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  1. added 2020-05-08
    Animals, Advance Directives, and Prudence: Should We Let the Cheerfully Demented Die?David Limbaugh - 2016 - Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 2 (4):481-489.
    A high level of confidence in the identity of individuals is required to let them die as ordered by an advance directive. Thus, if we are animalists, then we should lack the confidence required to apply lethal advance directives to the cheerfully demented, or so I argue. In short, there is consensus among animalists that the best way to avoid serious objections to their account is to adopt an ontology that denies the existence of brains, hands, tables, chairs, iced-tea, and (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-01
    Two Sides of the Same Coin? Neutral Monism as an Attempt to Reconcile Subjectivity and Objectivity in Personal Identity.Iva Apostolova & Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2020 - Metaphysica 21 (1):129-149.
    Standard views of personal identity over time often hover uneasily between the subjective, first-person dimension, and the objective, third-person dimension of a person’s life. Since both dimensions capture something integral to personal identity, we show that neither can successfully be discarded in favor of the other. The apparent need to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity, however, presents standard views with problems both in seeking an ontological footing of, as well as epistemic evidence for, personal identity. We contend that a fresh look (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-26
    Valores grafométricos y su relación con los 16 factores de personalidad.Sergio Barrera Rodríguez, J. Guzmán-González & F. Sánchez-García - 2019 - Scientia in Verba Magazine 4 (supl. 1):1-13.
    A la par del desarrollo del concepto de personalidad se han desarrollado múltiples formas de evaluación que han resultado prolíficas para la psicología en distintas ramas, popularmente la grafología goza de aceptación en algunas disciplinas de la psicología, aunque en existan limitadas investigaciones que avalen su validez y confiabilidad. El objetivo del siguiente trabajo es describir la relación entre los elementos de la expresión gráfica de los participantes y sus rasgos de personalidad con el fin de verificar si hay alguna (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-24
    Philosophy as Fiction: Self, Deception, and Knowledge in Proust.Joshua Landy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Philosophy as Fiction seeks to account for the peculiar power of philosophical literature by taking as its case study the paradigmatic generic hybrid of the twentieth century, Marcel Proust's In Search of Lost Time. At once philosophical--in that it presents claims, and even deploys arguments concerning such traditionally philosophical issues as knowledge, self-deception, selfhood, love, friendship, and art--and literary, in that its situations are imaginary and its stylization inescapably prominent, Proust's novel presents us with a conundrum. How should it be (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-20
    To Thine Own Selves Be True-Ish: Shakespeare’s Hamlet as Formal Model.Joshua Landy - 2018 - In Tzachi Zamir (ed.), Shakespeare’s Hamlet: Philosophical Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: pp. 154-87.
    This chapter presents the core challenge before Hamlet as that of achieving authenticity in the face of inner multiplicity. Authenticity—which this chapter will take to mean (1) acting on the (2) knowledge of (3) what one truly is, beneath one’s various masks and social roles—becomes a particularly pressing need under conditions of (early) modernity, when traditional forms of action-guidance are at least halfway off the table. But authenticity is highly problematic when the self that is discovered turns out to be (...)
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  6. added 2020-04-20
    Still Life in a Narrative Age: Charlie Kaufman's Adaptation.Joshua Landy - 2011 - Critical Inquiry 37 (3):497-514.
    We are living in an age that is narratively obsessed: both in the academy and in popular culture, temporally articulated phenomena currently exert a vice-like grip over the collective imagination. Under such conditions, how may non-narrative sources of aesthetic power be made available once again to human observers? Charlie Kaufman’s response, in Adaptation, takes the form not of statements but of actions, of “philosophical therapy” for our insatiable narrative hunger. It leaves us, in the end, with two phenomena that have (...)
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  7. added 2020-04-20
    "Les Moi En Moi": The Proustian Self in Philosophical Perspective.Joshua Landy - 2001 - New Literary History 1 ( 32):91-132.
