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  1. The Grateful Un-Dead? Philosophical and Social Implications of Mind-Uploading.Ivan William Kelly - manuscript
    The popular belief that our mind either depends on or (in stronger terms) is identical with brain functions and processes, along with the belief that advances in technology in virtual reality and computability will continue, has contributed to the contention that one-day (perhaps this century) it may be possible to transfer one’s mind (or a simulated copy) into another body (physical or virtual). This is called mind-uploading or whole brain emulation. This paper serves as an introduction to the area and (...)
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  2. Continuité temporelle de soi et pratique de la botanique chez Rousseau.Pierre Landou - unknown - In Pascal Bouvier (ed.), to be published. Université de Savoie.
    Article où l'on propose une lecture égologique de la botanique rousseauiste. La botanique certifierait la continuité temporelle d'un moi menacé de fragmentation.
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  3. Conativism About Personal Identity.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. Routledge.
    This paper aims to provide an overview of the conceptual terrain of what we call conative accounts of personal identity. These are views according to which the same-person relation in some sense depends on a range of broadly conative phenomena, especially desires, behaviours and conventions. We distinguish views along three dimensions: what role the conations play, what kinds of conations play that role, and whether the conations that play that role are public or private. We then offer a more detailed (...)
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  4. Evaluation and Objections to Judith Thomson in "People and Their Bodies".Seth Carter - forthcoming - GRIN Publishing.
    In her essay, “People and their Bodies,” Judith Thomson writes an evaluation of several formulations of the psychological criterion for personal identity and attempts a strategy of criticizing each formulation of the psychological theory. This is done in order to conclude that a physical theory must be the only remaining viable sufficient candidate for explaining personal identity that is both necessary and sufficient, despite its theoretical weaknesses. This paper seeks to analyze Thomson's critique and explain why her chosen formulations of (...)
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  5. Reasons and Conscious Persons.Christian Coseru - forthcoming - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. London: Routledge. pp. 160-186.
    What justifies holding the person that we are today morally responsible for something we did a year ago? And why are we justified in showing prudential concern for the future welfare of the person we will be a year from now? These questions cannot be systematically pursued without addressing the problem of personal identity. This essay considers whether Buddhist Reductionism, a philosophical project grounded on the idea that persons reduce to a set of bodily, sensory, perceptual, dispositional, and conscious elements, (...)
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  6. Is Psychology What Matters in Survival?Johan E. Gustafsson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    According to the Psychological-Continuity Account of What Matters, you are justified in having special concern for the well-being of a person at a future time if and only if that person will be psychologically continuous with you as you are now. On some versions of the account, the psychological continuity is required be temporally ordered, whereas, on other versions, it is allowed to be temporally unordered. In this paper, I argue that the account is implausible if the psychological continuity is (...)
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  7. Corporatised Identities ≠ Digital Identities: Algorithmic Filtering on Social Media and the Commercialisation of Presentations of Self.Charlie Harry Smith - forthcoming - In Christopher Burr & Luciano Floridi (eds.), Ethics of Digital Well-being: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Springer.
    Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical identity theory requires modification when theorising about presentations of self on social media. This chapter contributes to these efforts, refining a conception of digital identities by differentiating them from ‘corporatised identities’. Armed with this new distinction, I ultimately argue that social media platforms’ production of corporatised identities undermines their users’ autonomy and digital well-being. This follows from the disentanglement of several commonly conflated concepts. Firstly, I distinguish two kinds of presentation of self that I collectively refer to (...)
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  8. Persons, Animals, Ourselves by Paul Snowdon. [REVIEW]C. S. Sutton - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv057.
  9. Jealousy and the Sense of Self: Unamuno and the Contemporary Philosophy of Emotion.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - Philosophy and Literature.
    This paper explores jealousy in Unamuno’s drama El otro. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion, I will argue that for the Spanish author jealousy gives the subject a sense of self. The paper begins by embedding Unamuno’s philosophical anthropology in the context of contemporary emotion theory. It then presents the drama as an investigation into the affective dimension of self-identity. The third section offers an analysis of jealousy as an emotion of self-assessment. The final section discusses how this drama can (...)
