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  1. added 2019-01-07
    Grounding and Anchoring: On the Structure of Epstein’s Social Ontology.Mari Mikkola - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    Brian Epstein’s The Ant Trap is a praiseworthy addition to literature on social ontology and the philosophy of social sciences. Its central aim is to challenge received views about the social world – views with which social scientists and philosophers have aimed to answer questions about the nature of social science and about those things that social sciences aim to model and explain, like social facts, objects and phenomena. The received views that Epstein critiques deal with these issues in an (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-31
    Partial Resemblance and Property Immanence.Paul Audi - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Objects partially resemble when they are alike in some way but not entirely alike. Partial resemblance, then, involves similarity in a respect. It has been observed that talk of “respects” appears to be thinly-veiled talk of properties. So some theorists take similarity in a respect to require property realism. I will go a step further and argue that similarity in intrinsic respects requires properties to be immanent in objects. For a property to be immanent in an object is roughly for (...)
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  3. added 2018-12-15
    Is Hobbes Really an Antirealist About Accidents?Sahar Joakim & C. P. Ragland - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (2):11-25.
    In Metaphysical Themes, Robert Pasnau interprets Thomas Hobbes as an anti-realist about all accidents in general. In opposition to Pasnau, we argue that Hobbes is a realist about some accidents (e.g., motion and magnitude). Section One presents Pasnau’s position on Hobbes; namely, that Hobbes is an unqualified anti-realist of the eliminativist sort. Section Two offers reasons to reject Pasnau’s interpretation. Hobbes explains that magnitude is mind-independent, and he offers an account of perception in terms of motion (understood as a mind-independent (...)
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  4. added 2018-12-01
    Is Sex Socially Constructed?Alex Byrne - 2018 - Arc Digital (nov 30).
    Three arguments for the thesis that sex is socially constructed are examined and rejected. No such argument could succeed, because sex is not socially constructed.
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  5. added 2018-11-10
    Heat in Renaissance Philosophy.Filip Buyse - 2020 - In Marco Sgarbi (ed.), Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy. Berlin: Springer.
    The term ‘heat’ originates from the Old English word hǣtu, a word of Germanic origin; related to the Dutch ‘hitte’ and German ‘Hitze’. Today, we distinguish three different meanings of the word ‘heat’. First, ‘heat’ is understood in colloquial English as ‘hotness’. There are, in addition, two scientific meanings of ‘heat’. ‘Heat’ can have the meaning of the portion of energy that changes with a change of temperature. And finally, ‘heat’ can have the meaning of the transfer of thermal energy (...)
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  6. added 2018-10-05
    Negative Properties, Conditionals and Determination.Nick Zangwill - 2003 - Topoi 22 (2):127-34.
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  7. added 2018-07-13
    There is No Haecceitic Euthyphro Problem.Alexander Skiles - forthcoming - Analysis:any061.
    Jason Bowers and Meg Wallace have recently argued that those who hold that every individual instantiates a ‘haecceity’ are caught up in a Euthyphro-style dilemma when confronted with familiar cases of fission and fusion. Key to Bowers and Wallace’s dilemma are certain assumptions about the nature of metaphysical explanation and the explanatory commitments of belief in haecceities. However, I argue that the dilemma only arises due to a failure to distinguish between providing a metaphysical explanation of why a fact holds (...)
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  8. added 2018-06-30
    Paradoks istnienia – propozycja (nie)filozoficznego wyjścia.Andrzej Bułeczka - 2015 - In Maciej Woźniczka & Andrzej Zalewski (eds.), Wokół negacji. Częstochowa, Polska: pp. 187-200.
    Since the dawn of philosophy existence poses problems to philosophical analysis. At first, it seems that it is an obvious core of metaphysical theories. However, similarly as is the case of e.g. truth, talk about existence easily leads to a serious paradox: on the one hand it seems that the discourse about existence is superflous, redundant, on the other we have a well known problem of negative existential claims such as „Pegasus does not exist” or „There are no dragons”. Because (...)
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  9. added 2018-06-08
    Descartes Our Contemporary. [REVIEW]James Edwin Mahon - 1999 - The European Legacy 4 (4):98-101.
