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Propositional Attitudes

Assistant editor: Steve Pearce (University of Western Ontario)
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Subcategories:History/traditions: Propositional Attitudes

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  1. Getting what you want.Lyndal Grant & Milo Phillips-Brown - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1791-1810.
    It is commonly accepted that if an agent wants p, then she has a desire that is satisfied in exactly the worlds where p is true. Call this the ‘Satisfaction-is-Truth Principle’. We argue that this principle is false: an agent may want p without having a desire that is satisfied when p obtains in any old way. For example, Millie wants to drink milk but does not have a desire that is satisfied when she drinks spoiled milk. Millie has a (...)
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  2. New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure.Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.) - 2013 - Palgrave.
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  3. A Dispositional Approach to the Attitudes.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - In N. Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief. Palgrave. pp. 75-99.
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  4. The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity.Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst - 2020 - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
    This volume provides a framework for approaching and understanding mental normativity. It presents cutting-edge research on the ethics of belief as well as innovative research beyond the normativity of belief—and towards an ethics of mind. By moving beyond traditional issues of epistemology the contributors discuss the most current ideas revolving around rationality, responsibility, and normativity. -/- The book’s chapters are divided into two main parts. Part I discusses contemporary issues surrounding the normativity of belief. The essays here cover topics such (...)
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  5. Wittgenstein's Attitudes.Fabien Schang - 2008 - In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduktion und Elimination in Philosophie und den Wissenschaften. pp. 289-291.
    What's wrong with modalities in (Wittgenstein 1922)? In (Suszko 1968), the writer argued that "Wittgenstein was somewhat confused and wrong in certain points. For example, he did not see the clear-cut distinction between language (theory) and metalanguage (metatheory): a confusion between use and mention of expressions". Furthermore, a modal logic was proposed in (von Wright 1986) as depicting Wittgenstein's bipolarity thesis in a S5 frame. -/- The aim of the present paper is to deal with the specific case of epistemic (...)
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  6. Espace logique et modalités chez Wittgenstein.Fabien Schang - 2014 - AL-Mukhatabat 9:230-242.
    L'article s'intéresse aux obstacles épistémologiques qui empêchèrent Wittgenstein d'admettre l'idée moderne de logique modale et, en particulier, les logiques d'attitudes propositionnelles. Tout en proposant un aperçu rétrospectif de la logique des modalités épistémiques, nous verrons que ces obstacles reposent avant tout sur la nature de l'espace logique présenté dans le Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus et le statut métaphysique du sujet. Des passages éclairants seront rappelés pour justi.
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  7. Les attitudes russelliennes.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 54:149-168.
    Russell prétend qu’un examen des croyances est indispensable pour définir nos raisonnements quotidiens et comprendre ce que les philosophes entendent par la notion de vérité. Cela étant, l’auteur considère qu’une étude de ces croyances n’a aucun rapport avec la logique, laquelle concerne uniquement le vrai et le faux. En d’autres termes, Russell associe croyance et psychologie tout en réservant le domaine de la logique au thème de la proposition, vraie ou fausse par définition. Une certaine théorie de la vérité sous-tend (...)
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  8. Review Essays: The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and PoliticsThe Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics. [REVIEW]Huw Price & Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):689.
    The dustjacket of The Common Mind bears a photograph of the traffic at a Sydney intersection on a wet winter’s evening in 1938. It is rush hour, and the homeward traffic conveys a fine sense of common purpose. The scene has a special resonance for me, for I stood at that very spot with my parents and brothers one similar evening in 1966, on the day we first arrived in Australia. There was a marked pedestrian crossing there then, which we (...)
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  9. Bilgrami’s Theory of Belief and Meaning.Gary Ebbs & Akeel Bilgrami - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):613.
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  10. Which Witch is Which? Exotic Objects and Intentional Identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):721-739.
