About this topic
Summary It seems that it's possible for Mary to utter the sentence ‘Whales are fish’ and thereby say that whales are fish. John might believe what Mary said, or not. If John and Mary both believe it then there is something that they both believe. That thing is false, however. That Mary can use that sentence to say that might be partly explained by the fact that ‘Whales are fish’ means that whales are fish. (The fact that Mary can use that sentence to convey that John doesn’t know much about Whales by adopting a certain tone of voice might also be partly explained by that meaning fact.) The preceding claims are not self-evident, but they are attractive. Taken at face value they suggest that there is a class of objects which can be believed, said, take truth values and serve as meanings. The standard name for such things is ‘propositions’. There are several debates at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics about the nature of these entities and the roles they should play in our philosophical theories.
Key works There have been several important books on the nature of propositions in recent years: Schiffer 2003; King 2007Soames 2010; Moltmann 2013King et al 2014; Hanks 2015; Merricks 2015. These focus on structured propositions. A classic account of propositions as sets of worlds is Stalnaker 1984.
Introductions Hanks 2009Stevens 2008
Related categories

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Material to categorize
  1. Esquisse d'Une Théorie Nominaliste de la Proposition.R. A.-M. - 1974 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (4):793-794.
  2. Securing Singular Thought About Merely Hypothetical Entities.Greg Ackerman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2193-2213.
    Although we are still in the dark when it comes to giving necessary and jointly sufficient criteria for what it takes to be thinking a singular thought, the paradigm cases are just ones where an agent is thinking about some particular object. When we erroneously think that Vulcan is a planet, our thought appears to be singular since it is, after all, about Vulcan. A promising way to explain this is to claim that there is something, a merely hypothetical entity, (...)
  3. On the Philosophy of Attitude Logic.Tuomo Aho - 1994 - Akateeminen Kirjakauppa.
  4. Proposition as the Connotation of Sentence.Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz - 1967 - Studia Logica 20 (1):87 - 98.
  5. The Logic of Hohfeldian Propositions.A. R. Anderson - 1970 - Logique Et Analyse 13 (49):231.
  6. Discussions: The Truth of Propositions.John Anderson - 1926 - Mind 35 (140):237-241.
  7. The Truth of Propositions.John Anderson - 1926 - Mind 35 (140):466-472.
  8. Content, Meaning, and Understanding.László Antal - 1964 - The Hague: Mouton.
  9. Judgements and Propositions: Logical, Linguistic, and Cognitive Issues.Sebastian Bab & Klaus Robering (eds.) - 2010 - Logos.
  10. Review of Krista Lawlor, New Thoughts About Old Things: Cognitive Policies As the Ground of Singular Concepts[REVIEW]Kent Bach - 2002 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (2).
  11. Information and Content: A Semantic Analysis.Yehoshua Bar-Hillel - 1955 - Synthese 9 (1):299 - 305.
  12. Meaning and Verifiability.W. H. F. Barnes - 1939 - Philosophy 14 (56):410 - 421.
    It is a widely held doctrine at the moment that metaphysical propositions are meaningless, are, in fact, not genuine propositions at all. This doctrine is supported by the contention that only propositions which are verifiable are significant: and it is held that metaphysical propositions do not fulfil this condition, and are consequently pseudo-propositions. Those who hold this view divide propositions into three classes: Tautologies; which are analytic, certain, and are guaranteed by the principle of contradiction. Factually significant propositions; which are (...)
  13. Fugitive Propositions Again.Rainer Bäuerle - 1978 - Analysis 38 (2):78 - 80.
  14. On the Logical Subject of the Proposition.E. C. Benecke - 1898 - Mind 7 (25):34-54.
  15. What is a Proposition?Jan Berg - 1967 - Logique Et Analyse 10:293-306.
  16. Imperfect Propositions.Andrea Bonomi - unknown
    The aim of this paper1 is to provide a unified semantic analysis for three important readings of the Italian Imperfetto (and Presente): the PROGressive, the HABitual, and the FUTurate reading. To highlight the role of the utterance context in setting the relevant parameters of interpretation, explicit temporal adverbials are left out of the scene and prominence is given to the situations where the context provides the temporal information required to discriminate between alternative readings, by exploiting a single logical form. The (...)
  17. Sense and Meaning.João Branquinho - 2005 - In Cognition and Content. Lisboa, Portugal:
    This paper discusses some relations between the notion of Fregean sense and the notion of linguistic meaning. It argues that these notions come apart from one another even in the case of non-indexical expressions. In particular, synonymous non-indexical expressions may be assigned different Fregean senses with respect to certain contexts of use.
  18. Achelier on La Proposition Et le Syllogisme. [REVIEW]Harold Chapman Brown - 1906 - Journal of Philosophy 3 (18):502.
  19. Paradigmatic Propositions.Harold I. Brown - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):85 - 90.
  20. Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment.Justus Buchler - 1951 - Dover Publications.
