Pseudoscience

In this paper, I draw attention to a revolution in the metaphysical commitments of Western astrology. Although I do not wish to promote astrology, I propose a rational route to this revolution. But there is a strong argument, from a Popperian perspective, that my proposal fails to establish rationality. I then consider whether we should say that astrology is either false or unfalsifiable, drawing attention to some surprising findings from schizophrenia research. Also, in a footnote I present “Tompkins’ paradox.”.

An argument is presented according to which exposing pseudo-scientific medical claims may be ethically wrong. It is then suggested that this argument gives an interesting explanation why the successful outing of pseudo-science may lead to an increase in medical pseudo-science overall.

Un domeniu, practică, sau set de cunoştinţe, ar putea în mod rezonabil să fie numit pseudoştiinţă atunci când este prezentat ca fiind în conformitate cu normele de cercetare ştiinţifică, dar din punctul de vedere al demonstraţiei nu respectă aceste norme. Karl Popper a declarat că nu este suficient să se facă distincţia între ştiinţă şi pseudoştiinţă, sau metafizică, prin criteriul de aderare riguroasă la metoda empirică, care este în esenţă inductivă, bazată pe observare sau experimentare. El a propus o metodă (...) de a distinge între metode empirice autentic, nonempirice sau chiar pseudoempirice. (shrink)

In this chapter we examine Moti Mizrahi’s claim that philosophers’ opposition of scientism is founded on their worry that scientism poses “a threat to the soul or essence of philosophy as an a priori discipline”. We find Mizrahi’s methodology for testing this thesis wanting. We offer an alternative hypothesis for the increased resistance of scientism: the antipathy started as a reaction to the New Atheist movement. We also consider two varieties of weak scientism, narrow and broad, and argue that narrow (...) versions of scientism draw unnatural and unfounded distinctions within science. Mizrahi belongs somewhere between these two types, but he commits the same mistakes as proponents of the narrow variety. We demonstrate that Mizrahi’s defence of weak scientism is problematic, once again, due to methodological reasons. As an alternative, we propose that weak scientism should be based on epistemic opportunism. Epistemic opportunism explains the success of science with scientists’ willingness to adopt any methods that demonstrably work. We also show how opportunistic scientism can avoid charges of triviality. (shrink)

Definitions of ‘pseudoscience’ are required to heed the established usage of the definiendum by subsuming those cases that are generally considered to be pseudoscientific, and by excluding those that are considered sciences. In this paper I sample the published record to assess the consensus on pseudoscience case classifications. The review finds inconclusive evidence for an overall agreement. However, the frequent usage of a small number of pseudoscience-cases indicates that these are considered paradigms of pseudoscience. I briefly discuss some practical implications (...) of these findings for the pseudoscience demarcation project. (shrink)

In contemporary society, “science” signifies authoritative understanding of the natural world; therefore “pseudo”-science means claimed but inauthentic, false knowledge about nature; and “fringe” science, between those two, means doubtfully trustworthy knowledge. In any case, whether or not it is a conscious decision and whether or not it is admitted, attributing authoritative understanding to science entails accepting the religion of scientism, the belief that scientific knowledge is superior to any other claims of knowledge. But the content of “science” is created by (...) human beings. Once it is conceded that science is fallible, as all human activities are bound to be, it becomes clear that anymainstream “scientific consensus” is also fallible; and therefore heterodox claims of knowledge should be greeted, initially at least, with a degree of tolerance and a willingness to consider evidence, to seek objective facts before judging something to be false knowledge, or, in contemporary jargon, “fake news.” The subtitle of this essay was inspired by the life (and work) of Oscar Wilde, who was only one among an uncountable host of human beings who have suffered seriously from the intolerance of their fellow human beings, the intolerance of the societies in whichthey lived. The intolerance Wilde faced may have had nothing directly to do with science, but it did indirectly: Declaring and believing his sexual preferences to be “unnatural” and therefore abhorrent presumed, with great dogmatic earnestness, that we command authentic knowledge about what is natural. (shrink)

The demarcation between science and pseudoscience is a long-standing problem in philosophy of science. Although philosophers have been hesitant to engage in this project since Larry Laudan announce...

For a long time, philosophers of science have expressed little interest in the so-called demarcation project that occupied the pioneers of their field, and most now concur that terms like “pseudoscience” cannot be defined in any meaningful way. However, recent years have witnessed a revival of philosophical interest in demarcation. In this paper, I argue that, though the demarcation problem of old leads to a dead-end, the concept of pseudoscience is not going away anytime soon, and deserves a fresh look. (...) My approach proposes to naturalize and down-size the concept, anchoring it in real-life doctrines and fields of inquiry. First, I argue against the definite article “the” in “the demarcation problem”, distinguishing between territorial and normative demarcation, and between different failures and shortcomings in science apart from pseudoscience. Next, I argue that pseudosciences can be fruitfully regarded as simulacra of science, doctrines that are not epistemically warranted but whose proponents try to create the impression that they are. In this element of imitation or mimicry, I argue, lies the clue to their common identity. Despite the huge variety of doctrines and beliefs gathered under the rubric of “pseudoscience”, and the wide range of defects from which they suffer, pseudosciences all engage in similar strategies to create an impression of epistemic warrant. The indirect, symptomatic approach defended here leads to a general characterization of pseudosciences in all domains of inquiry, and to a useful diagnostic tool. (shrink)

After a review of previous uses of the term “pseudotechnology”, a definition is proposed: “A pseudotechnology is an alleged technology that is irreparably dysfunctional for its intended purpose since it is based on construction principles that cannot be made to work”. The relationship between pseudotechnology and pseudoscience is discussed, and so is the relationship between pseudotechnology and the much weaker concept of technological malfunction. An explanation is offered of why pseudotechnology is much more seldom referred to than pseudoscience: dysfunctional technology (...) usually reveals itself when put to use, whereas dysfunctional science tends to be more difficult to disclose. (shrink)