    This paper is about intentional identity, the phenomenon of intentional attitudes having a common focus. I present an argument against an approach to explaining intentional identity, defended by Nathan Salmon, Terence Parsons and others, that involves positing exotic objects. For example, those who adopt this sort of view say that when two astronomers had beliefs about Vulcan, their attitudes had a common focus because there is an exotic object that both of their beliefs were about. I argue that countenancing these (...)
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  11. II.—On a Defect in the Customary Logical Formulation of Inductive Reasoning.Bernard Bosanquet - 1911 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1):29-40.
  12. Quine on Logic, Propositional Attitudes, and the Unity of Knowledge.André Leclerc - 2003 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 7 (1-2):131-145.
    I shall examine Quine’s conception of logic, of propositional attitudes, and of the unity of knowledge in order to show that there are some tensions in Quine’s system. I first propose a conception of the use or application of logic, stating that logic strictly speaking applies to intentional phenomena or to things that presuppose the existence of intentional phenomena. Then, I consider briefly Quine’s philosophy of logic and discuss some issues. In Quine’s philosophy, logic stays at the very center of (...)
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  13. Informative Aboutness.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):354-364.
    Pretheoretically, ‘all believers are immortal’ is about all believers, but B is not about any unbeliever. Similarly, ‘all mortals are unbelievers’ is not about any immortal, but M is about all mortals. But B and M are logically equivalent universal generalizations, so arguably they are about exactly the same objects; by, they are about those mortals who are unbelievers, contradicting. If one responds by giving up, is there still a sense in which B treats unbelievers differently from believers? I argue (...)
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  14. Propositional Attitude, Affective Attitude and Irony Comprehension.Francisco Yus - 2016 - Pragmatics Cognition 23 (1):92-116.
    According to relevance theory, irony comprehension invariably entails the identification of some opinion or thought and the identification of the speaker’s dissociative attitude. In this paper, it is argued that it is also essential for hearers to identify not only that propositional attitude, but also the affective attitude that the speaker holds towards the source of this echo so that an optimallyrelevant interpretive outcomeis achieved. This notion comprises feelings and emotions of a non-propositional quality which affect the propositional effects obtained (...)
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  15. Propositional Attitude, Affective Attitude and Irony Comprehension.Francisco Yus - 2016 - Pragmatics Cognition 23 (1):92-116.
    According to relevance theory, irony comprehension invariably entails the identification of some opinion or thought and the identification of the speaker’s dissociative attitude. In this paper, it is argued that it is also essential for hearers to identify not only that propositional attitude, but also the affective attitude that the speaker holds towards the source of this echo so that an optimallyrelevant interpretive outcomeis achieved. This notion comprises feelings and emotions of a non-propositional quality which affect the propositional effects obtained (...)
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  16. Objects of Thought? On the Usual Way Out of Prior’s Objection to the Relational Theory of Propositional Attitude Sentences.Giulia Felappi - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):438-444.
    Traditionally, ‘that’-clauses occurring in attitude attributions are taken to denote the objects of the attitudes. Prior raised a famous problem: even if Frege fears that the Begriffsschrift leads to a paradox, it is unlikely that he fears a proposition, a sentence or what have you as the alleged object denoted by the ‘that’-clause. The usual way out is to say that ‘that’-clauses do not contribute the objects of the attitudes but their contents. I will show that, if we accept this (...)
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  17. Belief Policies.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):736-738.
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  18. An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.Louis P. Pojman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):496-498.
  19. Having Know‐How: Intellect, Action, and Recent Work on Ryle's Distinction Between Knowledge‐How and Knowledge‐That.Greg Sax - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):507-530.
    Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing‐how/knowing‐that distinction charging that it obstructs our understanding of human action. Incorrectly interpreting the distinction to imply that knowledge‐how is non‐propositional, they object that Ryle's argument for it is unsound and linguistic theory contradicts it. I show that they misconstrue the distinction and Ryle's argument. Consequently, their objections fail. On my reading, Ryle's distinction pertains to, not knowledge, but an explanatory gap between explicit and implicit content, and his argument for it is sound. I defend (...)
