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  1. added 2019-01-25
    Liars, Tigers, and Bearers of Bad News, Oh My!: Towards a Reasons Account of Defeat.Emelia Miller - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):82-99.
    The standard reliabilist line on defeat is open to counterexamples regarding its necessity and sufficiency. In this paper, I present three problems for the standard reliabilist line from the recent literature on defeat before arguing that reliabilists can solve those problems by adopting an account of justification that ties defeat to the evidence possessed by the relevant agent. In doing so, I show that there is a conception of having evidence that reliabilists can adopt without giving up on the core (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-06
    Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    According to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that p supervenes upon (...)
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  3. added 2018-11-21
    Justification Épistémique.Arturs Logins - 2018 - L’Encyclopédie Philosophique (Version Grand Public).
    Certaines croyances sont justifiées tandis que d’autres ne le sont pas. Si je crois que la Terre est ronde, on peut considérer que ma croyance est justifiée, alors que si je crois qu’elle est plate, elle ne l’est pas. Qu’est-ce qui différencie les unes des autres ? Une croyance justifiée doit-elle toujours être fondée sur une autre croyance justifiée ? Comment pouvons-nous éviter la conclusion sceptique selon laquelle nous ne sommes pas justifiés à croire quoi que ce soit ? Ces (...)
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  4. added 2018-10-10
    Indicator Reliabilism.James Chase - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):115 - 137.
    In 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology' Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the (...)
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  5. added 2018-10-09
    Explanationism and Justified Beliefs About the Future.T. Ryan Byerly - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):229 - 243.
    Explanationism holds that a person's evidence supports a proposition just in case that proposition is part of the best available explanation for the person's evidence. I argue that explanationism faces a serious difficulty when it comes to justified beliefs about the future. Often, one's evidence supports some proposition about the future but that proposition is not part of the best available explanation for one's evidence. Attempts to defend explanationism against this charge are unattractive. Moving to a modified better contrastive explanation (...)
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  6. added 2018-10-09
    Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification.Albert Casullo - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):41-58.
    Radical empiricism is the view that experience is the only source of knowledge. Hence, radical empiricism denies the existence of a priori knowledge. Its most famous proponents are John Stuart Mill and W. V. Quine. Although both reject a priori knowledge, they offer different empiricist accounts of the knowledge alleged by their opponents to be a priori. My primary concern in this paper is not with the cogency of their positive accounts. My focus is their arguments against a priori knowledge. (...)
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  7. added 2018-10-09
    Static Justification in the Dynamics of Belief.John Cantwell - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):481-503.
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  8. added 2018-10-09
    The Justification of Belief.T. E. Burke - 1994 - Wittgenstein-Studien 1 (1).
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  9. added 2018-10-09
    Does Knowledge Entail Justification?L. S. Carrier - 1994 - International Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):413-418.
  10. added 2018-10-09
    Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Edited by George Pappas.Lawrence R. Carleton - 1982 - Modern Schoolman 60 (1):60-61.
  11. added 2018-09-29
    Perceptual Justification and Assertively Representing the World.Jochen Briesen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2239-2259.
    This paper argues that there is a problem for the justificatory significance of perceptions that has been overlooked thus far. Assuming that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes and that only propositional attitudes which assertively represent the world can function as justifiers, the problem consists in specifying what it means for a propositional attitude to assertively represent the world without losing the justificatory significance of perceptions—a challenge that is harder to meet than might first be thought. That there is such a (...)
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  12. added 2018-09-29
    Justificação, coerência e circularidade.Júlio César Burdzinski - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):65-93.
    This paper has the following structure: in the first section, I report on the historical and philosophical roots of the problems of knowledge and justification; in the second, I lay out the distinction between truth and epistemic justification; the third section is devoted to the problem of circularity, a problem often attributed to coherentism; in the fourth section, I introduce an unorthodox notion of justification, systemic justification; in the fifth, I present and criticize another unorthodox notion of justification, non-linear inferential (...)
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  13. added 2018-09-29
    Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity.J. Brown - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):339-348.
  14. added 2018-09-29
    Evidence and Warrants for Belief in a College Astronomy Course.Nancy W. Brickhouse, Zoubeida R. Dagher, Harry L. Shipman & William J. Letts - 2002 - Science & Education 11 (6):573-588.
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  15. added 2018-09-29
    Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?Laurence BonJour - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):1-14.
  16. added 2018-09-29
    Knowledge, Justification, and Truth: A Sellarsian Approach to Epistemology.Laurence BonJour - 1969 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    The present essay has two faces. On the one hand, it is an essay in what I conceive to be the fundamental problems of epistemology, and a presentation and defense of solutions to those problems which I find plausible. On the other hand, it is also an essay in the philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars, and a selective defense thereof. Obviously the connecting link which is required to make these two faces of the essay compatible with one another is a belief (...)
