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  1. Mental Causation as Joint Causation.Chiwook Won - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    This paper explores and defends the idea that mental properties and their physical bases jointly cause their physical effects. The paper evaluates the view as an emergentist response to the exclusion problem, comparing it with a competing nonreductive physicalist solution, the compatibilist solution, and argues that the joint causation view is more defensible than commonly supposed. Specifically, the paper distinguishes two theses of closure, Strong Closure and Weak Closure, two causal exclusion problems, the overdetermination problem and the supervenience problem, and (...)
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  2. Metaphysical Emergence.Jessica M. Wilson - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Both the special sciences and ordinary experience suggest that there are metaphysically emergent entities and features: macroscopic goings-on (including mountains, trees, humans, and sculptures, and their characteristic properties) which depend on, yet are distinct from and distinctively efficacious with respect to, lower-level physical configurations and features. These appearances give rise to two key questions. First, what is metaphysical emergence, more precisely? Second, is there any metaphysical emergence, in principle and moreover in fact? Metaphysical Emergence provides clear and systematic answers to (...)
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  3. Russellian Physicalism and its Dilemma.Lok-Chi Chan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies.
    Russellian monism – an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (1927/1992) – is roughly the view that the natural sciences can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not about their categorical properties, and, moreover, that our qualia are constituted by categorical properties. Recently, Stoljar (2001a, 2001b), Strawson (2008), Montero (2010, 2015), Alter and Nagasawa (2012), and Chalmers (2015) have attempted to develop this doctrine into a version of physicalism. Russellian monism faces the (...)
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  4. Mentality and Object: Computational and Cognitive Diachronic Emergence.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 20 (2):296-356.
    Espousing non-reductive physicalism, how do we pick out the specific relevant physical notion(s) from physical facts, specifically in relation to phenomenal experience? Beginning with a historical review of Gilbert Ryle’s behaviorism and moving through Hilary Putnam’s machine-state functionalism and Wilfrid Sellars’ inferential framework, up to more contemporaneous computationalist- and cognitivist-functionalism (Gualtiero Piccinini), we survey accounts of mentality that countenance the emergence of mental states vide input- and output-scheme. Ultimately arriving at the conclusion that functionalism cannot account for problems such as (...)
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  5. Panpsychism, The Combination Problem, and Plural Collective Properties.Einar Duenger Bohn - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):383-394.
    I develop and defend a version of panpsychism that avoids the combination problem by appealing to plural collective properties.
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  6. Emergentism as an Option in the Philosophy of Religion: Between Materialist Atheism and Pantheism.James Franklin - 2019 - Suri: Journal of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines 7 (2):1-22.
    Among worldviews, in addition to the options of materialist atheism, pantheism and personal theism, there exists a fourth, “local emergentism”. It holds that there are no gods, nor does the universe overall have divine aspects or any purpose. But locally, in our region of space and time, the properties of matter have given rise to entities which are completely different from matter in kind and to a degree god-like: consciousnesses with rational powers and intrinsic worth. The emergentist option is compared (...)
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  7. Consciousness, Mind and Spirit.Arran Gare - 2019 - Cosmos and History 15 (2):236-264.
    The explosion of interest in consciousness among scientists in recent decades has led to a revival of interest in the work of Whitehead. This has been associated with the challenge of biophysics to molecular biology in efforts to understand the nature of life. Some claim that it is only through quantum field theory that consciousness will be made intelligible. Most, although not all work in this area, focusses on the brain and how it could give rise to consciousness. In this (...)
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  8. Emergentism and Sadra’s Psychology; a Common Physicalistic Challenge.Mahdi Homazadeh - 2019 - Asian Philosophy 29 (3):221-230.
    This paper first explores in detail a regenerated theory in philosophy of mind, known among contemporary philosophers as ‘emergentism’. By distinguishing strong and weak versions of the theory, I explain two important explanatory challenges presented by physicalists against this theory. In the following, I provide a brief overview of Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s theory of the incipience and degrees of the soul, examining similarities and differences between this theory and strong emergentism. Then, underlining the main aspects of similarity between the two theories, (...)
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  9. Emergence and Non-Reductive Physicalism.Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Frank Macdonald - 2019 - In Sophie Gibb, Robin Findlay Hendry & Tom Lancaster (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Emergence. New York, NY, USA; Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 195-205.
  10. Pansentient Monism: Formulating Panpsychism as a Genuine Psycho-Physical Identity Theory [PhD Thesis: Abstract & Contents Pages].Peter Sjöstedt-H. - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Essex
    The thesis that follows proffers a solution to the mind-matter problem, the problem as to how mind and matter relate. The proposed solution herein is a variant of panpsychism – the theory that all (pan) has minds (psyche) – that we name pansentient monism. By defining the suffix 'psyche' of panpsychism, i.e. by analysing what 'mind' is (Chapter 1), we thereby initiate the effacement of the distinction between mind and matter, and thus advance a monism. We thereafter critically examine the (...)
