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Summary Propositions have been thought of as identical to facts. Alternatively, facts have been theorised as true propositions.
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  1. added 2020-04-17
    Über Tatsachen. An die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern.Geert Keil - 2019 - Forschung and Lehre:894-897.
    * Einige Gemeinplätze über Tatsachen und Wissenschaft * Postfaktische Kommunikation und »alternative Fakten« * Ist nur Unumstößliches Tatsache? * Woran starb Ramses II.? * Ist der naive Realismus nicht seit Kant überwunden?
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  2. added 2020-04-06
    Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic.Robert Trueman - forthcoming - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, I articulate and defend Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege’s insight that properties are not objects. According to this theory, properties are nothing but the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Fregean realism is the key to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley’s Regress and the Problem of Universals. I also argue that Fregean realism can be extended to cover states of affairs and propositions. According to this extended theory, states of affairs (...)
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  3. added 2019-08-28
    Existentialism, Aliens and Referentially Unrestricted Worlds.Michael Longenecker - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3723-3738.
    Existentialism claims that propositions that directly refer to individuals depend on those individuals for their existence. I argue for two points regarding Existentialism. First, I argue that recent accounts of Existentialism run into difficulties accommodating the possibility of there being a lonely alien electron. This problem is distinct from one of the better-known alien problems—concerning iterated modal properties of aliens—and can’t be solved using a standard response to the iterated case. Second, though the lonely alien electron problem might seem to (...)
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  4. added 2019-08-15
    Are Propositions Facts?Andrei Marasoiu - 2012 - In Piotr Stalmaszcyzk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos Verlag. pp. 385.
    This paper explores whether Jeffrey King's theory of propositions is committed to an obscure metaphysics which identifies propositions with certain kinds of facts. §1 presents the problem to which King tries to provide a solution, the problem of the unity of the proposition. §2 presents King's doubtful identification of propositions with certain existentially generalized facts over languages, words, speakers, contexts, times and places. §3 sketches a host of objections to the identification made in §2, provided King’s identification is taken to (...)
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  5. added 2019-08-15
    Fact-, Proposition-, and Event-Individuation.Philip L. Peterson - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:29-36.
    The distinctions among facts, propositions, and events are supported by linguistic analyses segregating factive, propositional, and eventive predicates. The concepts of fact, proposition, and event may be basic categories of human understanding, as well as being ontologically significant. FPE theory was developed in part to reject the identification of facts with true propositions. The degree of ‘fineness’ of individuations within each category results from how closely event-, fact-, or proposition-individuation mirrors linguistic semantic structure. Event structure is not reflected in many (...)
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  6. added 2019-08-15
    Knowledge and Belief; Facts and Propositions.Joseph Margolis - 1976 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 2 (1):41-54.
    The principal claims supported include: (i) that 'believe' and 'know' take the same grammatical object 'that p'; (ii) that each may take grammatical objects that the other cannot take; (iii) that merely grammatical considerations cannot determine whether 'that p' designates a proposition or a fact; (iv) that, on an epistemically relevant interpretation, 'that p' may be construed either as designating a proposition or a fact or both; (v) that propositions and facts are correlative and heuristic entities. The issues are developed (...)
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  7. added 2019-08-15
    Propositions, Facts, and Immediate Experience.George Louis Proctor - 1957 - Dissertation, University of Virginia
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  8. added 2019-08-15
    A Whiteheadian Analysis of Propositions and Facts.Martin A. Greenman - 1952 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13 (4):477-486.
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  9. added 2019-08-15
    Facts and Propositions.Moritz Schlick - 1934 - Analysis 2 (5):65 - 70.
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  10. added 2019-08-15
    Symposium: “Facts and Propositions.”.F. P. Ramsey & G. E. Moore - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-206.
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  11. added 2019-07-26
    Propositions and Cognitive Relations.Nicholas K. Jones - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):157-178.
    There are two broad approaches to theorizing about ontological categories. Quineans use first-order quantifiers to generalize over entities of each category, whereas type theorists use quantification on variables of different semantic types to generalize over different categories. Does anything of import turn on the difference between these approaches? If so, are there good reasons to go type-theoretic? I argue for positive answers to both questions concerning the category of propositions. I also discuss two prominent arguments for a Quinean conception of (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-18
    Introduction to the Ontology of Knowledge Iss. 20200403.Jean-Louis Boucon - 2020
    This text aims to introduce Ontology of Knowledge (OK) as an ontological model. According to OK these are not the world and its forms that make themselves intelligible to the subject but a principle of knowledge: the Logos, which gives meaning, which gives forms to a Reality that is otherwise formless, unspeakable. The Spirit, as a logical system, thus plays the central role; it creates forms, gives existence to the objects it represents, animates the representation it has of itself and (...)