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  17. added 2018-09-27
    Justified Judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.
    When is a belief or judgment justified? One might be forgiven for thinking the search for single answer to this question to be hopeless. The concept of justification is required to fulfil several tasks: to evaluate beliefs epistemically, to fill in the gap between truth and knowledge, to describe the virtuous organization of one’s beliefs, to describe the relationship between evidence and theory (and thus relate to confirmation and probabilification). While some of these may be held to overlap, the prospects (...)
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  18. added 2018-09-23
    Believing Against the Evidence, by Miriam Schleifer McCormick. [REVIEW]José Luis Bermúdez - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):942-945.
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  19. added 2018-09-22
    Justification, Epistemic.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2016
    Epistemic Justification We often believe what we are told by our parents, friends, doctors, and news reporters. We often believe what we see, taste, and smell. We hold beliefs about the past, the present, and the future. Do we have a right to hold any of these beliefs? Are any supported by evidence? Should we … Continue reading Justification, Epistemic →.
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  20. added 2018-09-22
    Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism.Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Ordinarily, people take themselves to know a lot. I know where I was born, I know that I have two hands, I know that two plus two equals four, and I also think I know a lot of other stuff too. However, the project of trying to provide a philosophically satisfying account of knowledge, one that holds up against skeptical challenges, has proven surprisingly difficult. Either one aims for an account of justification (and knowledge) that is epistemologically demanding, in an (...)
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  21. added 2018-09-22
    Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.B. Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.
    One attractive feature of process reliabilism is its reductive potential: it promises to explain justification in entirely non-epistemic terms. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of epistemic defeat poses a serious challenge for process reliabilism’s reductive ambitions. The standard process reliabilist analysis of defeat is the ‘Alternative Reliable Process Account’ (ARP). According to ARP, whether S’s belief is defeated depends on whether S has certain reliable processes available to her which, if they had been used, would have resulted (...)
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  22. added 2018-09-22
    Justification and the Truth-Connection By Clayton Littlejohn. [REVIEW]Peter Baumann - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):731-733.
    Review of Littlejohn, "Justification and the Truth Connection".
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  23. added 2018-09-22
    Reasoning as a Source of Justification.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):113-126.
    In this essay we argue that reasoning can sometimes generate epistemic justification, rather than merely transmitting justification that the subject already possesses to new beliefs. We also suggest a way to account for it in terms of the relationship between epistemic normative requirements, justification and cognitive capacities.
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  24. added 2018-09-22
    Justifications and Excuses.Marcia Baron - unknown
    The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy. But exactly how it should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement. My aim in this paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying disagreements account for them. I give particular attention to the following question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a justification, (...)
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  25. added 2018-09-22
    Memories of the Fourth Condition and Lessons to Be Learned From Suspicious Externalism.Murat Baç - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (2):127-145.
    A significant and interesting part of the post-Gettier literature regarding the analysis of propositional knowledge is the attempt to supplement the traditional tripartite analysis by employing a fourth condition regarding the defeasibility of evidence and thus to preclude the counterexamples displayed in Gettier’s original article. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the sort of externalism that accompanies the most promising of the proposed fourth conditions, due to Pollock, in order to offer some fresh insights on this old (...)
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  26. added 2018-09-22
    Review of “Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation”. [REVIEW]Robert Barnard - 2007 - Essays in Philosophy 8 (2):2.
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  27. added 2018-09-22
    Review: Bonjour's Dilemma. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):679 - 693.
  28. added 2018-09-22
    Foundationalism Strikes Back? In Search of Epistemically Basic.Nanay Bence - 2005 - In Rene van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood (eds.), Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge. Ontos-Verlag. pp. 41.
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  29. added 2018-09-22
    Memorial Justification.Robert Audi - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):31-45.
  30. added 2018-09-22
    Epistemic Desiderata.William P. Alston - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):527-551.
  31. added 2018-09-22
    The Current State of the Coherence Theory: Critical Essays on the Epistemic Theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour, with Replies. [REVIEW]John Bender - 1993 - Noûs 27 (1):111-113.
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  32. added 2018-09-22
    Articulation and Justification.Renford Bambrough - 1988 - The Monist 71 (3):311-319.
  33. added 2018-09-22
    Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):57-89.
  34. added 2018-09-22
    The Social and Cultural Component of Epistemic Justification — a Reply.David B. Annis - 1982 - Philosophia 12 (1-2):51-55.
  35. added 2018-09-22
    Justification.Wayne Angus Backman - 1982 - Dissertation, University of Cincinnati
    This dissertation is an investigation into the nature of justification and rational belief. In Chapter I, four theories of the justification of belief are presented and criticized. These theories--classical foundationalism, modest foundationalism, coherentism, and the causal theory--are found to be similar in a certain respect. They each embody or are consistent with a certain conception of rationality, one in which beliefs are rational just in case they are backed by adequate justifications, and in which adequate justifications are thought to be (...)