    This essay discusses Proust’s theory of selfhood. Throughout the novel, it argues, Proust’s protagonist struggles with the problem of finding or constructing a self that is both unique and enduring, in the face not only of change across time but also of serious division at any given moment, as the various faculties vie for control. Involuntary memory offers a partial solution, by revealing the existence within us of an aspect that is both individuating and stable—namely, our perspective. Our perspective, however, (...)
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  8. added 2020-04-03
    Rationality and Future Discounting.Arif Ahmed - 2018 - Topoi 39 (2):245-256.
    The best justification of time-discounting is roughly that it is rational to care less about your more distant future because there is less of you around to have it. I argue that the standard version of this argument, which treats both psychological continuity and psychological connectedness as reasons to care about your future, can only rationalize an irrational—because exploitable—form of future discounting.
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  9. added 2020-03-17
    Introduction to the Collection.Andrea Sauchelli - 2020 - In Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. London, UK: pp. 1-9.
  10. added 2020-03-17
    Introduction to Part Three: Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2020 - In Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. London, UK: pp. 48-67.
  11. added 2020-02-23
    Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
    Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that (...)
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  12. added 2020-02-16
    The Moral Self and Moral Duties.J. A. C. Everett, Joshua August Skorburg & Julian Savulescu - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Recent research has begun treating the perennial philosophical question, “what makes a person the same over time?” as an empirical question. A long tradition in philosophy holds that psychological continuity and connectedness of memories are at the heart of personal identity. More recent experimental work, following Strohminger & Nichols (2014), has suggested that persistence of moral character, more than memories, is perceived as essential for personal identity. While there is a growing body of evidence supporting these findings, a critique by (...)
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  13. added 2020-01-07
    Jealousy and the Sense of Self: Unamuno and the Contemporary Philosophy of Emotion.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - Philosophy and Literature.
    This paper explores jealousy in Unamuno’s drama El otro. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion, I will argue that for the Spanish author jealousy gives the subject a sense of self. The paper begins by embedding Unamuno’s philosophical anthropology in the context of contemporary emotion theory. It then presents the drama as an investigation into the affective dimension of self-identity. The third section offers an analysis of jealousy as an emotion of self-assessment. The final section discusses how this drama can (...)
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  14. added 2019-12-22
    Surviving, to Some Degree.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    In this paper we argue that reflection on the patterns of practical concern that agents like us exhibit strongly suggests that the same person relation (SP-relation) comes in continuous degrees rather than being an all or nothing matter. We call this the SP-degree thesis. Though the SP-degree thesis is consistent with a range of views about personal-identity, we argue that combining desire-first approaches to personal-identity with the SP-degree thesis better explains our patterns of practical concern, and hence gives us reason (...)
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  15. added 2019-12-14
    Facial Features as Character Predictors: Phenotypic Approach Testing.Vitalii Shymko - 2020 - SSRN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL.
    This paper presents the results of testing the hypotheses concerning the connection between some phenotypic bodily features and such individual psychological characteristics as aggressiveness, impetuosity, pedantry, passivity, etc. In particular, studied the validity of using appropriate representations of phenotypology to predict respective character traits. The results obtained disprove the possibility of a direct use of the phenotypic approach for reliable characterological profiling.
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  16. added 2019-12-10
    On the Question of the Place and Role of Language in the Process of Personality Socialization: Structural-Ontological Sketch.Vitalii Shymko - 2019 - Psycholinguistics 26 (1):385-400.
    Objective – is to formulate a methodological discourse regarding the place and role of the language interconnected with the process of socialization of a person and develop a systemic idea of the corresponding functional features. -/- Materials & Methods – this discourse is formulated on the basis of a systemic idea of the personality socialization, which, in turn, is realized using the structural-ontological method of studying the subject matter field in interdisciplinary researches. This method involves the construction of special visual-graphic (...)
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  17. added 2019-12-03
    Reasons and Conscious Persons.Christian Coseru - forthcoming - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. London: Routledge. pp. 160-186.