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  13. added 2019-03-29
    La estructura lógica del comportamiento humano.Michael Starks - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    Mi afirmación es que la tabla de intencionalidad (racionalidad, mente, pensamiento, lenguaje, personalidad, etc.) que se presenta aquí describe de forma prominente más o menos precisa, o al menos sirve como una heurística para, cómo pensamos y comportamos, y por lo que abarca no meramente filosofía y psicología, pero todo lo demás (historia, literatura, matemáticas, política, etc.). Tenga en cuenta especialmente que la intencionalidad y la racionalidad como yo (junto con Searle, Wittgenstein y otros) lo ve, incluye tanto deliberativo consciente (...)
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  14. added 2019-01-31
    The Role of Thoughts in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Christopher Gilbert - 1998 - Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (4):341-352.
  15. added 2018-09-11
    Davidson, Correspondence Truth and the Frege-Gödel-Church Argument.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Manuel Otero - 1998 - History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (2):63-81.
    This paper argues for a conditional claim concerning a famous argument—developed by Church in elucidation of some remarks by Frege to the effect that the bedeutung of a sentence is the sentence's truth-value—the Frege-Gödel-Church argument, or FGC for short. The point we make is this :if, and just to the extent that, Arthur Smullyan's argument against Quine's use of FGC is sound, then essentially the same rejoinder disposes also of Davidson's use of FGC against 'correspondence' theories of truth. We thus (...)
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  16. added 2018-06-15
    Reasons and Beliefs.Attila Tanyi & Matteo Morganti - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:179-196.
    The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. The problem is that those who endorse such a view seem forced to maintain both a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and b) that the conception according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is outlandish. The suggestion is put forward that, by distinguishing the content of a (...)
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  17. added 2018-05-08
    What Truth Is.Mark Jago - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Mark Jago presents and defends a novel theory of what truth is, in terms of the metaphysical notion of truthmaking. This is the relation which holds between a truth and some entity in the world, in virtue of which that truth is true. By coming to an understanding of this relation, he argues, we gain better insight into the metaphysics of truth. The first part of the book discusses the property being true, and how we should understand it in terms (...)
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  18. added 2018-04-29
    Introduction.Alda Mari, Claire Beyssade & Fabio Del Prete - 2012 - In Claire Beyssade and Fabio Del Prete Alda Mari (ed.), Genericity. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-92.
    Introduction to genericity in the nominal, verbal and sentential domain.
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  19. added 2017-12-15
    ​The Nature and Structure of Content, by Jeffrey King, Oxford University Press, 2007. [REVIEW]Genoveva Martí & Dan Zeman - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):814-819.
  20. added 2017-10-27
    The Negativity of Negative Propositions.Carl Erik Kühl - 2012 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 47:87-110.
    The problem of truthmakers for negative propositions was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1918. Since then the debate has mostly been concerned with whether to accept or reject their existence, and little has been said about what it is that makes a negative proposition negative. This is a problem as it is obvious that you cannot just read it off from the grammar of a sentence. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that propositions may be negative or positive (...)
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  21. added 2017-05-26
    Minimalism About Truth: Special Issue Introduction.Joseph Ulatowski & Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):927-933.
    The theme of this special issue is minimalism about truth, a conception which has attracted extensive support since the landmark publication of Paul Horwich's Truth (1990). Many well-esteemed philosophers have challenged Horwich's alethic minimalism, an especially austere version of deflationary truth theory. In part, this is at least because his brand of minimalism about truth also intersects with several different literatures: paradox, implicit definition, bivalence, normativity, propositional attitudes, properties, explanatory power, meaning and use, and so forth. Deflationist sympathizers have introduced (...)
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  22. added 2017-05-10
    Davidson, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Problem of Predication.José L. Zalabardo - forthcoming - In Claudine Verheggen (ed.), Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  23. added 2017-03-24
    Truth, Explanation, Minimalism.Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):987–1009.
    Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a ‘reversal of explanatory direction’. Once reversed, they purport that their own minimal theory adequately explains all of the facts involving truth. But minimalists’ main objection to inflationism seems to misfire, and the subsequent reversal of explanatory direction, if it can be made sense of, leaves minimalism in no better explanatory position; and even if the objection were serviceable and (...)
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  24. added 2016-12-12
    This is Not an Instance of (E).Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1035–1063.
    Semantic paradoxes like the liar are notorious challenges to truth theories. A paradox can be phrased with minimal resources and minimal assumptions. It is not surprising, then, that the liar is also a challenge to minimalism about truth. Horwich (1990) deals swiftly with the paradox, after discriminating between other strategies for avoiding it without compromising minimalism. He dismisses the denial of classical logic, the denial that the concept of truth can coherently be applied to propositions, and the denial that the (...)
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  25. added 2016-12-08
    Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift.A. Moffett Marc - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):81-97.
    The Problem of Doxastic Shift may be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the distribution of nominal complements of the form 'the φ that p' strongly suggests that 'that'-clauses cannot be univocally assigned propositional denotations; on the other hand, facts about quantification strongly suggest that 'that'-clauses must be assigned univocal denotations. I argue that the Problem may be solved by defining the extension of a proposition to be a set of facts or, more generally, conditions. Given this, the (...)
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  26. added 2016-11-15
    Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions.Mark Jago - 2017 - Argumenta 2 (2):293-308.
    Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.
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  27. added 2016-10-26
    Are Propositions Essentially Representational?Bryan Pickel - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But – for good reason – King claims that propositions possess truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can't follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing (...)
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  28. added 2016-10-24
    The Nature of Facts.Peter Herbst - 1952 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):90 – 116.
  29. added 2016-10-14
    Introduction.David Hunter & Gurpreet Rattan - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):515-517.
    (2013). Introduction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 515-517.
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  30. added 2016-07-06
    Propositions Directly About Particulars.C. H. Langford - 1929 - Mind 38 (150):219-225.
  31. added 2016-05-14
    Minimal Truthmakers.Donnchadh O'conaill & Tuomas E. Tahko - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):228-244.
    A minimal truthmaker for a given proposition is the smallest portion of reality which makes this proposition true. Minimal truthmakers are frequently mentioned in the literature, but there has been no systematic account of what they are or of their importance. In this article we shall clarify the notion of a minimal truthmaker and argue that there is reason to think that at least some propositions have minimal truthmakers. We shall then argue that the notion can play a useful role (...)
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  32. added 2016-05-04
    Gödel's "Slingshot" Argument and His Onto-Theological System.Srećko Kovač & Kordula Świętorzecka - 2015 - In Kordula Świętorzecka (ed.), Gödel's Ontological Argument: History, Modifications, and Controversies. Semper. pp. 123-162.
  33. added 2016-01-26
    Two Notions of Logical Form.Andrea Iacona - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (12):617-643.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of the two roles. (...)
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  34. added 2016-01-24
    Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, Jeff Speaks, New Thinking About Propositions. [REVIEW]Thomas Hodgson - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):80-83.
  35. added 2016-01-05
    The Unity of the Fact.Stephen Read - 2005 - Philosophy 80 (3):317-342.
    What binds the constituents of a state of affairs together and provides unity to the fact they constitute? I argue that the fact that they are related is basic and fundamental. This is the thesis of Factualism: the world is a world of facts. I draw three corollaries: first, that the Identity of truth is mistaken, in conflating what represents (the proposition) with what is represented (the fact). Secondly, a popular interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, due to Steinus, whereby false propositions (...)
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  36. added 2016-01-05
    The Natural History of Fact.D. K. Johnston - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):275 – 291.
    The article provides an example of the application of the techniques and results of historical linguistics to traditional problems in the philosophy of language. It takes as its starting point the dispute about the nature of facts that arose from the 1950 Aristotelian Society debate between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. It is shown that, in some cases, expressions containing the noun fact refer to actions and events; while in other cases, such expressions do not have a referring (...)
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  37. added 2016-01-05
    Designating Propositions.Jeffrey C. King - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):341-371.
    Like many, though of course not all, philosophers, I believe in propositions. I take propositions to be structured, sentence-like entities whose structures are identical to the syntactic structures of the sentences that express them; and I have defended a particular version of such a view of propositions elsewhere. In the present work, I shall assume that the structures of propositions are at least very similar to the structures of the sentences that express them. Further, I shall assume that ordinary names (...)