  21. Of the Proposition.Stewart Candlish & Nic Damnjanovic - 2012 - In Jl Zalabardo (ed.), Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 64.
  22. Not the Optimistic Type.Ben Caplan, Chris Tillman, Brian McLean & Adam Murray - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):575-589.
    (2013). Not the optimistic type. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 575-589.
  23. Propositions Negatable in Three Ways.David Carr - 1980 - Analysis 40 (4):214 - 219.
  24. Propositions. An Introduction.Massimiliano Carrara & Elisabetta Sacchi - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):1-27.
  25. Relations and the Identity of Propositions.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (4):237 - 244.
  26. The “Sneaky O” Proposition.F. F. Centore - 1970 - New Scholasticism 44 (4):600-602.
  27. What Is It to Act Upon a Proposition?Roderick Chisholm - 1961 - Analysis 22 (1):1 - 6.
  28. Teorie Del Giudizio.Gaetano Chiurazzi - 2005 - Aracne.
  29. Die Intentionalitätstheorie Anton Martys.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):175-214.
    The point of departure for Anton Marty's theory of intentionality is Franz Brentano's ontology of intentionality as outlined in the unpublished manuscript of his logic-lectures from the second half of the 1880's. This rich ontology comprises immanent objects, immanent propositional contents and states of affairs. The late Marty rejects all immanent entities in Brentano's sense and explains intentionality in terms of counterfactualconditionals.However,contraryto the late Brentano,he insists on the indispensability of the category of states of affairs. Consequently Marty can formulate a (...)
  30. The Meaning of Ethical Propositions.John A. Clark - 1947 - Philosophical Review 56 (6):631-644.
  31. New Thinking About Propositions.John Collins - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):842-845.
  32. Propositions.Larry Wear Colter - unknown
  33. Propositions.Larry Wear Colter - 1974 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
  34. Propositions.D. R. Cousin - 1948 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49:151 - 170.
  35. Sur Les Rapports Logiques Des Concepts Et Des Propositions.Louis Couturat - 1917 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 24 (1):15 - 58.
  36. Singular Thought.Tim Crane & Jody Azzouni - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):21-43.
    A singular thought can be characterized as a thought which is directed at just one object. The term ‘thought’ can apply to episodes of thinking, or to the content of the episode (what is thought). This paper argues that episodes of thinking can be just as singular, in the above sense, when they are directed at things that do not exist as when they are directed at things that do exist. In this sense, then, singular thoughts are not object-dependent.
  37. Propositionen.Lars Dänzer & Miguel Hoeltje - forthcoming - In Markus Schrenk (ed.), Handbuch Metaphysik. Metzler.
  38. Propositions.William Davie - 1979 - Philosophical Investigations 2 (2):65-66.
  39. The Art of Conjecture.Bertrand de Jouvenel - 1967 - New York: Basic Books.
    Reprint of: Art of conjecture / Translated from the French by Nikita Lary. -- New York, Basic Books [1967].
  40. La R'ef'erence Vide Th'eories de la Proposition.Alain de Libera - 2002
  41. G.F. Stout's Theory of Judgment and Proposition: Proefschrift Ter Verkrijging Van De Graad Van Doktor. der Schaar & Maria Sandra - 1991 - M.S. Van Der Schaar.
  42. The Meaning and Truth of Propositions in the'Summulae'by the Dominican Domingo De Soto (1494-1560).S. Di Liso - 2000 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 55 (4):547-564.
  43. Propositions Are Not Simple.Matt Duncan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):351-366.
  44. Fugitive Propositions.Austin Duncan-Jones - 1949 - Analysis 10 (1):21 - 24.
  45. A Historically Informed Defence of the Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment [Review of Samuel Lebens, Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: A History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement].Landon D. C. Elkind - 2018 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 38:89-96.
    Book Review: Samuel Lebens (2017) "Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement".
  46. Human Scientific Propositions.Lester Embree - 1992 - In D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester E. Embree & Jitendranath Mohanty (eds.), Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy. Indian Council of Philosophical Research in Association with Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. pp. 247.
  47. Common Sense Propositions: A. C. Ewing.A. C. Ewing - 1973 - Philosophy 48 (186):363-379.
    Philosophers have not been sceptical only about metaphysics or religious beliefs. There are a great number of other beliefs generally held which they have had at least as much difficulty in justifying, and in the present article I ask questions as to the right philosophical attitude to these beliefs in cases where to our everyday thought they seem so obvious as to be a matter of the most ordinary common sense. A vast number of propositions go beyond what is merely (...)
  48. Statements and What is Stated.Richard N. Faber - 1972 - Philosophical Studies 23 (1-2):32 - 47.
  49. Propositions as the Only Realities.Frederic B. Fitch - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1):99 - 103.
  50. The Reality of Propositions.Frederic B. Fitch - 1955 - Review of Metaphysics 9 (1):3 - 13.
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