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Probabilistic Principles
Edited by Christopher J. G. Meacham (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
About this topic
| Summary | One can think of belief in a binary way--you either believe something or you don't. One can also think of belief as something that comes in degrees--you can believe something to a number of different degrees. It has been popular in formal epistemology to think of beliefs in the latter way, as things which come in degrees, and to further maintain that such degrees of belief should should satisfy the probability axioms. Given this picture, it has been debated whether there are other normative constraints on what an agent's degrees of belief should be like. The probabilistic principles discussed in this area are largely proposals about what these further normative constraints on degrees of belief should be like. |
| Key works | A classic description and defense of conditionalization can be found in Urbach & Howson 1993. An influential and critical discussion of Indifference Principles can be found in Van Fraassen 1989. Important discussions and applications of scoring rules are given in Oddie 1997 and Joyce 1998. An early and influential discussion of chance-credence principles is given by Lewis 2010. Reflection Principles were introduced and defended in van Fraassen 1984 and van Fraassen 1995. Influential discussions of direct inference principles are given in Kyburg 1974 and Pollock 1990. |
| Introductions | Good introductory discussions that cover many of the principles discussed in this section can be found in a number of places, including Urbach & Howson 1993, Strevens ms and Weisberg 2011. |
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Related
Subcategories
Conditionalization (390)
Indifference Principles (139)
Scoring Rules (197)
Updating Principles (420)
Contents
1914 found
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| 1 — 50 / 1914 |
Material to categorize
- Sơ kết năm 2023 của bayesvl.Hannah Chau - 2024 - Bayesvl.Trưa ngày 1-1 năm mới, R Documentation cho biết mức downloads tạm tính của chương trình bayesvl trong tháng 12-2023. Hiện đang đứng ở mức 157, tháng thấp nhất trong năm.
- Inductive Probability.John Patrick Day - 1961 - New York, NY, USA: Humanities Press.
- Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first- and higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of doxastic responses to the evidence. Given plausible assumptions about the relationship between your first- and higher-order attitudes, it can't be rational to adopt a credence on the edge of that range. But Permissivism says that, for some such range, any credence in that range is rational. Permissivism, in its traditional form, cannot be right. I consider some (...)
- (1 other version)Epistemology and Inference. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. [REVIEW]Stephen Spielman - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):149-150.
- Probability. [REVIEW]Mauricio Suárez - 2011 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (1):99-103.
- A Treatise on Probability.Clarence Irving Lewis - 1922 - Philosophical Review 31 (2):180.
- (1 other version)Probability and Paradox.F. Granger - 1929 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 9 (1):1-18.
- Special issue on Combining Probability and Logic.Jon Williamson & Dov Gabbay - 2003 - Journal of Applied Logic 1 (3-4):135-138.
- XIII.—The Philosophy of Probability.A. Wolf - 1913 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13 (1):328-361.
- Dutch Pioneers of Science. Leo Beek.Willem Hackmann - 1988 - Isis 79 (1):132-134.
- Heuristics can produce surprisingly rational probability estimates: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014).Håkan Nilsson, Peter Juslin & Anders Winman - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (1):103-111.
- Probability theory, not the very guide of life.Peter Juslin, Håkan Nilsson & Anders Winman - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):856-874.
- The principle of belief congruence and the congruity principle as models of cognitive interaction.Milton Rokeach & Gilbert Rothman - 1965 - Psychological Review 72 (2):128-142.
- The Quantification of Judgment: Some Methodological Suggestions.Robert L. Winkler - 1967 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 62 (320):1105-1120.The personalistic theory of probability prescribes that a person should use personal probability assessments in decision-making and that these assessments should correspond with his judgments. Since the judgments exist solely in the assessor's mind, there is no way to prove whether or not this requirement is satisfied. De Finetti has proposed the development of methods which should oblige the assessor to make his assessments correspond with his judgments. An ideal Assessor is hypothesized and his behavior is investigated under a number (...)
- On the subjective probability of compound events.Maya Bar-Hillel - 1973 - Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 9 (3):396-406.Subjects were requested to choose between gambles, where the outcome of one gamble depended on a single elementary event, and the other depended on an event compounded of a series of such elementary events. The data supported the hypothesis that the subjective probability of a compound event is systematically biased in the direction of the probability of its components resulting in overestimation of conjunctive events and underestimation of disjunctive events. Studies pertaining to this topic are discussed.