Après un examen des emplois antérieurs du terme « pseudotechnologie », une définition est proposée : « Une pseudotechnologie est une technologie présumée, irrémédiablement dysfonctionnelle pour l’usage auquel elle est destinée, puisqu’elle est basée sur des principes de construction qui ne peuvent pas être mis en œuvre ». La relation entre la pseudotechnologie et la pseudoscience est examinée, tout comme la relation entre la pseudotechnologie et le concept beaucoup plus faible de malfonction technologique. Une explication est proposée de la raison (...) pour laquelle la pseudotechnologie est beaucoup plus rarement mentionnée que la pseudoscience : le dysfonctionnement d’une technologie se manifeste généralement au moment de son utilisation, tandis que le dysfonctionnement d’une science est généralement plus difficile à établir. (shrink)

This paper reviews how research on the demarcation problem has developed, starting from Popper’s criterion of falsifiability and ending with recent naturalistically oriented approaches. The main differences between traditional and contemporary approaches to the problem are explicated in terms of six postulates called the traditional assumptions. It is argued that all of the assumptions can be dismissed without giving up on the demarcation problem and that doing so might benefit further discussions on pseudoscience. Four present-day research movements on evaluating the (...) boundaries of science are introduced: (1) philosophy of pseudoscience, (2) social epistemology of dissent, (3) agnotology, and (4) evaluation of expertise. Researchers working within these areas have abandoned some or all traditional assumptions. (shrink)

Bilim felsefesinin temel tartışma konuları arasında yer alan bilimde rasyonalite ve sınır çizme problemleri, bilimin ne olduğundan hareketle, bilime bir alan belirleme, bilim olan ile olmayan arasına bir sınır çizme, söz konusu sınırı ve bilimi belirli bir rasyonalite düşüncesiyle temellendirme talepleri doğrultusunda şekillenen, birbiriyle bağlantılı iki problemdir. Bilimde rasyonalite ve sınır çizme problemleri, özellikle 20. yüzyıldan itibaren, mantıkçı pozitivizmle birlikte, temel bir konu olarak gündeme gelmektedir. Mantıkçı pozitivistler, bilimin sınırlarını belirlemek, bu doğrultuda bilim olmayanı bilimden elemek üzerinde durmaktadır. Metafiziğin bilimden (...) elenmesi, bilimsel metot, bilimsel açıklama söz konusu anlayışın temel tartışma konularını oluşturmaktadır. Mantıkçı pozitivistler bilimsel ölçüt olarak doğrulanabilirlik ilkesini ve bu ilkeye eşlik eden mantıksal çözümleme yöntemini öne sürmektedir. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the analysis of conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy theories by taking into consideration some of the major contributions about the topic presently provided by several disciplines. A definition is given that helps illustrate the most prominent features of these beliefs, namely monological bias, logical and conceptual fallacies, dispositional influence and pseudorationality. Other important psychological preconditions are also provided (such as, among others, credulity, hypersensitive agency detection devices and proneness to self-deception), but, as the paper argues, they are (...) features shared to a greater or lesser extent with other belief systems, like radical political ideologies and religious fundamentalisms. As a result, it is suggested that a more proper understanding of the phenomenon is attainable by approaches combining psychological data with the analysis of groups and sociopolitical dynamics. Exceptional contingencies and shifts in power distribution among group/social actors seem to be the most influential factors that explain formation, spread and salience of this kind of beliefs. (shrink)

Homoeopathy is commonly recognised as pseudoscience. However, there is, to date, no systematic discussion that seeks to establish this view. In this paper, we try to fill this gap. We explain the nature of homoeopathy, discuss the notion of pseudoscience, and provide illustrative examples from the literature indicating why homoeopathy fits the bill. Our argument contains a conceptual and an empirical part. In the conceptual part, we introduce the premise that a doctrine qualifies as a pseudoscience if, firstly, its proponents (...) claim scientific standing for it and, secondly, if they produce bullshit to defend it, such that, unlike science, it cannot be viewed as the most reliable knowledge on its topic. In the empirical part, we provide evidence that homoeopathy fulfils both criteria. The first is quickly established since homoeopaths often explicitly claim scientificity. To establish the second, we dive into the pseudo-academic literature on homoeopathy to provide evidence of bullshit in the arguments of homoeopaths. Specifically, we show that they make bizarre ontological claims incompatible with natural science, illegitimately shift the burden of proof to sceptics, and mischaracterise, cherry-pick, and misreport the evidence. Furthermore, we demonstrate that they reject essential parts of established scientific methodology and use epistemically unfair strategies to immunise their doctrine against recalcitrant evidence. (shrink)

In a recent paper, José Ángel Gascón extends the Frankfurtian notion of bullshit to the sphere of argumentation. On Frankfurt’s view, the hallmark of bullshit is a lack of concern for the truth of an utterance on the part of the bullshitter. Similarly, Gascón argues, the hallmark of argumentative bullshit should be viewed as a lack of concern for whether the reasons that are adduced for a claim genuinely support that claim. Gascón deserves credit for drawing attention to the idea (...) of argumentative bullshit. Nevertheless, we argue, his treatment leaves room for further refinement as he fails to clarify important points and misidentifies several features of argumentative bullshit. In particular, Gascón’s account fails to accommodate non-Frankfurtian forms of argumentative bullshit. This paper aims to amend and extend his proposal and proposes a general account that can encompass both Frankfurtian and non-Frankfurtian forms of argumentative bullshit. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada öğrencilerin bilimle tanışmasında anahtar rol oynayan sınıf öğretmenlerinin ve geleceğin sınıf öğretmeni olan sınıf öğretmeni adaylarının bilimin doğasına yönelik görüşlerinin ve bilim-sözde bilim ayrımı inanışlarının incelenmesi ve değişkenler açısından değerlendirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Araştırmanın çalışma grubu Orta Karadeniz Bölgesi’nde yer alan bir ilin merkez ilçesinde yer alan 344 sınıf öğretmeni ve bu ilde sınıf öğretmenliği bölümünde öğrenim gören 240 öğrenci olarak belirlenmiş, gönüllülük esasına dayalı olarak 172 öğretmen ve 136 öğretmen adayından veri toplanmıştır. Bu araştırmada veriler ‘Sözde-Bilim İnanış Ölçeği’ ve (...) ‘Bilimin Doğası İnanışları Ölçeği’ kullanılarak elde edilmiştir. Konunun farklı değişkenler açısından değerlendirilmesi amacıyla ölçekler dışında ‘Kişisel Bilgi Formu’ kullanılmıştır. Özcan ve Turgut (2014) tarafından geliştirilen ‘Bilimin Doğası İnanışları Ölçeği’ 7 faktör ve 37 sorudan oluşmaktadır. Ölçekle ilgili yapılan analizlerde ölçeğin güvenirlik katsayısı 0,70 olarak bulunmuştur. Ölçek yetişkin grubu için hazırlandığından faktör analizi yeniden yapılmamıştır. Çetinkaya ve Taşar (2018) tarafından geliştirilen ‘Sözde-Bilim İnanış Ölçeği’ 3 faktör ve 21 sorudan oluşmaktadır. Ölçek ortaokul öğrencileri için hazırlandığından ve bu çalışmada da yetişkin grubu ile uygulama yapıldığından faktör analizi yeniden yapılmıştır. (shrink)