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  11. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism.Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland - 2018 - Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell.
  12. What's Wrong With Brute Supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and Superdupervenience.Kevin Morris - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):256-280.
    This paper offers a qualified defense of Terry Horgan’s view of brute, inexplicable supervenience theses as physically unacceptable—as having no place in physicalist metaphysics—and his corresponding emphasis on the importance of “superdupervenience”, metaphysical supervenience that can be explained in a “materialistically acceptable” way. I argue, in response to Tom Polger, that it may be possible to ground the physical unacceptability of brute supervenience in its relation physically unacceptable properties supervening on physical properties; moreover, I argue that Horgan’s emphasis on the (...)
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  13. Brute Facts.Elly Vintiadis & Constantinos Mekios (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Brute facts are facts that don't have explanations. They are instrumental in our attempts to give accounts of other facts or phenomena, and so they play a key role in many philosophers' views about the structure of the world. This volume explores neglected questions about the nature of brute facts and their explanatory role.
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  14. Must Strong Emergence Collapse?Umut Baysan & Jessica Wilson - 2017 - Philosophica 91:49--104.
    Some claim that the notion of strong emergence as involving ontological or causal novelty makes no sense, on grounds that any purportedly strongly emergent features or associated powers 'collapse', one way or another, into the lower-level base features upon which they depend. Here we argue that there are several independently motivated and defensible means of preventing the collapse of strongly emergent features or powers into their lower-level bases, as directed against a conception of strongly emergent features as having fundamentally novel (...)
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  15. Hylomorphic Animalism, Emergentism, and the Challenge of the New Mechanist Philosophy of Neuroscience.Daniel D. De Haan - 2017 - Scientia et Fides 5 (2):9 - 38.
    This article, the first of a two-part essay, presents an account of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism that engages with recent work on neuroscience and philosophy of mind. I show that Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is compatible with the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology, but that it is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. I begin with the basic claims of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism and focus on its understanding of psychological powers embodied in the nervous system. Next, I (...)
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  16. The Compatibility of Downward Causation and Emergence.Simone Gozzano - 2017 - In Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti (eds.), Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation. New York, uSA: Routledge. pp. 296-312.
    In this paper, I shall argue that both emergence and downward causation, which are strongly interconnected, presuppose the presence of levels of reality. However, emergence and downward causation pull in opposite directions with respect to my best reconstruction of what levels are. The upshot is that emergence stresses the autonomy among levels while downward causation puts the distinction between levels at risk of a reductio ad absurdum, with the further consequence of blurring the very notion of downward. Therefore, emergence and (...)
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  17. The Impossibility of Emergent Conscious Causal Powers.Pat Lewtas - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):475-487.
    This paper argues that emergent conscious properties can't bestow emergent causal powers. It supports this conclusion by way of a dilemma. Necessarily, an emergent conscious property brings about its effects actively or other than actively. If actively, then, the paper argues, the emergent conscious property can't have causal powers at all. And if other than actively, then, the paper argues, the emergentist finds himself committed to incompatible accounts of causation.
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  18. The Quest for Emergence.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2017 - Munich: Philosophia.
    The Quest for Emergence is a comprehensive philosophical introduction to emergence. It includes the illustration and discussion of the major varieties of emergentism. The book also introduces many scientific examples of emergence and all the problems and objections affecting emergentism. In the introduction, the author provides a characterization of emergence and of some key distinctions: for example, the one between weak and strong emergence. The second chapter contains a short history of British Emergentism. The configurational forces objection against emergentism is (...)
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  19. Downward Causation: An Opinionated Introduction.Michele Paolini Paoletti & Francesco Orilia - 2017 - In Michele Paolini Paoletti & Francesco Orilia (eds.), Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-21.
    Downward causation is a widespread and problematic phenomenon. It is typically defined as the causation of lower-level effects by higher-level entities. Downward causation is widespread, as there are many examples of it across different sciences: a cell constraints what happens to its own constituents; a body regulates its own processes; two atoms, when they are appropriately related, make it the case that their own electrons are distributed in certain ways. However, downward causation is also problematic. Roughly, it seems to be (...)
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  20. Stoljar’s Dilemma and Three Conceptions of the Physical: A Defence of the Via Negativa.Raphaël Fiorese - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):201-229.
    Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. But what does it mean to say that everything is physical? Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that no account of the physical is available which allows for a formulation of physicalism that is both possibly true and deserving of the name. As against this claim, I argue that a version of the via negativa—roughly, the view that the physical is to be characterised in terms of the nonmental—provides just such an account.
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  21. Demystifying Emergence.David Yates - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3:809-841.
    Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that’s no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist worldview require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it’s natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to (...)
