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Subcategories:History/traditions: Propositional Attitudes
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  1. Peter Godfrey -Smith (1986). Why Semantic Properties Won't Earn Their Keep. Philosophical Studies 50 (2):223-236.
  2. Barbara Abbott (1995). Natural Language and Thought: Thinking in English. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):49-55.
  3. Diana Ackerman (1980). Natural Kinds, Concepts, and Propositional Attitudes. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):469-486.
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  4. Diana Ackerman (1980). Thinking About an Object: Comments on Pollock. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):501-508.
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  5. Diana Felicia Ackerman (1976). Proper Names, Natural Kind Terms and Propositional Attitudes. Dissertation, University of Michigan
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  6. Tuomo Aho (2003). Propositional Attitudes. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 80 (1):201-221.
    Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on (...)
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  7. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
  8. Varol Akman, Notions and Oracles.
    On Crimmins and Perry’s account of propositional attitude ascription (1989), beliefs are concrete cognitive structures—particulars ("things in the head") that belong to an agent and that have a lifetime. They are related to the world and to other cognitive structures and abilities, allowing one to classify the latter by propositional content. Containing ideas and notions as constituents, beliefs are structured entities. The difference between notions and ideas is the difference between an agent’s ways of thinking about individuals vs. properties.
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  9. Joseph Almog (2005). Is a Unified Description of Language-and-Thought Possible? Journal of Philosophy 102 (10):493-531.
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  10. Wayne Alt (1980). There is No Paradox of Desire in Buddhism. Philosophy East and West 30 (4):521-528.
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  11. Peter Wallace Brannen Alward (1998). Believed World Semantics. Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    The problems that arise for analyses of belief ascriptions pose one of the greatest impediments to an adequate semantic theory. My dissertation offers a novel solution to these well-known problems. What I have developed is a version of the believed-world approach to the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. Believed-world theories make use of the notion of a person's associated believed world, or a set of worlds compatible with what a person believes, in their semantic theories. Typically, semantic content of ascription (...)
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  12. Gisle Andersen & Thorstein Fretheim (2000). Pragmatic Markers and Propositional Attitude.
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  13. C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Language, Logic, and Mind. CSLI Publications.
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  14. James F. Anderson (1976). Language, Thought, and History. New Scholasticism 50 (3):323-332.
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  15. M. Astroh (1990). Logical Competence in the Context of Propositional Attitudes. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 23 (1):3-44.
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  16. Jay David Atlas, Aboutness, Fiction, and Quantifying Into Intentional Contexts: A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on The..
    A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on the Active/Passive Mood Distinction in English, etc.
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  17. Anita Avramides (1989). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism Lynne Rudder Baker Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. 190. $19.95 (U.S.), $9.95 (U.S.) Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 28 (04):693-.
  18. Lynne Rudder Baker (1996). Science and the Attitudes: A Reply to Sanford. Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):187-189.
    Explaining Attitudes was not intended to be hostile to science. Its target is what I called the Standard View, a conception of the attitudes that is held almost universally. The heart of the Standard View is the thesis that beliefs (and other..
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  19. Earl of Balfour (1927). Familiar Beliefs and Transcendent Reason. Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (7):395-396.
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  20. John A. Barnden (1992). Connectionism, Generalization, and Propositional Attitudes: A Catalogue of Challenging Issues. In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 149--178.
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  21. Jon Barwise & Yiannis N. Moschovakis (1978). Global Inductive Definability. Journal of Symbolic Logic 43 (3):521-534.
    We show that several theorems on ordinal bounds in different parts of logic are simple consequences of a basic result in the theory of global inductive definitions.
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  22. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1985). Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (1):105--161.
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  23. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
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  24. Wolfgang Barz (2011). Singuläre Propositionen und das Fassen eines Gedankens. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 36 (1):71-93.
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  25. Rainer Bäuerle & Max J. Cresswell (1989). Propositional Attitudes. In Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 491--512.
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  26. George Bealer (1989). On the Identification of Properties and Propositional Functions. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):1 - 14.
    Arguments are given against the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical. The first shows that the familiar extensional treatment of propositional functions -- that, for all x, if f(x) = g(x), then f = g -- must be abandoned. Second, given the usual assumptions of propositional-function semantics, various propositional functions (e.g., constant functions) are shown not to be properties. Third, novel examples are given to show that, if properties were identified with propositional functions, crucial fine-grained intensional distinctions would (...)
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  27. S. Beck (1988). Lewis, Loar and the Logical Form of Attitude Ascriptions. South African Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):100-104.
    In this article, the attempts by David Lewis and Brian Loar to make perspicuous the logical form of sentences ascribing propositional attitudes to individuals are set out and criticized. Both work within the assumption of the truth of 'type' physicalism, and require that logically perspicuous attitude ascriptions be compatible with the demands of such a doctrine. It is argued that neither carry out this task successfully - Lewis's perspicuous ascriptions have counter-intuitive implications, while Loar's avoidance of these undermines type physicalism (...)
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  28. Christoph Beierle, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Marco Ragni & Frieder Stolzenburg (eds.) (2015). Proceedings of the KI 2015 Workshop on Formal and Cognitive Reasoning.
