Protophilosophy

Suppose we were to randomly pick out a book on Buddhism or Eastern Philosophy and turn to the section on 'no-self' (anatt?). On this central teaching, we would most likely learn that the Buddha rejected the Upanisadic notion of Self (?tman), maintaining that a person is no more than a bundle of impermanent, conditioned psycho-physical aggregates (khandhas). The rejection of ?tman is seen by many to separate the metaphysically 'extravagant' claims of Hinduism from the austere tenets of Buddhism. The status (...) quo has not, however, gone unchallenged. I shall join forces against this pernicious view, integrating some recent contributions into a sustained, two-pronged argument against no-?tman theories of anatt?. At the end it shall be suggested, in line with Thanissaro Bhikkhu, that anatt? is best understood as a practical strategy rather than as a metaphysical doctrine. (shrink)

Extending a nascent line of Asian philosophical research in music education, we mine Indian philosophies of music and education. Three key questions guide our project: What are Vedic philosophies of music? What are Vedic philosophies of education? Taken together, what insights can we draw for contemporary music education writ large? To address our questions, we analyze key passages from the Upanishads and synthesize ideas from these texts. A quartet of inter-related ideas emerge from our analysis: the guru, the shishya, vidya, (...) and moksha. In brief, the guru (teacher) is revered as one would god, for it is the teacher who leads the shishya (student) toward vidya (knowledge) and through that toward moksha (liberation of the soul), which can also be attained via making music, such as the singing of Om (the absolute sound). In addition to proffering insights for contemporary music education, particularly in terms of how the ancient Vedic guru-shishya parampara adds nuance to contemporary discussions on the master-apprentice model of music education, we imagine how music education philosophy might look like if it were to be sung. (shrink)

Of all the forces that have worked and are still working to mold the destinies of humans, none, certainly, is more potent than the manifestation of which we call religion. Generally, in life, we give importance only to those things that fulfill our daily needs. In this aspect, we take food, clothes, and dwelling as essential aspects of life, from which we accomplish our physical needs. But according to Swami Vivekananda, in this life, we are not bound to this physical (...) necessity. There are higher desires than this and continuous motivation to these higher desires leads to the ‘necessity of religion’. Now the question is that what role does religion play in our lives? Religion played a major role in Vivekananda’s ideas. To Vivekananda religion was not only talk or doctrine or theory but the realization of the best and strongest powers within oneself. He said – “it is being and becoming, not hearing or acknowledging; it is the whole soul becoming changed into what it believes.” Vivekananda believes that the essence of man lies in his soul, which he possesses in addition to his body and mind. While Swamiji defines education as ‘the manifestation of the perfection already in man.’ The aim of education is to manifest in our lives perfection, which is the very nature of our inner self. (shrink)

Krishna Del Toso offre una penetrante analisi della cultura indiana sotto la particolare prospettiva della pratica marziale e della dimensione agonistica, riconducendole alla grande matrice di senso che è l’azione sacrificale sullo sfondo del grande testo classico Ṛgveda.

Śankara did not comment on the first s ū tra in his Brahmas ū trabh āṣ ya, which was a common practice in such cases; rather, he started by defining two terms: ‘superimposition’ and ‘ignorance’, in a special introductory chapter known to a wider audience as Adhy ā sabh āṣ ya. The question arises as to why he deemed it necessary to precede his commentary to the initial s ū tra with these additional elucidations. Bh ā mat ī, Vācaspati Miśra’s (...) commentary on Mah ā s ū trabh āṣ ya, seems to shed some light on the problem. According to the doctrine of advaita, the phrase ‘desire to know Brahman’ in the first s ū tra seems prima facie to have no meaning. Thus, the introductory commentary is an explanation of an idea of Brahman which is foreign to advaita. (shrink)

book review: Sylvain Lévi, "La dottrina del sacrificio nei Brāhmaṇa. Con tre saggi di Roberto Calasso, Charles Malamoud e Louis Renou", traduzione di Silvia D’Intino. Adelphi, Milano 2009, 224 pp.

This Whiteheadian Dialogue explores a fresh and important cross-elucidatory path: What have we, and what can be learned from a dialogue with Eastern worldviews?