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  10. Two Sides of the Same Coin? Neutral Monism as an Attempt to Reconcile Subjectivity and Objectivity in Personal Identity.Iva Apostolova & Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2020 - Metaphysica 21 (1):129-149.
    Standard views of personal identity over time often hover uneasily between the subjective, first-person dimension, and the objective, third-person dimension of a person’s life. Since both dimensions capture something integral to personal identity, we show that neither can successfully be discarded in favor of the other. The apparent need to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity, however, presents standard views with problems both in seeking an ontological footing of, as well as epistemic evidence for, personal identity. We contend that a fresh look (...)
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  11. Surviving, to some degree.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3805-3831.
    In this paper we argue that reflection on the patterns of practical concern that agents like us exhibit strongly suggests that the same person relation comes in continuous degrees rather than being an all or nothing matter. We call this the SP-degree thesis. Though the SP-degree thesis is consistent with a range of views about personal-identity, we argue that combining desire-first approaches to personal-identity with the SP-degree thesis better explains our patterns of practical concern, and hence gives us reason to (...)
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  12. Why Parfit Can Rebut Johnstonʼs Reductio.Douglas Ehring - 2020 - Theoria 86 (5):583-594.
    Theoria, EarlyView. Henry Pollock, in “Parfit's Fission Dilemma: Why Relation R Doesn't Matter”, examines the options available to Parfit for defending his “argument from below” from Johnstonʼs reductio objection. Pollock argues that Parfitʼs proposed defence against Johnston fails. In this article, I argue that Pollockʼs objections to Parfitʼs defence can be resisted.
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  13. The Moral Self and Moral Duties.Jim A. C. Everett, Joshua August Skorburg & Julian Savulescu - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology (7):1-22.
    Recent research has begun treating the perennial philosophical question, “what makes a person the same over time?” as an empirical question. A long tradition in philosophy holds that psychological continuity and connectedness of memories are at the heart of personal identity. More recent experimental work, following Strohminger & Nichols (2014), has suggested that persistence of moral character, more than memories, is perceived as essential for personal identity. While there is a growing body of evidence supporting these findings, a critique by (...)
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  14. Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.
    This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View, the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s de (...)
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  15. Are the Irreversibly Comatose Still Here? The Destruction of Brains and the Persistence of Persons.Lukas J. Meier - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (2):99-103.
    When an individual is comatose while parts of her brain remain functional, the question arises as to whether any mental characteristics are still associated with this brain, that is, whether the person still exists. Settling this uncertainty requires that one becomes clear about two issues: the type of functional loss that is associated with the respective profile of brain damage and the persistence conditions of persons. Medical case studies can answer the former question, but they are not concerned with the (...)
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  16. Introduction to the Collection.Andrea Sauchelli - 2020 - In Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. London, UK: pp. 1-9.
  17. Introduction to Part Three: Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2020 - In Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. London, UK: pp. 48-67.
  18. Using Phenotypology Hypotheses as a Personality Assessment Tool: The Tentative Validation Study.Vitalii Shymko - 2020 - PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNAL 6 (5):9-17.
    The transformational pace of modern education, healthcare, business management systems, etc., requires new approaches for prompt and reliable personality assessment. Phenotypology is one of such theories and it claims of the discovered interconnections of a person’s psychological and psychophysical characteristics on the basis of individual features of his/her phenotype. The article aim is to present some validation results for the Phenotypology hypotheses as a possible tool for personality assessment. In order to verify connections between phenotypic treats and individual behavior, we (...)
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  19. Czech Version of the Spiritual Well-Being Scale: Evaluation and Psychometric Properties.Peter Tavel, Jan Sandora, Jana Furstova, Alek Lačev, Vit Husek, Zuzana Puzova, Iva Polackova Solcova & Klara Malinakova - 2020 - Psychological Reports 1.
