- Local and Global Deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscriptdetails
- What the "Equal Weight View" Is.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscriptdetails
- More Trouble for Regular Probabilitites.Matthew W. Parker - 2012details
- Downwards Propriety in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - forthcoming - Mind.details
- Accuracy, Probabilism, and the Insufficiency of the Alethic.Corey Dethier - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-17.details
- Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
- Higher-Order Uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays.details
- Kyburg.'The Rule of Adjunction and Reasonable Inference,'.E. Henry Jr - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
- Truth, Knowledge, and the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
- Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily.David Builes, Sophie Horowitz & Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):3-20.details
- Be Modest: You're Living on the Edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
- Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.details
- Logics of Imprecise Comparative Probability.Yifeng Ding, Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas F. Icard - 2021 - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 132:154-180.details
- Why Be Random?Thomas Icard - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):fzz065.details
- Probabilities with Gaps and Gluts.Dominik Klein, Ondrej Majer & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (5):1107-1141.details
- You Say You Want a Revolution: Two Notions of Probabilistic Independence.Alexander Meehan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3319-3351.details
- Weintraub’s Response to Williamson’s Coin Flip Argument.Matthew W. Parker - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-21.details
- Conglomerability, Disintegrability and the Comparative Principle.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):479-488.details
- A Deference Model of Epistemic Authority.Sofia Ellinor Bokros - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12041-12069.details
- Bayesian Decision Theory and Stochastic Independence.Philippe Mongin - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (1):152-178.details
- A Puzzle About Experts, Evidential Screening-Off and Conditionalization.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):64-72.details
- Comparative Infinite Lottery Logic.Matthew W. Parker - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 84:28-36.details
- Dutch Book Arguments.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.details
- Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.details
- Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey’s rule.John R. Welch - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2051-2072.details
- Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.details
- Accuracy, Conditionalization, and Probabilism.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4017-4033.details
- Coherence and Common Causes: Against Relevance-Sensitive Measures of Coherence.Jakob Koscholke & Michael Schippers - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):771-785.details
- Basic‐Know And Super‐Know.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):375-391.details
- Generalised Reichenbachian Common Cause Systems.Claudio Mazzola - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4185-4209.details
- Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.details
- How to Avoid Maximizing Expected Utility.Bradley Monton - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
- On Linear Aggregation of Infinitely Many Finitely Additive Probability Measures.Michael Nielsen - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (3-4):421-436.details
- Symmetry Arguments Against Regular Probability: A Reply to Recent Objections.Matthew Parker - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-21.details
- Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.details
- Ideal Counterpart Theorizing and the Accuracy Argument for Probabilism.Clinton Castro & Olav Vassend - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):207-216.details
- O Argumento do Milagre comete a Falácia da Taxa-base? Apresentação, Estado da Arte e Questões de Formalização.Pedro Bravo De Souza - 2018 - Intuitio 11 (1):46-64.details
- Bayesian Argumentation and the Value of Logical Validity.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (5):806-821.details
- The Faulty Signal Problem: Counterfactual Asymmetries in Causal Decision Theory and Rational Deliberation.Daniel Listwa - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2717-2739.details
- Symmetry Arguments Against Regular Probability: A Reply to Recent Objections.Matthew Parker - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):8.details
- A Dutch Book Theorem and Converse Dutch Book Theorem for Kolmogorov Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):705-735.details
- An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
- Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
- Foley’s Threshold View of Belief and the Safety Condition on Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):589-594.details
- Quinean Holism, Analyticity, and Diachronic Rational Norms.Brett Topey - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3143-3171.details
- Bayesian Variations: Essays on the Structure, Object, and Dynamics of Credence.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
- Chance, Credence and Circles.Fabrizio Cariani - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):49-58.details
- Frá skoðunum til trúnaðar og aftur til baka: Yfirlit um bayesíska þekkingarfræði [English title: "From Belief to Credence and Back Again: An Overview of Bayesian Epistemology"].Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Hugur 28:146-162.details
- Conditioning Using Conditional Expectations: The Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox.Zalán Gyenis, Gabor Hofer-Szabo & Miklós Rédei - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2595-2630.details
- Inductive Explanation and Garber–Style Solutions to the Problem of Old Evidence.David Kinney - 2017 - Synthese:1-15.details
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