Related categories

211 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 211
  1. added 2020-04-09
    Vice, Mental Disorder, and the Role of Underlying Pathological Processes.Nancy Nyquist Potter & Peter Zachar - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):27-29.
  2. added 2020-03-10
    Review of Jesse S. Summers and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Clean Hands? Philosophical Lessons From Scrupulosity[REVIEW]Noell Birondo - 2020 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3.
    Philosophical lessons come in many different shapes and sizes. Some lessons are big, some are small. Some lessons go deep and have a big impact, some are shallow and have almost none. Some lessons are not really philosophical at all or would not really be lessons for an audience of academic philosophers. I mention these truisms not to disparage this informative book on 'moral OCD' (moral obsessive-compulsive disorder, or 'Scrupulosity') but rather to emphasize how difficult it can be to discern (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-12-02
    Roger Smith, Trial by Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981. Pp. Ix + 238. £15.00. [REVIEW]Joan Busfield - 1985 - British Journal for the History of Science 18 (1):89-90.
  4. added 2019-12-02
    Psychiatry and the Humanities, Vol. 1. [REVIEW]Gerald C. Hay Jr - 1976 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 25:376-378.
  5. added 2019-11-17
    Responsibility and the Problem of So-Called Marginal Agents.Larisa Svirsky - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-18.
    Philosophical views of responsibility often identify responsible agency with capacities like rationality and self-control. Yet in ordinary life, we frequently hold individuals responsible who are deficient in these capacities, such as children or people with mental illness. The existing literature that addresses these cases has suggested that we merely pretend to hold these agents responsible, or that they are responsible to a diminished degree. In this paper, I demonstrate that neither of these approaches is satisfactory, and offer an alternative focused (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-11-17
    Authenticity, Insight and Impaired Decision-Making Capacity in Acquired Brain Injury.Gareth S. Owen, Fabian Freyenhagen & Wayne Martin - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (1):29-32.
    Thanks to Barton Palmer and John McMillan for these thoughtful commentaries. We found much to agree with and it is striking how so many of the issues relating to decision-making capacity assessment find resonances outside of an English jurisdiction. California and New Zealand are clearly grappling with a very similar set of issues and the commentaries speak to the international nature of these discussions.We will pick up on some main points the commentaries raise.As Palmer notes, DMC law is vulnerable to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. added 2019-11-17
    Stories as Tales and as Histories: A Response to the Commentary.Daniel N. Robinson - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):229-230.
  8. added 2019-11-17
    Commentary on" True Wishes".John Eekelaar - 1995 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (4):305-307.
  9. added 2019-11-13
    Philosophy of Psychiatry.Dominic Murphy - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  10. added 2019-11-13
    A Broader Notion of Competent Decision Making in Respect to What Is in the Best Interests of Patients Affected by Anorexia.Floris Tomasini - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (2):155-157.
    Simona Giordano (2010) claims that whether or not anorexics should be allowed to die should not primarily depend on their competence, but on the extent of whether the condition can be alleviated. This implies two outcomes. First, that if an anorexic has a reasonable chance of recovery, competent refusal of treatment can be overridden. Second, that if an anorexic has no realistic chance of recovery, patient refusal needs to be upheld—not, exclusively, on the basis of patient’s decision-making competence, but on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2019-11-13
    Internists of the Mind or Physicians of the Soul: Does Psychiatry Need a Public Philosophy?Don Browning - 2008 - Zygon 43 (2):371-383.
    Although psychiatry is interested in what both body and mind contribute to behavior, it sometimes emphasizes one more than the other. Since the early 1980s, American psychiatry has shifted its interest from mind and psyche to body and brain. Neuroscience and psychopharmacology are increasingly at the core of psychiatry. Some experts claim that psychiatry is no longer interested in problems in living and positive goals such as mental health, happiness, and morality but rather has narrowed its focus to mental disorders (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. added 2019-11-13
    The Origin of Addictions by Means of Unnatural Decision.Serge H. Ahmed - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):437-438.
    The unified framework for addiction (UFA) formulated by Redish et al. is a tour de force. It uniquely predicts that there should be multiple addiction syndromes and pathways – a diversity that would reflect the complexity of the mammalian brain decision system. Here I explore some of the evolutionary and developmental ramifications of UFA and derive several new avenues for research.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2019-11-13
    Cognitive Architecture and the Limits of Interpretationism.Philip Gerrans - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):42-48.
  14. added 2019-11-13
    Commentary on Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry.Benjamin W. Libet - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):95-96.
  15. added 2019-11-13
    Prescriptions for Responsible Psychiatry.Joseph Agassi - 1996 - In William T. O'Donohue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. pp. 339.
    The ills of psychiatry are currently diagnoses with the aid of deficient etiologies. The currently proposed prescriptions for psychiatry are practically impossible. The defective part of the profession is its leadership which in its very defensiveness sticks to the status quo, thereby owning the worst defects and impeding all possible cure. The current discussions of the matter are pretentious and thus woolly. The minimal requirement from the profession as a whole and from each of its individual members is that they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2019-11-13
    Commentary on Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry.Christopher D. Frith - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):91-93.
