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Summary Propositions have been thought of as identical to facts. Alternatively, facts have been theorised as true propositions.
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  1. Davidson, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Problem of Predication.José L. Zalabardo - forthcoming - In Claudine Verheggen (ed.), Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  2. Introduction to the Ontology of Knowledge Iss. 20210402.Jean-Louis Boucon - 2021 - Philpapers.
    We can only know what determines us as being and by the fact that it determines us as being. Our knowledge is therefore logically limited to what determines us as being. Since representation is defined as the act that makes knowledge dicible, our representation is logically limited to what dynamically determines us as being. Our representation is included in our becoming. Nothing that we represent, no infinite, can exceed the mere necessity of our becoming. The world, my physical being and (...)
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  3. Propositions Are Not Representational.Thomas D. Brown - 2021 - Synthese:1-16.
    It is often presumed by those who use propositions in their theories that propositions are representational; that is, that propositions represent the world as being some way. This paper makes two claims against this presumption. First, it argues that it does not follow from the fact that propositions play the theoretical roles usually attributed to them that they are representational. This conclusion is reached by rebutting three arguments that can be made in support of the claim that propositions are representational. (...)
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  4. A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin & James Franklin - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (2).
    In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other nonmental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work on (...)
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  5. Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic.Robert Trueman - 2020 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Universals, but also to understanding the relationship between states of affairs, propositions, and the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism, Trueman suggests, ultimately leads to a version (...)
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  6. Propositions and Cognitive Relations.Nicholas K. Jones - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):157-178.
    There are two broad approaches to theorizing about ontological categories. Quineans use first-order quantifiers to generalize over entities of each category, whereas type theorists use quantification on variables of different semantic types to generalize over different categories. Does anything of import turn on the difference between these approaches? If so, are there good reasons to go type-theoretic? I argue for positive answers to both questions concerning the category of propositions. I also discuss two prominent arguments for a Quinean conception of (...)
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  7. Über Tatsachen. An die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern.Geert Keil - 2019 - Forschung and Lehre:894-897.
    * Einige Gemeinplätze über Tatsachen und Wissenschaft * Postfaktische Kommunikation und »alternative Fakten« * Ist nur Unumstößliches Tatsache? * Woran starb Ramses II.? * Ist der naive Realismus nicht seit Kant überwunden?
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  8. Existentialism, Aliens and Referentially Unrestricted Worlds.Michael Longenecker - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3723-3738.
    Existentialism claims that propositions that directly refer to individuals depend on those individuals for their existence. I argue for two points regarding Existentialism. First, I argue that recent accounts of Existentialism run into difficulties accommodating the possibility of there being a lonely alien electron. This problem is distinct from one of the better-known alien problems—concerning iterated modal properties of aliens—and can’t be solved using a standard response to the iterated case. Second, though the lonely alien electron problem might seem to (...)
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  9. La estructura lógica del comportamiento humano.Michael Starks - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    Mi afirmación es que la tabla de intencionalidad (racionalidad, mente, pensamiento, lenguaje, personalidad, etc.) que se presenta aquí describe de forma prominente más o menos precisa, o al menos sirve como una heurística para, cómo pensamos y comportamos, y por lo que abarca no meramente filosofía y psicología, pero todo lo demás (historia, literatura, matemáticas, política, etc.). Tenga en cuenta especialmente que la intencionalidad y la racionalidad como yo (junto con Searle, Wittgenstein y otros) lo ve, incluye tanto deliberativo consciente (...)
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  10. Reasons and Beliefs.Attila Tanyi & Matteo Morganti - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:179-196.
    The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. The problem is that those who endorse such a view seem forced to maintain both a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and b) that the conception according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is outlandish. The suggestion is put forward that, by distinguishing the content of a (...)
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  11. What Truth Is.Mark Jago - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Mark Jago presents and defends a novel theory of what truth is, in terms of the metaphysical notion of truthmaking. This is the relation which holds between a truth and some entity in the world, in virtue of which that truth is true. By coming to an understanding of this relation, he argues, we gain better insight into the metaphysics of truth. The first part of the book discusses the property being true, and how we should understand it in terms (...)
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  12. This is Not an Instance of (E).Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1035–1063.
    Semantic paradoxes like the liar are notorious challenges to truth theories. A paradox can be phrased with minimal resources and minimal assumptions. It is not surprising, then, that the liar is also a challenge to minimalism about truth. Horwich (1990) deals swiftly with the paradox, after discriminating between other strategies for avoiding it without compromising minimalism. He dismisses the denial of classical logic, the denial that the concept of truth can coherently be applied to propositions, and the denial that the (...)
