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Propositional Attitudes

Assistant editor: Steve Pearce (University of Western Ontario)
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History/traditions: Propositional Attitudes

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  1. Imaginative Beliefs.Joshua Myers - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    I argue for the existence of imaginative beliefs: mental states that are imaginative in format and doxastic in attitude. I advance two arguments for this thesis. First, there are imaginings that play the functional roles of belief. Second, there are imaginings that play the epistemic roles of belief. These arguments supply both descriptive and normative grounds for positing imaginative beliefs. I also argue that this view fares better than alternatives that posit distinct imaginative and doxastic states to account for the (...)
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  2. Pennywise Parsimony: Langland-Hassan on Imagination.Neil Van Leeuwen - forthcoming - Analysis.
    This essay discusses Peter Langland-Hassan's approach to "explaining imagination" as it plays out in his recent book of that title. Langland-Hassan offers a theory of “attitude imagining” that avoids positing what he calls a “sui generis cognitive attitude.” This theory attempts to explain things like pretend play, hypothetical reasoning, and cognition of fiction; to explain them using only (what he calls) more “basic” mental states like beliefs and desires; and thus to explain them without positing a distinct cognitive attitude of (...)
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  3. What is the attitude of desire?Kael McCormack - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    I defend a view of the attitude of desire against a close rival. Both views are versions of “the guise of the good” thesis. The guise of the good says that a desire for P involves P appearing good in some respect. I defend a content-based account of value appearances against an attitude-based account. On the content view, a desire for P represents P as good while the attitude of that desire presents P’s value as true. In other words, a (...)
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  4. Reasoning With Attitude.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
  5. Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What Is Belief? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Abstract In slogan form, the thesis of this paper is that beliefs are self-verifying fictions: We make them up, but in so doing, they come to exist, and so the fiction of belief is in fact true. This picture of belief emerges from a combination of three independently motivated views: (1) a phenomenal intentionalist picture of intentionality, on which phenomenal consciousness is the basis of intentionality; (2) what I will call a “self-ascriptivist” picture of derived representation, on which non-fundamental representational (...)
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  6. Non-Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and the Self-Refutation Argument.Michał Wieczorkowski - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-17.
    The skeptical solution is based on two assumptions — the rejection of semantic facts and the denial of semantic nihilism. On the basis of the non-factualist interpretation of this solution, these two assumptions are reconciled by stating that meaning ascriptions possess non-descriptive function. Nonetheless, Alexander Miller argues that this position is self-refuting since, as despite its non-descriptivism, by rejecting any kind of semantic facts, it inevitably leads to semantic nihilism. In this text, I demonstrate that Miller’s argument is not sound. (...)
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  7. Do Emotions Represent Values and How Can We Tell?A. Grzankowski - manuscript
    Do emotions represent values? The dominant view in philosophy has it that they do. There is wide disagreement over the details, but this core commitment is common. But there is a new comer on scene: the attitude view. According to it, rather than representing value properties, there is a value-relevant way you represent the targets of emotion. For example, in feeling angry with someone you stand to them in the relation of representing-as-having-wronged-you. Although a recent view, it has quickly generated (...)
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  8. What’s your Opinion? Negation and ‘Weak’ Attitude Verbs.Henry Ian Schiller - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1141-1161.
    Attitude verbs like ‘believe’ and ‘want’ exhibit neg-raising: an ascription of the form a doesn’t believe that p tends to convey that a disbelieves—i.e., believes the negation of—p. In ‘Belief is Weak’, Hawthore et al. observe that neg-raising does not occur with verbs like ‘know’ or ‘need’. According to them, an ascription of the form a believes that p is true just in case a is in a belief state that makes p more likely than not, and so—excepting cases of (...)
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  9. Against Emotions as Feelings: Towards an Attitudinal Profile of Emotion.Rodrigo Díaz - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7):223-245.
    Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...)
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  10. Identitas Tanpa Eksistensi: Perlakuan Proposisional Quine.Raisa Rahima - 2023 - Lsfdiscourse.Org.
    Apa itu yang ada? Kita akan membilang seluruh objek di sekitaran kita: lampu, buku, langit, matahari dan lain-lain. Tetapi bagaimana jika seseorang bertanya, “Apa yang kamu inginkan?” kita akan menjawab “Aku ingin kapal pesiar, iPhone, Taylor Swift.” dan objek lain yang terpikirkan. Bagaimana seseorang dapat menjamin bahwa kapal pesiar yang kita pikirkan sesuai dengan kapal pesiar yang ada?. Artikel ini membahas perlakuan proposisional Quine dalam memahami identitas objek tanpa eksistensi yang mengemban status ontologis (keberadaan) dari proses kuantifikasi level-pertama.
