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Properties

Edited by Gabriele Contessa (Carleton University)
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  1. Peter Achinstein (1974). The Identity of Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (4):257 - 275.
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  2. D. E. Alburger & D. H. Wilkinson (1958). The Properties of Beryllium-11. Philosophical Magazine 3 (35):1332-1333.
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  3. H. L. Allsopp & D. F. Gibbs (1959). The Electromechanical Properties of Barium Titanate. Philosophical Magazine 4 (39):359-370.
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  4. William P. Alston (1954). Simple Location. Review of Metaphysics 8 (2):334 - 341.
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  5. Peter Alward, Comments on Patrick McGivern's “Parts of Properties: Realization as Decomposition”.
    My main reaction to MCGivern’s paper was one of dialectical puzzlement. Block argues that, Macro Non-Reduction: [all] macro properties are irreducible to the micro properties on which they supervene..
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  6. Peter Alward, COMMENTARY: “Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties” by Andrew Egan.
    Egan argues against Lewis’s view that properties are sets of actual and possible individuals and in favour of the view that they are functions from worlds to extensions (sets of individuals). Egan argues that Lewis’s view implies that 2nd order properties are never possessed contingently by their (1st order) bearers, an implication to which there are numerous counter-examples. And Egan argues that his account of properties is more commensurable with the role they play as the semantic values of predicates than (...)
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  7. G. E. M. Anscombe (1971). Causality and Properties. In Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  8. D. M. Armstrong (forthcoming). The Causal Theory of Properties: Shoemaker, Ellis and Others. Philosophical Studies.
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  9. D. M. Armstrong (2005). Reply to Bird. Analysis 65 (287):264–265.
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  10. D. M. Armstrong (1997). Properties. In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press.
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  11. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Causal Theory of Properties. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  12. David M. Armstrong (1992). Properties. In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 14--27.
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  13. David Malet Armstrong (1999). The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  14. William A. Bauer (2013). Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties. Disputatio 5 (35).
    Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers—explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses the relation between powers and (...)
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  15. Simon Bostock (2004). Internal Properties And Property Realism. Metaphysica 5 (2):73-83.
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  16. Donald Brownstein (1973). Negative Exemplification. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1):43 - 50.
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  17. Godehard Brüntrup (2009). Natural Individuals and Intrinsic Properties. In Ludger Honnefelder, Edmund Runggaldier & Benedikt Schick (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 237-252.
    In the world there are concrete particulars that exhibit the kind of substantial unity that allows them to be called substances or “natural individuals”, as opposed to artifacts or mere conglomerates. Persons, animals, and possibly the most fundamental physical simples are all natural individuals. What gives these entities the ontological status of a substantial unity? Arguments from the philosophy of mind and arguments from general metaphysics show that physical properties alone cannot account for substantial unity. The ultimate intrinsic properties of (...)
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  18. Keith Campbell (2002). Unit Properties, Relations, and Spatio-Temporal Naturalism. Modern Schoolman 79 (2-3):151-162.
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  19. Milic Capek (1979). Two Views of Motion: Change of Position or Change of Quality? Review of Metaphysics 33 (2):337 - 346.
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  20. C. B. Carter (1977). The Formation and Properties of Faulted Dipoles. Philosophical Magazine 36 (1):147-167.
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  21. Jonathan Cohen (2010). Sounds and Temporality. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:303-320.
    What is the relationship between sounds and time? More specifically, is there something essentially or distinctively temporal about sounds that distinguishes them from, say, colors, shapes, odors, tastes, or other sensible qualities? And just what might this distinctive relation to time consist in? Apart from their independent interest, these issues have a number of important philosophical repercussions. First, if sounds are temporal in a way that other sensible qualities are not, then this would mean that standard lists of paradigm secondary (...)
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  22. Steven L. Cohen & Melinda S. Crouse (1987). Failure to Find Antianxiety Properties of Cholecystokinin-Octapeptide. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (3):204-206.
