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  1. G. E. Moore. Essays in Retrospect. [REVIEW]B. W. A. - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):376-376.
  2. The Circularity of a Self-Supporting Inductive Argument.Peter Achinstein - 1962 - Analysis 22 (6):138 - 141.
  3. Audi on Structural Justification.Frederick Adams - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:493-498.
  4. Unjustified Defeaters.David Alexander - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):891-912.
    A number of philosophers have recently claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. However these claims have been made in passing, occurring in the context of defenses of other theses. As a result, the claim that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters has been neither vigorously defended nor thoroughly explained. This paper fills that gap. It begins by identifying problems with the two most in-depth accounts of the possibility of unjustified defeaters due to Bergmann and Pryor. It then offers a revised (...)
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  5. Justification and Truth Value: A Reply.Robert Almeder - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (3):319-322.
    Among other things, Odegard urged that a person can be completely justified in believing a false proposition because the truth condition can be shown to be satisfied independently of the satisfaction of the evidence condition for human knowledge. I respond to his argument and other arguments attacking the arguments I previously offered for the view that a person cannot be completely justified in believing a false proposition.
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  6. How to Think About Reliability.William P. Alston - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):1-29.
  7. Epistemic Desiderata.William P. Alston - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):527-551.
  8. Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):57-89.
  9. The Social and Cultural Component of Epistemic Justification — a Reply.David B. Annis - 1982 - Philosophia 12 (1-2):51-55.
  10. Epistemic Justification.David B. Annis - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (2):259-266.
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  11. Memorial Justification.Robert Audi - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):31-45.
  12. Memories of the Fourth Condition and Lessons to Be Learned From Suspicious Externalism.Murat Baç - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (2):127-145.
    A significant and interesting part of the post-Gettier literature regarding the analysis of propositional knowledge is the attempt to supplement the traditional tripartite analysis by employing a fourth condition regarding the defeasibility of evidence and thus to preclude the counterexamples displayed in Gettier’s original article. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the sort of externalism that accompanies the most promising of the proposed fourth conditions, due to Pollock, in order to offer some fresh insights on this old (...)
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  13. Justification.Wayne Angus Backman - 1982 - Dissertation, University of Cincinnati
    This dissertation is an investigation into the nature of justification and rational belief. In Chapter I, four theories of the justification of belief are presented and criticized. These theories--classical foundationalism, modest foundationalism, coherentism, and the causal theory--are found to be similar in a certain respect. They each embody or are consistent with a certain conception of rationality, one in which beliefs are rational just in case they are backed by adequate justifications, and in which adequate justifications are thought to be (...)
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  14. Reasoning as a Source of Justification.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):113-126.
    In this essay we argue that reasoning can sometimes generate epistemic justification, rather than merely transmitting justification that the subject already possesses to new beliefs. We also suggest a way to account for it in terms of the relationship between epistemic normative requirements, justification and cognitive capacities.
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  15. Articulation and Justification.Renford Bambrough - 1988 - The Monist 71 (3):311-319.
  16. Review of “Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation”. [REVIEW]Robert Barnard - 2007 - Essays in Philosophy 8 (2):2.
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  17. Justifications and Excuses.Marcia Baron - unknown
    The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy. But exactly how it should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement. My aim in this paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying disagreements account for them. I give particular attention to the following question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a justification, (...)
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  18. Justification and the Truth-Connection By Clayton Littlejohn. [REVIEW]Peter Baumann - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):731-733.
    Review of Littlejohn, "Justification and the Truth Connection".
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  19. Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.B. Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.
    One attractive feature of process reliabilism is its reductive potential: it promises to explain justification in entirely non-epistemic terms. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of epistemic defeat poses a serious challenge for process reliabilism’s reductive ambitions. The standard process reliabilist analysis of defeat is the ‘Alternative Reliable Process Account’ (ARP). According to ARP, whether S’s belief is defeated depends on whether S has certain reliable processes available to her which, if they had been used, would have resulted (...)