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  13. Minimalism About Truth: Special Issue Introduction.Joseph Ulatowski & Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):927-933.
    The theme of this special issue is minimalism about truth, a conception which has attracted extensive support since the landmark publication of Paul Horwich's Truth (1990). Many well-esteemed philosophers have challenged Horwich's alethic minimalism, an especially austere version of deflationary truth theory. In part, this is at least because his brand of minimalism about truth also intersects with several different literatures: paradox, implicit definition, bivalence, normativity, propositional attitudes, properties, explanatory power, meaning and use, and so forth. Deflationist sympathizers have introduced (...)
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  14. Knowing the Facts: A Contrastivist Account of the Referential Opacity of Knowledge Attributions.Giorgio Volpe - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Cham: Palgrave. pp. 401-420.
    The view that propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts is prima facie rather appealing, especially for realistically minded philosophers, but it is difficult to square with the referential opacity of knowledge attributions of the form ‘S knows that p’. For how could Lois Lane know that Superman can fly and ignore that Clark Kent can fly if knowledge is a two-place relation between an agent and a fact and the fact that Superman can fly just is the fact that Clark (...)
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  15. Facts, Factives, and Contrafactives.Richard Holton - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):245-266.
    Frege begins his discussion of factives in ‘On Sense and Reference’ with an example of a purported contrafactive, that is, a verb that entails, or presupposes, the falsity of the complement sentence. But the verb he cites, ‘wähnen’, is now obsolete, and native speakers are sceptical about whether it really was a contrafactive. Despite the profusion of factive verbs, there are no clear examples of contrafactive propositional attitude verbs in English, French or German. This paper attempts to give an explanation (...)
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  16. Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions.Mark Jago - 2017 - Argumenta 2 (2):293-308.
    Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.
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  17. Are Propositions Essentially Representational?Bryan Pickel - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But – for good reason – King claims that propositions possess truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can't follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing (...)
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  18. Two Notions of Logical Form.Andrea Iacona - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (12):617-643.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of the two roles. (...)
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  19. Minimal Truthmakers.Donnchadh O'conaill & Tuomas E. Tahko - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):228-244.
    A minimal truthmaker for a given proposition is the smallest portion of reality which makes this proposition true. Minimal truthmakers are frequently mentioned in the literature, but there has been no systematic account of what they are or of their importance. In this article we shall clarify the notion of a minimal truthmaker and argue that there is reason to think that at least some propositions have minimal truthmakers. We shall then argue that the notion can play a useful role (...)
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  20. Truthmaker Internalism and the Mind-Dependence of Propositions.Robin Stenwall - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):59-76.
    It is generally thought that truthmaking has to be an internal relation because if it weren’t, then, as David Armstrong argues, “everything may be a truthmaker for any truth”. Depending on whether we take an internal relation to be one that is necessitated by the mere existence of its terms or one that supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its relata, the truthbearers involved in the truthmaking relation must either have their contents essentially or intrinsically. In this paper, I examine (...)
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  21. Gödel's "Slingshot" Argument and His Onto-Theological System.Srećko Kovač & Kordula Świętorzecka - 2015 - In Kordula Świętorzecka (ed.), Gödel's Ontological Argument: History, Modifications, and Controversies. Semper. pp. 123-162.
  22. Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation.Kris McDaniel - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):757-768.
    The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are intensionally equivalent propositions, such that one proposition is true in virtue of the other but not vice versa. I focus on what our theory of propositions should look like when it's guided by metaphysical concerns about what is true in virtue of (...)
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  23. Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, Jeff Speaks, New Thinking About Propositions. [REVIEW]Thomas Hodgson - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):80-83.
  24. New Thinking About Propositions.Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames & Jeff Speaks - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Philosophy, science, and common sense all refer to propositions--things we believe and say, and things which are true or false. But there is no consensus on what sorts of things these entities are. Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks argue that commitment to propositions is indispensable, and each defend their own views on the debate.
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  25. Falsemakers: Something Negative About Facts.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):169-182.
    The author argues for the existence of negative facts. The first section is devoted to an argument, grounded on truthmaker maximalism, that aims at demonstrating that negative facts must exist at least as false propositions’ falsemakers. In the second section, the author analyzes and criticizes several attempts to get rid of negative facts: the ones based on incompatibilities, absences, totality facts and polarities, as well as the ones based on various restrictions on truthmaker maximalism or on the non-acceptance of facts (...)
