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  1. Measuring Moral Identities: Psychopaths and Responsibility.Gwen Adshead - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):185-187.
  2. Psychopaths and Other-Regarding Beliefs.Gwen Adshead - 1999 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):41-44.
  3. Practical Reason, Responsibility and the Psychopath.Robert L. Arrington - 1979 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):71–89.
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  4. Stabbing in the Dark: English Law Relating to Psychopathy.Peter Bartlett - 2010 - In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 25.
  5. Psychopathic Individuals Exhibit but Do Not Avoid Regret During Counterfactual Decision Making.Arielle Baskin-Sommersa, Allison M. Stuppy-Sullivana Allison & Joshua W. Buckholtz - 2016 - Proceedins of the National Academy of Sciences 113 (50):14438-14443.
    Psychopathy is associated with persistent antisocial behavior and a striking lack of regret for the consequences of that behavior. Although explanatory models for psychopathy have largely focused on deficits in affective responsiveness, recent work indicates that aberrant value-based decision making may also play a role. On that basis, some have suggested that psychopathic individuals may be unable to effectively use prospective simulations to update action value estimates during cost–benefit decision making. However, the specific mechanisms linking valuation, affective deficits, and maladaptive (...)
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  6. The "Reasonable Person" and the Psychopath.Jeffrey Bedrick - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):13-15.
    I have great sympathy for what seem to be two main goals in Michelle Ciurria’s (2014) “Moral Responsibility and Mental Health: Applying the Standard of the Reasonable Person,” although I am not sure the reasonable person standard achieves either of the goals. These central goals seem to be to preserve an objective standard of moral responsibility and to do so in a way that “does not depersonalize the target individual” (Ciurria 2014, 7). In this commentary, I focus on my doubts (...)
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  7. Freedom, Resentment, and the Psychopath.Piers Benn - 1999 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):29-39.
    This paper discusses the moral responsibility of psychopaths for their anti-social actions. Starting from P. F. Strawson's discussion of our participant reactive attitudes, which stresses their indispensability for meaningful human relations, the paper contrasts a variety of "normal" wrongdoers with psychopaths. It suggests that the latter are often seriously deficient in their capacity to entertain these attitudes, and that their resulting lack of proper self-evaluation may explain both their callousness and their imprudence. It is then argued that only creatures able (...)
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  8. Aggression, Psychopathy and Free Will From a Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.James Blair - 2007 - Behavioral Sciences and the Law 25:321–331.
    This article considers the notion of free will in the context of aggression and psychopathy research. The philosophical literature is very briefly considered to determine under what assumptions free will can be considered to exist. However, as the issue of free will is very difficult to address directly, the prime focus of this article is on issues raised in the philosophical debate, that may be empirically tractable and that are relevant to the understanding of psychopathy. Specifically, the following issues are (...)
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  9. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Psychopathy and Implications for Judgments of Responsibility.R. James R. Blair - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):149-157.
    Psychopathy is a developmental disorder associated with specific forms of emotional dysfunction and an increased risk for both frustration-based reactive aggression and goal-directed instrumental antisocial behavior. While the full behavioral manifestation of the disorder is under considerable social influence, the basis of this disorder appears to be genetic. At the neural level, individuals with psychopathy show atypical responding within the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Moreover, the roles of the amygdala in stimulus-reinforcement learning and responding to emotional expressions and vmPFC (...)
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  10. The Indefinite Civil Commitment of Dangerous Sex Offenders Is an Appropriate Legal Compromise Between "Mad" and "Bad" - A Study of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute.Katherine Blakey - 1996 - Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 10 (1):227-300.
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  11. Considering New Insights Into Antisociality and Psychopathy.Inti Brazil - 2015 - The Lancet Psychiatry 2:115–116.
  12. Responsibility, Incompetence, and Psychopathy.David O. Brink - 2013 - In The Lindley Lecture. University of Kansas.
    This essay articulates a conception of responsibility and excuse in terms of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing and explores its implications for insanity, incompetence, and psychopathy. The fair opportunity conception factors responsibility into conditions of normative competence and situational control and factors normative competence into cognitive and volitional capacities. This supports a conception of incompetence that recognizes substantial impairment of either cognitive or volitional capacities as excusing, provided the agent is not substantially responsible for her own incompetence. This conception (...)
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  13. Moral Responsibility and Psychopathy: Why We Do Not Have Special Obligations To The Psychopath.Justin Caouette - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 4 (2):26-27.
    Addressing concerns about the treatment of psychopaths, Grant Gillett and Flora Huang (2013) argue that we ought to accept a relational or holistic view of psychopathy and APSD rather than the default biomedical-deficit model since the latter “obscures moral truths about the psychopath”. This change in approach to the psychopath will both mitigate at least some of their moral responsibility for the harms they cause, and force communities to incur special obligations, so they claim, because the harms endured by psychopaths (...)