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  23. Michael B. Conant & Tom Trabasso (1964). Conjunctive and Disjunctive Concept Formation Under Equal-Information Conditions. Journal of Experimental Psychology 67 (3):250.
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  24. Sam Cowling (2015). Non-Qualitative Properties. Erkenntnis 80 (2):275-301.
    The distinction between qualitative properties like mass and shape and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and being next to Obama is important, but remains largely unexamined. After discussing its theoretical significance and cataloguing various kinds of non-qualitative properties, I survey several views about the nature of this distinction and argue that all proposed reductive analyses of this distinction are unsatisfactory. I then defend primitivism, according to which the distinction resists reductive analysis.
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  25. R. G. Durrant (1970). Identity of Properties and the Definition of 'Good'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):360 – 361.
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  26. Douglas Edwards (2014). Properties. Polity Press.
    The world is populated with many different objects, to which we often attribute properties: we say, for example, that grass is green, that the earth is spherical, that humans are animals, and that murder is wrong. We also take it that these properties are things in their own right: there is something in which being green, or spherical, or an animal, or wrong, consists, and that certain scientific or normative projects are engaged in uncovering the essences of such properties. In (...)
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  27. Nikk Effingham (2015). The Location of Properties. Noûs 49 (4):846-866.
    This paper argues that, assuming properties exist and must be located in spacetime, the prevailing view that they are exactly located where their instances are is false. Instead a property is singularly located at just one region, namely the union of its instance's locations. This bears not just on issues in the metaphysics of properties, but also on the debate over whether multi-location is conceivable and/or possible.
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  28. David Ellerman, Partitions and Objective Indefiniteness.
    Classical physics and quantum physics suggest two meta-physical types of reality: the classical notion of a objectively definite reality with properties "all the way down," and the quantum notion of an objectively indefinite type of reality. The problem of interpreting quantum mechanics (QM) is essentially the problem of making sense out of an objectively indefinite reality. These two types of reality can be respectively associated with the two mathematical concepts of subsets and quotient sets (or partitions) which are category-theoretically dual (...)
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  29. Reinaldo Elugardo (2004). Skidmore on Properties. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):189-193.
  30. John Forge (1996). Explanation and the Quantum State. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):203 – 215.
    Abstract This paper argues that there are good reasons to adopt a non-reductive account of states when it comes to quantum mechanics. That is to say, it is argued that there are advantages to thinking about states as sui generis, as reducible to classes of values of quantities, when it comes to the quantum domain. One reason for holding this view is that it seems to improve the prospects for explanation. In more detail, it is argued that there is an (...)
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  31. Brian Jonathan Garrett (2013). Douglas Ehring , Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (4):279-281.
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  32. Christopher S. Gifford (2013). Against the Modal Argument. Erkenntnis 78 (3):627-646.
    The relationship between alethic modality and indeterminacy is yet to be clarified. A modal argument—an argument that appeals to alethic modality—against vague objects given by Joseph Moore offers a potential clarification of the relationship; it is proposed that there are cases for which the following holds: if it is indeterminate whether A = B then it is possible that it is determinate that A = B. However, the argument faces three problems. The problems remove the argument’s threat against vague objects (...)
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  33. P. Hájíček & J. Tolar (2009). Intrinsic Properties of Quantum Systems. Foundations of Physics 39 (5):411-432.
    A new realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is introduced. Quantum systems are shown to have two kinds of properties: the usual ones described by values of quantum observables, which are called extrinsic, and those that can be attributed to individual quantum systems without violating standard quantum mechanics, which are called intrinsic. The intrinsic properties are classified into structural and conditional. A systematic and self-consistent account is given. Much more statements become meaningful than any version of Copenhagen interpretation would allow. A (...)
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  34. Nat Hansen (2016). Color Comparisons and Interpersonal Variation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made true or false by objective (non-subject-involving) facts, is the argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique hues. Recently, an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been proposed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues (Gómez-Torrente, 2016). In Hansen (2015), I (...)
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  35. Daniel M. Hausman (1999). Lessons From Quantum Mechanics. Synthese 121 (1-2):79-92.