    In this review of two books, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, by Stephen Gaukroger, and Descartes and his Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies, edited by Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene, I consider arguments about the motivation of Descartes for writing the Meditations on First Philosophy. According to Gaukroger, Descartes wrote the Meditations simply to legitimate his natural philosophy, which he had already worked out, for an audience of theologians and Scholastic philosophers, whom he feared would condemn it (as Galileo had been (...)
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  10. added 2018-03-19
    Defining Qualitative Properties.Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a systematic account of the metaphysically important distinction between haecceitistic properties, such as being David Lewis or being acquainted with David Lewis, and qualitative properties, such as being red or being acquainted with a famous philosopher. I first argue that this distinction is hyperintensional, that is, that cointensional properties can differ in whether they are qualitative. Then I develop an analysis of the qualitative/haecceitistic distinction according to which haecceitistic properties are relational in (...)
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  11. added 2018-02-24
    Ways.".Peter Simons - 1994 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):12-15.
    There is more than one way to kill a cat. What are ways? Very little has been written about them in general, but they appear at crucial places in many philosophical discussions. Clarity over the ontology of ways could help in several areas of philosophy. After indicating where ways have been mentioned, I discuss briefly the corresponding linguistic feature, adverbs of manner, before outlining three theories: a Platonistic one making ways a complex kind of function, a Davidsonian one in which (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-23
    Armstrong And The Problem Of Converse Relations.Charles B. Cross - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):215-227.
    In "A World of States of Affairs" David Armstrong offers a comprehensive metaphysics based on the thesis that the world consists of states of affairs. Among the entities postulated by Armstrong's theory are relations, including non-symmetrical relations, and while Armstrong does not agree with Russell that all relations have a direction or definite order among their places, he does explicitly acknowledge that the slots of a non-symmetrical relation have a definite order or direction. I first show that non-symmetrical relations pose (...)
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  13. added 2018-02-12
    Toward an Algorithmic Metaphysics.Steve Petersen - 2013 - In David Dowe (ed.), Algorithmic Probability and Friends: Bayesian Prediction and Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 306-317.
    There are writers in both metaphysics and algorithmic information theory (AIT) who seem to think that the latter could provide a formal theory of the former. This paper is intended as a step in that direction. It demonstrates how AIT might be used to define basic metaphysical notions such as *object* and *property* for a simple, idealized world. The extent to which these definitions capture intuitions about the metaphysics of the simple world, times the extent to which we think the (...)
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  14. added 2018-01-11
    Synechism: The Keystone of Peirce's Metaphysics.Joseph Esposito - 2005 - The Commens Encyclopedia: The Digital Encyclopedia of Peirce Studies.
    Synechism, as a metaphysical theory, is the view that the universe exists as a continuous whole of all of its parts, with no part being fully separate, determined or determinate, and continues to increase in complexity and connectedness through semiosis and the operation of an irreducible and ubiquitous power of relational generality to mediate and unify substrates. As a research program, synechism is a scientific maxim to seek continuities where discontinuities are thought to be permanent and to seek semiotic relations (...)
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  15. added 2017-12-16
    Bradley's Regress: A Matter of Parsimony.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2018 - In Daniele Bertini & Damiano Migliorini (eds.), Relations. Ontology and Philosophy of Religion. Milan: Mimesis International. pp. 109-122.
    I shall investigate in this contribution some solutions to Bradley's well-known regress. Moreover, I shall evaluate such solutions in light of the principle of ontological parsimony: all other things being equal, do not multiply entities (and types of entities) beyond necessity. This will show the advantages of accepting one peculiar solution to the regress, i.e., the one based on modes (particular properties that also ontologically depend on their " bearers "). In section 1, I shall present Bradley's regress. In section (...)
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  16. added 2017-11-15
    Making Sense of Negative Properties.David Hommen - 2017 - Axiomathes (1):1-26.
    Few philosophers believe in the existence of so-called negative properties. Indeed, many find it mind-boggling just to imagine such entities. By contrast, I believe not only that negative properties are quite conceivable, but also that there are good reasons for thinking that some such properties actually exist. In this paper, I would like to explicate a concept of negative properties which I think avoids the logical absurdities commonly believed to frustrate theories of negative existences. To do this, I shall deploy (...)
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  17. added 2017-09-12
    Secondary Qualities and Self-Location.Andy Egan - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.
    There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer-independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less-than-fully-real, subjective, observer-dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of (...)
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  18. added 2017-09-05
    To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.