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  11. The Euthyphro Challenge in Metasemantics.Bar Luzon - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):217-237.
    This paper argues that functionalist metasemantic views, such as Conceptual Role Semantics and Interpretivism, face a Euthyphro challenge. The challenge, put roughly, is this: functionalist metasemantic views reverse the order of explanation. According to such views, representational mental states have the contents that they do partly because they play certain roles in our mental lives. According to an intuitive picture of the roles that representational mental states play in our mental lives, however, these states play the roles they do partly (...)
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  12. Reasoning in attitudes.Franz Dietrich & Antonios Staras - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1–31.
    People reason not only in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. They form preferences from existing preferences, or intentions from existing beliefs and intentions, and so on. This often involves choosing between rival conclusions. Building on Broome (Rationality through reasoning, Hoboken, Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118609088, 2013) and Dietrich et al. (J Philos 116:585–614. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20191161138, 2019), we present a philosophical and formal analysis of reasoning in attitudes, with or without facing choices in reasoning. We give different accounts of choosing, in (...)
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  13. Unsurprising Conditions for Conditional Surprise.Eugene Ho - manuscript
    Blumberg and Holguín present two puzzles regarding the semantics of attitude reports involving conditionals (ie. Attitude-Conditionals) which seem to involve commitments to assertions which entail contradictions, and take this data to call for a revision of our semantics for Attitude-Conditionals. This paper attempts to resolve the puzzles without radically revising our semantics for conditionals. (This is a work in progress. Please ask before citing/circulating.).
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  14. Integrating Abduction and Inference to the Best Explanation.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 14 (2):1-18.
    Tomis Kapitan’s work on Peirce’s conception of abduction was instrumental for our coming to see how Peircean abduction both relates to and is importantly different from inference to the best explanation (IBE). However, he ultimately concluded that Peirce’s conception of abduction was a muddle. Despite the deeply problematic nature of Peirce’s theory of abduction in these respects, Kapitan’s work on Peircean abduction offers insight into the nature of abductive inquiry that is importantly relevant to the task of making sense of (...)
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  15. An object-centric solution to Edelberg's puzzles of intentional identity.Eugene Ho - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):364.
    My belief that Socrates was wise, and your belief that Socrates was mortal can be said to have a common focus, insofar as both these thoughts are about Socrates. In Peter Geach’s terminology, the objects of our beliefs bear the feature of intentional identity, because our beliefs share the same putative target. But what if it turned out that Socrates never existed? Can a pair of thoughts share a common focus if the object both thoughts are about, does not actually, (...)
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  16. The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality.Cody Turner - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):747-774.
    This paper offers a novel argument against the phenomenal intentionality thesis (or PIT for short). The argument, which I'll call the extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality, is centered around two claims: the first asserts that some source intentional states extend into the environment, while the second maintains that no conscious states extend into the environment. If these two claims are correct, then PIT is false, for PIT implies that the extension of source intentionality is predicated upon the extension of (...)
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  17. Words on Kripke’s Puzzle.Maciej Tarnowski & Maciej Głowacki - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-21.
    In this paper we present a solution to Saul Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief Meaning and use, Dordrecht, 1979) based on Kaplan’s metaphysical picture of words. Although it is widely accepted that providing such a solution was one of the main incentives for the development of Kaplan’s theory, it was never presented by Kaplan in a systematic manner and was regarded by many as unsatisfactory. We agree with these critiques, and develop an extension of Kaplan’s theory by introducing the notion of (...)
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  18. A Philosophically Neutral Semantics for Perception Sentences.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2022 - Theoria 88:532-544.
    Jaakko Hintikka proposed treating objectual perception sentences, such as “Alice sees Bob,” as de re propositional perception sentences. Esa Saarinen extended Hintikka’s idea to eventive perception sentences, such as “Alice sees Bob smile.” These approaches, elegant as they may be, are not philosophically neutral, for they presuppose, controversially, that the content of all perceptual experiences is propositional in nature. The aim of this paper is to propose a formal treatment of objectual and eventive perception sentences that builds on Hintikka’s modal (...)
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  19. That ‐clauses: Some bad news for relationalism about the attitudes.Robert J. Matthews - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (3):414-431.