    What justifies holding the person that we are today morally responsible for something we did a year ago? And why are we justified in showing prudential concern for the future welfare of the person we will be a year from now? These questions cannot be systematically pursued without addressing the problem of personal identity. This essay considers whether Buddhist Reductionism, a philosophical project grounded on the idea that persons reduce to a set of bodily, sensory, perceptual, dispositional, and conscious elements, (...)
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  18. added 2019-12-01
    Corporatised Identities ≠ Digital Identities: Algorithmic Filtering on Social Media and the Commercialisation of Presentations of Self.Charlie Harry Smith - forthcoming - In Christopher Burr & Luciano Floridi (eds.), Ethics of Digital Well-being: A Multidisciplinary Approach.
    Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical identity theory requires modification when theorising about presentations of self on social media. This chapter contributes to these efforts, refining a conception of digital identities by differentiating them from ‘corporatised identities’. Armed with this new distinction, I ultimately argue that social media platforms’ production of corporatised identities undermines their users’ autonomy and digital well-being. This follows from the disentanglement of several commonly conflated concepts. Firstly, I distinguish two kinds of presentation of self that I collectively refer to (...)
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  19. added 2019-11-28
    A Psycho-Phenomenal Account of the Self.Jane Loo - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (3-4):127-148.
    Psychological continuity theories have been the dominant theories of personal identity over time, and the phenomenal approach has largely been neglected because of the bridge problem. I propose a hybrid account of the persistence of the self that draws on both psychological and phenomenal influences while avoiding the problems that both theories face in their 'pure' form. Such a hybrid theory retains the benefits of a phenomenal account of intra-streamal unity, and provides a better account of inter-streamal unity with the (...)
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  20. added 2019-11-13
    ¿Yo soy una persona?David Villena Saldaña - 2010 - Analítica 4 (4):55-67.
    The persistence problem in relation to us is usually approached from a point of view that gives priority to psychological continuity. My goal in this paper is to advance an argument against it. In order to do so, I start defining the notion of identity and showing the problems that arise from the concept of diachronic identity. Psychological continuity as a criterion of identity for things like us emerges in this context. And, since the mental supervenes on the physical, those (...)
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  21. added 2019-10-31
    Are the Irreversibly Comatose Still Here? The Destruction of Brains and the Persistence of Persons.Lukas J. Meier - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (2):99-103.
    When an individual is comatose while parts of her brain remain functional, the question arises as to whether any mental characteristics are still associated with this brain, that is, whether the person still exists. Settling this uncertainty requires that one becomes clear about two issues: the type of functional loss that is associated with the respective profile of brain damage and the persistence conditions of persons. Medical case studies can answer the former question, but they are not concerned with the (...)
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  22. added 2019-10-28
    Human Beings.Mark Johnston - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):59-83.
  23. added 2019-10-01
    Limiting Identity in Criminal Law.Mihailis E. Diamantis - 2019 - Boston College Law Review.
    People change with time. Their personalities, values, and preferences shift incrementally as they accrue life experience, discover new sources of meaning, and form/lose memories. Accumulated psychological changes eventually reshape not just how someone relates to the world about her, but also who she is as a person. This transience of human identity has profound implications for criminal law. Previous legal scholarship on personal identity has assumed that only abrupt tragedy and disease can change who we are. However, psychologists now know (...)
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  24. added 2019-09-12
    Parfits Reduktionismus und die Möglichkeit struktureller Einheit: Vorarbeiten zu einer aristotelischen Theorie personaler Identität.Sascha Settegast - 2018 - In Sebastian Gäb, Dominic Harion & Peter Welsen (eds.), Person und Identität. Regensburg: S. Roderer. pp. 109-170.
    In der Diskussion um personale Identität nehmen die einflussreichen Arbeiten Derek Parfits eine Sonderstellung ein, insofern Parfit nicht bestrebt ist, eines der gängigen Identitätskriterien zu verteidigen, sondern vielmehr behauptet, dass unsere alltäglichen wie philosophischen Vorstellungen von personaler Identität unrettbar inkohärent sind und deshalb aufgegeben werden sollten. In seinem Beitrag beleuchtet Sascha Settegast die verschiedenen Argumente, die Parfit für diese provokante These vorbringt, und unternimmt insbesondere den Versuch einer systematischen Dekonstruktion der wichtigsten Gedankenexperimente Parfits, die zeigen soll, dass sich diese Gedankenexperimente (...)