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  20. What Should We Believe About the Future?Miloud Belkoniene - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    This paper discusses the ability of explanationist theories of epistemic justification to account for the justification we have for holding beliefs about the future. McCain’s explanationist account of the relation of evidential support is supposedly in a better position than other theories of this type to correctly handle cases involving beliefs about the future. However, the results delivered by this account have been questioned by Byerly and Martin. This paper argues that McCain’s account is, in fact, able to deliver plausible (...)
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  21. Foundationalism Strikes Back? In Search of Epistemically Basic.Nanay Bence - 2005 - In Rene van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood (eds.), Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge. Ontos-Verlag. pp. 41.
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  22. The Current State of the Coherence Theory: Critical Essays on the Epistemic Theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour, with Replies. [REVIEW]John Bender - 1993 - Noûs 27 (1):111-113.
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  23. Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.
    Epistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus here on Sanford Goldberg's approach (...)
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  24. Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
    This paper is a response to Peter Klein's "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning". After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
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  25. Review: Bonjour's Dilemma. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):679 - 693.
  26. Believing Against the Evidence, by Miriam Schleifer McCormick. [REVIEW]José Luis Bermúdez - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):942-945.
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  27. Justified Judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.
    When is a belief or judgment justified? One might be forgiven for thinking the search for single answer to this question to be hopeless. The concept of justification is required to fulfil several tasks: to evaluate beliefs epistemically, to fill in the gap between truth and knowledge, to describe the virtuous organization of one’s beliefs, to describe the relationship between evidence and theory (and thus relate to confirmation and probabilification). While some of these may be held to overlap, the prospects (...)
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  28. Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?Laurence BonJour - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):1-14.
  29. Knowledge, Justification, and Truth: A Sellarsian Approach to Epistemology.Laurence BonJour - 1969 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    The present essay has two faces. On the one hand, it is an essay in what I conceive to be the fundamental problems of epistemology, and a presentation and defense of solutions to those problems which I find plausible. On the other hand, it is also an essay in the philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars, and a selective defense thereof. Obviously the connecting link which is required to make these two faces of the essay compatible with one another is a belief (...)
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  30. Evidence and Warrants for Belief in a College Astronomy Course.Nancy W. Brickhouse, Zoubeida R. Dagher, Harry L. Shipman & William J. Letts - 2002 - Science & Education 11 (6):573-588.
  31. Perceptual Justification and Assertively Representing the World.Jochen Briesen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2239-2259.
    This paper argues that there is a problem for the justificatory significance of perceptions that has been overlooked thus far. Assuming that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes and that only propositional attitudes which assertively represent the world can function as justifiers, the problem consists in specifying what it means for a propositional attitude to assertively represent the world without losing the justificatory significance of perceptions—a challenge that is harder to meet than might first be thought. That there is such a (...)
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  32. Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity.J. Brown - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):339-348.
  33. Justificação, coerência e circularidade.Júlio César Burdzinski - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):65-93.
    This paper has the following structure: in the first section, I report on the historical and philosophical roots of the problems of knowledge and justification; in the second, I lay out the distinction between truth and epistemic justification; the third section is devoted to the problem of circularity, a problem often attributed to coherentism; in the fourth section, I introduce an unorthodox notion of justification, systemic justification; in the fifth, I present and criticize another unorthodox notion of justification, non-linear inferential (...)
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  34. The Justification of Belief.T. E. Burke - 1994 - Wittgenstein-Studien 1 (1).
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  35. A Dispositional, Internalist, Evidentialist Virtue Epistemology.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):399-424.
    This paper articulates and defends a novel version of internalist evidentialism which employs dispositions to account for the relation of evidentialsupport. In section one, I explain internalist evidentialist views generally, highlighting the way in which the relation of evidential support stands at the heart of these views. I then discuss two leading ways in which evidential support has been understood by evidentialists, and argue that an account of support which employs what I call epistemic dispositions remedies difficulties arguably faced by (...)