    For the new generation of cognitive neuroscientists, the mind-brain problem is no longer a matter for philosophical speculation; how the mind links with the brain can be studied experimentally. The strength of this belief is demonstrated by a stream of popular science books purporting to show how consciousness emerges from the brain. In contrast, Sean Spence presents a rigorous, modest and wholly admirable discussion of the physiological underpinnings of free will. It is of particular importance that he brings to our (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2019-11-13
    Commentary on Searle and the 'Deep Unconscious'.Dan Lloyd - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (3):201-202.
  18. added 2019-11-11
    Political Liberalism and Values-Based Practice: Processes Above Outcomes or Rediscovering the Priority of the Right Over the Good.Jon Rubin - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (2):117-123.
  19. added 2019-11-11
    When Violence Becomes a Psychiatric Symptom.Simon Wilson & Gwen Adshead - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):57-67.
  20. added 2019-11-11
    Vice, Disorder, Conduct, and Culpability.Stephen J. - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):47-49.
  21. added 2019-11-11
    Reasons Count.John Z. - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):73-74.
  22. added 2019-11-11
    Vice, Mental Disorder, and the Role of Underlying Pathological Processes.Nancy Nyquist & Peter Zachar - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):27-29.
  23. added 2019-11-11
    The Bad, the Ugly, and the Need for a Position by Psychiatry.Lloyd A. - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):43-46.
  24. added 2019-11-11
    Vice and the Diagnostic Classification of Mental Disorders: A Philosophical Case Conference.John Z. - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):1-17.
    This main article for a Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology philosophical case conference is intended to raise philosophical, psychiatric, and public policy issues concerning the relationship between concepts of criminality, mental disorder, and the classification of mental disorders. After introducing the basic problem of the confounding of “vice” and mental disorder concepts in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition—Text Revision, the author summarizes three different cases from the literature that illustrate the problem of the vice–mental disorder relationship. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  25. added 2019-11-11
    Cause, Fault, Norm.John Z. - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):51-55.
  26. added 2019-11-10
    Psychiatric Treatment and the Problem of Equality: Whose Justice, Which Rationality?Floris Tomasini - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):101-103.
  27. added 2019-11-08
    Does Decision-Making Capacity Require the Absence of Pathological Values?Demian Whiting - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4):341-344.
    Decision-making capacity (DMC) is normally taken to include (1) understanding (and appreciation); (2) the ability to deliberate or weigh up; and (3) the ability to express a choice. In an article published recently in PPP, Jacinta Tan and her colleagues (2006) suggest that DMC requires also (4) the absence of 'pathological values' (i.e., values that arise from mental disorder). In this paper, I argue that although (1)–(3) might be necessary for DMC, (4) is not necessary (barring cases where pathological values (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. added 2019-11-08
    Sanity and Irresponsibility.P. Eddy Wilson - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):293-302.
    Taking up the idea that sanity is a necessary condition for responsibility, Susan Wolf sets forth two criteria for determining whether an actor is sane. I argue that the second criterion is inappropriate for this determination since it invokes some hidden axiological standard. I reexamine a case study that Wolf describes and arrive at a different judgment about the responsibility of the actor. I argue that the foremost criterion for determining whether an actor is sane is functional rather than axiological. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2019-11-06
    The Paradox of the Assessment of Capacity Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.Ajit Shah - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (2):111-115.
    The mental capacity Act 2005 (MCA; Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005) was partially implemented on April 1, 2007, and fully implemented on October 1, 2007, in England and Wales. The MCA provides a statutory framework for people who lack decision-making capacity (DMC) or who have capacity and want to plan for the future when they may lack DMC. Health care and social care providers need to be familiar with the MCA and the associated legal structures and processes. The MCA is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. added 2019-11-06
    Running Before We Can Walk: Do We Have the Capacity?Toby Williamson - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (2):147-150.
    Mental competence, or ‘mental capacity’ as it is referred to in recent legislation in the UK, is a concept that is expanding rapidly as a common currency in health and social care services. Neelke Doorn’s “Anthropological Reflection on the Concept of Competence” makes for fascinating and highly relevant reading and the legal and ethical discussions she describes taking place in the Netherlands would appear to echo many of those that have occurred in the UK over the last 5 to 10 (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. added 2019-11-06
    Pathological Altruism.Barbara Oakley, Ariel Knafo, Guruprasad Madhavan & David Sloan Wilson (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Pathological Altruism presents a number of new, thought-provoking theses that explore a range of hurtful effects of altruism and empathy.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32. added 2019-11-06
    Decision-Making Capacity and the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards.Peter Lucas - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (2):117-122.