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  38. added 2016-01-05
    On Denoting Propositions and Facts.Terence Parsons - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:441-460.
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  39. added 2016-01-05
    Anaphoric Reference to Facts, Propositions, and Events.Philip L. Peterson - 1982 - Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (2):235 - 276.
    Factive predicates (like ‘-matters’, ‘discover-’, ‘realizes-’) take NPs that refer to facts, propositional predicates (like ‘-seems’, ‘believes-’, ‘-likely’) take NPs that refer to propositions, and eventive predicates (like ‘-occurs’, ‘-take place’, ‘-causes-’) take NPs that refer to events (broadly speaking, including states, processes, conditions, ect.). Logically speaking at least two out of the three categories (facts, propositions, and events) can be eliminated. So, if all three kinds of referents turn out to be required for natural language semantics, their postulation is (...)
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  40. added 2016-01-05
    Facts, Propositions and Entailment.Arthur N. Prior - 1948 - Mind 57 (225):62-68.
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  41. added 2016-01-05
    Is a Fact a True Proposition?--A Reply.C. J. Ducasse - 1942 - Journal of Philosophy 39 (5):132-136.
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  42. added 2016-01-05
    Propositions, Opinions, Sentences, and Facts.C. J. Ducasse - 1940 - Journal of Philosophy 37 (26):701-711.
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  43. added 2016-01-05
    Some Remarks on `Facts' and Propositions.Carl G. Hempel - 1935 - Analysis 2 (6):93-96.
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  44. added 2015-09-28
    Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation.Kris McDaniel - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):757-768.
    The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are intensionally equivalent propositions, such that one proposition is true in virtue of the other but not vice versa. I focus on what our theory of propositions should look like when it's guided by metaphysical concerns about what is true in virtue of (...)
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  45. added 2015-07-07
    Falsemakers: Something Negative About Facts.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):169-182.
    The author argues for the existence of negative facts. The first section is devoted to an argument, grounded on truthmaker maximalism, that aims at demonstrating that negative facts must exist at least as false propositions’ falsemakers. In the second section, the author analyzes and criticizes several attempts to get rid of negative facts: the ones based on incompatibilities, absences, totality facts and polarities, as well as the ones based on various restrictions on truthmaker maximalism or on the non-acceptance of facts (...)
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  46. added 2015-03-06
    Forms, Facts &Truth.Roger Wertheimer - manuscript
    critical analysis of logical form of predications of truth vs predications of fact.
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  47. added 2015-02-09
    Law and Eschatology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought.Barry Smith - 1978 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 21 (1-4):425 – 441.
    The paper investigates the role played by ethical deliberation and ethical judgment in Wittgenstein's early thought in the light of twentieth?century German legal philosophy. In particular the theories of the phenomenologists Adolf Reinach, Wilhelm Schapp, and Gerhart Husserl are singled out, as resting on ontologies which are structurally similar to that of the Tractatus: in each case it is actual and possible Sachverhalte which constitute the prime ontological category. The study of the relationship between the states of affairs depicted, e.g., (...)
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  48. added 2015-02-06
    Logic and the Sachverhalt.Barry Smith - 1989 - The Monist 72 (1):52-69.
    Those who conceive logic as a science have generally favoured one of two alternative conceptions as to what the subject-matter of this science ought to be. On the one hand is the nowadays somewhat old-fashioned-seeming view of logic as the science of judgment, or of thinking or reasoning activities in general. On the other hand is the view of logic as a science of ideal meanings, 'thoughts', or 'propositions in themselves'. There is, however, a third alternative conception, which enjoyed only (...)
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  49. added 2014-08-10
    Review of Paul Gochet, Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions. [REVIEW]Barry Smith - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):216-217.
  50. added 2014-04-02
    Richard Gaskin: The Unity of the Proposition.Laurynas Adomaitis - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):106-111.
    Richard Gaskin’s work on the problem of the unity of the proposition (“the problem”, henceforth) has sometimes been called magisterial due to its vast historical and conceptual scope. Indeed, the author engages in lengthy discussions of the conceptions of propositions that have been overlooked by most previous investigations on the problem. Not only aspects of Frege’s and Russell’s theories of propositions that appear most problematic are subject to Gaskin’s investigation, it also includes Prabhākara semantics, the approach of Gregory of Rimini (...)
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