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  25. added 2019-09-10
    Personal Identity and Trivial Survival.Andrea Sauchelli - 2019 - Theoria 85 (5):402-411.
    Your replica is created on Mars and you, on Earth, are destroyed. Parfit claims that your replica may still have what prudentially matters for you – provided that you are psychologically connected and continuous with your replica. If someone accidentally destroys the tapes containing your psychological profile used in the production of your replica and this same action fortuitously produces a functionally equivalent tape, Ehring claims that Parfit should maintain that the resulting new individual may still have what matters. Nihilism (...)
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  26. added 2019-06-14
    Гуманітарні стратегії «донбасизації» України.Ruslana Demchuk - 2017 - NaUKMA Research Papers. History and Theory of Culture 191:18-25.
    У дослідженні на прикладі Донбаського регіону проаналізовано феномен регіональної ідентичності, яка моделюється на прорадянській «класовій» ідеології; йдеться про експансію її носіїв, щодо підпорядкування гуманітарного простору України. Політичні та медійні міфи, що є технологічними маніпуляціями, зумовлюють тривалий процес сепарації Донбасу. Нині, зокрема внаслідок російської агресії, щодо майбутнього регіону є повна невизначеність, проте його адаптація у межах України можлива лише за умов деіндустріалізації та деконструкції технологічної/антиукраїнської міфології.
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  27. added 2019-06-14
    Історична ностальгія: пошук ідентичності в епоху глобалізації.Maria Vasylkovska - 2016 - NaUKMA Research Papers. History and Theory of Culture 179:5-9.
    У статті розглянуто поняття історичної ностальгії як феномену постмодерністської культури, виникнення якого спричинене кризою ідентичності та культурно-цивілізаційною кризою в глобалізованому світі. Проаналізовано низку можливих підходів до концептуалізації історичної ностальгії як туги за образом минулого. На прикладі сучасної ностальгії за Середніми віками, неомедієвалізму, що втілюється в популярних продуктах масової культури, досліджено питання ролі ескапізму і пошуку втраченої ідентифікаційної цілісності індивіда у виникненні цього явища. Сучасну історичну ностальгію автор порівнює з політичними міфами про Золотий вік.
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  28. added 2019-06-06
    A Continuidade Física Garante a Persistência Pessoal No Tempo.Hugo Luzio - 2016 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):699-724.
    In the following sections we hold that physical continuity suffices personal persistence through time. First, we determine the theoretic and conceptual grounds of the metaphysical problem of personal identity, the relevant notion of «personal identity», the temporal persistence question simpliciter, what identity criteria and individuation principles are, and the formal properties of the identity concept. We differentiate between the simple and complex views, stating the reductionist thesis transversal to the latter. In the central sections, we discuss the main arguments and (...)
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  29. added 2019-06-06
    The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity: Non-Branching and the Individuation of Person Stages: Dialogue.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):377-386.
    ABSTRACT We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the formulation raises some interesting questions about the individuation of person stages.
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  30. added 2019-06-06
    The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique.William Hasker - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.
    This paper discusses the “constitution view” of human persons, as set forth by Lynne Rudder Baker in her book, Persons and Bodies. The metaphysical notion of constitution is explained and briefly defended. It is shown, however, that the view that human persons are constituted by their bodies faces difficulties in specifying the “person-favorable conditions” under which a human body constitutes a person. Furthermore, none of the arguments in support of the claim that humans are constituted by their bodies is persuasive. (...)
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  31. added 2019-06-06
    Functionalism, the Brain, and Personal Identity.Lawrence H. Davis - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):259-279.
    One might expect functionalism to imply that personal identity is preserved through various operations on the brain, including transplantation. I argue that this is not clearly so even where the whole brain is transplanted. It is definitely not so in cases where only the cerebrum is transplanted, a conceivable kind of hemispherectomy, and even certain cases in which the brain is "gradually" replaced by an inorganic substitute. These results distinguish functionalism from other accounts taking what Eric T. Olson calls the (...)