    Principle 2 of the 2005 Mental Capacity Act (MCA) requires that decision-making capacity should be assumed, unless there is conclusive evidence, on a balance of probabilities, to the contrary (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005). In his article “The Paradox of the Assessment of Capacity Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005,” Ajit Shah (2011) raises the concern that the new Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS), introduced through the Mental Health Act (Department of Health 2007), conflict with this principle (henceforth, the principle (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. added 2019-11-06
    The Pragmatic Aspects of Assessing Mental Capacity.Ajit Shah - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (2):133-134.
  34. added 2019-11-06
    Surrender Versus Control: How Best Not to Drink.Mark Rego - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (3):223-226.
  35. added 2019-11-06
    Reasons, Responsibility, and Fiction.Benedict Smith - 2006 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):161-166.
  36. added 2019-11-06
    Aristotelian Akrasia and Psychoanalytic Regression.Michael Stocker - 1997 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (3):231-241.
  37. added 2019-11-06
    Commentary on True Wishes.Lloyd A. Wells - 1995 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (4):315-317.
  38. added 2019-11-06
    Review: Psychiatry, Law, and Responsibility. [REVIEW]Antony Flew - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (141):425 - 432.
  39. added 2019-11-05
    On the Personal, the One and the Many.Panagiotis Oulis - 2013 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (2):137-140.
    Gloria Ayob Begins her commentary with the main metaphysical and ethical motivations for including the personal perspective in psychopathological assessments. The metaphysical motivation: human actions are performed for a reason. Thus, from the personal perspective, explaining human actions amounts to justifying them by appeal to individual’s reasons. However, does it follow from this peculiarity that “explanations of human behavior that appeal to empirical generalizations and those that consist in justifying an action by appeal to reasons are of entirely different logical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. added 2019-11-05
    Vulnerability to Psychosis, I-Thou Intersubjectivity and the Praecox-Feeling.Somogy Varga - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):131-143.
    Psychotic and prodromal states are characterized by distortions of intersubjectivity, and a number of psychopathologists see in the concrete I-You frame of the clinical encounter the manifestation of such impairment. Rümke has coined the term of ‘praecox-feeling’, designated to describe a feeling of unease emanating in the interviewer that reflects the detachment of the patient and the failure of an ‘affective exchange.’ While the reliability of the praecox-feeling as a diagnostic tool has since been established, the explanation and theoretical framing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. added 2019-11-05
    Affecting the Body and Transforming Desire: The Treatment of Suffering as the End of Medicine.Hillel D. Braude - 2012 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (4):265-278.
    I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment. I will keep them from harm and injustice. The Hippocratic Oath formulates the ethical principle of medical beneficence and its negative formulation non-maleficence. It relates medical ethics to the traditional end of medicine, that is, to heal, or to make whole. First and foremost, the duty of the physician is to heal, and if this is not possible at least not to harm. This (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42. added 2019-11-05
    Pain and Suffering: Körper Und Leib, and the Telos of Pain Care.James Giordano - 2012 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (4):279-283.
    Hillel Braude offers a thoughtful paper that explores the nature of suffering, with particular relation to—and distinction from—pain, as regards the work of Eric Cassell, and in reflection of the perspectives of Karl Jaspers and Emmanuel Levinas. To be sure, establishing distinction(s) between pain and suffering is not an easy task. As Yuri Maricich and I have noted, pain and suffering are often used synonymously, even in medical conversation(s). Yet, we have urged that such colloquialisms should be rectified, particularly in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. added 2019-11-05
    Responsibility Without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of Personality Disorder.Hanna Pickard - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3):209-224.
  44. added 2019-11-05
    Mental Competence or Best Interests?Ajit Shah - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (2):151-152.
    The anthropological approach to mental competence is very interesting. I shall reason that the issue of mental competence and the determination best interests in the decision making process has been integrated together in this anthropological approach. I use the relatively recent Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) for England and Wales (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005) to illustrate this line of reasoning. I have deliberately chosen the phrase decision-making capacity (DMC) in this commentary to separate it from the concept of determination (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. added 2019-11-05
    Oh Blame, Where Is Thy Sting?Nancy Nyquist Potter - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3):225-230.
    I think that Hanna Pickard and I are in agreement that the dichotomy between ‘having’ and ‘not having’ control and conscious knowledge should be rejected. Personality disordered (PD) service users, like the rest of us, have degrees of not knowing and knowing, controlling and not controlling, such that pinpointing exactly when assignment of responsibility should enter into judgments of service users is murky and difficult. This position includes both metaphysical and epistemological issues in that it is a separate question whether (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2019-11-04
    Autonomy and the Relational Self.Scott Y. H. Kim - 2013 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (2):183-185.
  47. added 2019-11-04
    Agency, Action, and Mechanism.Joseph Loizzo - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (2):121-122.
  48. added 2019-11-01
    Commentary on "Suicide, Euthanasia, and the Psychiatrist".Kelleher Michael J. - forthcoming - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (2):145-149.
  49. added 2019-11-01
    Psychopathology and Morality.Finn Spicer - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):359-363.
  50. added 2019-11-01
    Second Commentary on" Aristotle's Function Argument".Thomas Stephen Szasz - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (1):3-16.
1 — 50 / 211