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  26. Introduction.David Hunter & Gurpreet Rattan - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):515-517.
    (2013). Introduction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 515-517.
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  27. Richard Gaskin: The Unity of the Proposition.Laurynas Adomaitis - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):106-111.
    Richard Gaskin’s work on the problem of the unity of the proposition (“the problem”, henceforth) has sometimes been called magisterial due to its vast historical and conceptual scope. Indeed, the author engages in lengthy discussions of the conceptions of propositions that have been overlooked by most previous investigations on the problem. Not only aspects of Frege’s and Russell’s theories of propositions that appear most problematic are subject to Gaskin’s investigation, it also includes Prabhākara semantics, the approach of Gregory of Rimini (...)
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  28. Propositions: Truth Vs. Existence.Heather Dyke - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer. pp. 127-138.
    I argue that there is an inherent tension in the notion of a proposition that gives us reason to doubt that there can be any single entity that plays all the roles and possesses all the features normally attributed to propositions. The tension is that some of the roles and features of propositions require them to be essentially representational, while others require them to be non-representational. I first present what I call the standard view of propositions: a series of theses (...)
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  29. The Negativity of Negative Propositions.Carl Erik Kühl - 2012 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 47 (1):87-110.
    The problem of truthmakers for negative propositions was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1918. Since then the debate has mostly been concerned with whether to accept or reject their existence, and little has been said about what it is that makes a negative proposition negative. This is a problem as it is obvious that you cannot just read it off from the grammar of a sentence. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that propositions may be negative or positive (...)
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  30. Are Propositions Facts?Andrei Marasoiu - 2012 - In Piotr Stalmaszcyzk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos Verlag. pp. 385.
    This paper explores whether Jeffrey King's theory of propositions is committed to an obscure metaphysics which identifies propositions with certain kinds of facts. §1 presents the problem to which King tries to provide a solution, the problem of the unity of the proposition. §2 presents King's doubtful identification of propositions with certain existentially generalized facts over languages, words, speakers, contexts, times and places. §3 sketches a host of objections to the identification made in §2, provided King’s identification is taken to (...)
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  31. Introduction.Alda Mari, Claire Beyssade & Fabio Del Prete - 2012 - In Claire Beyssade and Fabio Del Prete Alda Mari (ed.), Genericity. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-92.
    Introduction to genericity in the nominal, verbal and sentential domain.
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  32. La interpretación como evento cognitivo expresado en razonamientos abductivos.María G. Navarro - 2012 - Trans/Form/Ação 35 (3):231-252.
    The purpose of this paper is to argue that abductive reasoning is part of a cognitive process of interpreting something as being something. The paper holds two fundamental claims. First, it proposes a definition of interpretation as a type of cognitive event. Second, it is argued that in some cases the activity of interpreting is a process to search for plausible assumptions for consistent explanatory hypotheses formation. As a result of these two theses, it is concluded that logic of interpretation (...)
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  33. Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions.Ian Proops - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (2):151-205.
    The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting”. This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that solution. One such consequence, it argues, is that (...)
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  34. ​The Nature and Structure of Content, by Jeffrey King, Oxford University Press, 2007. [REVIEW]Genoveva Martí & Dan Zeman - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):814-819.
  35. Interpretar y argumentar.María G. Navarro - 2009 - Spanish National Research Council/ Plaza & Valdés.
    Dentro de la tradición de la hermenéutica filosófica y, más específicamente, de la ontología hermenéutica del filósofo alemán H.G. Gadamer, "Interpretar y argumentar" constituye una indagación en el modelo de racionalidad propio ...
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  36. Bogus Singular Terms and Substitution Salva Denotatione.Rafal Urbaniak - 2009 - The Reasoner 3.
    This is the third installment of a paper which deals with comparison and evaluation of the standard slingshot argument (for the claim that all true sentences, if they refer, refer to the same object) with the doxastic formulation.
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  37. Slingshot Arguments: Two Versions.Rafal Urbaniak - 2009 - The Reasoner 3.
    The first installment of a paper comparing the standard slingshot argument with the doxastic version.
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  38. The Unity of the Fact.Stephen Read - 2005 - Philosophy 80 (3):317-342.