- 9. The de Finetti Lottery and Equiprobability.Paul Bartha - 2005 - In Kent A. Peacock & Andrew D. Irvine (eds.), Mistakes of reason: essays in honour of John Woods. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. pp. 158-172.
- Chapter 7. Absolute Probability Functions Construed as Representing Degrees of Logical Truth.Peter Roeper & Hughes Leblanc - 1999 - In Peter Roeper & Hugues Leblanc (eds.), Probability Theory and Probability Semantics. University of Toronto Press. pp. 114-141.
- Chapter 3. Relative Probability Functions and Their T-Restrictions.Peter Roeper & Hughes Leblanc - 1999 - In Peter Roeper & Hugues Leblanc (eds.), Probability Theory and Probability Semantics. University of Toronto Press. pp. 45-58.
- Significance testing, p-values and the principle of total evidence.Bengt Autzen - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):281-295.The paper examines the claim that significance testing violates the Principle of Total Evidence. I argue that p-values violate PTE for two-sided tests but satisfy PTE for one-sided tests invoking a sufficient test statistic independent of the preferred theory of evidence. While the focus of the paper is to evaluate a particular claim about the relationship of significance testing and PTE, I clarify the reading of this methodological principle along the way.
- An airtight Dutch book.Vann McGee - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):257-265.
- (1 other version)It All Adds Up: The Dynamic Coherence of Radical Probabilism.S. L. Zabell - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S98-S103.
- A Continuum of Inductive Methods Arising from a Generalized Principle of Instantial Relevance.C. J. Nix & J. B. Paris - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (1):83-115.In this paper we consider a natural generalization of the Principle of Instantial Relevance and give a complete characterization of the probabilistic belief functions satisfying this principle as a family of discrete probability functions parameterized by a single real δ ∊ [0, 1).
- (1 other version)The Axioms and Algebra of Intuitive Probability.Bernard O. Koopman - 1940 - Annals of Mathematics:269--292.
- The Modern Epistemic Interpretations of Probability: Logicism and Subjectivism.Maria Carla Galavotti - 2011 - In Dov M. Gabby & John Woods (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic: Inductive Logic. North Holland: Amsterdam. pp. 153--203.
- Bruno de Finetti and Imprecision.Paolo Vicig & Teddy Seidenfeld - unknownWe review several of de Finetti’s fundamental contributions where these have played and continue to play an important role in the development of imprecise probability research. Also, we discuss de Finetti’s few, but mostly critical remarks about the prospects for a theory of imprecise probabilities, given the limited development of imprecise probability theory as that was known to him.
- HACKING, I. "The Emergence of Probability". [REVIEW]J. R. Lucas - 1977 - Mind 86:466.Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - Probability and Opinion: A Study in the Medieval Presuppositions of Post-Medieval Theories of Probability.Edmund F. Byrne (ed.) - 1968 - The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.Recognizing that probability (the Greek doxa) was understood in pre-modern theories as the polar opposite of certainty (episteme), the author of this study elaborates the forms which these polar opposites have taken in some twentieth century writers and then, in greater detail, in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Profiting from subsequent more sophisticated theories of probability, he examines how Aquinas’s judgments about everything from God to gossip depend on schematizations of the polarity between the systematic and the non-systematic: revelation/reason, science/opinion, (...)
- Biased Coins: A model for higher-order probabilities.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2014 - In Maria Carla Galavotti, Elisabeth Nemeth & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), European Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Science in Europe and the Vienna Heritage. Cham: Springer. pp. 241-248.Is it coherent to speak of the probability of a probability, and the probability of a probability of a probability, and so on? We show that it is, in the sense that a regress of higher-order probabilities can lead to convergent sequences that determine all these probabilities. By constructing an implementable model which is based on coin-making machines, we demonstrate the consistency of our regress.
- (1 other version)Classical Probability in the Enlightenment. [REVIEW]Theodore Porter - 1989 - British Journal for the History of Science 22 (4):444-446.
- Probability in the Philosophy of Religion.D. H. Mellor - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):548-554.
- The Carnapian Tolerance in the Foundations of Probability'.Wilhelm K. Essler - 1984 - Epistemologia 7:171-190.