    This paper is an investigation of the general logic of "identifications", claims such as 'To be a vixen is to be a female fox', 'To be human is to be a rational animal', and 'To be just is to help one's friends and harm one's enemies', many of which are of great importance to philosophers. I advocate understanding such claims as expressing higher-order identity, and discuss a variety of different general laws which they might be thought to obey. [New version: (...)
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  19. added 2017-08-17
    On the Possibility of Contigently Dispositional Properties.Vassilios Livanios - 2010 - Abstracta 6 (1):3-17.
    Metaphysicians who hold that there is an ontological distinction between two kinds of fundamental natural properties assume that properties are dispositional or non-dispositional necessarily. In contrast to this, I suggest that one can admit the existence of fundamental contingently dispositional properties. After some clarifications concerning the content of the suggested view, I respond to several objections regarding its intelligibility and viability and outline two of its important consequences.
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  20. added 2017-08-08
    Chisholm on Psychological Attributes.Karl Pfeifer - 1993 - In Roberto and White Casati (ed.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993). Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 413-417.
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  21. added 2017-07-23
    The Metaphysics of Relations, Edited by Anna Marmodoro and David Yates. [REVIEW]Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (44):123–130.
    The Metaphysics of Relations is an anthology of thirteen original papers plus an introduction, addressing the philosophical issue of relations from a contemporary and historical perspective. The result is a remarkably coherent whole, where the different papers shed light on each other even though very few of them explicitly address interconnections. As a consequence, the book works really well as an introduction to the philosophical issue on relations, while the individual papers represent cutting edge research on the particular issues that (...)
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  22. added 2017-06-13
    Discernibility and Qualitative Difference.Micah Newman - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:43-49.
    The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, according to which two objects are identical if they share all the same properties, has come in for much criticism. Michael Della Rocca has recently defended PII on the grounds that it is needed to forestall the possibility that where there appears to be only one object present, there is actually a multiplicity of exactly-overlapping such objects. Katherine Hawley has criticized this approach for violating a plausible “ground rule” in applying rules of indiscernibility (...)
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  23. added 2017-04-21
    Supervenience and Closure.Cleve James Van - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 58 (3):225 - 238.
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  24. added 2017-02-23
    Continuum Companion to Metaphysics.Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.) - 2012 - Continuum Publishing.
  25. added 2017-02-13
    On Negative and Disjunctive Properties.Uwe Meixner - 1992 - In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 28--36.
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  26. added 2017-01-14
    Topology and Leibnizian Principles of Identity of Indiscernibles.Thomas Mormann - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to show that topology has a bearing on Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). According to (PII), if, for all properties F, an object a has property F iff object b has property F, then a and b are identical. If any property F whatsoever is permitted in PII, then Leibniz’s principle is trivial, as is shown by “identity properties”. The aim of this paper is to show that topology can make a (...)
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  27. added 2017-01-04
    Quidditism and the Resemblance of Properties.Ghislain Guigon - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):177-184.
    It is widely agreed that properties play causal roles: they capture the causal powers of things. But do properties have their causal roles essentially? David Lewis did not think so. He adhered to the doctrine of quidditism, namely the doctrine that the identity of properties is primitive and that they can trade their causal roles. Quidditism is controversial. But Lewis did not see why he should want to reject it. He knew that he could avoid quidditism on the cheap by (...)
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  28. added 2017-01-04
    Forms of Correspondence: The Intricate Route From Thought to Reality.Gila Sher - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 157--179.
    The paper delineates a new approach to truth that falls under the category of “Pluralism within the bounds of correspondence”, and illustrates it with respect to mathematical truth. Mathematical truth, like all other truths, is based on correspondence, but the route of mathematical correspondence differs from other routes of correspondence in (i) connecting mathematical truths to a special aspect of reality, namely, its formal aspect, and (ii) doing so in a complex, indirect way, rather than in a simple and direct (...)
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  29. added 2016-12-22
    Topology and Leibnizian Principles of the Identity of Indiscernibles.Mormann Thomas - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to show that topology has a bearing on Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). According to (PII), if, for all properties F, an object a has property F iff object b has property F, then a and b are identical. If any property F whatsoever is permitted in PII, then Leibniz’s principle is trivial, as is shown by “identity properties”. The aim of this paper is to show that topology can make a (...)