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  36. Explanationism and Justified Beliefs About the Future.T. Ryan Byerly - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):229 - 243.
    Explanationism holds that a person's evidence supports a proposition just in case that proposition is part of the best available explanation for the person's evidence. I argue that explanationism faces a serious difficulty when it comes to justified beliefs about the future. Often, one's evidence supports some proposition about the future but that proposition is not part of the best available explanation for one's evidence. Attempts to defend explanationism against this charge are unattractive. Moving to a modified better contrastive explanation (...)
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  37. Static Justification in the Dynamics of Belief.John Cantwell - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):481-503.
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  38. Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Edited by George Pappas.Lawrence R. Carleton - 1982 - Modern Schoolman 60 (1):60-61.
  39. Does Knowledge Entail Justification?L. S. Carrier - 1994 - International Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):413-418.
  40. Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):753-772.
    Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses—are _in principle_ incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the _prima facie_ appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, neither the extended cognition _nor_ the extended mind theses are in principle (...)
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  41. Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification.Albert Casullo - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):41-58.
    Radical empiricism is the view that experience is the only source of knowledge. Hence, radical empiricism denies the existence of a priori knowledge. Its most famous proponents are John Stuart Mill and W. V. Quine. Although both reject a priori knowledge, they offer different empiricist accounts of the knowledge alleged by their opponents to be a priori. My primary concern in this paper is not with the cogency of their positive accounts. My focus is their arguments against a priori knowledge. (...)
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  42. Indicator Reliabilism.James Chase - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):115 - 137.
    In 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology' Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the (...)
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  43. Ist das Gettier-Problem wirklich ein Problem?Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2000 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 33 (82):45-56.
    Viele Philosophen Glauben, daß die sogenannte „klassische” Definition des Wissens: -/- (W)Das Subjekt S weiß, daß p =Df. (i) S glaubt (ist überzeugt), daß p; (ii) S hat eine Begründung (eine epistemische Rechtferigung) für seine Überzeugung, daß p; und (iii) es ist der Fall, daß p. -/- durch das berühmte Gegenbeispiel Gettiers endgültig demoliert wurde: Gettier hat die folgende Situation konstruiert: -/- (G)(1) Das Subjekt S hat eine gute induktive Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. (2) S hat die Überzeugung (...)
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  44. Responsibilist Evidentialism.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2999-3016.
    When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the person responsibly acquired and sustained the evidence that supports the proposition. This view overcomes a deficiency in a prominent theory of epistemic justification. As championed by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism is a theory subject to counterexamples at the hands of (...)
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  45. Propositional Justification.Earl Conee - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):65 - 68.
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  46. Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism.Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Ordinarily, people take themselves to know a lot. I know where I was born, I know that I have two hands, I know that two plus two equals four, and I also think I know a lot of other stuff too. However, the project of trying to provide a philosophically satisfying account of knowledge, one that holds up against skeptical challenges, has proven surprisingly difficult. Either one aims for an account of justification (and knowledge) that is epistemologically demanding, in an (...)
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  47. Bergmann's Dilemma and Internalism's Escape.John M. DePoe - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):409-423.
    Michael Bergmann has argued that internalist accounts of justification face an insoluble dilemma. This paper begins with an explanation of Bergmann’s dilemma. Next, I review some recent attempts to answer the dilemma, which I argue are insufficient to overcome it. The solution I propose presents an internalist account of justification through direct acquaintance. My thesis is that direct acquaintance can provide subjective epistemic assurance without falling prey to the quagmire of difficulties that Bergmann alleges all internalist accounts of justification cannot (...)
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  48. Doxastic Permissiveness and the Promise of Truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge what is often called the “Uniqueness” thesis. According to this thesis, given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. It is sensible for defenders of Uniqueness to commit to an accompanying principle that: when some agent A has equal epistemic reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, the unique epistemically rational doxastic attitude for A to adopt with (...)
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  49. Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their (...)
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  50. Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    According to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that p supervenes upon (...)
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