Toplumların gelişmesi, kendisini oluşturan bireylerin bilimsel düşünmelerine ve yaşamlarında bilimsel bilgileri kullanmalarına bağlıdır. Bilimsel düşünerek yaşamını devam ettiren bireylerin yaşamlarında hata yapma olasılıkları daha düşüktür. Çünkü bilgi, öğrenmeler, araştırmalar ve gözlemler sonucu elde edilen doğrulara ve ilkelere dayanır. Bilimsel bilgi ise geçerli ve kabul edilebilir metotlar kullanarak yapılan araştırmalar sonucu gözlemler yoluyla elde edilen bilgilerdir. Bilimsel bilgiler doğruluğu ve geçerliği defalarca kanıtlanmış kanunlaşmış bilgilerdir.

The present work explores what is distinctive about science by analyzing the nature of scientific knowledge within a wider than conventional framework: broadening the focus on “physical science” to...

Fen eğitimi ve öğretiminin anahtar unsurlarından bir tanesi bilimin doğasının ve özelliklerinin doğru bir şekilde tespit edilmesidir. Bilimin doğasına yönelik tespitler fen eğitimi yöntemlerini birçok açıdan etkilemektedir. Fen eğitimi ve fen öğretimi ile ilgili olan kişiler bilimin doğasının açık bir şekilde öğretilmesi gerektiğini kabul etmektedir. Thomas Kuhn’un bilim tarihi, bilim felsefesi ve bilim sosyolojisi alanlarını içeren incelemeleri neticesinde ileri sürdüğü bilimin yapısına, işleyişine ve doğasına yönelik tezleri (paradigma, olağan bilim, bilimsel devrimler, eşölçülemezlik, bulmaca çözme, kuram seçimi, keşif ve gerekçelendirme ayrımı) (...) fen eğitimi ve öğretimi alanında sıklıkla başvurulan kaynaklar olmuştur. Bu doğrultuda makalede mantıkçı pozitivist bilim anlayışının bilimin nesnel, evrensel, kesin gerçekleri ortaya çıkaran, sosyal-kültürel değerlerden ve ön yargılardan bağımsız, bilimsel bilginin birikimsel bir şekilde ilerlediği yönündeki iddiası bilimin gerçek doğasını yansıtamadığı düşüncesiyle Kuhn’un görüşleri çerçevesinde tartışılmaktadır. Makalenin temel savı Kuhn’un bilime ve bilimin doğasına yönelik tespitlerinin bilimin gelişen, dönüşen ve değişen yapıdaki gerçek doğasına vurgu yaptığı ve böylece fen eğitiminde sıklıkla başvurulan bilimin doğasına yönelik kavrayışı dönüştürdüğüdür. (shrink)

It has become almost a cliché to say that we live in a post-truth world; that people of all trades speak with an indifference to truth. Speaking with an indifference to how things really are is famously regarded by Harry Frankfurt as the essence of bullshit. This paper aims to contribute to the philosophical and theoretical pragmatics discussion of bullshit. The aim of the paper is to offer a new theoretical analysis of what bullshit is, one that is more encompassing (...) than Frankfurt’s original characterization. I part ways with Frankfurt in two points. Firstly, I propose that we should not analyze bullshit in intentional terms (i.e. as indifference). Secondly, I propose that we should not analyze it in relation to truth. Roughly put, I propose that bullshit is best characterized as speaking with carelessness toward the evidence for one’s conversational contribution. I bring forward, in the third section, a battery of examples that motivate this characterization. Furthermore, I argue that we can analyze speaking with carelessness toward the evidence in Gricean terms as a violation of the second Quality maxim. I argue that the Quality supermaxim, together with its subordinate maxims, demand that the speaker is truthful (contributes only what she believes to be true) and reliable (has adequate evidence for her contribution). The bullshitter’s main fault lies in being an unreliable interlocutor. I further argue that we should interpret what counts as adequate evidence, as stipulated by the second Quality Maxim, in contextualist terms: the subject matter and implicit epistemic standards determine how much evidence one needs in order to have adequate evidence. I contrast this proposed reading with a subjectivist interpretation of what counts as having adequate evidence and show that they give different predictions. Finally, working with a classic distinction, I argue that we should not understand bullshit as a form of deception but rather as a form of misleading speech. (shrink)