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  32. added 2019-06-06
    Parfit on Personal Identity: In Defense of Natural Persons.Deborah C. Smith - 2001 - Idealistic Studies 31 (2/3):169-181.
    This paper examines Parfit's argument that personal identity is not what matters, focusing on his case against reductionist theories of personal identity. I argue that Parfit's reasons for rejecting reductionist views do not take the physical criterion for personal identity seriously enough. I outline a thoroughly naturalistic version of the reductionist theory that, if true, would escape Parfit's criticism. Such a view would be a plausible candidate for a relation that would matter as much as, if not more than, the (...)
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  33. added 2019-06-06
    Will I Be a Dead Person?W. R. Carter - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167-171.
    Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the Standard View of personal identity in mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson's favored Biological View of personal identity.
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  34. added 2019-06-06
    Personal Identity and Dead People.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):219-242.
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  35. added 2019-06-06
    Consciousness and Self‐Identity.Peter Unger - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):63-100.
  36. added 2019-05-25
    Conativism About Personal Identity.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. Routledge.
    This paper aims to provide an overview of the conceptual terrain of what we call conative accounts of personal identity. These are views according to which the same-person relation in some sense depends on a range of broadly conative phenomena, especially desires, behaviours and conventions. We distinguish views along three dimensions: what role the conations play, what kinds of conations play that role, and whether the conations that play that role are public or private. We then offer a more detailed (...)
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  37. added 2019-05-24
    Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.
    This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View, the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s de (...)
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  38. added 2019-04-26
    Aksioidentity as a Determinant of Vocational Training for a Future Psychologist.Valentina Voloshyna - 2018 - Psychology and Psychosocial Interventions 1:31-35.
    The article presents the results of a theoretical and empirical study of the process of development of the axiological identity of a future psychologist in the process of his/her professional training in a higher educational institution. The article substantiates the necessity to use the technology of forming the axiological identity of a future psychologist in the process of professional training as a structural component of his/her integral professional value. The axiological identity of a future psychologist is characterized by the integration (...)
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  39. added 2019-04-12
    The Brave Officer Rides Again.Andreas Mogensen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):315-329.
    According to the Psychological Account of personal identity, personal identity across time is maintained by some form of psychological overlap or continuance. I show that the Psychological Account has trouble accommodating cases of transient retrograde amnesia. In such cases, the transitivity of psychological continuity may break down. I consider various means of responding to this problem, arguing that the best available response will undercut our ability to rely on intuitions about brain transplantation to support the Psychological Account. When the Psychological (...)
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  40. added 2019-03-11
    Impersonal Identity and Corrupting Concepts.Kathy Berendt - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):159-188.
  41. added 2019-03-06
    Punishing Wrongs From the Distant Past.Thomas Douglas - 2019 - Law and Philosophy 38 (4):335-358.
    On a Parfit-inspired account of culpability, as the psychological connections between a person’s younger self and older self weaken, the older self’s culpability for a wrong committed by the younger self diminishes. Suppose we accept this account and also accept a culpability-based upper limit on punishment severity. On this combination of views, we seem forced to conclude that perpetrators of distant past wrongs should either receive discounted punishments or be exempted from punishment entirely. This article develops a strategy for resisting (...)
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  42. added 2019-02-04
    Moral Enhancement Can Kill.Parker Crutchfield - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):568-584.
    There is recent empirical evidence that personal identity is constituted by one’s moral traits. If true, this poses a problem for those who advocate for moral enhancement, or the manipulation of a person’s moral traits through pharmaceutical or other biological means. Specifically, if moral enhancement manipulates a person’s moral traits, and those moral traits constitute personal identity, then it is possible that moral enhancement could alter a person’s identity. I go a step further and argue that under the right conditions, (...)
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  43. added 2019-01-02
    Personale Identität Ohne Persönlichkeit? Anmerkungen Zu Einem Vernachlässigten Zusammenhang.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2016 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123 (1):114-145.