    What binds the constituents of a state of affairs together and provides unity to the fact they constitute? I argue that the fact that they are related is basic and fundamental. This is the thesis of Factualism: the world is a world of facts. I draw three corollaries: first, that the Identity of truth is mistaken, in conflating what represents (the proposition) with what is represented (the fact). Secondly, a popular interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, due to Steinus, whereby false propositions (...)
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  39. The Natural History of Fact.D. K. Johnston - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):275 – 291.
    The article provides an example of the application of the techniques and results of historical linguistics to traditional problems in the philosophy of language. It takes as its starting point the dispute about the nature of facts that arose from the 1950 Aristotelian Society debate between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. It is shown that, in some cases, expressions containing the noun fact refer to actions and events; while in other cases, such expressions do not have a referring (...)
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  40. Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism.Ian Proops - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (65):374-376.
    An article explicating Wittgenstein's logical atomism and surveying the relevant secondary literature.
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  41. Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift.A. Moffett Marc - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):81-97.
    The Problem of Doxastic Shift may be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the distribution of nominal complements of the form 'the φ that p' strongly suggests that 'that'-clauses cannot be univocally assigned propositional denotations; on the other hand, facts about quantification strongly suggest that 'that'-clauses must be assigned univocal denotations. I argue that the Problem may be solved by defining the extension of a proposition to be a set of facts or, more generally, conditions. Given this, the (...)
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  42. Truthmakers, Truthbearers and the Objectivity of Truth.Artur Rojszczak & Barry Smith - 2003 - In Jaako Hintikka (ed.), Philosophy and Logic: In Search of the Polish Tradition. Boston: Kluwer. pp. 229-268.
    The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski’s “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn of the century, (...)
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  43. Designating Propositions.Jeffrey C. King - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):341-371.
    Like many, though of course not all, philosophers, I believe in propositions. I take propositions to be structured, sentence-like entities whose structures are identical to the syntactic structures of the sentences that express them; and I have defended a particular version of such a view of propositions elsewhere. In the present work, I shall assume that the structures of propositions are at least very similar to the structures of the sentences that express them. Further, I shall assume that ordinary names (...)
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  44. Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain.I. Angelelli & P. Pérez-Ilzarbe (eds.) - 2000 - G. Olms.
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  45. Time and Propositions in Jerónimo Pardo.Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe - 2000 - In I. Angelelli & P. Pérez-Ilzarbe (eds.), Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain. G. Olms. pp. 54--251.
    From the medieval and post-medieval analyses dealing with propositions and time one gathers that their relation can be considered from various points of view. It could be said that there is not one "time" connected with a proposition, but several "times": following d'Ors, I will distinguish at least three: the time of the utterance, the time of the copula, and the time of truth. These three times of the proposition may or may not coincide. In these pages I propose to (...)
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  46. Fact-, Proposition-, and Event-Individuation.Philip L. Peterson - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:29-36.
    The distinctions among facts, propositions, and events are supported by linguistic analyses segregating factive, propositional, and eventive predicates. The concepts of fact, proposition, and event may be basic categories of human understanding, as well as being ontologically significant. FPE theory was developed in part to reject the identification of facts with true propositions. The degree of ‘fineness’ of individuations within each category results from how closely event-, fact-, or proposition-individuation mirrors linguistic semantic structure. Event structure is not reflected in many (...)
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  47. Davidson, Correspondence Truth and the Frege-Gödel-Church Argument.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Manuel Otero - 1998 - History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (2):63-81.
    This paper argues for a conditional claim concerning a famous argument—developed by Church in elucidation of some remarks by Frege to the effect that the bedeutung of a sentence is the sentence's truth-value—the Frege-Gödel-Church argument, or FGC for short. The point we make is this :if, and just to the extent that, Arthur Smullyan's argument against Quine's use of FGC is sound, then essentially the same rejoinder disposes also of Davidson's use of FGC against 'correspondence' theories of truth. We thus (...)
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  48. The Role of Thoughts in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Christopher Gilbert - 1998 - Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (4):341-352.
  49. On Denoting Propositions and Facts.Terence Parsons - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:441-460.
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  50. Logic and the Sachverhalt.Barry Smith - 1989 - The Monist 72 (1):52-69.
    Those who conceive logic as a science have generally favoured one of two alternative conceptions as to what the subject-matter of this science ought to be. On the one hand is the nowadays somewhat old-fashioned-seeming view of logic as the science of judgment, or of thinking or reasoning activities in general. On the other hand is the view of logic as a science of ideal meanings, 'thoughts', or 'propositions in themselves'. There is, however, a third alternative conception, which enjoyed only (...)
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