- Varieties of subjective-probability.Rs Lockhart - 1992 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 30 (6):483-483.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- It All Adds Up: The Dynamic Coherence of Radical Probabilism It All Adds Up: The Dynamic Coherence of Radical Probabilism (pp. S98-S103). [REVIEW]S. L. Zabell - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S98-S103.Brian Skyrms (1987, 1990, 1993, 1997) has discussed the role of dynamic coherence arguments in the theory of personal or subjective probability. In particular, Skryms (1997) both reviews and discusses the utility of martingale arguments in establishing the convergence of beliefs within the context of radical probabilism. The classical martingale converence theorem, however, assumes the countable additivity of the underlying probability measure; an assumption rejected by some subjectivists such as Bruno de Finetti (see, e.g., de Finetti 1930 and 1972). This (...)
- On the probability of particular events.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1961 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 15 (58):366-75.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- On representation of source reliability in weight of evidence.Daniel E. O'Leary - 1991 - In Bernadette Bouchon-Meunier, Ronald R. Yager & Lotfi A. Zadeh (eds.), Uncertainty in Knowledge Bases: 3rd International Conference on Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems, IPMU'90, Paris, France, July 2 - 6, 1990. Proceedings. Springer. pp. 115--123.
- Fronting in Dutch.Jan G. Kooij - 1978 - In Frank Jansen (ed.), Studies on fronting. Lisse [postbus 168]: Peter de Ridder Press.
- De Finetti's generalizations of exchangeability.Persi Diaconis & David Freedman - 1971 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 2--233.
- Factors determining the probability of recollection of intraoperative events.L. Goldman - 1990 - In B. Bonke, W. Fitch & K. Millar (eds.), Memory and Awareness In Anesthesia. Swets & Zeitlinger. pp. 45--9.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Philosophical foundations of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1996 - In Sahotra Sarkar (ed.), Logic, probability, and epistemology: the power of semantics. New York: Garland Pub. Co.. pp. 3--115.
- From probabilities to percepts.Bjorn Merker - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. pp. 88--37.(collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark 7 citations
- Reinforcement probability and concurrent operants.Jordan Rosenberg - 1974 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 4 (6):582-584.
- The modification of background frequency information.Philip H. Marshall, Clay E. George & Pamela Cohen - 1985 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 23 (1):9-11.
- (1 other version)Bruno de Finetti. Philosophical Lectures on Probability. Collected, edited, and annotated by Alberto Mura. Translated by Hykel Hosni. Synthese Library; 340. [REVIEW]Jon Williamson - 2010 - Philosophia Mathematica 18 (1):130-135.(No abstract is available for this citation).
- (1 other version)"Boekbalie" — a unique Dutch website.Adriaan Langendonk - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 17 (4):198-200.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Relative importance of probabilities and payoffs in risk taking.Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein - 1968 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 78 (3p2):1.
- Strength of the relationship between the value of an event and its subjective probability as a function of method of measurement.Dean G. Pruitt & Robert D. Hoge - 1965 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 69 (5):483.
- Reichenbachian Common Cause Systems of Arbitrary Finite Size Exist.Gábor Hofer-Szabó & Miklós Rédei - 2006 - Foundations of Physics 36 (5):745-756.A partition $\{C_i\}_{i\in I}$ of a Boolean algebra Ω in a probability measure space (Ω, p) is called a Reichenbachian common cause system for the correlation between a pair A,B of events in Ω if any two elements in the partition behave like a Reichenbachian common cause and its complement; the cardinality of the index set I is called the size of the common cause system. It is shown that given any non-strict correlation in (Ω, p), and given any finite (...)
- Probabilities all the way down.Adam LaCaze - 2006 - Metascience 15 (3):547-551.
- An Endless Hierarchy of Probabilities.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):267-276.Suppose q is some proposition, and let P(q) = v0 (1) be the proposition that the probability of q is v0.1 How can one know that (1) is true? One cannot know it for sure, for all that may be asserted is a further probabilistic statement like P(P(q) = v0) = v1, (2) which states that the probability that (1) is true is v1. But the claim (2) is also subject to some further statement of an even higher probability: P(P(P(q) (...)
- The Raven Paradox Revisited in Terms of Random Variables.Bruno Carbonaro & Federica Vitale - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):763-795.The discussion about the Raven Paradox is ever-renewing: after nearly 70 years, many authors propose from time to time new solutions, and many authors state that these solutions are unsatisfactory. It is worthy to be carefully noted that though most arguments in favor or against the paradox are based on the notion of “probability” and on the application of Bayes’ law, not one of them makes use of the Kolmogorov axiomatic theory of probability and on the subsequent notion of “random (...)
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