    Spirituality and spiritual well-being are connected with many areas of human life. Thus, especially in secular countries, there is a need for reliable validated instruments for measuring spirituality. The Spiritual Well-Being Scale is among the world’s most often used tools; therefore, the aim of this study was its psychometrical evaluation in the secular environment of the Czech Republic on a nationally representative sample (n = 1797, mean age: 45.9 ± 17.67; 48.6% men). A non-parametric comparison of different sociodemographic groups showed (...)
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  20. Could You Merge With AI? Reflections on the Singularity and Radical Brain Enhancement.Cody Turner & Susan Schneider - 2020 - In Markus Dirk Dubber, Frank Pasquale & Sunit Das (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-325.
  21. Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Choice in Medical Ethics.Lucie White - 2020 - In Michael Kühler & Veselin Mitrović (eds.), Theories of the Self and Autonomy in Medical Ethics. pp. 31-47.
    When talking about personal identity in the context of medical ethics, ethicists tend to borrow haphazardly from different philosophical notions of personal identity, or to abjure these abstract metaphysical concerns as having nothing to do with practical questions in medical ethics. In fact, however, part of the moral authority for respecting a patient’s self-regarding decisions can only be made sense of if we make certain assumptions that are central to a particular, psychological picture of personal identity, namely, that patients will (...)
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  22. ПерезАГрУзКА а. в. НеХаев омский государственный технический университет, г. омск личНости и выживаНие.а. в НеХаев - 2020 - Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity 5 (3):101-108.
    статья содержит реконструкцию аргумента стремительных психологических изменений скотта кэмпбелла. согласно требованиям стандартного психоло- гического подхода, тождество личности основано на постоянстве ее воспо- минаний, убеждений, желаний и намерений. личность сохраняет свое тож- дество во времени, если обладает сильной психологической связанностью и преемственностью. структура аргумента стремительных психологических изменений сопоставляется с аргументом невероятно длительных психологи- ческих изменений дэвида льюиса. главными целями критических атак этих аргументов служат временная рассогласованность психологической связан- ности и преемственности, а также тезис редукционизма, что все важные для выживания факты могут (...)
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  23. Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition.Radim Bělohrad - 2019 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 26 (2):207–227.
    Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, and most Lockeans say that we are material things coinciding with animals. Some animalists argue that if persons and animals coincide, they must have the same intrinsic properties, including thinking, and, as a result, there are ‘too many thinkers’ associated with each human being. Further, Lockeans have trouble explaining how animals and persons can be numerically different and have different persistence conditions. For these reasons, the idea (...)
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  24. Limiting Identity in Criminal Law.Mihailis E. Diamantis - 2019 - Boston College Law Review.
    People change with time. Their personalities, values, and preferences shift incrementally as they accrue life experience, discover new sources of meaning, and form/lose memories. Accumulated psychological changes eventually reshape not just how someone relates to the world about her, but also who she is as a person. This transience of human identity has profound implications for criminal law. Previous legal scholarship on personal identity has assumed that only abrupt tragedy and disease can change who we are. However, psychologists now know (...)
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  25. Punishing Wrongs From the Distant Past.Thomas Douglas - 2019 - Law and Philosophy 38 (4):335-358.
    On a Parfit-inspired account of culpability, as the psychological connections between a person’s younger self and older self weaken, the older self’s culpability for a wrong committed by the younger self diminishes. Suppose we accept this account and also accept a culpability-based upper limit on punishment severity. On this combination of views, we seem forced to conclude that perpetrators of distant past wrongs should either receive discounted punishments or be exempted from punishment entirely. This article develops a strategy for resisting (...)
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  26. Non-Branching Personal Persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.
    Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can hold from one to many. And, if they can, the analysis of personal persistence must include a non-branching clause to avoid non-transitive identities or multiple occupancy. It is far from obvious, however, what form this clause should take. This paper argues that previous accounts are inadequate and develops a new proposal.
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  27. Personal Identity and Trivial Survival.Andrea Sauchelli - 2019 - Theoria 85 (5):402-411.
    Your replica is created on Mars and you, on Earth, are destroyed. Parfit claims that your replica may still have what prudentially matters for you – provided that you are psychologically connected and continuous with your replica. If someone accidentally destroys the tapes containing your psychological profile used in the production of your replica and this same action fortuitously produces a functionally equivalent tape, Ehring claims that Parfit should maintain that the resulting new individual may still have what matters. Nihilism (...)