Muitos psicólogos ainda pensam que a maior referência para falar sobre a demarcação de ciência/pseudociência é Popper. Entretanto, as discussões sobre o problema da demarcação não se encerraram com o critério da falseabilidade, e a filosofia teve diversos avanços. Este trabalho tem por objetivo atualizar os estudantes e profissionais de psicologia sobre os avanços no campo da filosofia da ciência, com um enfoque na teoria de Hansson. Para isso, foi consultado o livro “Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem”, obra (...) que marcou o começo da reviravolta sobre o alegado fim do problema da demarcação, bem como os ensaios de Hansson disponíveis na literatura. Foi possível observar que, após Popper, Laudan foi outro filósofo que teve um importante impacto no debate. Ele tentou decretar o fim da discussão, tratando a demarcação como um pseudoproblema, e afirmando que todas as tentativas de demarcar ciência/pseudociência anteriores haviam fracassado, incluindo a de Popper. Por muito tempo seu decreto vigorou, até que novas teorias foram desenvolvidas e filósofos da ciência começaram um movimento para contrapô-lo. Uma das teorias contemporâneas é a de Hansson, que propõe uma definição ampliada de ciência, não se resumindo às ciências empíricas. Para ele, ciência é a prática que nos fornece as afirmações mais confiáveis que podem ser feitas, em um determinado momento, sobre um objeto de estudos abarcado por uma comunidade de disciplinas de conhecimento. Já a pseudociência, para Hansson, é uma doutrina desviante que se afasta consideravelmente dos critérios de qualidade científicos, enquanto seus maiores proponentes tentam criar a impressão de que ela representa o que há de mais confiável sobre seu objeto de estudos. A proposta de Hansson também apresenta uma lista de multicritérios, que auxiliam a identificar se uma determinada doutrina é pseudocientífica. Ela inclui os seguintes itens: 1) Credo na autoridade, 2) Experimentos não repetíveis, 3) Exemplos escolhidos a dedo, 4) Resistência à testagem, 5) Desdém com informações refutantes, 6) Construída em subterfúgio, e 7) Explicações são abandonadas sem substituição. Ao discutir as propostas contemporâneas para o problema da demarcação, psicólogos e analistas do comportamento terão melhores recursos para diferenciar ciência da pseudociência. (shrink)

Introduction: In the past, psychoanalysis was classified as a pseudoscience. Karl Popper was one of those who objected to the idea that psychoanalysis is a science, using falsifiability. However, falsifiability cannot be considered sufficient anymore, since it carries major weaknesses and better alternatives to address the issue are available. Objective: This article intends to evaluate the scientific status of psychoanalysis concerning the demarcation problem. Method: In order to do so, Sven Ove Hansson’s criteria were used. His proposal consists of a (...) set of sufficient and necessary conditions which is complemented by a multicriteria list that helps identifying pseudosciences. It was analyzed how much psychoanalysis fits each of Hansson's seven items, besides proposing the addition of an eighth. Results: The results showed that psychoanalysis was compatible with all eight demarcation of pseudoscience’s items. Conclusion: In the end, the conclusion was that even if falsifiability was to be dismissed, the evidence suggests that there are still enough reasons to affirm that psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience, since it significantly deviates from scientific quality standards. (shrink)

Sözde-bilim ile ilgili bu tartışmalar uluslararası literatürde yapılıyor olsa da Türkiye’de henüz bu konuların eleştirel olarak ele alındığı söylenemez. Dolayısıyla sözde-bilimlerin eleştirel olarak ele alındığı öğrenme ortamlarının öğrencilerin bilime ve sözde-bilime ilişkin algılarına etkisi üzerine yapılacak araştırmalar konunun daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlayabilir ve belki de ilerideki program değişiklerinde öğretim programlarında sözde-bilimin yer bulmasının yolunu açabilir.

The core thesis of this book is that to understand the implications of incentive structures in modern higher education, we require a deeper understanding of associated issues in the philosophy of science. Significant public and philanthropic resources are directed towards various forms of research in the hope of addressing key societal problems. That view, and the associated allocation of resources, relies on the assumption that academic research will tend towards finding truth – or at least selecting the best approximations of (...) it. The present book builds on, and extends, contributions in philosophy and higher education to argue that this assumption is misplaced: with serious implications for modern higher education and its role in informing societal decisions and government policy. The book develops a philosophical foundation for the analysis of the connection between higher education incentives, scientific progress and societal outcomes. That in turn is used to demonstrate how the current approach to incentivising intellectual and scientific progress is likely not only to fail, but in fact to cause harm on the very dimensions it purports to improve. The arguments presented are illustrated with examples from medicine and academic economics, making the book one of the first to examine issues of scientific progress and social consequences across the human and social sciences. In doing so, it develops a novel critique of modern economics that in turn provides a more philosophically substantive foundation for popular critiques of economics than has existed to date. (shrink)

Bilim ve çarpık bilim arasına sınır çizebilmek için yapılan girişimler farklı teorilerin gelistirilmesini sağlamıştır. Henüz net bir sınır çizilememiştir ve tartışmalar devam etmektedir. İlk olarak doğrulama ve yanlışlama teorileri daha sonraları ise bilim çalışmalarını bir bütün olarak ele alan, araştırma programları olarak gören teoriler sunulmuştur. Bilimsel çalışmaların, yeni sorunlar üretmesi ve eleştirel bakış açısına sahip olması da bilim olanın sınırlarını çizebilmek için ölçütler arasında sayılmıştır. Bu çabalar ile bilim pratiklerinin irdelenmesi zamanla bilim insanına ve bilim kurumlarına yönelmiştir. Bu konunun önemli (...) bir sorunu bilim yolu ile ulaşabileceğimiz doğru bilginin ne olduğu ile neyin bilim olarak ele alınabileceğinin tek bir sorun gibi ele alınmasıdır. Bilimsel doğrunun ne olduğu ile bilimsel bilginin ne olduğu tartışması iç içe yürütülmektedir. Bir diğer sorun ise bilimin sınırlarını belirlerken bilim çalışmaları dışında etik ve sosyal ölçütler aranmasıdır. Bu yaklaşımlar konuyu çözümsüz bir noktaya götürmektedir. Diğer önemli nokta Astroloji örneğinin yanlış bilgilerle ele alınmasıdır. Bu çalışmada tartışmanın bilim pratiklerinde kalması gerektiği savunulmuştur. Çarpık bilimi ayırmak için sık kullanılan Astroloji örneği yeniden ele alınarak yanlış yargılara sebep olan bilgiler düzeltilmeye çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca önermelerin bilimsel doğruyu ayırma konusundaki önemi ve durumu tartışılmış böylece neyin bilim, neyin bilimsel doğru ve neyin bilim dışı olduğu netleştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. (shrink)