Previously (Vimal, 2009b) in Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies, we discussed (i) the dual-aspect-dual-mode proto-experience (PE)-subjective experience (SE) framework of consciousness based on neuroscience, (ii) its implication in war, suffering, peace, and happiness, (iii) the process of sublimation for optimizing them and converting the negative aspects of seven groups of self-protective energy system (desire, anger, ego, greed, attachment, jealousy, and selfish-love) into their positive aspects from both western and eastern perspectives. In this article, we summarize the recent development since then as (...) follows. (1) In (Vimal, 2009e), we rigorously investigated the classical and quantum matching and selection processes for precisely experiencing a specific SE in a specific neural-network. (2) In (Vimal, 2009i), we unpacked the quantum view of superposition related to the superposition-based hypothesis H1 of our framework in terms of subquantum dual-aspect primal entities (bhutatmas) and addressed the related explanatory gaps. (3) In, we developed alternative hypotheses of our framework, namely, the superposition-then-integration-emergence based H2, the integration-emergence based H3, the intelligent mechanism based H4, and the vacuum/Aether based H5. We concluded that our framework with H1 is the most optimal one because it has the least number of problems (Vimal, 2009j). (4) In, we found over 40 different but overlapping meanings attributed to the term ‘consciousness’ and suggested that authors must specify which aspect of consciousness they refer to when using this term to minimize confusion (Vimal, 2009f). (5) In, we proposed definitions of consciousness, qualia, mind, and awareness (Vimal, 2009h). (6) In, we investigated the necessary ingredients for access (reportable) consciousness: wakefulness, re-entry, attention, working memory and so on (Vimal, 2009g). (7) In, we discussed Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-origination with respect to our PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2009a). (8) In, we linked dynamic systems theory and fractal catalytic theory with standard representation theory using our framework (Vimal, 2009d). (9) In, we introduce the PE-SE aspects of consciousness in theoretical classical and quantum physics including loop quantum gravity and string theory (Vimal, 2009k). (10) In (Vimal, 2009c), we proposed that the SE of subject or ‘self’ in self-related neural-network is tuned to the self-related SEs/PEs superposed in other innumerable entities during samadhi state via matching and selection processes. This leads to bliss, ecstasy, or exceptionally high degree of climax at samadhi state. We conclude that, so far, the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework with hypothesis H1 is the most optimal framework for explaining our conventional reality because it has the least number of problems. (shrink)

The Papers In This Volume, Presented At A Seminar Organised By The Gurukula Kangri Viswavidyalaya, Offer A Kaleidoscopic View Of Myriad Aspects Of Himalayan Eco-System Like Causes Of Its Degradation, Impact Of Hydroelectric To Deforestation And Role Of Wild Life. The Deliberations Also Highlight The Relevance Of Vedic Philosophy In Conserving The Fragile Himalayan Eco-System.

The study of Vedas has been an ongoing endeavor for centuries with various interpretations made to understand their essence. A commentary by Sri Aurobindo on Rigveda discussed in his book "The Secret of the Veda" is considered to provide a deeper understanding of the teachings of the Vedas in a contemporary context, as it removes difficulties posed by the ancient form of Sanskrit and interpretations done over different times and contexts. This recomprehension of the Vedas aims to change the perception (...) of the Vedas from being a collection of nonsensical hymns to a more insightful and profound collection of teachings, drawing upon the works of modern scholars of Sanskrit. In this text, we aim to encapsulate the interpretation of Sri Aurobindo in a chapter form so that it becomes accessible to the general audience. (shrink)

In his adventurous monograph in comparative philosophy, The Origins of Philosophy in Ancient Greece and Ancient India, Richard Seaford offers to explain why philosophy, which on his account originated in the sixth century BCE separately in both Greece and India, took such a similar form in both cultures.