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  22. Why Survival is Metaphysically Impossible.Raymond D. Bradley - 2015 - In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 297-328.
    Human bodies have a totally different mode of existence from those collections of mental properties (intelligence, will power, consciousness, etc.) that we call minds. They belong to the ontological category of physical substances or entities, whereas mental properties belong to the ontological category of properties or attributes, and as such can exist only so long as their physical bearers exist. Mental properties “emerge” (in a sense that makes emergence ubiquitous throughout the natural world) when the constituent parts of a biological (...)
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  23. Emergent Substances, Physical Properties, Action Explanations.Jeff Engelhardt - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1125-1146.
    This paper proposes that if individual X ‘inherits’ property F from individual Y, we should be leery of explanations that appeal to X’s being F. This bears on what I’ll call “emergent substance dualism”, the view that human persons or selves are metaphysically fundamental or “new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers” even though they depend in some sense on physical particulars :5–23, 2006; Personal agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Two of the most prominent advocates of (...)
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  24. Property Reductive Emergent Dualism.Jeff Engelhardt - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):63-75.
    This paper sketches and motivates a metaphysics of mind that is both substance dualist and, to a large extent, property reductive. Call it “property reductive emergent dualism”. Section “Emergent Dualism” gives the broad outlines of the view. Sections “Problems of Mental Causation” and “Theoretical Virtues” argue that it can claim several advantages over non-reductive physicalist theories of mind. Section “Problems of Mental Causation” considers metaphysical challenges to mental causation in detail. Section “Theoretical Virtues” considers overall theoretical virtues: ontological and ideological (...)
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  25. A Physicalistic Account of Emergentism.Nicholas Schroeder - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):479-494.
    Jaegwon Kim’s argument against non-reductive physicalism is well known. Many philosophers take Kim’s argument to also apply to emergentism. But this does not necessarily follow. In this paper, I will first briefly show why Kim’s argument against non-reductive physicalism need not apply to emergentism. Next, I will present a physicalistic account of emergentism offered by Jason Megill in his paper “A Defense of Emergence.” This will be followed by an examination of some of the limitations of Megill’s account, in particular, (...)
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  26. Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong.Jessica Wilson - 2015 - In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wuthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. pp. 251-306.
    Motivated by the seeming structure of the sciences, metaphysical emergence combines broadly synchronic dependence coupled with some degree of ontological and causal autonomy. Reflecting the diverse, frequently incompatible interpretations of the notions of dependence and autonomy, however, accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering variety. Here I argue that much of this apparent diversity is superficial. I first argue, by attention to the problem of higher-level causation, that two and only two strategies for addressing this problem accommodate the genuine emergence (...)
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  27. In Defense of Emergent Individuals: A Reply to Moreland.Joshua Johnson - 2014 - Faith and Philosophy 31 (1):91-104.
    J. P. Moreland has recently raised a number of metaphysical objections to the theory of Emergent Individuals that is defended by Timothy O’ Connor, Jonathan Jacobs, and others. Moreland argues that only theism can provide a sufficient explanation for human consciousness, and he considers the theory of Emergent Individuals to offer a competing naturalistic explanation that must be refuted in order for his argument to be successful. Moreland focuses his objections on the account of emergence advocated by the defenders of (...)
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  28. Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise.Christian List - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent (...)
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  29. An Augustinian Philosopher Between Dualism and Materialism: Ernan McMullin on Human Emergence.Paul L. Allen - 2013 - Zygon 48 (2):294-304.
    In claiming the independence of theology from science, Ernan McMullin nevertheless saw the danger of separating these disciplines on questions of mutual significance, as his accompanying article “Biology and the Theology of the Human” in this edition of Zygon shows. This paper analyzes McMullin's adoption of emergence as a qualified endorsement of a view that avoids the excesses of both dualism and materialism. I argue that McMullin's distinctive contribution is the conceptual clarification of emergence in the light of a precise (...)
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  30. Emergence and Consciousness.Patrick Lewtas - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (4):527-553.
    Most definitions of radical emergentism characterize it epistemologically. This leads to misunderstandings and makes it hard to assess the doctrine's metaphysical worth. This paper puts forward purely metaphysical characterizations of emergentism and property emergence. It explores the nature of the necessitation relation between base and emergent and argues that emergentism entails a Humean account of causation and related relations. Then it presents arguments against emergentism, both as a wider metaphysic and as an account of consciousness. These maintain that emergentism makes (...)
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  31. Emergence.David Yates - 2013 - In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Mind. SAGE Reference. pp. 283-7.
    This article surveys different forms of emergence, distinguishing them from each other by means of their relationship to deducibility conceived as Kimian functional reduction.
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  32. E-PHYSICALISM - A PHYSICALIST THEORY OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS.Reinaldo J. Bernal - 2012 - Frankfurt, Germany: Ontos Verlag.