The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a priori (...) reasoning, and therefore might be considered artificial or too vague. When we base our position on contemporary behavioural sciences, we can see that the epistemic character of believers in pseudoscience is for the most part determined by two related factors. Firstly, these epistemic agents show a higher level of cognitive laziness. By this I mean an inability or unwillingness to engage in reflective thinking and a reluctance to account for counterevidence. Secondly, they yield more easily to metacognitive overconfidence. This can be broadly understood as so-called “knowledge illusion”, the inability to recognize one’s own intellectual limits. The deficiency usually stems from a misunderstanding of the division of cognitive labour and of the agent’s role in epistemic society. I find the proposed epistemological approach to pseudoscience crucial. Only if we understand the descriptive aspects of the problem, can we think of normative solutions to it. (shrink)

An old philosophical problem of delineating science from pseudoscience has in today’s world far superseded the task of unearthing sufficient and necessary conditions which science should be able to satisfy and on which pseudoscience would fall short. Our interests have shifted from the search for the rigorous criteria of demarcation, to describing various scientific and pseudoscientific activities – as well as bringing the psychological backgrounds of beliefs in numerous pseudoscientific theories to light. We aim to pinpoint some of the key (...) characteristics of said activities and the strategies they employ. Also, we attempt to answer the question of why are individuals prone to believing various conspiracy theories, alternative historical explanations and other pseudoscientific theories. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada; bilim, sözdebilim ayrımına yönelik tasarlanan öğretim etkinliklerinin, 7. sınıf öğrencilerinin sözdebilimsel inançlarına ve eleştirel düşünme becerilerine etkisini araştırmak ayrıca hangi bilimsellik ve hatalı bilimsellik ölçütlerine sahip olduklarını belirlemek amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaçlar doğrultusunda araştırmanının modeli iç içe karma desen olarak belirlenmiştir. Çalışma, 2018-2019 eğitim öğretim yılının ikinci döneminde, Kocaeli ili Başiskele ilçesinde bulunan bir devlet ortaokulunda gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışmanın nicel kısmında bir deney (n=29) ve bir kontrol (n=30) grubu olmak üzere 59 öğrenci, nitel kısmında ise deney grubunda bulunan 29 öğrenci (...) bulunmaktadır. On hafta süren araştırmada deney grubunda; farklı sözdebilimsel içerikler yer alan bilim, sözde–bilim ayrımı bağlamında hazırlanan etkinlikler ile öğretim gerçekleştirilmiş, kontrol grubundaysa mevcut öğretim programında öngörülen etkinliklerle ders işlenmiştir. Çalışmaların tamamı seçmeli bilim uygulamaları derslerinde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Veri toplama aracı olarak; Sözdebilim İnanç Ölçeği, Eleştirel Düşünme ölçekleri Takımı ve araştırmacı tarafından geliştirilen öğrenci görüşme formları kullanılmıştır. Verilerin analizinde, karışık ölçümler için iki yönlü varyans analizi ve içerik analizi kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca veri analizlerinde, SPSS 18.0 paket programı ve Nvivo 12 nitel veri analizi programından yararlanılmıştır. Araştırmanın bulgularına göre, 7. sınıf öğrencilerinin eleştirel düşünme becerileri orta, sözdebilimsel inançları yüksektir. Tasarlanan öğretim etkinlikleri öğrencilerin eleştirel düşünme becerilerini arttırmış, sözdebilimsel inançlarını azaltmıştır. Öğrenci görüşlerinde tespit edilen hatalı bilimsellik ölçütleri, mantığa bürüme, etkililik, bilimsel kavramlar içerme, otoriteye dayanma, kaynak içerme, geçmişten gelen bilgi ve çoğunluk görüşüdür. Öğrenci görüşlerinde tespit edilen bilimsellik ölçütleri ise ölçütleri kanıtlanabilirlik, test edilebilirlik, tutarlılık, tekrarlanabilirlik, bilim dünyasının desteği, mantığa aykırılık ve kasıtlı bilimsel jargondur. Yapılan sözdebilimsel içerikli etkinlikler arasında öğrencilerin en fazla hataya düştükleri etkinlikler astroloji ve antik astronot kuramı olmuştur. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada; bilim, sözdebilim ayrımına yönelik tasarlanan öğretim etkinliklerinin, 7. sınıf öğrencilerinin sözdebilimsel inançlarına ve eleştirel düşünme becerilerine etkisini araştırmak ayrıca hangi bilimsellik ve hatalı bilimsellik ölçütlerine sahip olduklarını belirlemek amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaçlar doğrultusunda araştırmanının modeli iç içe karma desen olarak belirlenmiştir. Çalışma, 2018-2019 eğitim öğretim yılının ikinci döneminde, Kocaeli ili Başiskele ilçesinde bulunan bir devlet ortaokulunda gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışmanın nicel kısmında bir deney (n=29) ve bir kontrol (n=30) grubu olmak üzere 59 öğrenci, nitel kısmında ise deney grubunda bulunan 29 öğrenci (...) bulunmaktadır. On hafta süren araştırmada deney grubunda; farklı sözdebilimsel içerikler yer alan bilim, sözde–bilim ayrımı bağlamında hazırlanan etkinlikler ile öğretim gerçekleştirilmiş, kontrol grubundaysa mevcut öğretim programında öngörülen etkinliklerle ders işlenmiştir. Çalışmaların tamamı seçmeli bilim uygulamaları derslerinde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Veri toplama aracı olarak; Sözdebilim İnanç Ölçeği, Eleştirel Düşünme ölçekleri Takımı ve araştırmacı tarafından geliştirilen öğrenci görüşme formları kullanılmıştır. Verilerin analizinde, karışık ölçümler için iki yönlü varyans analizi ve içerik analizi kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca veri analizlerinde, SPSS 18.0 paket programı ve Nvivo 12 nitel veri analizi programından yararlanılmıştır. Araştırmanın bulgularına göre, 7. sınıf öğrencilerinin eleştirel düşünme becerileri orta, sözdebilimsel inançları yüksektir. Tasarlanan öğretim etkinlikleri öğrencilerin eleştirel düşünme becerilerini arttırmış, sözdebilimsel inançlarını azaltmıştır. Öğrenci görüşlerinde tespit edilen hatalı bilimsellik ölçütleri, mantığa bürüme, etkililik, bilimsel kavramlar içerme, otoriteye dayanma, kaynak içerme, geçmişten gelen bilgi ve çoğunluk görüşüdür. Öğrenci görüşlerinde tespit edilen bilimsellik ölçütleri ise ölçütleri kanıtlanabilirlik, test edilebilirlik, tutarlılık, tekrarlanabilirlik, bilim dünyasının desteği, mantığa aykırılık ve kasıtlı bilimsel jargondur. Yapılan sözdebilimsel içerikli etkinlikler arasında öğrencilerin en fazla hataya düştükleri etkinlikler astroloji ve antik astronot kuramı olmuştur. (shrink)

