probability functions in the special case of classical logic but allowing consideration of other classes of "essentially Kolmogorovian" probability functions relative to other logics. We take a broad view of the Bayesian approach as dictating inter alia that from the perspective of a given logic, rational degrees of belief are those representable (...)
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  32. added 2014-03-21
    Model Selection in Science: The Problem of Language Variance.M. Forster - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):83-102.
    Recent solutions to the curve-fitting problem, described in Forster and Sober ([1995]), trade off the simplicity and fit of hypotheses by defining simplicity as the paucity of adjustable parameters. Scott De Vito ([1997]) charges that these solutions are 'conventional' because he thinks that the number of adjustable parameters may change when the hypotheses are described differently. This he believes is exactly what is illustrated in Goodman's new riddle of induction, otherwise known as the grue problem. However, the 'number of adjustable (...)
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  33. added 2014-03-18
    Statistical Model Selection Criteria and the Philosophical Problem of Underdetermination.I. A. Kieseppa - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):761-794.
    I discuss the philosophical significance of the statistical model selection criteria, in particular their relevance for philosophical of underdetermination. I present an easily comprehensible account of their simplest possible application and contrast it with their application to curve-fitting problems. I embed philosophers' earlier discussion concerning the situations in which the criteria yield implausible results into a more general framework. Among other things, I discuss a difficulty which is related to the so-called subfamily problem, and I show that it has analogies (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-15
    Quantifier Probability Logic and the Confirmation Paradox.Theodore Hailperin - 2007 - History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):83-100.
    Exhumation and study of the 1945 paradox of confirmation brings out the defect of its formulation. In the context of quantifier conditional-probability logic it is shown that a repair can be accomplished if the truth-functional conditional used in the statement of the paradox is replaced with a connective that is appropriate to the probabilistic context. Description of the quantifier probability logic involved in the resolution of the paradox is presented in stages. Careful distinction is maintained between a formal logic language (...)
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  35. added 2014-03-07
    Probability Logic of Finitely Additive Beliefs.Chunlai Zhou - 2010 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):247-282.
    Probability logics have been an active topic of investigation of beliefs in type spaces in game theoretical economics. Beliefs are expressed as subjective probability measures. Savage’s postulates in decision theory imply that subjective probability measures are not necessarily countably additive but finitely additive. In this paper, we formulate a probability logic Σ + that is strongly complete with respect to this class of type spaces with finitely additive probability measures, i.e. a set of formulas is consistent in Σ + iff (...)
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  36. added 2013-12-02
    J.-H. Lambert's Theory of Probable Syllogisms.Thierry Martin - unknown
    In his Neues Organon of 1764, the mathematician and astronomer Jean-Henri Lambert [12] developed a theory of probable syllogisms, with the aim of formally describing the probabilist reasoning and then applying it to the probability of testimony, thus imparting an epistemic sense to the concept of probability. In the present text, we propose to study the principles of this theory and the difficulties it raises.
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  37. added 2013-11-16
    Carnap’s Thought on Inductive Logic.Yusuke Kaneko - 2012 - Philosophy Study 2 (11).
    Although we often see references to Carnap’s inductive logic even in modern literatures, seemingly its confusing style has long obstructed its correct understanding. So instead of Carnap, in this paper, I devote myself to its necessary and sufficient commentary. In the beginning part (Sections 2-5), I explain why Carnap began the study of inductive logic and how he related it with our thought on probability (Sections 2-4). Therein, I trace Carnap’s thought back to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as well (Section 5). In (...)
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  38. added 2013-11-11
    The Confirmation of Singular Causal Statements by Carnap’s Inductive Logic.Yusuke Kaneko - 2012 - Logica Year Book 2011.
    The aim of this paper is to apply inductive logic to the field that, presumably, Carnap never expected: legal causation. Legal causation is expressible in the form of singular causal statements; but it is distinguished from the customary concept of scientific causation, because it is subjective. We try to express this subjectivity within the system of inductive logic. Further, by semantic complement, we compensate a defect found in our application, to be concrete, the impossibility of two-place predicates (for causal relationship) (...)
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  39. added 2013-11-06
    Luminosity and Vagueness.Elia Zardini - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.
    The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...)