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  36. added 2018-09-22
    Epistemic Justification.David B. Annis - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (2):259-266.
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  37. added 2018-09-21
    Unjustified Defeaters.David Alexander - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):891-912.
    A number of philosophers have recently claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. However these claims have been made in passing, occurring in the context of defenses of other theses. As a result, the claim that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters has been neither vigorously defended nor thoroughly explained. This paper fills that gap. It begins by identifying problems with the two most in-depth accounts of the possibility of unjustified defeaters due to Bergmann and Pryor. It then offers a revised (...)
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  38. added 2018-09-21
    How to Think About Reliability.William P. Alston - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):1-29.
  39. added 2018-09-21
    Justification and Truth Value: A Reply.Robert Almeder - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (3):319-322.
    Among other things, Odegard urged that a person can be completely justified in believing a false proposition because the truth condition can be shown to be satisfied independently of the satisfaction of the evidence condition for human knowledge. I respond to his argument and other arguments attacking the arguments I previously offered for the view that a person cannot be completely justified in believing a false proposition.
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  40. added 2018-09-17
    The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Facts about justification are not brute facts. They are epistemic facts that depend upon more fundamental non-epistemic facts. Internalists about justification often argue for mentalism, which claims that facts about justification supervene upon one’s non-factive mental states, using Lehrer and Cohen’s :191–207, 1983) New Evil Demon Problem. The New Evil Demon Problem tells you to imagine yourself the victim of a Cartesian demon who deceives you about what the external world is like, and then asks whether you nevertheless have justification (...)
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  41. added 2018-09-14
    Audi on Structural Justification.Frederick Adams - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:493-498.
  42. added 2018-09-14
    G. E. Moore. Essays in Retrospect. [REVIEW]B. W. A. - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):376-376.
  43. added 2018-09-14
    The Circularity of a Self-Supporting Inductive Argument.Peter Achinstein - 1962 - Analysis 22 (6):138 - 141.
  44. added 2018-07-14
    The Many Ways of the Basing Relation.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - forthcoming - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. London: Routledge.
    A subject S's belief that Q is well-grounded if and only if it is based on a reason of S that gives S propositional justification for Q. Depending on the nature of S's reason, the process whereby S bases her belief that Q on it can vary. If S's reason is non-doxastic––like an experience that Q or a testimony that Q––S will need to form the belief that Q as a spontaneous and immediate response to that reason. If S's reason (...)
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  45. added 2018-05-04
    What Should We Believe About the Future?Miloud Belkoniene - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    This paper discusses the ability of explanationist theories of epistemic justification to account for the justification we have for holding beliefs about the future. McCain’s explanationist account of the relation of evidential support is supposedly in a better position than other theories of this type to correctly handle cases involving beliefs about the future. However, the results delivered by this account have been questioned by Byerly and Martin. This paper argues that McCain’s account is, in fact, able to deliver plausible (...)
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  46. added 2017-11-18
    Evidentialism, Time-Slice Mentalism, and Dreamless Sleep.Andrew Moon - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance With the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Springer Verlag.
    I argue that the following theses are both popular among evidentialists but also jointly inconsistent with evidentialism: 1) Time-Slice Mentalism: one’s justificational properties at t are grounded only by one’s mental properties at t; 2) Experience Ultimacy: all ultimate evidence is experiential; and 3) Sleep Justification: we have justified beliefs while we have dreamless, nonexperiential sleep. Although I intend for this paper to be a polemic against evidentialists, it can also be viewed as an opportunity for them to clarify their (...)
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  47. added 2017-10-23
    The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification.Giacomo Melis - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):367-379.
    One important distinction in the debate over the nature of epistemic justification is the one between propositional and doxastic justification. Roughly, while doxastic justification is a property of beliefs, propositional justification is a property of propositions. On a rather common view, which accounts for doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification plus the so-called ‘basing relation’, propositional justification is seen as the prior notion, and doxastic justification is explained in terms of it. According to the opposing view, the direction of (...)
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  48. added 2017-09-14
    Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their (...)
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  49. added 2017-06-26
    Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer Verlag.
    According to the Path Principle, it is permissible to expand your set of beliefs iff (and because) the evidence you possess provides adequate support for such beliefs. If there is no path from here to there, you cannot add a belief to your belief set. If some thinker with the same type of evidential support has a path that they can take, so do you. The paths exist because of the evidence you possess and the support it provides. Evidential support (...)
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  50. added 2017-02-27
    The Externalist’s Demon.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):399-434.
    In this paper, I defend externalist accounts of justified belief from Cohen's new evil demon objection. While I think that Cohen might be right that the person is justified in believing what she does, I argue that this is because we can defend the person from criticism and that defending a person is a very different thing from defending a person's attitudes or actions. To defend a person's attitudes or actions, we need to show that they met standards or did (...)
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