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  29. Delia Belleri (2013). On What is Effable. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):341-349.
    The Effability thesis has it that all propositions can be encoded by a sentence. By contrast, the Ineffability thesis has it that no proposition can be encoded by a sentence. In this article, I undermine an important motivation for the Ineffability thesis and advance a proposal concerning what is effable and what is not. My strategy will be as follows: First, I'll note that the Ineffability thesis assumes that propositions/thoughts are determinate. I'll point out that propositions/thoughts qua the things we (...)
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  30. Jonathan Berg (forthcoming). Precis of Jonathan Berg, Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief. Philosophia:1-11.
    In Direct Belief I argue for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, I use Grice’s theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and go on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted “Inner Speech” Picture of Thought. The work (...)
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  31. José Luis Bermúdez (2009). Review of Dominic Murphy, Michael Bishop (Eds.), Stich and His Critics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (9).
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  32. Ann Bezuidenhout (2000). Attitude Ascriptions, Context and Interpretive Resemblance. In K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier.
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  33. Anne Bezuidenhout (1997). „How Context-Dependent Are Attitude Ascriptions?‟ In: D. Jutronic“. In Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics. Maribor.
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  34. Matthew Bixby, Is Belief In God A Hinge Proposition?
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  35. George Y. Bizer, Jamie C. Barden & Richard E. Petty (2003). Attitudes. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
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  36. O. Black (1996). Infinite Regress Arguments and Infinite Regresses. Acta Analytica 16:17.
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  37. Alexander Bochman (2000). Belief Contraction as Nonmonotonic Inference. Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (2):605-626.
    A notion of an epistemic state is introduced as a generalization of common representations suggested for belief change. Based on it, a new kind of nonmonotonic inference relation corresponding to belief contractions is defined. A number of representation results is established that cover both traditional AGM contractions and contractions that do not satisfy recovery.
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  38. Steven E. Boër (2009). Propositions and the Substitution Anomaly. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):549-586.
    The Substitution Anomaly is the failure of intuitively coreferential expressions of the corresponding forms “that S” and “the proposition that S” to be intersubstitutable salva veritate under certain ‘selective’ attitudinal verbs that grammatically accept both sorts of terms as complements. The Substitution Anomaly poses a direct threat to the basic assumptions of Millianism, which predict the interchangeability of “that S” and “the proposition that S”. Jeffrey King has argued persuasively that the most plausible Millian solution is to treat the selective (...)
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  39. Radu J. Bogdan (2008). Predicative Minds: The Social Ontogeny of Propositional Thinking. MIT Press/Bradford Books.
    An exploration of why and how the human competence for predication came to be.
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  40. Ivan Boh (1984). Propositional Attitudes in the Logic of Walter Burley and William Ockham. Franciscan Studies 44 (1):31-59.
  41. Paolo Bonardi (2007). On Schiffer's Arguments Against the Fregean Model of 'That-Clauses': A Comment on Vignolo. Abstracta 3 (2):162-175.
    In “Propositions: What They Could and What They Could Not Be”, Massimiliano Vignolo counters the arguments put forward by Stephen Schiffer (“The Things We Mean”) against the so-called Fregean model of ‘that’-clauses. My purpose here is to show that some of Vignolo’s objections to Schiffer’s arguments do not hit the mark. I shall also present a new argument against the Fregean model, which takes its cue from two of Schiffer’s arguments.
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  42. George Boolos & Raymond M. Smullyan (1979). What is the Name of This Book?: The Riddle of Dracula and Other Logical Puzzles. Philosophical Review 88 (3):496.
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  43. Bernard Bosanquet (1910). On a Defect in the Customary Logical Formulation of Inductive Reasoning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:29 - 40.
  44. David Lyman Boyer (1977). A Just-as-If Theory of Belief and Behavior. Dissertation, Boston University Graduate School
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  45. M. C. Bradley (1977). Stove on Hume. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):69 – 73.
  46. Richard Bradley (2008). Comparing Evaluations. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part1):85-100.
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  47. Paul Brockelman (1977). Behavior and Belief. Philosophy Today 21 (2):168-183.
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  48. John Broome (1991). Desire, Belief and Expectation. Mind 100 (2):265-267.
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  49. Susan Christine Brower-Toland (2002). Late-Medieval Theories of Propositions: Ockham and the 14th-Century Debate Over Objects of Judgment. Dissertation, Cornell University
    Since the classic writings of Frege, Russell, and Moore, philosophers have devoted considerable attention to questions concerning the nature and ontological status of propositions . Interest in propositions does not originate, however, with the 20th century. On the contrary, it begins in antiquity and runs through the Middle Ages, flourishing in the 14th century in particular, owing largely to the work of William Ockham on mental language and judgment. In his early writings, Ockham claims that what functions as the objects (...)
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  50. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Wright on the McKinsey Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):385-391.
    The McKinsey Problem concerns a puzzling implication of the doctrines of Content Externalism and Privileged Access. I provide a categorization of possible solutions to the problem. Then I discuss Crispin Wright’s work on the problem. I argue that Wright has misconceived the status of his own proferred solution to the problem.
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