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  1. Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind.C. Anthony Anderson (ed.) - 1990 - Stanford: CSLI.
  2. Brain States with Attitude.Louise M. Antony - 2001 - In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. CSLI Publications.
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  3. Beliefs and Desires as Causes of Actions: A Reply to Donald Davidson.David M. Armstrong - 1975 - Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.
  4. Logical Competence in the Context of Propositional Attitudes.M. Astroh - 1990 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 23 (1):3-44.
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  5. Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism Lynne Rudder Baker Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. 190. $19.95 (U.S.), $9.95 (U.S.) Paper. [REVIEW]Anita Avramides - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (04):693-.
  6. Attitudes in Action: A Causal Account.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Manuscrito 25 (3):47-78.
    This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do.
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  7. Explaining Attitudes.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - Cambridge University Press.
    Explaining Attitudes develops a new account of propositional attitudes - practical realism.
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  8. Attitudes as Nonentities.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203.
    materialist that beliefs are not immaterial soul-states, I think that the conception of beliefs as brain states is badly misguided. I hope to show that "beliefs are brain states or soul states" is a false dichotomy. I am using the phrase 'beliefs as brain states' to cover several familiar theses: the token-identity thesis, according to which beliefs are identical to brain-state tokens; nonreductive materialism, according to which beliefs are constituted by brain states (as pebbles are constituted by..
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  9. Attitudes Without Propositions.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
    This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing `that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form `x believes that p' and `σ means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that `that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) `that'-clause-containing sentences (...)
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  10. Some Remarks on Belief and Desire.Gerald W. Barnes - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (July):340-349.
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  11. Relationen zu Propositionen.Wolfgang Barz - 2005 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (4):512 - 529.
    Ich versuche zu zeigen, daß die auf Frege zurückgehende These, daß Meinungen Relationen zwischen Personen und Propositionen darstellen, nicht zwangsläufig die Frage nach der Natur des Mechanismus aufwirft, der Personen mit Propositionen verbindet. Um meine Auffassung zu begründen, lasse ich zunächst eine Überlegung Revue passieren, die meines Erachtens den stärksten Beweggrund für die Einführung von Propositionen darstellt. In diesem Zusammenhang zeigt sich, daß sich die These, daß Meinungen Relationen zwischen Personen und Propositionen darstellen, auf die Struktur von Berichten über Meinungen (...)
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  12. Propositions.George Bealer - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):1-32.
    Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts (...)
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  13. Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.
    The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ‘S Vs that p’. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. A reason for the characterization relying on beliefs, (...)
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  14. Analysis Without Noise.Jonathan Bennett - 1991 - In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.
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  15. Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief.Jonathan Berg - 2012 - De Gruyter Mouton.
    Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted "Inner Speech" Picture of Thought. The work serves as (...)
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  16. Donald Davidson, Paradoxes de l'irrationalité, tr. de Pascal Engel, Combas, Éditions de l'Éclat, coll. « Tiré à part », 1991. [REVIEW]Renée Bilodeau - 1993 - Philosophiques 20 (2):503-506.
    Compte-rendu de trois articles de Donald Davidson "Paradoxes of Irrationality", "Deception and Division" et "Rational Animals".
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  17. Attitudes.George Y. Bizer, Jamie C. Barden & Richard E. Petty - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
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  18. Propositional Attitudes and Formal Ontology.Steven E. Boër - 1994 - Synthese 98 (2):187 - 242.
    This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.
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  19. Individuating Propositional Attitudes.Donald Brownstein - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (2):205-212.
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  20. Language, Mind and Logic.Jeremy Butterfield (ed.) - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a collection of eleven original essays in analytical philosophy by British and American philosophers, centering on the connection between mind and language. Two themes predominate: how it is that thoughts and sentences can represent the world; and what having a thought - a belief, for instance - involves. Developing from these themes are the questions: what does having a belief require of the believer, and of the way he or she relates to the environment? In particular, does having (...)
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  21. Predict the Behavior: Propositional Attitudes and Philosophy of Action.Leonardo Caffo - 2011 - Dialettica and Filosofia (2011):1-8.
    The folk Psychology frames propositional attitudes as fundamental theoretical entities for the construction of a model designed to predict the behavior of a subject. A trivial, such as grasping a pen and writing reveals - something complex - about the behavior. When I take a pen and start writing I do, trivially, because I believe that a certain object in front of me is a pen and who performs a specific function that is, in fact, that of writing. When I (...)