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  28. On the Question of the Place and Role of Language in the Process of Personality Socialization: Structural-Ontological Sketch.Vitalii Shymko - 2019 - Psycholinguistics 26 (1):385-400.
    Objective – is to formulate a methodological discourse regarding the place and role of the language interconnected with the process of socialization of a person and develop a systemic idea of the corresponding functional features. -/- Materials & Methods – this discourse is formulated on the basis of a systemic idea of the personality socialization, which, in turn, is realized using the structural-ontological method of studying the subject matter field in interdisciplinary researches. This method involves the construction of special visual-graphic (...)
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  29. Rationality and Future Discounting.Arif Ahmed - 2018 - Topoi 39 (2):245-256.
    The best justification of time-discounting is roughly that it is rational to care less about your more distant future because there is less of you around to have it. I argue that the standard version of this argument, which treats both psychological continuity and psychological connectedness as reasons to care about your future, can only rationalize an irrational—because exploitable—form of future discounting.
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  30. Rights and Persons.Pierfrancesco Biasetti - 2018 - In Andrea Altobrando, Takuya Niikawa & Richard Stone (eds.), The Realizations of the Self. Springer. pp. 217-232.
    One of the main reasons for justifying rights originates from the principle of the separateness of persons. However, it can been denied that persons are definite and “thick” entities, and, as such, that their supposed separateness expresses a fundamental normative principle. Should we then reconsider or abandon rights-talk? I will argue for the contrary, and claim that an extreme reductionist position towards persons is flawed. Moreover, I will claim that right-discourse can be anchored on grounds other than the principle of (...)
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  31. Moral Enhancement Can Kill.Parker Crutchfield - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):568-584.
    There is recent empirical evidence that personal identity is constituted by one’s moral traits. If true, this poses a problem for those who advocate for moral enhancement, or the manipulation of a person’s moral traits through pharmaceutical or other biological means. Specifically, if moral enhancement manipulates a person’s moral traits, and those moral traits constitute personal identity, then it is possible that moral enhancement could alter a person’s identity. I go a step further and argue that under the right conditions, (...)
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  32. Is Blameworthiness Forever?Andrew C. Khoury & Benjamin Matheson - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):204-224.
    Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that "once blameworthy, always blameworthy." They believe that blameworthiness is like diamonds: it is forever. We argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness for past action is completely divorced from (...)
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  33. To Thine Own Selves Be True-Ish: Shakespeare’s Hamlet as Formal Model.Joshua Landy - 2018 - In Tzachi Zamir (ed.), Shakespeare’s Hamlet: Philosophical Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: pp. 154-87.
    This chapter presents the core challenge before Hamlet as that of achieving authenticity in the face of inner multiplicity. Authenticity—which this chapter will take to mean (1) acting on the (2) knowledge of (3) what one truly is, beneath one’s various masks and social roles—becomes a particularly pressing need under conditions of (early) modernity, when traditional forms of action-guidance are at least halfway off the table. But authenticity is highly problematic when the self that is discovered turns out to be (...)
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  34. The Brave Officer Rides Again.Andreas Mogensen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):315-329.
    According to the Psychological Account of personal identity, personal identity across time is maintained by some form of psychological overlap or continuance. I show that the Psychological Account has trouble accommodating cases of transient retrograde amnesia. In such cases, the transitivity of psychological continuity may break down. I consider various means of responding to this problem, arguing that the best available response will undercut our ability to rely on intuitions about brain transplantation to support the Psychological Account. When the Psychological (...)
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  35. The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: Decoupling the Self From the Personal Level.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophic Exchange 2018.
    Philosophers of mind commonly draw a distinction between the personal level – the distinctive realm of conscious experience and reasoned deliberation – and the subpersonal level, the domain of mindless mechanism and brute cause and effect. Moreover, they tend to view cognitive science through the lens of this distinction. Facts about the personal level are given a priori, by introspection, or by common sense; the job of cognitive science is merely to investigate the mechanistic basis of these facts. I argue (...)