    Propositional relationalists about the attitudes claim to find support for their view in what they assume to be the dyadic relational logical form of the predicates by which we canonically attribute propositional attitudes. In this paper I argue that the considerations that they adduce in support of this assumption, specifically for the assumption that the that-clauses that figure in these predicates are singular terms, are suspect on linguistic grounds. Propositional relationalism may nonetheless be true, but the logical form of attitude (...)
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  20. The Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality.Raamy Majeed - 2022 - Philosophy 97 (2):169-185.
    The contemporary view of the relationship between conscious and unconscious intentionality consists in two claims: unconscious propositional attitudes represent the world the same way conscious ones do, and both sets of attitudes represent by having determinate propositional content. Crane has challenged both claims, proposing instead that unconscious propositional attitudes differ from conscious ones in being less determinate in nature. This paper aims to evaluate Crane's proposal. In particular, I make explicit and critique certain assumptions Crane makes in support of his (...)
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  21. The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2021 - In The Fragmented Mind. New York, NY, USA: pp. 350-375.
    On an intellectualist approach to belief, the intellectual endorsement of a proposition (such as “The working poor deserve as much respect as the handsomely paid”) is sufficient or nearly sufficient for believing it. On a pragmatic approach to belief, intellectual endorsement is not enough. Belief is behaviorally demanding. To really, fully believe, you must also “walk the walk.” This chapter argues that the pragmatic approach is preferable on pragmatic grounds: It rightly directs our attention to what matters most in thinking (...)
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  22. Quantificational Attitudes.Benjamin Lennertz - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (11):585-613.
    The literature contains a popular argument in favor of the position that conditional attitudes are not simple attitudes with conditional contents but, rather, have a more complex structure. In this paper I show that an analogous argument applies to what we might call quantificational attitudes—like an intention to follow every bit of good advice I receive or a desire to get rabies shots for each bite I incur from an infected bat. The conditions under which these attitudes are satisfied and (...)
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  23. That solution to Prior’s puzzle.Hüseyin Güngör - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2765-2785.
    Prior's puzzle is a puzzle about the substitution of certain putatively synonymous or coreferential expressions in sentences. Prior's puzzle is important, because a satisfactory solution to it should constitute a crucial part of an adequate semantic theory for both proposition-embedding expressions and attitudinal verbs. I argue that two recent solutions to this puzzle are unsatisfactory. They either focus on the meaning of attitudinal verbs or content nouns. I propose a solution relying on a recent analysis of that-clauses in linguistics. Our (...)
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  24. Private Investigators and Public Speakers.Alexander Sandgren - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):95-113.
    Near the end of 'Naming the Colours', Lewis (1997) makes an interesting claim about the relationship between linguistic and mental content; we are typically unable to read the content of a belief off the content of a sentence used to express that belief or vice versa. I call this view autonomism. I motivate and defend autonomism and discuss its importance in the philosophy of mind and language. In a nutshell, I argue that the different theoretical roles that mental and linguistic (...)
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  25. Higher‐order metaphysics.Lukas Skiba - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):1-11.
    Subverting a once widely held Quinean paradigm, there is a growing consensus among philosophers of logic that higher-order quantifiers (which bind variables in the syntactic position of predicates and sentences) are a perfectly legitimate and useful instrument in the logico-philosophical toolbox, while neither being reducible to nor fully explicable in terms of first-order quantifiers (which bind variables in singular term position). This article discusses the impact of this quantificational paradigm shift on metaphysics, focussing on theories of properties, propositions, and identity, (...)
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  26. Modes of Truth: The Unified Approach to Truth, Modality, and Paradox.Carlo Nicolai & Johannes Stern (eds.) - 2021 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    The aim of this volume is to open up new perspectives and to raise new research questions about a unified approach to truth, modalities, and propositional attitudes. The volume's essays are grouped thematically around different research questions. The first theme concerns the tension between the theoretical role of the truth predicate in semantics and its expressive function in language. The second theme of the volume concerns the interaction of truth with modal and doxastic notions. The third theme covers higher-order solutions (...)
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  27. To Believe is Not to Think: A Cross-Cultural Finding.Neil Van Leeuwen, Kara Weisman & Tanya Luhrmann - 2021 - Open Mind 5:91-99.
    Are religious beliefs psychologically different from matter-of-fact beliefs? Many scholars say no: that religious people, in a matter-of-fact way, simply think their deities exist. Others say yes: that religious beliefs are more compartmentalized, less certain, and less responsive to evidence. Little research to date has explored whether lay people themselves recognize such a difference. We addressed this question in a series of sentence completion tasks, conducted in five settings that differed both in religious traditions and in language: the US, Ghana, (...)
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  28. The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging.Thomas Grundmann - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (2):208-218.