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  40. added 2013-10-07
    Piecewise Versus Total Support: How to Deal with Background Information in Likelihood Arguments.Benjamin Jantzen - unknown
    The use of the Law of Likelihood (LL) as a general tool for assessing rival hypotheses has been criticized for its ambiguous treatment of background information. The LL endorses radically different answers depending on what information is designated as background versus evidence. I argue that once one distinguishes between two questions about evidentiary support, the ambiguity vanishes. I demonstrate this resolution by applying it to a debate over the status of the ‘fine-tuning argument’.
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  41. added 2013-09-30
    Forecasted Risk Taking in Youth: Evidence for a Bounded-Rationality Perspective.Mandeep K. Dhami & David R. Mandel - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):161-171.
    This research examined whether youth's forecasted risk taking is best predicted by a compensatory (namely, subjective expected utility) or non-compensatory (e.g., single-factor) model. Ninety youth assessed the importance of perceived benefits, importance of perceived drawbacks, subjective probability of benefits, and subjective probability of drawbacks for 16 risky behaviors clustered evenly into recreational and health/safety domains. In both domains, there was strong support for a noncompensatory model in which only the perceived importance of the benefits of engaging in a risky behavior (...)
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  42. added 2013-09-23
    Akaike’s Theorem and Weak Predictivism in Science.Wang-Yen Lee - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):594-599.
  43. added 2013-09-23
    Belief and Contextual Acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.
    I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology. The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance , which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual way. Within this framework, I discuss (...)
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  44. added 2013-09-23
    Sherlock Holmes and Probabilistic Induction.Soshichi Uchii - unknown
    In this paper, (1) I argue that Sherlock Holmes was a good logician according to the standard of his day, and (2) I try to show what his method of reasoning was. Now, (2) is a harder task than (1), because we have to identify the essential features of his method of reasoning. In order to show this, I have not only to examine what Holmes says he is doing, but also to look at the methods of scientific reasoning recommended (...)
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  45. added 2013-06-12
    Smith on Justification and Probability.Brian Weatherson - manuscript
    Call Justificatory Probabilism (hereafter, JP) the thesis that there is some (classical) probability function Pr such that for an agent S with evidence E, the degree to which they are justified in believing a hypothesis H is given by Pr(H|E). As stated, the thesis is fairly ambiguous, though none of the disambiguations are obviously true. Indeed, several of them are obviously false. If JP is a thesis about how justified agents are in fully believing propositions, it is trivially false. I’m (...)
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  46. added 2013-05-31
    The Mathematical Pull of Temptation.Joseph S. Fulda - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):305-307.
    Argues that the mathematical structure of a tempting or, more generally, risk-taking situation may prove far more dispositive of the choice made than either character or the lure/pull of the subject/object of temptation/risk-taking. -/- Briefly discusses some implications of this.
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  47. added 2013-02-04
    Justification, Normalcy and Evidential Probability.Martin Smith - manuscript
    NOTE: This paper is a reworking of some aspects of a previous paper of mine – ‘What else justification could be’ published in Noûs in 2010. I’m currently in the process of writing a book developing and defending some of the ideas from this paper. What follows will, I hope, fall into place as one of the chapters of this book – though it is still very much at the draft stage. Comments are welcome. -/- My concern in this paper (...)
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  48. added 2013-01-08
    On Subjective Probability and Related Problems.GÜnter Menges - 1970 - Theory and Decision 1 (1):40.
  49. added 2013-01-05
    Syllogistic Reasoning with Intermediate Quantifiers.Niki Pfeifer & Gernot D. Kleiter - manuscript
    n S are P ”) is proposed for evaluating the rationality of human syllogistic reasoning. Some relations between intermediate quantifiers and probabilistic interpretations are discussed. The paper concludes by the generalization of the atmosphere, matching and conversion hypothesis to syllogisms with intermediate quanti- fiers. Since our experiments are currently still running, most of the paper is theoretical and intended to stimulate psychological studies.
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  50. added 2012-12-25
    Modal Operators with Probabilistic Interpretations, I.M. Fattorosi-Barnaba & G. Amati - 1987 - Studia Logica 46 (4):383-393.
    We present a class of normal modal calculi PFD, whose syntax is endowed with operators M r, one for each r [0,1] : if a is sentence, M r is to he read the probability that a is true is strictly greater than r and to he evaluated as true or false in every world of a F-restricted probabilistic kripkean model. Every such a model is a kripkean model, enriched by a family of regular probability evaluations with range in a (...)
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