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  30. added 2016-12-08
    Taking Monism Seriously.David M. Cornell - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2397-2415.
    Monism is the view that there is only a single material object in existence: the world. According to this view, therefore, the ordinary objects of common sense—cats and hats, cars and stars, and so on—do not actually exist; there is only the world. Because of this, monism is routinely dismissed in the contemporary literature as being absurd and obviously false. It is simply obvious that there is a plurality of material things, thus it is simply obvious that monism is false, (...)
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  31. added 2016-12-08
    On an Argument for Humility.Ann Whittle - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):461-497.
    Considerations upon the nature of properties and laws have led some philosophers to claim that the correct epistemic attitude with regards to the intrinsic properties of particulars is scepticism. I examine one particularly clear version of this line of argument, and contend that a serious form of scepticism is not established. However, I argue that the theories of properties and laws underlying the argument have unwanted metaphysical implications. These provide a stronger reason to jettison the analyses. I end by sketching (...)
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  32. added 2016-12-08
    Rigid Designators for Properties.Joseph LaPorte - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):321-336.
    Here I defend the position that some singular terms for properties are rigid designators, responding to Stephen P. Schwartz’s interesting criticisms of that position. First, I argue that my position does not depend on ontological parsimony with respect to properties – e.g., there is no need to claim that there are only natural properties – to get around the problem of “unusual properties.” Second, I argue that my position does not confuse sameness of meaning across possible worlds with sameness of (...)
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  33. added 2016-12-08
    The Consistency of The Naive Theory of Properties.Hartry Field - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):78-104.
    If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the naïve theory of properties: for any predicate Θ(x), there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if Θ(o). Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. I show that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. (...)
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  34. added 2016-12-08
    Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties.Andy Egan - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48-66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...)
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  35. added 2016-12-08
    Similarity and Continuous Quality Distributions.Thomas Mormann - 1996 - The Monist 79 (1):76--88.
  36. added 2016-12-05
    On Doing Without Relations.Daniel von Wachter - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):355-358.
    Internal relations are nothing over and above the terms of the relation.
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  37. added 2016-10-26
    Modal Semantics Without Worlds.Craig Warmke - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):702-715.
    Over the last half century, possible worlds have bled into almost every area of philosophy. In the metaphysics of modality, for example, philosophers have used possible worlds almost exclusively to illuminate discourse about metaphysical necessity and possibility. But recently, some have grown dissatisfied with possible worlds. Why are horses necessarily mammals? Because the property of being a horse bears a special relationship to the property of being a mammal, they say. Not because every horse is a mammal in every possible (...)
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  38. added 2016-10-23
    A Neo-Armstrongian Defense of States of Affairs: A Reply to Vallicella.Katarina Perovic - 2016 - Metaphysica 17 (2):143-161.
    Vallicella’s influential work makes a case that, when formulated broadly, as a problem about unity, Bradley’s challenge to Armstrongian states of affairs is practically insurmountable. He argues that traditional relational and non-relational responses to Bradley are inadequate, and many in the current metaphysical debate on this issue have come to agree. In this paper, I argue that such a conclusion is too hasty. Firstly, the problem of unity as applied to Armstrongian states of affairs is not clearly defined; in fact, (...)
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  39. added 2016-10-20
    Exemplification as Explanation.Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (2):401-417.
    In this paper I critically investigate an unorthodox attempt to metaphysically explain in virtue of what there are states of affairs. This is a suggestion according to which states of affairs exist thanks to, rather than, as is the common view, in spite of, the infinite regress their metaphysical explanation seems to engender. I argue that, no matter in which form it is defended, or in which theoretical framework it is set, this suggestion cannot provide us with the explanation we (...)
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  40. added 2016-10-20
    The One Over Many.Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2008 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 84:37.
    This paper investigates the One over Many, first as it was first introduced by Plato. Here, it is argued, the One over Many can be understood in at least two senses, both different from, but in a sense included in, the sense in which the One-over-Many is regarded as an argument for the existence of universals. In both of these senses, it is argued, it is possible to accept the One-over-Many while denying the existence of universals.This established, I examine the (...)
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  41. added 2016-10-13
    All Things Must Pass Away.Joshua Spencer - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:67.
    Are there any things that are such that any things whatsoever are among them. I argue that there are not. My thesis follows from these three premises: (1) There are two or more things; (2) for any things, there is a unique thing that corresponds to those things; (3) for any two or more things, there are fewer of them than there are pluralities of them.
