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Summary One approach to the nature of propositions takes them to be entities that exist pleonastically as a result of our practices of thinking and speaking.
Key works Schiffer 2003
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  1. added 2019-09-09
    Some Remarks on “Language-Created Entities”.Iris Einheuser - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):185-192.
    Some entities, such as fictional characters, propositions, properties, events and numbers are prima facie promising candidates for owing their existence to our linguistic and conceptual practices. However, it is notoriously hard to pin down just what sets such allegedly “language-created” entities apart from ordinary entities. The present paper considers some of the features that are supposed to distinguish between entities of the two kinds and argues that, on an independently plausible account of what it takes to individuate objects, the criteria (...)
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  2. added 2019-08-23
    The Things We Mean, by Stephen Schiffer. [REVIEW]Wayne Wright - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (18):191-197.
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  3. added 2019-08-15
    Schiffers’s Unhappy Face Solution to a Puzzle About Moral Judgement.Michael Smith - manuscript
    where, according to Schiffer, the concept of an F is pleonastic just in case the concept itself licenses entailments of the form: S ⇒ ∃xFx. These are what he calls "somethingfrom-nothing" entailments and the various practices in which such entailments are made are what he calls "hypostatisizing practices" (p.57). The concept of a proposition is pleonastic, according to this definition, because it licenses the move from a claim like 'Fido is a dog,' a claim containing only the singular term 'Fido' (...)
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  4. added 2019-08-15
    Review: Stephen Schiffer, The Things We Mean. [REVIEW]Nikola Kompa - 2008 - ProtoSociology 25:215-224.
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  5. added 2019-08-15
    The Things We Mean, by Stephen Schiffer.Robert J. Stainton - unknown
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  6. added 2019-08-15
    Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press UK.
    If there exist such things as the things we mean, then those things are also the things we believe, and the things in terms of which we must understand all semantic notions. If such entities as the things we mean and believe exist, an account of their nature must be the most foundational concern in the theory of linguistic and mental representation.Schiffer argues that there are such things as the things we mean and believe. They are what he calls pleonastic (...)
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  7. added 2018-09-06
    The Expressing Relation.Andrea Iacona - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (3):235-260.
    The paper deals with the question of what it is for a sentence to express a proposition. In the first part of the paper I argue that a certain notion of proposition widely adopted in contemporary philosophy is more theoretically loaded than is commonly assumed. The fact is that some properties are typically assigned to propositions, but no support for the claim that there are things with those properties can be found in the “evidence” from ordinary language. My point is (...)
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  8. added 2017-01-01
    The Concrete Modal Realist Challenge to Platonism.Matthew McGrath - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):587 – 610.
  9. added 2016-01-05
    From Remnants to Things, and Back Again.Thomas Hofweber - manuscript
    forthcoming in Meanings and other Things: essays on Stephen Schiffer Gary Ostertag (ed.) MIT Press 2007. Schiffer substantially changed his view about propositions and that-clauses somewhere between his two most recent books: Remnants of Meaning and The Things We Mean. I look at what problems his earlier view had, and what reason Schiffer gives for giving it up in favor of his more recent view. I argue that Schiffer’s reasons are not very good reasons, and that instead the problems for (...)
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  10. added 2016-01-05
    Pleonastic Entities: Fictional Characters and Propositions.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):65-78.
    Stephen Schiffer holds that propositions are pleonastic entities. I will argue that there is a substantial difference between propositions and fictional characters, which Schiffer presents as typical pleonastic entities. My conclusion will be that if fictional characters are typical pleonastic entities, then Schiffer fails to show that propositions are pleonastic entities.
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  11. added 2016-01-05
    Schiffer’s New Theory of Propositions. [REVIEW]Thomas Hofweber - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):211–217.
    Every fifteen years or so Stephen Schiffer writes a state of the art book on the philosophy of language, with special emphasis on belief ascriptions, meaning, and propositions. The latest is his terrific new book The Things we Mean. It is again full of ideas, insights, arguments, expositions, and theories. For us, however, who believe that that-clauses are first and foremost clauses, not referring expressions, and that they thus do not refer to propositions or anything else, The Things we Mean (...)
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  12. added 2015-09-28
    Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation.Kris McDaniel - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):757-768.
    The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are intensionally equivalent propositions, such that one proposition is true in virtue of the other but not vice versa. I focus on what our theory of propositions should look like when it's guided by metaphysical concerns about what is true in virtue of (...)
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  13. added 2014-02-17
    The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Stephen Schiffer presents a groundbreaking account of meaning and belief, and shows how it can illuminate a range of crucial problems regarding language, mind, knowledge, and ontology. He introduces the new doctrine of 'pleonastic propositions' to explain what the things we mean and believe are. He discusses the relation between semantic and psychological facts, on the one hand, and physical facts, on the other; vagueness and indeterminacy; moral truth; conditionals; and the role of propositional content in information acquisition and explanation. (...)
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  14. added 2013-11-07
    Propositions.Andrea Iacona - 2002 - Name.