While concern about public irrationality and antiscientific movements is not new, the increasing power of right-wing populist movements that promote distrust of expertise and of scientific institutions gives such concerns a new context. Experience with classic pseudosciences such as creationism, and the long-running efforts by defenders of science to oppose such pseudosciences, may also help us understand today’s post-truth populism. The politics of creationism and science education in the United States and in Turkey does not, however, suggest easy answers. Moreover, (...) there are important features of politics in liberal democracies that drive a populist backlash, which makes it counterproductive for defenders of science to call for deference to all forms of expertise claimed by professionals. There is a danger that the rhetoric of reason that is used to defend science will become part of a more general apologetics for an unsustainable status quo. (shrink)

As I write this preface, the world faces unbridled polarisation. Not far from here, the streets of Barcelona are burning due to violent riots, driven by postmodern identity politics and recalcitrant doxastic narcissism. Worldwide, clashes of irreconcilable, often extravagant, conceptions shape current controversies over key social issues and global challenges. Political campaigns spread disinformation as routine, aimed at increasing the isolation and radicalisation of social groups. As a result, authoritarian governments are flourishing among consolidated democracies, such as the United States, (...) Brazil, Poland, Italy, Hungary, the United Kingdom, and Mexico. In other countries, such as France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland, populists parties that propose regressive policies are gaining momentum, promoting the fracture of civic epistemology. This political situation emerges from a lower level phenomenon: echo-chambers of information elicited by filter bubbles and consumer-oriented algorithms. These days, people do not need demagogue politicians or professional charlatans to bring them into contact with, and embolden them to accept, disinformation. Instead, the generalised post-truth situation must be considered a pathology of communication that affects almost all dimensions of our cultural landscape: as hot cognition boosts the rejection of evidence-based discussion over identity-related issues, critical thinking is widely perceived as threatening to internalised partisanship and ingroup bias. Predictably, unfounded beliefs thrive under these conditions. Influential groups successfully promote alternative epistemologies through the denial of scientific facts — e.g. anthropogenic climate change, scientific consensus on the safety of vaccination, or well-documented disinformation on Brexit and the like. Science and universities are exploited in order to defend corporate interests. Fake news, corrupt journalism, and other forms of manipulation of public opinion goes unpunished. Social networks, as the dominant model of interpersonal communication, are a hotbed of epistemic agitation. In general terms, fact acceptance has come to be understood as a tribal process, thus leaving behind modern standards of public reason and critical assessment. This situation is not new: humanity has always been involved in all sorts of biases and dishonest motives. Nevertheless, the current upsurge of irrationality arises from its technical intensification. This special issue is aimed at aiding understanding of this state of affairs, as the philosophical analysis of pseudoscience and post-truth is a subject with great social relevance — a fascinating journey through the dark side of human cognition, not sufficiently taken into account within current philosophical discussions. Despite not having clearly delineated sections, it is structured in three thematic clusters. The first cluster deals with the general elucidation and ramifications of post-truth. The second cluster analyses specific instances of disinformation and misconceptions, particularly in relation to pseudoscience as a social affair and organised scepticism. Lastly, the third cluster is composed of a heterogeneous set of reflections on the cultural implications of post-truth and pseudoscience, including education and virtue epistemology. I would like to thank the authors who have participated in this special issue. As a guest editor, I’m proud of having worked with you all, and of the magnificent manuscripts included in this monograph. Moreover, I would like to thank the editor-in-chief of this journal, Paulo Vélez León, for his kind invitation and his courageous support. (shrink)

What is pseudo-science and when do charges of pseudo-scientific thinking generally arise? These questions are answered by looking at six examples where the charge of pseudo-science has arisen: anti-vaccination and the claims that it causes illnesses, Creationism – the claim that the Bible is literally true –, chiropractic and claims about curing cancer and the like, pre-Darwinian evolution, that is developmental hypotheses before the Origin of Species, Immanuel Velikovsky and his book, Worlds in Collision, and the Gaia hypothesis that the (...) Earth is an organism. It is agreed that there is an objective foundation to charges of pseudo-science and the author’s testimony in a court case in Arkansas in 1981, arguing that Creationism is not genuine science, is used to support this claim. Karl Popper’s criterion of demarcation invoking falsifiability is a key notion here. However, it is argued that charges of pseudo-science occur most frequently when conventional practitioners are under threat. Then claims of pseudo-science are used to attack the non-conventional opposition. The examples are used to support this conclusion. (shrink)