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  36. Life-Extending Enhancements and the Narrative Approach to Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (4):219-225.
    Various debates on the desirability and rationality of life-extending enhancements have been pursued under the presupposition that a generic psychological theory of personal identity is correct. I here discuss how the narrative approach to personal identity can contribute to these debates. In particular, I argue that two versions of the narrative approach offer good reasons to reject an argument against the rationality of life-extending enhancements.
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  37. Parfits Reduktionismus und die Möglichkeit struktureller Einheit: Vorarbeiten zu einer aristotelischen Theorie personaler Identität.Sascha Settegast - 2018 - In Sebastian Gäb, Dominic Harion & Peter Welsen (eds.), Person und Identität. Regensburg: S. Roderer. pp. 109-170.
    In der Diskussion um personale Identität nehmen die einflussreichen Arbeiten Derek Parfits eine Sonderstellung ein, insofern Parfit nicht bestrebt ist, eines der gängigen Identitätskriterien zu verteidigen, sondern vielmehr behauptet, dass unsere alltäglichen wie philosophischen Vorstellungen von personaler Identität unrettbar inkohärent sind und deshalb aufgegeben werden sollten. In seinem Beitrag beleuchtet Sascha Settegast die verschiedenen Argumente, die Parfit für diese provokante These vorbringt, und unternimmt insbesondere den Versuch einer systematischen Dekonstruktion der wichtigsten Gedankenexperimente Parfits, die zeigen soll, dass sich diese Gedankenexperimente (...)
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  38. Aksioidentity as a Determinant of Vocational Training for a Future Psychologist.Valentina Voloshyna - 2018 - Psychology and Psychosocial Interventions 1:31-35.
    The article presents the results of a theoretical and empirical study of the process of development of the axiological identity of a future psychologist in the process of his/her professional training in a higher educational institution. The article substantiates the necessity to use the technology of forming the axiological identity of a future psychologist in the process of professional training as a structural component of his/her integral professional value. The axiological identity of a future psychologist is characterized by the integration (...)
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  39. Against Psychological Sequentialism.Huiyuhl Yi - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 23:129-134.
    Psychological Sequentialism holds that no causal constraint is necessary for the preservation of what matters in survival; rather, it is sufficient for preservation if two groups of mental states are similar enough and temporally close enough. Suppose one’s body is instantaneously dematerialized and subsequently, by an amazing coincidence, a group of molecules are configured to form a qualitatively identical human body. On this view, these events preserve what matters in survival. Despite its unpopularity, several philosophers have argued for this view. (...)
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  40. Against Branching Identity.William Bauer - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1709-1719.
    Would you survive if your consciousness branched into two or more streams? Commonly discussed within the context of split-brain scenarios, this possibility might soon become commonplace with mind uploading technology. Cerullo suggests that after nondestructive mind uploading and other branching scenarios, personal identity would continue in two streams of consciousness. Thus he argues for what he calls branching identity. In this discussion, I evaluate the theory of branching identity and Cerullo’s arguments for it, concluding that branching identity is insufficiently justified (...)
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  41. Гуманітарні стратегії «донбасизації» України.Ruslana Demchuk - 2017 - NaUKMA Research Papers. History and Theory of Culture 191:18-25.
    У дослідженні на прикладі Донбаського регіону проаналізовано феномен регіональної ідентичності, яка моделюється на прорадянській «класовій» ідеології; йдеться про експансію її носіїв, щодо підпорядкування гуманітарного простору України. Політичні та медійні міфи, що є технологічними маніпуляціями, зумовлюють тривалий процес сепарації Донбасу. Нині, зокрема внаслідок російської агресії, щодо майбутнього регіону є повна невизначеність, проте його адаптація у межах України можлива лише за умов деіндустріалізації та деконструкції технологічної/антиукраїнської міфології.
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  42. Bratman on Identity Over Time and Identification at a Time.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):1-14.
    According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One common reductionist answer to this worry contends that self-determining agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s self-determining the decision. In this paper, I discuss Michael Bratman’s well-known identification reductionist theory (...)