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  22. Baker, LR-Explaining Attitudes.K. -Y. Cheng - 1997 - Philosophical Books 38:121-122.
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  23. Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.William Child - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (3):306-312.
  24. What Happens to Reliabilism When It Is Liberated From the Propositional Attitudes?Paul M. Churchland - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):91-112.
  25. Radical Ascent.Andy Clark - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:211-27.
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  26. Beliefs and Desires Incorporated.Austen Clark - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):404-25.
    Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that "folk" explanations of human behavior--explanations in terms of beliefs and desires--sometimes succeed. They sometimes enable us to understand and predict patterns of motion that otherwise would remain unintelligible and unanticipated. Is the only explanation for such success that folk psychology is a viable proto-scientific theory of human psychology? I shall describe an analysis which yields a negative answer to that question. It was suggested by an observation and an analogy, both of (...)
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  27. Mark Richard, Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them Reviewed By.M. J. Cresswell - 1990 - Philosophy in Review 10 (10):430-432.
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  28. Context in the Attitudes.Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (2):185 - 198.
    I wish first to motivate very briefly two points about the kind of context sensitive semantics needed for attitude reports, namely that reports are about referents and about mental representations; then I will compare two proposals for treating the attitudes, both of which capture the two points in question.
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  29. Content Essentialism.Marian David - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (28):103-114.
    The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat against this, (...)
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  30. What is Present to the Mind.Donald Davidson - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:197-213.
  31. The Mind of Donald Davidson.Donald Davidson - 1989 - Netherlands: Rodopi.
  32. What is Present to the Mind?Donald Davidson - 1989 - In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Netherlands: Rodopi. pp. 197-213.
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  33. On Gauging Attitudes.David Davies - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (2):129-54.
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  34. Davidson, Indeterminacy, and Measurement.David Davies - 1995 - Acta Analytica 10 (14):37-56.
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  35. Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations.Rafael De Clercq - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386 - 402.
    Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.
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  36. Inan on Objectual and Propositional Ignorance.Erhan Demircioglu - 2016 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):305-311.
    In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between “objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the distinction between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the “received view,” according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is “always about truth,” and enables us to (...)
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  37. The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion.Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not (...)
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  38. Thoughts and Their Ascription.Michael Devitt - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):385-420.
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  39. Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought.Frances Egan - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):379 - 388.
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  40. What's Wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind.M. F. Egan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (December):664-74.
    Stephen Stich has argued that psychological theories that instantiate his Syntactic Theory of Mind are to be preferred to content-based or representationalist theories, because the former can capture and explain a wider range of generalizations about cognitive processes than the latter. Stich's claims about the relative merits of the Syntactic Theory of Mind are unfounded. Not only is it false that syntactic theories can capture psychological generalizations that content-based theories cannot, but a large class of behavioral regularities, readily explained by (...)
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  41. Brain States, Causal Explanation, and the Attitudes.Reinaldo Elugardo - 2001 - In Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
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  42. Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics.Reinaldo Elugardo - 2001 - Stanford: CSLI Publications.
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  43. Opacity in the Attitudes.Evan Fales - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):725 - 752.
  44. Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Philosophical Debates.Arthur Falk - 2004 - University Press of America.
    First published in 2004, this book is a rigorous textbook on the metaphysics of the mind for advanced students of philosophy, covering the background they need to understand the debates and bringing them to the frontiers of current research. It is also a monograph on the nature of de re and de se states of mind, incorporating material the author published in journals. The short file you will see is only a gateway to more than two dozen other files which (...)
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  45. Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates.Arthur E. Falk - 2004 - Hamilton Books, University Press of America.
    This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
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  46. The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience.Neil Feit - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.
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  47. The Problem of De Se Attitudes: An Introduction to the Issues and the Essays.Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone - 2013 - In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications. pp. 1-25.
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  48. Davidson's Theory of Propositional Attitudes.Richard H. Feldman - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):693-712.
    Donald davidson has proposed an account of indirect discourse that has been the subject of a great deal of discussion. Critics have contended that the theory saddles sentences in indirect discourse with implications they do not have, That the theory rests on an unsuitably obscure primitive notion that it cannot be extended to "de re" constructions and that it cannot be extended to sentences about other propositional attitudes such as belief. In this paper, I formulate davidson's theory more precisely than (...)
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  49. Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum.J. A. Fodor - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  50. Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?Craig French - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):115-127.
    In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...)
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