Finding the demarcation criterion for the identification of scientific knowledge is the most important task of normative epistemology. Pseudoscience is not a harmless leisure activity, it can pose a danger to the functioning of liberal democratic societies and the well-being of their citizens. First, there is an outline of how to define science instrumentally without slipping into the detrimental heritage of conceptual essentialism. The second part is dedicated to Popper’s falsification criterion and the objections of its opponents, which eventually led (...) to the abandonment of “naïve” falsificationism. Then I present two promising solutions to the problem, namely the ostensive definition of pseudoscience and the cognitive research of pseudoscientific thinking. In conclusion, I suggest to further extend the typology of alternatives to science to include parascience. (shrink)

Since Popper and Lakatos, the demarcation line between science and non-science has been considered one of the fundamental issues of the philosophy of science. According to Lakatos, pseudoscience is a non-science, which appears as science, using science's public authority. Since then, mountains of texts have been published on how non-sciences, such as astrology, are not sciences. -/- But the enemy is not on the other side of the border. The enemy is in our midst. Science has been institutionalized. The best (...) way to do the pseudoscience is to fuss inside the big enterprise recognized as a science. (shrink)

In this article, I seek to improve upon a definition of pseudoscience put forward by Sven Ove Hansson. I argue that not only does its use of ‘pseudoscientific statement’ as definiendum inadequately address the theoretical issue of demarcation, it also makes the definition inapt for practical demarcation. Moreover, I argue that Hanson’s definition subsumes statements and associated practices that are forms of bad science, resulting in an unfavourably wide concept. I try to save the definition from the brunt of this (...) critique by arguing that some pseudoscientific statements are particularly significant when demarcating a discipline as a pseudoscience. (shrink)

An argument that what makes science distinctive is its emphasis on evidence and scientists' willingness to change theories on the basis of new evidence. Attacks on science have become commonplace. Claims that climate change isn't settled science, that evolution is “only a theory,” and that scientists are conspiring to keep the truth about vaccines from the public are staples of some politicians' rhetorical repertoire. Defenders of science often point to its discoveries (penicillin! relativity!) without explaining exactly why scientific claims are (...) superior. In this book, Lee McIntyre argues that what distinguishes science from its rivals is what he calls “the scientific attitude”—caring about evidence and being willing to change theories on the basis of new evidence. The history of science is littered with theories that were scientific but turned out to be wrong; the scientific attitude reveals why even a failed theory can help us to understand what is special about science. McIntyre offers examples that illustrate both scientific success (a reduction in childbed fever in the nineteenth century) and failure (the flawed “discovery” of cold fusion in the twentieth century). He describes the transformation of medicine from a practice based largely on hunches into a science based on evidence; considers scientific fraud; examines the positions of ideology-driven denialists, pseudoscientists, and “skeptics” who reject scientific findings; and argues that social science, no less than natural science, should embrace the scientific attitude. McIntyre argues that the scientific attitude—the grounding of science in evidence—offers a uniquely powerful tool in the defense of science. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to determine the perceptions of gifted and talented 4th grade primary school students towards pseudoscience, as well as their awareness of scientific process skills by using pseudoscientific scenarios. Specifically, the aim is to reveal the students’ knowledge about crystals, which is a pseudoscientific issue, views on treatments carried out with crystals, experiences about experiments, knowledge about scientific process skills and scientific process skills used in proposing research methodology for claims about crystals’ healing abilities.

e first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. (...) -/- America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. Hence my essay “Suicide by Democracy”. It is also now clear that the seven sociopaths who rule China are winning world war 3, and so my concluding essay on them. The only greater threat is Artificial Intelligence which I comment on briefly in the last paragraph. (shrink)

Feyerabend is well-known as a pluralist, and notorious for his defences of, and sympathetic references to, heterodox subjects, such as parapsychology. Focusing on the latter, I ask how we should understand the relationship between the pluralism and the defences, drawing on Marcello Truzzi's and Martin Gardner's remarks on Feyerabend along the way.

A critical analysis of twenty-one demarcation criteria is carried out, obtaining as a result a demarcating tool that allows appropriate screening between science and pseudoscience. After an introduction that will emphasize the scientific and social relevance of the demarcation problem and the need of an adequate approach to face it, the specific problems of multicriterial attempts will be remarked, such as their lack of theoretical foundations and the presence of dispensable and contradictory items. On the basis of this first analysis, (...) a metacriterion, the necessary general requirements for a demarcation criterion, will be established. The data analysis will show a lack of progress among demarcation criteria from 1964 to date, and will provide a demarcation criterion partially based on the items with greater support. (shrink)

Die Medizin ist nur eines von vielen Beispielen, die zeigen, wie wichtig die Unterscheidung zwischen Wissenschaft und Pseudowissenschaft ist. Wer wissenschaftlich erforschte Arzneimittel verwendet, der maximiert seine Chance auf Heilung. Wer sich dagegen auf pseudowissenschaftliche Präparate verlässt, der verschenkt diese Chance oder schadet sich sogar. Aus diesem Grund ist die Frage, wie man Pseudowissenschaften erkennt, nicht nur von wissenschaftsphilosophischem Interesse. Es handelt sich dabei um eine enorm wichtige, lebenspraktische Frage. Der folgende Beitrag stellt zehn Kriterien vor, die bei der Unterscheidung (...) von Wissenschaft und Pseudowissenschaft helfen. (shrink)

A chapter of the book Elogio del Cientificismo.