Agamben is slowly entering the English academy. This review shows how Agamben's understanding of poetry can and should inform the eschatological nature of the lyric. The review does its cultural work by rethinking poetry and the poetic impulse. The book under review by Claire Colebrook and Jason Maxwell, prepare us for messianic times and shows how Agamben critiques the Spinozist-Marxist project. This book's weaknesses lie in Agamben's hubris in glibly going on to write on Hinduism. & Colebrook and Mason have (...) been excused for not bothering with the religion of a poorer nation than theirs. After all, this reviewer never said that Hinduism is India's state religion. Leave it to others to state that. LOL. Agamben's onto-theology is brought out in this review as has been by Colebrook and Maxwell. (shrink)

A prevailing view among specialists is that Indian philosophy "proper" can only be philosophy written in Sanskrit and a few other Prakrits (any of the several Middle Indo-Aryan vernaculars formerly spoken in India), in a doxographical style, and along more or less clearly drawn scholastic lines. As such, it encompasses the entirety of speculative and systematic thought in India up to the advent of British colonial rule in the 19th Century. Minds Without Fear challenges this dominant view of the history (...) of Indian philosophy, arguing that Indian philosophy produced in English during the Raj does not mark a radical departure from its indigenous cultural forms so much as their appropriation in the service of intercultural philosophy. While necessarily politically fraught (given the status of English as the language of colonial power), the new vernacular becomes a vehicle for Enlightenment ideas of rationality and scientific progress, and serves as a new "scholarly metalanguage" in the formation of a modern Indian philosophical canon. (shrink)

Śankara did not comment on the first s ū tra in his Brahmas ū trabh āṣ ya, which was a common practice in such cases; rather, he started by defining two terms: ‘superimposition’ and ‘ignorance’, in a special introductory chapter known to a wider audience as Adhy ā sabh āṣ ya. The question arises as to why he deemed it necessary to precede his commentary to the initial s ū tra with these additional elucidations. Bh ā mat ī, Vācaspati Miśra’s (...) commentary on Mah ā s ū trabh āṣ ya, seems to shed some light on the problem. According to the doctrine of advaita, the phrase ‘desire to know Brahman’ in the first s ū tra seems prima facie to have no meaning. Thus, the introductory commentary is an explanation of an idea of Brahman which is foreign to advaita. (shrink)

The above problem is discussed with the use of the example of selected canonical Upanishads. The analysis starts with a fragment from the Mundaka Upanishad : “When he [ brahman ] that is both high [ para ] and low [ apara ] is seen”. In my opinion, this very conjoining of the absolute and relative reality, which is considerably rare in the canonical texts, requires in-depth analysis. In the discussed texts, the para / apara dimensions of reality are strictly (...) correlated with the states of consciousness in which they are experienced. Thus, in my discussion, I also consider whether all yoga adepts have always been talking about experiencing the four states of consciousness. I discuss the terms which denote the para and apara dimensions as well as the question whether the text indicates their hierarchy and, if this is the case, in what contexts and in what respect. I refer to the canonical Upanishads which belong to the Atharvaveda lineage, i.e. to Prashna, Mundaka, and Mandukya. (shrink)

The Upaniṣads, as one of the trilogy of principal Vedāntic texts, the oldest and the most fundamental of them, have exposed a more or less detailed discussion on dreaming, taking it whether as the factual object of their discourse or as a symbol. However, there has been a debate between different schools of Vedāntic philosophy about oneirology, science of dreams and their interpretation, discussion of nature of the dream state, its reality and unreality. This paper, after a short study of (...) oneirology in the Vedas and Upaniṣads, examines argumentations of four great philosophers of different Vedāntic schools, Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva, pertaining to dreams. (shrink)

[Dream and Reality between India and Greece].

[The Soul Chariot Allegory in Plato and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad].

Apūrvaṃ vyākaraṇakauśalam ity āstām: “let it remain an example of unprecedented grammatical skill” — thus sarcastically remarks the Dvaitin commentator Jayatīrtha on Śaṅkarācārya’s sleight of hand to turn written saṃbhūti into asaṃbhūti at one of the many difficult turns the Īśa Upaniṣad has in store for his strictly monistic stance. But Jayatīrtha’s own master Madhva is renowned in his own right for his “unprecedented skill” in conjuring up whole unattested smṛti passages to corroborate his interpretations. Indeed, more specimens of “unprecedented (...) skill” are displayed in turn by each of the great bhāṣyakāras of the three conflicting schools — Advaita, Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita — on this Upaniṣad, which on account of its extreme pithiness is singularly suited to demonstrate the length dārśanikas are willing to go to make an authoritative text square each with his own preconceived philosophical outlook. A most telling example of the preemptive force of world-views on actual theoretical practice in the Indian context. (shrink)