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  20. Reasons and Motivation—Not a Wrong Distinction.Simon Robertson - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback) 106 (3):391-397.
    This paper responds to Susan Hurley’s attempt to undermine the adequacy of the distinction at the heart of the internalism–externalism debate about reasons for action. The paper shows that Hurley’s argument fails and then, more positively, indicates a neat way to characterize the distinction.
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  21. Review of “The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports“ by Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt. [REVIEW]G. Forbes - 2001 - Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):372-380.
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  22. Review of “Discourse, Beliefs and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription” by Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt. [REVIEW]Alessandro Capone - 2001 - Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):365-372.
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  23. Review of “Abduction, Belief and Context in Dialogue“ by Harry Bunt and William Black. [REVIEW]Eli Dresner - 2003 - Pragmatics and Cognition 11 (2):390-394.
  24. Measurement‐Theoretic Accounts of Propositional Attitudes.Robert J. Matthews - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):828-841.
    In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of philosophers, notably Churchland, Field, Stalnaker, Dennett, and Davidson, began to argue that propositional attitude predicates are a species of measure predicate, analogous in important ways to numerical predicates by which we attribute physical magnitudes. Other philosophers, including myself, have subsequently developed the idea in greater detail. In this paper I sketch the general outlines of measurement‐theoretic accounts of propositional attitudes, explaining in the briefest terms the basic idea of such accounts, (...)
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  25. Hume’s Theory of Mental Representation.David Landy - 2012 - Hume Studies 38 (1):23-54.
    Hume’s arguments in the Treatise require him to employ not only the copy principle, which explains the intrinsic properties of perceptions, but also a thesis that explains the representational content of a perception. I propose that Hume holds the semantic copy principle, which states that a perception represents that of which it is a copy. Hume employs this thesis in a number of his most important arguments, and his doing so enables him to answer an important objection concerning the status (...)
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  26. Belief, Simulation and the First Person: Comments on A Study of Concepts by Christopher Peacocke.Jane Heal - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):413-417.
    In these comments I shall concentrate on one topic, namely Peacocke’s proposals concerning what is involved in possessing the concept of belief. The proposals are, of course, presented by him within the framework of a general theory of concepts, some parts of which are illuminating and others of which are more debatable. But differences about these issues are not germane to what follows and for our purposes I shall assume the correctness of the broad lines of his theory.
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  27. François Recanati’s Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation. [REVIEW]Kirk Ludwig - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):481-488.
    The book is divided into twenty chapters, divided in turn into six parts. Parts I-III contain the main positive account of metarepresentations. The main semantic thesis of parts I-III is that metarepresentational sentences are not relational, but involve a metarepresentational operator applied to a sentence which functions in its usual way, but which is evaluated relative to a “shifted circumstance” in use. This is supposed to represent a novel account of the semantics of attitude sentences that preserves “semantic innocence” and (...)
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  28. The Analogy of Degrees of Being: A Critique of Cajetan’s Analogy of Names.Paul G. Kuntz - 1982 - New Scholasticism 56 (1):51-79.
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  29. Between Thoughts and Things: The Status of Meanings.Thomas D. Sullivan - 1976 - New Scholasticism 50 (1):85-95.
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  30. Group Behaviour and Rationality.J. Moreh - 1988 - Social Science Information 27 (1):99-118.
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  31. Some Thoughts...; Continued From P. 6.Mark Weinstein - 1988 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 2 (2):9-9.
  32. The Objects of Propositional Attitudes.John J. Macintosh - 1988 - Philosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 4:465-470.
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  33. Why Fuss About These Quirks of the Vernacular? Propositional Attitude Sentences in Prior’s Nachlass.Giulia Felappi - 2016 - Synthese 193 (11):3521-3534.
    In English, in order to speak about Arthur’s attitudes, we use sentences like “Arthur believes that natural language is messy”. For sentences of this kind we have a standard theory, according to which the ‘that’-clause ‘that natural language is messy’ denotes a proposition. As Prior showed for the first time, the standard theory appears to be at odds with some linguistic data. Geach and Prior both assumed that linguistic data are to be taken as reliable guides to a correct semantic (...)