Un ghid util pentru începători în astrologie, cu informații practice și sfaturi utile despre erele astrologice, semnele astrologice, zodiac, horoscop, planete astrologice și astronomice, și despre astrologiile chineză, hindusă și occidentală. Aplicarea practică a astrologiei în diferite domenii ale activității umane. Principiile de bază ale astrologiei au fost stabilite în parte încă din antichitate, fiind rezumate în maxima hermetică “cum e sus, aşa şi jos“. Tycho Brahe a folosit o frază similară pentru a rezuma studiile SHOP SHOP SALE în astrologie: (...) suspiciendo despicio, “privind în sus văd în jos”. Multe tradiţii astrologice se bazează pe poziţiile şi mişcările relative ale diferitelor corpuri cereşti şi pe reţelele cereşti calculate sau implicate considerate la momentul şi locul evenimentului studiat. Sunt luate în considerare în special planetele astrologice, stelele, nodurile lunare, zonele arabe pentru calcularea horoscopului, şi planetele ipotetice. Modelul de referinţă pentru astfel de poziţii aparente este definit de zodiacul tropical sau sideral al celor douăsprezece semne pe de o parte, şi de orizontul local (axele ascendent – descendent) şi axele mediană a cerului – imum coeli (fundul cerului), pe de altă parte. Cel de al doilea model local este de obicei divizat în douăsprezece case astrologice. Mai departe, unghiurile planetare astrologice sunt folosite pentru a determina relaţiile geometrice / unghiulare dintre diferite corpuri şi unghiuri cereşti în calcularea horoscopului. În Occident, liderii politici au consultat adeseori astrologii. De exemplu, agenția de informații britanice MI5 a angajat pe Louis de Wohl ca astrolog după ce s-a aflat că Adolf Hitler a folosit astrologia pentru a stabili momentele acțiunilor SHOP SHOP SALE . După ce John Hinckley a avut o tentativă de asasinare a președintelui american Ronald Reagan, prima doamna Nancy Reagan a solicitat astrologului Joan Quigley să fie astrologul secret al Casei Albe. CUPRINS: Astrologia - Etimologie - Istoria - - Lumea antică - - Egiptul elenistic - - Grecia și Roma - - Evul Mediu - Principii și practici - - Principiile de bază ale astrologiei - - Astrologia occidentală - - Astrologia hindusă - - Astrologia chineză și din Asia de Est - Puncte de vedere teologice - - Antichitate - - Evul Mediu - - Epoca modernă - Analiza științifică și critici - - Demarcație - - Eficacitatea - - Lipsa de mecanisme și coerență - Impactul cultural - - Politica și societatea occidentală - - India și Japonia - - Literatură și muzică Ere astrologice - Aspecte controversate ale erelor astrologice - Abordarea consensului pentru erele astrologice - Ere de durate egale sau variabile - Tranziții ale erelor - Alte păreri cu privire la erele astrologice - Aspecte de calcul - - Primul punct de aliniere în Berbec - punctul fiduciar - Ere prezente și viitoare - - Era Peştilor - - Era Vărsătorului - Sub-perioadele erelor astrologice - - Subperioadele de la Berbec la Pești - - Subperioadele dwadasamsa - - Direcția subperioadelor (înainte sau retrograd?) - Mituri noi, alternative și marginale - - Abordarea alternativă la calibrarea precesiei Semne astrologice - Semnele zodiacale occidentale - - Istoria și simbolismul zodiacului - - Polaritatea și cele patru elemente - - Cele trei modalități - - Dominații planetare - - Demnitate și detriment, înălțare și cădere - - Clasificări suplimentare - Astrologia indiană - - Nakshatras - Semnele zodiacului chinezesc - - Simbolismul zodiacului - - Cele douăsprezece semne - - Cele cinci elemente - Zodiacul - - Nume - - Utilizare - - Constelații - - Tabel de date - - Precesiunea echinocțiilor - - În astronomia modernă - - Caractere Unicode Factori tehnici - Aspecte astrologice - - Abordare - - Aspecte majore - - - Conjuncția - - - Sextilul - aspect intermediar major/minor - - - Pătratul - - - Trigonul - - - Opoziţia - - - Declinări - Planete în astrologie - - Simbolism planetar - - - Mișcarea zilnică - - Istorie - - Planete clasice - - - Soare - - - Luna - - - Mercur - - - Venus - - - Marte - - - Jupiter - - - Saturn - - Planetele moderne - - - Uranus - - - Neptun - - - Pluto - - - Ceres Tradiţii în astrologie - Tradiţii istorice - Tradiţii ezoterice - Astrologia chineză - - China și Asia de Est - - Calendarul luni-solar - - - Tabel calendaristic de șaizeci de ani - Astrologia hindusă - - Istorie - - Astrologia hindusă modernă - - - Poziționarea astrologiei - - Elemente - - - Rāśi - semne zodiacale - - - Nakṣatra - case lunare - - - Daśā - perioade planetare - - - Graha - planete - - - Gochara - tranziții - - - Yoga - combinații planetare - - - Bhāva - case - - - Dṛṣṭi - aspecte - Astrologia occidentală - - Principii de bază - - Zodiac - - - Cele douăsprezece semne - - - Astrologia semnului Soarelui - - Planetele - - - Planetele clasice - - - Nodurile Lunii - - - Demnitate esențială Tipuri de astrologii - Astrologia medicală - - Prezentare generală - Astrologia orară - - Abordare - - Atribuirea caselor - - Întoarcerea diagramei - - Interpretare - Astrologia horoscopică - - Ramuri ale astrologiei horoscopice - - - Astrologia natală - - - Astrologia lumească - - - Astrologia alegerii - - - Astrologia orară - Astrologia natală - - Caracteristici importante - - Diagrama de ponderare - - - Ponderare de semn - - - Semnătura diagramei - - - Ponderare de casă - - Modelarea diagramei - - - Modele de aspecte - - - Emisfere - - - Modele Jones - - Evaluarea științifică - - - Experimentul Carlson - - - Dean si Kelly - - - Efectul Marte - Astrologia psihologică - - Origini - - Moştenirea jungiană - - Alte abordări psihologice - - Filozofie - - Critici - - Cercetare - Astrologia siderală și astrologia tropicală - - Istorie - - Tradiții siderale - - - Astrologia hindusă - - - Astrologia siderală occidentală - Astrologia semnului Soarelui - - Istorie - - Semnele Soarelui - Astrologia sinoptică . (shrink)