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  14. Some Thoughts on Diverse Psychopathic Offenders and Legal Responsibility.Christopher Ciocchetti - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):195-198.
    In this commentary, I respond to several criticisms of my prior article arguing that, for purposes of assigning moral responsibility, we should understand psychopaths as persons who lack the ability to treat actions as affecting relationships. I discuss the implications of different kinds of psychopaths and the corresponding levels of moral responsibility. I also briefly discuss the legal implications of a psychopath’s diminished moral responsibility.
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  15. The Responsibility of the Psychopathic Offender.Christopher Ciocchetti - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):175-183.
    In this paper, I argue that the responsibility-affecting defect of psychopaths is their incapacity for responding to acts within relationships. I begin with Piers Benn's account of psychopaths as incapable of forming participant reactive attitudes. Benn argues that participant reactive attitudes are essentially communicative and the ability to form and understand participant reactive attitudes is crucial to being a member of the moral community. Against Benn, I argue, though participant reactive attitudes can be communicative, they are not essentially communicative. Instead, (...)
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  16. Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry, and Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nic Damnjanovic - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):199 - 202.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 1, Page 199-202, March 2012.
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  17. Will a Stroke of Neuroscience Ever Eradicate Evil?Ronald de Sousa & Douglas Heinrichs - 2010 - In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Usa.
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  18. Psychopathy and Answerability.Antony Duff - 2010 - In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 198-212.
  19. Commentary on "Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and Responsibility&Quot.Antony Duff - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):283-286.
  20. Puppetmasters and Personality Disorders: Wittgenstein, Mechanism, and Moral Responsibility.Carl Elliott - 1994 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):91-100.
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  21. Diagnosing Blame: Responsibility and the Psychopath.Carl Elliott - 1992 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):199-214.
    The diagnosis of psychopathy is controversial largely because of two notions: first, that because of their defects, psychopaths cannot understand morality, and second, that these defects should thus excuse psychopaths from moral responsibility for their actions. However, it is not clear just what is involved in understanding morality. The argument that the psychopath is ignorant of morality in the same way that one might be ignorant of facts is difficult to sustain. However, a closer examination of the psychopath's peculiar deficiencies (...)
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  22. The International Handbook of Psychopathic Disorders and the Law: Laws and Policies, Vol II.A. Felthouse & H. Saß (eds.) - 2007 - John Wiley and Sons.
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  23. Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and Responsibility.Lloyd Fields - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):261-277.
  24. Mental Impairment, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility: Psychopathy and the Purposes of Punishment.Cordelia Fine & Jeanette Kennett - 2004 - International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):425-443.
    We have argued here that to attribute criminal responsibility to psychopathic individuals is to ignore substantial and growing evidence that psychopathic individuals are significantly impaired in moral understanding. They do not appear to know why moral transgressions are wrong in the full sense required by the law. As morally blameless offenders, punishment as a basis for detention cannot be justified. Moreover, as there are currently no successful treatment programs for psychopathy, nor can detention be justified on grounds of treatment. Instead, (...)
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  25. The Selves and the Shoemaker: Psychopaths, Moral Judgement, and Responsibility.Stephen Finlay - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):125–133.
    David Shoemaker argues from (A) psychopaths’ emotional deficiency, to (B) their insensitivity to moral reasons, to (C) their lack of criminal responsibility. This response observes three important ambiguities in this argument, involving the interpretation of (1) psychopaths’ emotional deficit, (2) their insensitivity to reasons, and (3) their moral judgements. Resolving these ambiguities presents Shoemaker with a dilemma: his argument either equivocates or it is falsified by the empirical evidence. An alternative perspective on psychopaths’ moral and criminal responsibility is proposed.
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  26. 'He Only Comes Out When I Drink My Gin’: DID, Personal Identity, and Moral Responsibility.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2016 - In Rocco J. Gennaro & Casey Harison (eds.), The Who and Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield: Lexington Press. pp. 121-134.
    This essay explores the topic of Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly called “Multiple Personality Disorder”) with special attention to such Quadrophenia masterpieces as “Dr. Jimmy” and “The Real Me.” A number of major philosophical questions arise: Can two or more “persons” really inhabit the same body? How can we hold Dr. Jimmy morally responsible for the reprehensible actions of Mr. Jim? Wouldn’t it be wrong to do so if they are really different people? What is it to be the “same” person (...)
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  27. Intentional Action, Moral Responsibility, and Psychopaths.Grant Gillett - 2010 - In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 283.
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  28. Benn-Ding the Rules of Resentment.Grant Gillett - 1999 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):49-51.
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  29. Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath.Walter Glannon - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):158-166.
