This category has changed name
About this topic
Summary One approach to the nature of propositions takes them to be entities that exist pleonastically as a result of our practices of thinking and speaking.
Key works Schiffer 2003
Related categories

18 found
Order:
  1. added 2020-04-06
    Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic.Robert Trueman - forthcoming - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, I articulate and defend Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege’s insight that properties are not objects. According to this theory, properties are nothing but the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Fregean realism is the key to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley’s Regress and the Problem of Universals. I also argue that Fregean realism can be extended to cover states of affairs and propositions. According to this extended theory, states of affairs (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. added 2020-01-13
    The Things We (Sorta Kinda) Believe. [REVIEW]John MacFarlane - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):218–224.
    On Schiffer’s new view, propositions are easy to come by. Any that-clause can be counted on to express one. Thus, trivially, there are vague propositions, conditional propositions, moral and aesthetic propositions. And where propositions go, truth and falsity follow: barring paradoxical cases, Schiffer accepts instances of the schemata “the proposition that p is true iff p” and “the proposition that p is false iff not-p.” What isn’t easy to find, Schiffer thinks, is determinate truth. By the end of the book, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3. added 2019-12-12
    Review of Stephen Schiffer, The Things We Mean[REVIEW]Peter Pagin - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (7).
    After Meaning, 1972, and The Remnants of Meaning , 1987, The Things We Mean is Stephen Schiffer's third major work on the foundations of the theory of linguistic meaning. In simplest possible outline, the development started with a positive attempt to base a meaning theory on a modified Gricean account of utterance meaning, but took a negative turn, with the problems of belief sentences as a major reason for thinking that a systematic (compositional) semantic theory for natural language was not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-12-01
    Pleonastic Propositions and de Re Belief.Gary Ostertag - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    In The Things We Mean, Stephen Schiffer defends a novel account of the entities to which belief reports relate us and to which their that-clauses refer. For Schiffer, the referred-to entities—propositions—exist in virtue of contingencies of our linguistic practices, deriving from “pleonastic restatements” of ontologically neutral discourse. Schiffer’s account of the individuation of propositions derives from his treatment of that -clause reference. While that -clauses are referential singular terms, their reference is not determined by the speaker’s referential intentions. Rather, their (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2019-10-29
    Propositions: What They Could and What They Could Not Be.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2006 - Abstracta 2 (2):129-147.
    I defend the Fregean model of propositions: propositions are the referents of that-clauses and structured entities made of concepts. Schiffer has presented a group of arguments against the Fregean model and advanced an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is twofold: to counter each of his arguments sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic constituents of propositions; to maintain that the notion of pleonastic entity is not robust enough for claiming the existence of propositions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-10-08
    Pleonastic Propositions and the Face Value Theory.Alex Steinberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1165-1180.
    Propositions are a useful tool in philosophical theorizing, even though they are not beyond reasonable nominalistic doubts. Stephen Schiffer’s pleonasticism about propositions is a paradigm example of a realistic account that tries to alleviate such doubts by grounding truths about propositions in ontologically innocent facts. Schiffer maintains two characteristic theses about propositions: first, that they are so-called pleonastic entities whose existence is subject to what he calls something-from-nothing transformations ; and, second, that they are the referents of ‘that’-clauses that function (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-09-09
    Some Remarks on “Language-Created Entities”.Iris Einheuser - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):185-192.
    Some entities, such as fictional characters, propositions, properties, events and numbers are prima facie promising candidates for owing their existence to our linguistic and conceptual practices. However, it is notoriously hard to pin down just what sets such allegedly “language-created” entities apart from ordinary entities. The present paper considers some of the features that are supposed to distinguish between entities of the two kinds and argues that, on an independently plausible account of what it takes to individuate objects, the criteria (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2019-08-23
    The Things We Mean, by Stephen Schiffer. [REVIEW]Wayne Wright - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (18):191-197.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2019-08-15
    Schiffers’s Unhappy Face Solution to a Puzzle About Moral Judgement.Michael Smith - manuscript
    where, according to Schiffer, the concept of an F is pleonastic just in case the concept itself licenses entailments of the form: S ⇒ ∃xFx. These are what he calls "somethingfrom-nothing" entailments and the various practices in which such entailments are made are what he calls "hypostatisizing practices" (p.57). The concept of a proposition is pleonastic, according to this definition, because it licenses the move from a claim like 'Fido is a dog,' a claim containing only the singular term 'Fido' (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2019-08-15
    Review: Stephen Schiffer, The Things We Mean. [REVIEW]Nikola Kompa - 2008 - ProtoSociology 25:215-224.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2019-08-15
    The Things We Mean, by Stephen Schiffer.Robert J. Stainton - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2017-01-01
    The Concrete Modal Realist Challenge to Platonism.Matthew McGrath - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):587 – 610.
  13. added 2016-01-05
    From Remnants to Things, and Back Again.Thomas Hofweber - manuscript
    forthcoming in Meanings and other Things: essays on Stephen Schiffer Gary Ostertag (ed.) MIT Press 2007. Schiffer substantially changed his view about propositions and that-clauses somewhere between his two most recent books: Remnants of Meaning and The Things We Mean. I look at what problems his earlier view had, and what reason Schiffer gives for giving it up in favor of his more recent view. I argue that Schiffer’s reasons are not very good reasons, and that instead the problems for (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. added 2016-01-05
    Pleonastic Entities: Fictional Characters and Propositions.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):65-78.
    Stephen Schiffer holds that propositions are pleonastic entities. I will argue that there is a substantial difference between propositions and fictional characters, which Schiffer presents as typical pleonastic entities. My conclusion will be that if fictional characters are typical pleonastic entities, then Schiffer fails to show that propositions are pleonastic entities.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2016-01-05
    Schiffer’s New Theory of Propositions. [REVIEW]Thomas Hofweber - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):211–217.
    Every fifteen years or so Stephen Schiffer writes a state of the art book on the philosophy of language, with special emphasis on belief ascriptions, meaning, and propositions. The latest is his terrific new book The Things we Mean. It is again full of ideas, insights, arguments, expositions, and theories. For us, however, who believe that that-clauses are first and foremost clauses, not referring expressions, and that they thus do not refer to propositions or anything else, The Things we Mean (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  16. added 2015-09-28
    Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation.Kris McDaniel - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):757-768.
    The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are intensionally equivalent propositions, such that one proposition is true in virtue of the other but not vice versa. I focus on what our theory of propositions should look like when it's guided by metaphysical concerns about what is true in virtue of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. added 2014-02-17
    The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Stephen Schiffer presents a groundbreaking account of meaning and belief, and shows how it can illuminate a range of crucial problems regarding language, mind, knowledge, and ontology. He introduces the new doctrine of 'pleonastic propositions' to explain what the things we mean and believe are. He discusses the relation between semantic and psychological facts, on the one hand, and physical facts, on the other; vagueness and indeterminacy; moral truth; conditionals; and the role of propositional content in information acquisition and explanation. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   149 citations  
  18. added 2013-11-07
    Propositions.Andrea Iacona - 2002 - Name.