    Typically, nudging is a technique for steering the choices of people without giving reasons or using enforcement. In benevolent cases, it is used when people are insufficiently responsive to reason. The nudger triggers automatic cognitive mechanisms – sometimes even biases – in smart ways in order to push irrational people in the right direction. Interestingly, this technique can also be applied to doxastic attitudes. Someone who is doxastically unresponsive to evidence can be nudged into forming true beliefs or doxastic attitudes (...)
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  29. Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the "Here-Replacement" Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (4):188-213.
    According to the Self-Location Thesis, certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person, spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-reflexive visual experiences, which involve the movement of an object toward the location of the perceiving subject. The main aim of this paper is (...)
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  30. Von der Möglichkeit des moralischen Subjektivismus. Eine Untersuchung zum Einstellungscharakter von Moral und Religion.Michael Oliva Córdoba - 2021 - Methodus 10 (1):3-31.
    Moral subjectivism is commonly associated with out-of-favour theories like, e.g., Alfred Ayer’s emotivism or John Mackie’s error theory. This paper approaches the field against the background of the attitudinal character of morality and religion. The possibility of a brand of moral subjectivism is established which is common to Ayer’s and Mackie’s theories in name only yet still has significant merits. The perspective from action theory and the philosophy of mind suggests that the problem of moral obligation, central to moral philosophy, (...)
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  31. Expressivism, inferentialism, and the status of attitudes.Krzysztof Poslajko - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The aim of this paper is to show that expressivism about attitudes is not a tenable position. Although this claim has been often made in the literature, traditional arguments against attitudinal expressivism assumed a dated form of expressivism. In order to show that ascriptions of attitudes cannot be seen as expressive in either of them, the paper discusses two more recent versions of expressivism: quasi-realism and inferentialist expressivism. Quasi-realism escapes traditional arguments against attitudinal expressivism because it allows expressive statements to (...)
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  32. Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Logic Vol. 10: Inductive Logic.Dov M. Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann & John Woods (eds.) - 2011 - Elsevier.
    Inductive Logic is number ten in the 11-volume Handbook of the History of Logic. While there are many examples were a science split from philosophy and became autonomous (such as physics with Newton and biology with Darwin), and while there are, perhaps, topics that are of exclusively philosophical interest, inductive logic — as this handbook attests — is a research field where philosophers and scientists fruitfully and constructively interact. This handbook covers the rich history of scientific turning points in Inductive (...)
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  33. Propositions are not representational.Thomas D. Brown - 2021 - Synthese (1-2):1-16.
    It is often presumed by those who use propositions in their theories that propositions are representational; that is, that propositions represent the world as being some way. This paper makes two claims against this presumption. First, it argues that it does not follow from the fact that propositions play the theoretical roles usually attributed to them that they are representational. This conclusion is reached by rebutting three arguments that can be made in support of the claim that propositions are representational. (...)
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  34. Copula is an intuitive predicate of consciousness on fulfilment of knowing and judging acts.Kiran Pala - 2020 - Humanit Soc Sci Commun 121 (7).
    The recent investigations into knowledge and its elements viz facts, skills and objects have become prominent in various subfields of philosophy and other areas like linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. These investigations have been mainly on understanding the relation between the intentionality and its referential entities to know how they enrich knowledge with their existence. This article starts with an exploration of the fundamental aspects of judgemental sense from the knowledge origins perspective. To explain the consequences of this, (...)
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  35. Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Themes From the Philosophy of Lynne Rudder Baker. Oxford, UK: Routledge. pp. 54-74.
    According to Lynne Rudder Baker’s Practical Realism, we know that we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a self-ascriptivist view, on which we have propositional attitudes in virtue of ascribing (...)
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  36. Review of Jaszczolt (1999): Discourse, Beliefs and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription. [REVIEW]Alessandro Capone - 2001 - Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):365-372.
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  37. Review of Jaszczolt (2000): The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 2001 - Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):372-380.
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  38. Review of Jaszczolt (2000): The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 2001 - Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):372-380.
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  39. Review of Bunt & Black (2000): Abduction, Belief and Context in Dialogue—Studies in Computational Pragmatics. [REVIEW]Eli Dresner - 2003 - Pragmatics and Cognition 11 (2):390-394.
  40. Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency 1.Paul Katsafanas - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:219.
    Many philosophers maintain that there is a distinction between acts that the agent plays an active role in producing, and acts that issue from the agent in a more passive fashion. According to the standard account, we can make sense of this distinction by maintaining that reflective or deliberative acts are paradigmatic cases of an agent’s playing an active role in the production of action. This chapter argues that this standard account is mistaken. Reflective or deliberative actions will seem to (...)