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  34. Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class.Dušan Dožudić - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):17-36.
    It is a standard view among philosophers that an attitude is propositional if a that clause could represent its content. One way of challenging this view is to argue that attitudes whose content can be represented in that way have categorically different content. A number of authors adopted such a strategy and imposed various restrictions on the propositional attitude class. In this paper, I will argue that such restrictions are not tenable because the arguments that are used to support them (...)
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  35. Propositional Attitudes Towards Presuppositions.Filippo Domaneschi, Elena Carrea, Alberto Greco & Carlo Penco - 2014 - Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (3):291-308.
    According to the Common Ground account proposed by Stalnaker, speakers involved in a verbal interaction have different propositional attitudes towards presuppositions. In this paper we propose an experimental study aimed at estimating the psychological plausibility of the Stalnakerian model. In particular, the goal of our experiment is to evaluate variations in accepting as appropriate a sentence that triggers a presupposition, where different attitudes are taken towards the presupposition required. The study conducted suggests that if a speaker has the attitude ofbelieftowards (...)
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  36. Is Belief In God A Hinge Proposition?Matthew Bixby - unknown
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  37. Act Theories and the Attitudes.Jeff Speaks - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1453-1473.
    Theories of propositions as complex acts, of the sort recently defended by Peter Hanks and Scott Soames, make room for the existence of distinct propositions which nonetheless represent the same objects as having the same properties and standing in the same relations. This theoretical virtue is due to the claim that the complex acts with which propositions are identified can include particular ways of cognizing, or referring to, objects and properties. I raise two questions about this sort of view—one about (...)
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  38. Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. [REVIEW]Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):895.
  39. What is the Name of This Book?: The Riddle of Dracula and Other Logical Puzzles.George Boolos & Raymond M. Smullyan - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (3):496.
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  40. Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.Mark Richard & Lynne Rudder Baker - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):614.
    When I started the book, I thought that if there are beliefs, then they are brain states. I still believe that. I express three caveats about the book.
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  41. Beliefs and Desires: From Attribution to Evaluation.Uku Tooming - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):359-369.
    The ability to attribute beliefs and desires is taken by many to be an essential component of human social cognition, enabling us to predict, explain and shape behaviour and other mental states. In this paper, I argue that there are certain basic responses to attributed attitudes which have thus far been overlooked in the study of social cognition, although they underlie many of the moves we make in our social interactions. The claim is that belief and desire attributions allow for (...)
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  42. Гіпотеза мови мислення дж. фодора й епістемічна логіка.Konstantin Rayhert - 2016 - Схід 3 (143):88-93.
    The study is to show the similarities between J. Fodor's Language of Thought hypothesis and epistemic modal logic. According to the J. Fodor's hypothesis there is the language of thought that is the meta-language in which mental representations of attitudes of organism to propositions expressed in object-language are formulated. These attitudes are called "propositional attitudes". In the hypothesis propositional attitudes are thoughts and relations between organism and proposition. Propositional attitudes are of interest for epistemic modal logics. In epistemic logics propositional (...)
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  43. Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.
  44. Is a Unified Description of Language-and-Thought Possible?Joseph Almog - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (10):493-531.
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  45. Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668.
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  46. Illustrations of the Stage and Acting in England to 1580.Clifford Davidson.Barbara Palmer - 1994 - Speculum 69 (1):125-127.
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  47. Cresswell M. J. Structured Meanings: The Semantics of Propositional Attitudes. Bradford Books. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1985, X + 202 Pp. [REVIEW]David Israel - 1987 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (3):878-882.
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  48. Structured Meanings: The Semantics of Propositional Attitudes.David Israel - 1987 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (3):878.
  49. Catholic Attitudes About War.F. H. Drinkwater - 1962 - New Blackfriars 43 (508):419-427.
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  50. VI.—Facts, Feelings and Attitudes.Bernard Mayo - 1950 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 51 (1):105-128.
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