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  42. added 2016-09-21
    Speaks's Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf Problem.T. Scott Dixon & Cody Gilmore - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):275-284.
    Speaks defends the view that propositions are properties: for example, the proposition that grass is green is the property being such that grass is green. We argue that there is no reason to prefer Speaks's theory to analogous but competing theories that identify propositions with, say, 2-adic relations. This style of argument has recently been deployed by many, including Moore and King, against the view that propositions are n-tuples, and by Caplan and Tillman against King's view that propositions are facts (...)
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  43. added 2016-09-03
    The Man Without Properties.Boris Hennig - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
    Contemporary philosophical logic rests on a distinction between things and properties. Properties are thought to differ from things in that their proper expression is incomplete or unsaturated. In this paper, I will argue that Aristotle did not distinguish between things and properties in this way. I will show, first, that Aristotle’s essences are not properties, and that certain passages in Aristotle make sense only if we do not take accidents to be properties either. The notion of a property is thus (...)
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  44. added 2016-08-29
    The Regress of Pure Powers Revisited.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):529-541.
    The paper aims to elucidate in better detail than before the dispute about whether or not dispositional monism—the view that all basic properties are pure powers—entails a vicious infinite regress. Particular focus is on Alexander Bird's and George Molnar's attempts to show that the arguments professing to demonstrate a vicious regress are inconclusive because they presuppose what they aim to prove, notably that powers are for their nature dependent on something else. I argue that Bird and Molnar are mistaken. It (...)
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  45. added 2016-07-04
    Two Types of Quidditism.Tyler Hildebrand - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):516-532.
    According to structuralism, all natural properties are individuated by their roles in causal/nomological structures. According to quidditism, at least some natural properties are individuated in some other way. Because these theses deal with the identities of natural properties, this distinction cuts to the core of a serious metaphysical dispute: Are the intrinsic natures of all natural properties essentially causal/nomological in character? I'll argue that the answer is ‘no’, or at least that this answer is more plausible than many critics of (...)
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  46. added 2016-06-17
    Distance and Dissimilarity.Ben Blumson - forthcoming - Philosophical Papers:1-29.
    This paper considers whether an analogy between distance and dissimilarlity supports the thesis that degree of dissimilarity is distance in a metric space. A straightforward way to justify the thesis would be to define degree of dissimilarity as a function of number of properties in common and not in common. But, infamously, this approach has problems with infinity. An alternative approach would be to prove representation and uniqueness theorems, according to which if comparative dissimilarity meets certain qualitative conditions, then it (...)
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  47. added 2016-05-11
    The Bradleyan Regress, Non-Relational Realism, and the Quinean Semantic Strategy.Jonathan Reid Surovell - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):63-79.
    Non-Relational Realism is a popular solution to the Bradleyan regress of facts or truths. It denies that there is a relational universal of exemplification; for an object a to exemplify a universal F-ness, on this view, is not for a relation to subsist between a and F-ness. An influential objection to Non-Relational Realism is that it is unacceptably obscure. The author argues that Non-Relational Realism can be understood as a selective application of satisfaction semantics to predicates like ‘exemplify’, and that (...)
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  48. added 2016-03-09
    Properties, Laws, and Worlds.Deborah C. Smith - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):471-489.
    Jonathan Schaffer argues against a necessary connection between properties and laws. He takes this to be a question of what possible worlds we ought to countenance in our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. In doing so, he unfairly rigs the game in favor of contingentism. I argue that the necessitarian can resist Schaffer’s conclusion while accepting his key premise that our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. require a very wide range of things called ‘possible worlds’. However, the necessitarian (...)
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  49. added 2016-03-09
    Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright’s Antirealist.Deborah C. Smith - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):129-139.
    In _Truth and Objectivity_, Crispin Wright argues that the notion of superassertibility affords the antirealist (with respect to a given range of discourse) a viable alternative to the realist’s more robust notion of truth. Toward this end, he endeavors to prove that a superassertibility predicate can satisfy the traditional equivalence schema: it is true that P iff P. (Wright takes satisfaction of this schema to be a criterion of adequacy for any viable truth predicate.) In this paper, I will argue (...)
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  50. added 2016-02-29
    New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical.Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This volume brings together leading (...)
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