    Psychopathy involves impaired capacity for prudential and moral reasoning due to impaired capacity for empathy, remorse, and sensitivity to fear-inducing stimuli. Brain abnormalities and genetic polymorphisms associated with these traits appear to justify the claim that psychopaths cannot be morally responsible for their behavior. Yet psychopaths are capable of instrumental reasoning in achieving their goals, which suggests that they have some capacity to respond to moral reasons against performing harmful acts and refrain from performing them. The cognitive and affective impairment (...)
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  30. Psychopathy and Responsibility.Walter Glannon - 1997 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (3):263–275.
  31. Author Reply: Vitacco, Erickson, and Lishner: Holding Psychopaths Morally and Criminally Culpable.Andrea L. Glenn, William S. Laufer & Adrian Raine - 2013 - Emotion Review 5 (4):426-427.
    Psychopathy is characterized by pronounced emotional deficits, yet individuals with psychopathic traits generally understand the law and the likely punishments for violating it. Vitacco, Erickson, and Lishner (2013) suggest that because of this appreciation, there is no question that psychopaths are criminally responsible. We make the modest argument that increasing psychological and neurological evidence calls into question whether conventional assumptions about an offender’s culpable states of mind hold true for psychopaths. It is likely, we suggest, that a wide range of (...)
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  32. Is It Wrong to Criminalize and Punish Psychopaths?Andrea L. Glenn, Adrian Raine & William S. Laufer - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):302-304.
    Increasing evidence from psychology and neuroscience suggests that emotion plays an important and sometimes critical role in moral judgment and moral behavior. At the same time, there is increasing psychological and neuroscientific evidence that brain regions critical in emotional and moral capacity are impaired in psychopaths. We ask how the criminal law should accommodate these two streams of research, in light of a new normative and legal account of the criminal responsibility of psychopaths.
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  33. Are All Types of Morality Compromised in Psychopathy.Andrea Glenn, R. Lyer, J. Graham, S. Koleva & Jonathan Haidt - 2009 - Journal of Personality Disorders 23:384–398.
    A long-standing puzzle for moral philosophers and psychologists alike is the concept of psychopathy, a personality disorder marked by tendencies to defy moral norms despite cognitive knowledge about right and wrong. Previously, discussions of the moral deficits of psychopathy have focused on willingness to harm and cheat others as well as reasoning about rule-based transgressions. Yet recent research in moral psychology has begun to more clearly define the domains of morality, en- compassing issues of harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and spiritual (...)
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  34. On Blaming and Punishing Psychopaths.Marion Godman & Anneli Jefferson - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):127-142.
    Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibility. In contrast, many philosophers and legal experts are increasingly persuaded by evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience indicating moral and cognitive deficits in psychopaths and have argued that they should be excused from moral responsibility. However, having opposite views concerning psychopaths’ moral responsibility, on the one hand, and criminal responsibility, on the other, seems unfortunate given the assumption that the law should, at least to some extent, (...)
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  35. Free Will in Psychopaths: A Phenomenological Description.Manuel RiobÓ GonzÁlez - 1990 - Analecta Husserliana 31:227.
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  36. A New Legal Treatment for Psychopaths? Perplexities for Legal Thinkers.Maria Isabel Gonzalez-Tapia, Ingrid Obsuth & Rachel Heeds - 2017 - International Journal of Law and Psychiatry:DOI: 10.1016/j.ijlp.2017.04.004.
    Public perception, fueled not only by popular and news media but also by expert claims that psychopaths are archetypes of evil: incorrigible, remorseless, cold-blooded criminals, whose crimes manifest in the most extreme levels of violence. But is there empirical evidence that psychopaths truly are what they are portrayed to be? If so, should the law respond, and adjust its treatment of psychopaths in court — permitting psychopathy to be admitted under an insanity defense and/or resulting in mitigation? In this paper, (...)
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  37. Responsible Psychopaths Revisited.Patricia Greenspan - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):265-278.
    This paper updates, modifies, and extends an account of psychopaths’ responsibility and blameworthiness that depends on behavioral control rather than moral knowledge. Philosophers mainly focus on whether psychopaths can be said to grasp moral rules as such, whereas it seems to be important to their blameworthiness that typical psychopaths are hampered by impulsivity and other barriers to exercising self-control. I begin by discussing an atypical case, for contrast, of a young man who was diagnosed as a psychopath at one point (...)
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  38. Responsible Psychopaths.Patricia S. Greenspan - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):417 – 429.
    Psychopaths are agents who lack the normal capacity to feel moral emotions (e.g. guilt based on empathy with the victims of their actions). Evidence for attributing psychopathy at least in some cases to genetic or early childhood causes suggests that psychopaths lack free will. However, the paper defends a sense in which psychopaths still may be construed as responsible for their actions, even if their degree of responsibility is less than that of normal agents. Responsibility is understood in Strawsonian terms, (...)