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  43. Homunculi Are People Too! Lewis's Definition of Personhood Debugged.Cody Gilmore - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):54-60.
    David Lewis defends the following "non-circular definition of personhood": "something is a continuant person if and only if it is a maximal R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages. That is: if and only if it is an aggregate of person-stages, each of which is R-related to all the rest (and to itself), and it is a proper part of no other such aggregate." I give a counterexample, involving a person who is a part of another, much larger person, with a separate mental (...)
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  44. Distributed Selves: Personal Identity and Extended Memory Systems.Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3135–3151.
    This paper explores the implications of extended and distributed cognition theory for our notions of personal identity. On an extended and distributed approach to cognition, external information is under certain conditions constitutive of memory. On a narrative approach to personal identity, autobiographical memory is constitutive of our diachronic self. In this paper, I bring these two approaches together and argue that external information can be constitutive of one’s autobiographical memory and thus also of one’s diachronic self. To develop this claim, (...)
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  45. Extended Mind and Cognitive Enhancement: Moral Aspects of Cognitive Artifacts.Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):17-32.
    This article connects philosophical debates about cognitive enhancement and situated cognition. It does so by focusing on moral aspects of enhancing our cognitive abilities with the aid of external artifacts. Such artifacts have important moral dimensions that are addressed neither by the cognitive enhancement debate nor situated cognition theory. In order to fill this gap in the literature, three moral aspects of cognitive artifacts are singled out: their consequences for brains, cognition, and culture; their moral status; and their relation to (...)
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  46. Agency and Reductionism About the Self.Marko Jurjako - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. Rijeka: University of Rijeka. pp. 255-284.
    Abstract The goal of this chapter is to provide an opinionated overview of the psychologically based account of personal identity and the role of agency within such an account. I describe the essential points of the psychological criterion of personal identity. Then, I discuss how the psychological criterion is related to the Reductionist View of personal identity and whether it is committed to what Derek Parfit names the Extreme Claim. I further discuss how the agency-based views of personal identity can (...)
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  47. Amoral, Im/Moral and Dis/Loyal: Children’s Moral Status in Child Welfare.Zlatana Knezevic - 2017 - Childhood 4 (24):470-484.
    This article is a discursive examination of children’s status as knowledgeable moral agents within the Swedish child welfare system and in the widely used assessment framework BBIC. Departing from Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, three discursive positions of children’s moral status are identified: amoral, im/moral and dis/loyal. The findings show the undoubtedly moral child as largely missing and children’s agency as diminished, deviant or rendered ambiguous. Epistemic injustice applies particularly to disadvantaged children with difficult experiences who run the risk of (...)
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  48. Boltzmannian Immortality.Christian Loew - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):761-776.
    Plausible assumptions from Cosmology and Statistical Mechanics entail that it is overwhelmingly likely that there will be exact duplicates of us in the distant future long after our deaths. Call such persons “Boltzmann duplicates,” after the great pioneer of Statistical Mechanics. In this paper, I argue that if survival of death is possible at all, then we almost surely will survive our deaths because there almost surely will be Boltzmann duplicates of us in the distant future that stand in appropriate (...)
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  49. A Psycho-Phenomenal Account of the Self.Jane Loo - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (3-4):127-148.
    Psychological continuity theories have been the dominant theories of personal identity over time, and the phenomenal approach has largely been neglected because of the bridge problem. I propose a hybrid account of the persistence of the self that draws on both psychological and phenomenal influences while avoiding the problems that both theories face in their 'pure' form. Such a hybrid theory retains the benefits of a phenomenal account of intra-streamal unity, and provides a better account of inter-streamal unity with the (...)
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  50. Animal Self-Awareness.Rory Madden - 2017 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 9 (9).
    Part of the philosophical interest of the topic of organic individuals is that it promises to shed light on a basic and perennial question of philosophical self-understanding, the question what are we? The class of organic individuals seems to be a good place to look for candidates to be the things that we are. However there are, in principle, different ways of locating ourselves within the class of organic individuals; organic individuals occur at both higher and lower mereological levels than (...)
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