I argue that, in one sense, collective wisdom can save civilization. But in a more important sense, collective wisdom should be understood as a form of civilization, as the result and expression of a moral civilizing-process that comes about through the creation and transmission of collective interpretations of human experience and human nature. Collective wisdom traditions function in this manner by providing an interpretation of what it means to be human and what thoughts, skills, and actions are required to live (...) a successful human life at the most general level of analysis. Collective wisdom can have a civilizing effect on individuals, and indirectly on societies, by providing a type of orienting framework for understanding the proper relationship between the self, others, and the world. Such traditions in effect provide a “blueprint” for the successful human life as such, by providing guidance on thought and action, on what is appropriate to think, feel, desire, and do in theoretical and practical contexts. A wise individual will be a 'civilized' individual in this moral sense, an individual who is properly habituated and educated so as to now reflectively endorse and desire thinking and acting in virtuous ways. However, this understanding of collective wisdom and civilization is in many ways today controversial and met with justified critiques and skeptical criticisms. To defend this way of approaching and answering our question against these critiques, I turn to ancient wisdom traditions from ancient India, China, and Greece as paradigms for understanding exactly how collective wisdom can achieve the end of civilizing humanity. Based on this analysis, I sketch the outlines of a revitalized ancient wisdom tradition able to civilize individuals today, but such a tradition must be updated to reflect the advancement of modern natural science and to meet the demands of living in our diverse, pluralistic, and globalized world. (shrink)

While acknowledging a certain affinity between his own thought and the Vedanta concept of a world-soul or universal spirit, Josiah Royce nevertheless locates this concept primarily in what he terms the Second Conception of Being—Mysticism. In his early magnum opus, The World and the Individual, Royce utilizes aspects of the Upanishads in order to flesh out his picture of the mystical understanding of and relationship to being. My primary concern in the present investigation is to introduce some nuance into Royce’s (...) conception of Indian thought, which may then serve to suggest similar possibilities for nuance for Royce’s conception of the Absolute. I will attempt to do in two primary ways: first, I will consider Royce’s use of Indian thought via the Upanishads in explicating his second historical conception of Being. I will then turn briefly to Emerson’s poem ‘Brahma’ and the Bhagavad Gita to see if a certain reversal that occurs in both places problematizes Royce’s depiction of the universal spirit in Indian thought as well as opens up new possibilities for Royce’s own Absolute. (shrink)

Truth and reality are not the same. Truth is experience of reality. Reality is perception of outside physical world and mental phenomenon. Truth is absolute and must be the same for every one though expressions may differ. But Reality is relative to the mental makeup and capacity of the individuals.

Aphoristic work, with translation and commentary on Vedanta philosophy.

Exposition of Advaita based on selections from the Vedāntaparibhāsā by Dharmarājādhvarindra, 17th cent., Yatīndramatadīpikā by Śrīnivāsadāsa, 17th cent., and Śrībhāsya by Rāmānuja, 1017-1137; with profuse quotations.

Interpretation of the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, work on Vedanta philosophy.

Aphoristic work on Vedanta philosophy with Sanskrit commentary and English translation.

Aphoristic work on Vedanta philosophy; Sanskrit text with French translation.

Sanskrit text with verse translation in English and Hindi.