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  39. Punishment and Psychopathy: A Case-Control Functional MRI Investigation of Reinforcement Learning in Violent Antisocial Personality Disordered Men.Sarah Gregory, R. James Blair, Dominic Ffytche, Andrew Simmons, Veena Kumari, Sheilagh Hodgins & Nigel Blackwood - 2014 - Lancet Psychiatry 2:153–160.
    Background Men with antisocial personality disorder show lifelong abnormalities in adaptive decision making guided by the weighing up of reward and punishment information. Among men with antisocial personality disorder, modifi cation of the behaviour of those with additional diagnoses of psychopathy seems particularly resistant to punishment. Methods We did a case-control functional MRI (fMRI) study in 50 men, of whom 12 were violent off enders with antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, 20 were violent off enders with antisocial personality disorder but (...)
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  40. Psychopathy and Law: A Practitioner’s Guide.Helina ̈ Ha ̈kkänen-Nyholm & Jan-Olof Nyholm (eds.) - 2012 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    The idea of this book was born during the establishment phase of our company PsyJuridica Ltd. At that stage, similarly to the present times, we had lengthy and innovative discussions of the overlapping needs we had identified to exist among the practitioners of the legal and psychological professions, as well as forensic area where we both had worked for so many years. We strongly feel that in both the legal and psychological professions, the focus is on the interaction of people. (...)
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  41. On Psychopaths and Culpability.I. Haji - 1998 - Law and Philosophy 17 (2):117-140.
  42. The Inauthentic Evaluative Schemes of Psychopaths and Culpability.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 261--282.
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  43. Psychopathy, Ethical Perception, and Moral Culpability.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (2):135-150.
    I argue that emotional sensitivity (or insensitivity) has a marked negative influence on ethical perception. Diminished capacities of ethical perception, in turn, mitigate what we are morally responsible for while lack of such capacities may altogether eradicate responsibility. Impairment in ethical perception affects responsibility by affecting either recognition of or reactivity to moral reasons. It follows that emotional insensitivity (together with its attendant impairment in ethical perception) bears saliently on moral responsibility. Since one distinguishing mark of the psychopath is emotional (...)
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  44. The Emotional Depravity of Psychopaths and Culpability.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2003 - Legal Theory 9 (1):63-82.
    In this paper, I restrict discussion to cases of psychopathy in which it is assumed that psychopaths who satisfy epistemic requirements of responsibility, including the requirement that one is culpable for an action only if one performs it in light of the belief that one is doing wrong, can and do perform actions they take to be immoral or illegal. I argue that in such cases, the well-documented emotional impairment of psychopaths fails to subvert moral culpability. In particular, it does (...)
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  45. The Responsibility of Psychopaths.Vinit Haksar - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (59):135-145.
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  46. Aristotle and the Punishment of Psychopaths.Vinit Haksar - 1964 - Philosophy 39 (150):323 - 340.
    In A paper called ‘The Responsibility of Psychopaths’, I think I succeeded in establishing that we cannot rule out a priori the possibility that psychopaths may be shown to be lacking in responsibility. I also examined some arguments that try to show the psychopathto be lacking in responsibility, but I concluded that these arguments were not very successful. In this paper I intend to make and examine some more attempts at showing the psychopath to be lacking in responsibility. But before (...)
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  47. Neuroimaging, Genetics, and Psychopathy: Implications for the Legal System.C. Harenski, Robert D. Hare & Kent A. Kiehl - 2010 - In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 125.
  48. Travelers, Mercenaries, and Psychopaths.James Harold & Carl Elliott - 1999 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):45-48.
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  49. Objective Assessment of Covert Antisocial Behavior: Predictive Validity and Ethical Considerations.Stephen P. Hinshaw - 2005 - Ethics and Behavior 15 (3):259 – 269.
    Although less observable than the overt actions of fighting and assault, covert antisocial behaviors such as stealing and property destruction comprise an important subclass of externalizing behavior patterns, displaying considerable predictive power toward delinquency in adolescence. I discuss a laboratory paradigm for objective observation of such behaviors in children that has shown impressive concurrent and predictive validity among samples of boys with and without attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Addressed herein are crucial questions regarding the ethics of tempting children to steal (...)
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  50. The Legal Self: Executive Processes and Legal Theory.William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):151-176.
    When laws or legal principles mention mental states such as intentions to form a contract, knowledge of risk, or purposely causing a death, what parts of the brain are they speaking about? We argue here that these principles are tacitly directed at our prefrontal executive processes. Our current best theories of consciousness portray it as a workspace in which executive processes operate, but what is important to the law is what is done with the workspace content rather than the content (...)
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