    Recent decades have seen an increasing tendency to exclude the phenomenon of personality from the metaphysical investigation of personal identity. We are advised not to confuse personal identity as a philosophical subject, namely as the metaphysical issue of specifying what it is that makes a person staying numerically self-identical over time, with the psychological question of 'personal identity' which asks what makes someone the individual person they are with their particular character and history. However, one might be unsatisfied with this. (...)
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  44. added 2018-09-24
    Die Zerlegung des Ichs. Über die Grundlagen personaler Identität.Marc Andree Weber - 2014 - Münster: Mentis.
    Können wir als Personen irreversible Gedächtnisverluste überleben? Wie steht es mit Teletransportationen? Wie mit jahrelangem Einfrieren? Fragen wie diese sind weit davon entfernt, bloße Denksportaufgaben für Science-Fiction-Fans zu sein. Vielmehr verraten uns Antworten darauf, welche unserer Eigenschaften uns wirklich wichtig sind und was unser Wesen ausmacht. -/- Unglücklicherweise beantworten Vertreter unterschiedlicher Theorien personaler Identität diese Fragen auf völlig verschiedene Weise. Manche schöpfen die Plausibilität ihrer Positionen aus phantasievollen Gedankenexperimenten; anderen sind dieselben Gedankenexperimente für eine ernsthafte Einbeziehung in die philosophische Theoriebildung (...)
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  45. added 2018-09-21
    Zwölf Antworten auf Williams' Paradox.Marc Andree Weber - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (1):128-154.
    Theories of personal identity face a paradox, which traces back to Bernard Williams: some scenarios obviously show that mental continuity is what solely matters in survival; others, on the contrary, show with equal obviousness that it is bodily continuity. Different authors have produced diverging and partly conflicting answers in response to that problem. Based on recent research concerning the structure of philosophical thought experiment, this paper reevaluates and, for the first time, neatly classifies those answers. What is more, several existing (...)
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  46. added 2018-09-21
    Baker's First-Person Perspectives: They Are Not What They Seem.Marc Andree Weber - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 7:158-168.
    Lynne Baker's concept of a first-person perspective is not as clear and straightforward as it might seem at first glance. There is a discrepancy between her argumentation that we have first-person perspectives and some characteristics she takes first-person perspectives to have, namely, that the instances of this capacity necessarily persist through time and are indivisible and unduplicable. Moreover, these characteristics cause serious problems concerning personal identity.
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  47. added 2018-09-06
    Prudence and Person-Stages.Kristie Miller - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):460-476.
    Persons care about their future selves. They reason about their future selves’ interests; they plan for their future selves’ happiness and they worry about their future selves’ suffering. This paper is interested in the interplay between diachronic prudential reason and certain accounts of the metaphysics of personal identity that fall under the broad umbrella ‘conventionalist’. Some conventionalists conclude that under certain conditions there are intractable decisions for there is no fact of the matter regarding whether a person-stage ought (prudentially) to (...)
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  48. added 2018-07-22
    Memory and the Self by Mark Rowlands. [REVIEW]Marina Trakas - 2017 - Phenomenological Reviews 3.
  49. added 2018-07-21
    Non-Branching Personal Persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.
    Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can hold from one to many. And, if they can, the analysis of personal persistence must include a non-branching clause to avoid non-transitive identities or multiple occupancy. It is far from obvious, however, what form this clause should take. This paper argues that previous accounts are inadequate and develops a new proposal.
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  50. added 2018-07-18
    The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: Decoupling the Self From the Personal Level.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophic Exchange 2018.
    Philosophers of mind commonly draw a distinction between the personal level – the distinctive realm of conscious experience and reasoned deliberation – and the subpersonal level, the domain of mindless mechanism and brute cause and effect. Moreover, they tend to view cognitive science through the lens of this distinction. Facts about the personal level are given a priori, by introspection, or by common sense; the job of cognitive science is merely to investigate the mechanistic basis of these facts. I argue (...)
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