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  41. New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure.Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Palgrave.
    Belief is a fundamental concept within many branches of contemporary philosophy and an important subject in its own right. This volume comprises 11 original essays on belief written by a range of the best authors in the field.
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  42. A Dispositional Approach to the Attitudes.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - In N. Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief. Palgrave. pp. 75-99.
    I argue that to have an attitude is, primarily, (1.) to have a dispositional profile that matches, to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects, a stereotype for that attitude, typically grounded in folk psychology, and secondarily, (2.) in some cases also to meet further stereotypical attitude-specific conditions. To have an attitude, on the account I will recommend here, is mainly a matter of being apt to interact with the world in patterns that ordinary people would regard as characteristic of (...)
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  43. A Grammar for the Mind: Time Embodied and Disembodied.B. Kotchoubey - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (7-8):66-88.
    A philosophical idea about a particular relation of humans to time has found its recent psychological development in the form of the hypothesis that at some age point human children acquire a specific ability to describe the past and to think about the future, while animals do not possess this ability but are 'stuck in time'. On the other hand, animals definitely possess memory, and their behaviour constitutes a set of anticipations. A solution of this contradiction is proposed on the (...)
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  44. Wittgenstein's Attitudes.Fabien Schang - 2008 - In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduktion und Elimination in Philosophie und den Wissenschaften. pp. 289-291.
    What's wrong with modalities in (Wittgenstein 1922)? In (Suszko 1968), the writer argued that "Wittgenstein was somewhat confused and wrong in certain points. For example, he did not see the clear-cut distinction between language (theory) and metalanguage (metatheory): a confusion between use and mention of expressions". Furthermore, a modal logic was proposed in (von Wright 1986) as depicting Wittgenstein's bipolarity thesis in a S5 frame. -/- The aim of the present paper is to deal with the specific case of epistemic (...)
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  45. Espace logique et modalités chez Wittgenstein.Fabien Schang - 2014 - AL-Mukhatabat 9:230-242.
    L'article s'intéresse aux obstacles épistémologiques qui empêchèrent Wittgenstein d'admettre l'idée moderne de logique modale et, en particulier, les logiques d'attitudes propositionnelles. Tout en proposant un aperçu rétrospectif de la logique des modalités épistémiques, nous verrons que ces obstacles reposent avant tout sur la nature de l'espace logique présenté dans le Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus et le statut métaphysique du sujet. Des passages éclairants seront rappelés pour justi.
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  46. Les attitudes russelliennes.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 54:149-168.
    Russell prétend qu’un examen des croyances est indispensable pour définir nos raisonnements quotidiens et comprendre ce que les philosophes entendent par la notion de vérité. Cela étant, l’auteur considère qu’une étude de ces croyances n’a aucun rapport avec la logique, laquelle concerne uniquement le vrai et le faux. En d’autres termes, Russell associe croyance et psychologie tout en réservant le domaine de la logique au thème de la proposition, vraie ou fausse par définition. Une certaine théorie de la vérité sous-tend (...)
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  47. Review Essays: The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and PoliticsThe Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics. [REVIEW]Huw Price & Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):689.
    The dustjacket of The Common Mind bears a photograph of the traffic at a Sydney intersection on a wet winter’s evening in 1938. It is rush hour, and the homeward traffic conveys a fine sense of common purpose. The scene has a special resonance for me, for I stood at that very spot with my parents and brothers one similar evening in 1966, on the day we first arrived in Australia. There was a marked pedestrian crossing there then, which we (...)
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  48. Bilgrami’s Theory of Belief and Meaning.Gary Ebbs & Akeel Bilgrami - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):613.
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  49. Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Traditional philosophical discussions of knowledge have focused on the epistemic status of full beliefs. In this book, Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. For instance, your .4 credence that it is raining outside can constitute knowledge, in just the same way that your full beliefs can. In addition, you can know that it might be raining, and that if it is raining then it is probably cloudy, where this knowledge is not knowledge of propositions, (...)
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  50. Which witch is which? Exotic objects and intentional identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):721-739.
    This paper is about intentional identity, the phenomenon of intentional attitudes having a common focus. I present an argument against an approach to explaining intentional identity, defended by Nathan Salmon, Terence Parsons and others, that involves positing exotic objects. For example, those who adopt this sort of view say that when two astronomers had beliefs about Vulcan, their attitudes had a common focus because there is an exotic object that both of their beliefs were about. I argue that countenancing these (...)
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