  36. John Heil (2004). Properties and Powers. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:223-254.
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  37. Daniel Heussen & James A. Hampton (2008). Ways of Explaining Properties. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 143--148.
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  38. Herbert Hochberg (2002). Individuation and Individual Properties: A Study of Metaphysical Futility. Modern Schoolman 79 (2-3):107-135.
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  39. R. Ishikawa, T. Ishikawa, J. T. Okada, T. Maski, Y. Watanabe & S. Nanao (2007). Thermophysical Properties of the Melts of AlPdMn Icosahedral Quasicrystal. Philosophical Magazine 87 (18-21):2965-2971.
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  40. Frank Jackson (1982). On Property Identity. Philosophia 11 (3-4):289-305.
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  41. H. W. B. Joseph, F. P. Ramsey & R. B. Braithwaite (1926). Symposium: Universals and the "Method of Analysis". Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 6 (1):1 - 38.
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  42. Michael Jubien (1996). Actualism and Iterated Modalities. Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):109 - 125.
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  43. Geert Keil (2006). Über die deskriptive Unerschöpflichkeit der Einzeldinge. In Geert Keil & Udo Tietz (eds.), Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse. mentis. pp. 83-125.
    Der Topos von der Unerschöpflichkeit des Gegenstands wird mit der Phänomenologie assoziiert. Den ihm verwandten Topos von der Unaussprechlichkeit des Individuellen haben Goethe und die deutschen Romantiker in die Welt getragen. Der Diktion der analytischen Philosophie sind die Ausdrücke „unerschöpflich“ und „unaussprechlich“ fremd. Dieser Umstand sollte analytische Philosophen nicht davon abhalten, sich den sprachphilosophischen und ontologischen Problemen zuzuwenden, die sich hinter den besagten Formeln verbergen. Husserls Wort für Unerschöpflichkeit ist „Fülle“. Die „Fülle des Gegenstandes“ erläutert Husserl als den „Inbegriff der (...)
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  44. S. Koch (1969). Value Properties. In Marjorie Glicksman Grene (ed.), The Anatomy of Knowledge. [Amherst]University of Massachusetts Press.
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  45. M. Krajčí & J. Hafner (2011). Catalytic Properties of Al13Co4studied Byab Initiomethods. Philosophical Magazine 91 (19-21):2904-2912.
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  46. Adam P. Kubiak & Rafał R. Wodzisz (2012). Scientific Essentialism in the Light of Classification Practice in Biology – a Case Study of Phytosociology. Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa 4:231-250.
    In our paper we investigate a difficulty arising when one tries to reconsiliateessentialis t’s thinking with classification practice in the biological sciences. The article outlinessome varieties of essentialism with particular attention to the version defended by Brian Ellis. Weunderline the basic difference: Ellis thinks that essentialism is not a viable position in biology dueto its incompatibility with biological typology and other essentialists think that these two elementscan be reconciled. However, both parties have in common metaphysical starting point and theylack explicit (...)
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  47. Shaughan Lavine (1991). Is Quantum Mechanics an Atomistic Theory? Synthese 89 (2):253 - 271.
    If quantum mechanics (QM) is to be taken as an atomistic theory with the elementary particles as atoms (an ATEP), then the elementary particlcs must be individuals. There must then be, for each elementary particle a, a property being identical with a that a alone has. But according to QM, elementary particles of the same kind share all physical properties. Thus, if QM is an ATEP, identity is a metaphysical but not a physical property. That has unpalatable consequences. Dropping the (...)
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  48. Jessica Leech (2015). Properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (4):439-442.
    A book review of "Properties" by Douglas Edwards (Polity Press, 2014).
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  49. Chenyang Li (1993). Natural Kinds: Direct Reference, Realism, and the Impossibility of Necessary a Posteriori Truth. Review of Metaphysics 47 (2):261-76.
  50. N. Lundquist, H. P. Myers & R. Westin (1962). The Paramagnetic Properties of the Monoborides of V, Cr, Mn, Fe, Co and Ni. Philosophical Magazine 7 (79):1187-1195.
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