Description: The Vedantasutra of Badarayana is one of the great philosophical works of India. It deals with those fundamental questions concerning man's existence, that still remain an enigma despite all attempts of eminent philosophers and religious leaders both past and present, of this world at unravelling its mysteries. The teachings of the Vedas, the doctrines of contemporary philosophers and the purport of important passages from Upanisads are its subject-matter. It is at once a repository of all earlier knowledge, a genesis (...) for further philosophical speculation and an evaluating scale for new metaphysical ideas. Its scope being universal and timeless, Badarayana resorted to a terse and aphoristic style for compressing a vast body of knowledge into such brief statements that could easily be memorized. The sutras are something more than an aphorism; for each, though brief to the point of being obscure, is so pregnant with meaning that interpretation has become difficult and resulted in the growth of an unending line of commentators, both Indian and foreign, spanning centuries from Sankara the earliest, passing through Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Srikantha, Nimbarka, Sripati, Vallabha, Suka, Baladeva to Radhakrishnan the latest. This book, known as the Govinda Bhasya, is the commentary of Baladeva, who was a disciple of Sri Caitanya the famous Vaisnavite saint of Bengal. Its approach is theistic and based on the teachings of Madhva and Caitanya. The English translation is faithful to the original. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Śankara did not comment on the first s ū tra in his Brahmas ū trabh āṣ ya, which was a common practice in such cases; rather, he started by defining two terms: ‘superimposition’ and ‘ignorance’, in a special introductory chapter known to a wider audience as Adhy ā sabh āṣ ya. The question arises as to why he deemed it necessary to precede his commentary to the initial s ū tra with these additional elucidations. Bh ā mat ī, Vācaspati Miśra’s (...) commentary on Mah ā s ū trabh āṣ ya, seems to shed some light on the problem. According to the doctrine of advaita, the phrase ‘desire to know Brahman’ in the first s ū tra seems prima facie to have no meaning. Thus, the introductory commentary is an explanation of an idea of Brahman which is foreign to advaita. (shrink)

[Does the gymnosophist’s reply to Alexander’s question on the origin of time indeed reflect an Indian doctrine?] The episode of Alexander’s interview with the gymnosophists has come down to us in several versions, among which the one in Plutarch’s Vita Alexandri is the most renowned. In this connection, the question arises whether the solutions given by the naked philosophers to the puzzles propounded by Alexander can be shown to reflect genuine Indian doctrines. Challenging Dumézil’s reply in the affirmative, the author (...) contends that they cannot. While most questions and answers are scarcely relevant to the investigation, as being of little (if any) philosophical import, the analysis concentrates on the more significant ones, and especially on the solution offered to the question as to which of the two — day or night — came first. According to Dumézil, the gymnosophist’s answer reported by Plutarch, i. e. that the day came first, by one day, reflects the vedic doctrine of the primeval cosmogonic role of Dawn and Light. Against this may be argued in the first place that such doctrine does not enjoy any prominent status in the Vedas themselves — quite to the contrary, it stands up disadvantegeously to many all-important texts, such as the Nāsadīyasūkta, which assign the primeval status to Darkness — and cannot therefore be regarded as being specifically Indian any more than its opposite. Secondly, it is shown that the Greek tradition is at great variance on this very point, to the extent that all logically conceivable solutions (i. e., precedence of day by one day / day by one night / night by one day / night by one night) are represented in some version or other. This inconsistency appears to stem from the fact that no particular doctrine (Indian or whatever) was envisaged; according to the present author, we have reason to believe that the gymnosophist’s reply was rather meant to set off by means of a paradox the sheer impossibility of a solution (all four alternatives being equivalent to that effect). This interpretation is reinforced by the gymnosophist’s own remark confessing the aporetical nature of his reply, and finally by a further recourse to paradox — this time a variant of the well-known “paradox of the liar” — which the author lays bare in the otherwise inexplicable dénouement of the anecdote. (shrink)

This paper attempts to give a critical appraisal of Professor Suresh Chandra’s views on Historiography of Civilization with reference to Dravidian Civilization. “Historiography of Indian Civilization: Harappans, Dravidians, Aryans and Gandhi’s freedom struggle” (published in JICPR June 1996) and “Demythologizing History: Dravidians in Relation to Harappans and the Aryans” (presented in the seminar on Dravidian Philosophy organized by Dravidian University, Kuppam) are the two significant works which are devoted to Historiography of civilization by Prof. Suresh Chandra. This paper mainly confines (...) to the first article since the second one, as the author himself stated, is an offshoot of the first. (shrink)

book review: Sylvain Lévi, "La dottrina del sacrificio nei Brāhmaṇa. Con tre saggi di Roberto Calasso, Charles Malamoud e Louis Renou", traduzione di Silvia D’Intino. Adelphi, Milano 2009, 224 pp.