    This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...)
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  33. 9 The Emergent Ontology of Persons.Mark H. Bickhard - 2012 - In Jack Martin & Mark H. Bickhard (eds.), The Psychology of Personhood: Philosophical, Historical, Social-Developmental and Narrative Perspectives. Cambridge University Press. pp. 165.
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  34. Powers, Structures, and Minds.William Jaworski - 2012 - In Ruth Groff & John Greco (eds.), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. Routledge. pp. 145-171.
    Powers often depend on structures. It is because of the eye’s structure that it confers the power of sight; destroy that structure, and you destroy the power. I sketch an antireductive yet broadly naturalistic account of the relation between powers and structures. Powers, it says, are embodied in structures. When applied to philosophy of mind, this view resembles classic emergentist theories. I nevertheless argue that it differs from them in crucial respects that insulate it from the problems that beset them (...)
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  35. Emergence in Mind (Mind Association Occasional Series) . Edited by Cynthia and Macdonald. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 288 Pages ISBN 13: 978-0-19-958362-1. [REVIEW]Elly Vintiadis - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (4):603-610.
  36. Physicalism and Emergence.John Blodwell - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):11-12.
    Physicalist theories of mind are usually taken to imply causal closure in the physical domain, which implies that physical events are wholly determined by the physical principles governing the context in which they exist. This leads inevitably to some form of reductionism or epiphenomenalism when applied to the neurophysical correlates of conscious experience. If intentionality, characterized in terms of an operative consciousness, is to have any purchase on physical reality then its action must have distinctive and objective structural features that (...)
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  37. Review of Cynthia MacDonald, Graham MacDonald (Eds.), Emergence in Mind[REVIEW]Philip Goff - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
  38. Emergence in Mind * Edited by Cynthia MacDonald and Graham MacDonald. [REVIEW]Matthew C. Haug - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):783-785.
  39. On the Importance of Being Emergent.Peter Cariani - 2010 - Constructivist Foundations 5 (2).
  40. Mediating Between Physicalism and Dualism: "Broad Naturalism" and the Study of Consciousness.Philip Clayton - 2010 - In Science and Religion in Dialogue. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 999--1010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: * 1 The Birth of Strict Naturalism and Its Theory of Knowledge * 2 Six Challenges to Strict Naturalism * 3 Constructive Formulations of Broad Naturalism * 4 The Epistemic Presumption in Favor of Broad Naturalism * 5 Final Questions * 6 Conclusion: Grounds for Optimism and Pessimism * Notes.
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  41. Explanation, Emergence and Causality: Comments on Crane.Michele Di Francesco - 2010 - In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Tim Crane's ‘Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap’ claims that non‐reductive physicalism must either close the explanatory gap, addressing the challenge famously posed by Levine's argument, or become identical to emergentism. Since no way to close the gap is available, the result is that there can be no interesting philosophical position intermediate between physicalism and emergentism. This chapter argues that if we look at the relation between physicalism and emergentism from the vantage point of reduction, Crane's (...)
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  42. 4 Two Varieties of Causal Emergentism.Michele Di Francesco - 2010 - In Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 64.
  43. Emergent Causation and Property Causation.Paul Noordhof - 2010 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press.
  44. Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom.Jessica Wilson - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
    Some claim that Non-reductive Physicalism is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism, or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety. I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations that may hold between the degrees of freedom needed (...)
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  45. Identity with a Difference: Comments on Macdonald and Macdonald.Peter Wyss - 2010 - In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 169.
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  46. Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Terry Horgan - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter formulates and motivates the current favored articulation of the metaphysical doctrine of materialism. It describes an alternative metaphysical position called minimal emergentism, which has two versions; and then contrasts it with stronger kinds of emergentism. Minimal emergentism posits certain inter-level necessitation relations — either nomically necessary connections, or metaphysically necessary connections — that are metaphysically brute. The chapter sets forth what it takes to be some very powerful challenges to materialism — challenges involving features of human consciousness. Finally, (...)
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  47. Supervenient and Yet Not Deducible: Is There a Coherent Concept of Ontological Emergence?Kim Jaegwon - 2009 - In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos Verlag.
  48. Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism : The Argument From Mental Causation.Timothy O'Connor & John Ross Churchil - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the 1990s, Jaegwon Kim developed a line of argument that what purport to be nonreductive forms of physicalism are ultimately untenable, since they cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental states. We argue that, while the argument needs some tweaking, its basic thrust is sound. In what follows, we lay out our preferred version of the argument and highlight its essential dependence on a causal-powers metaphysic, a dependence that Kim does not acknowledge in his official presentations of the argument. (...)
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  49. Mind in Life. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 63 (4):615-619.
  50. Emergent Minds.Friedel Weinert - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):189-200.
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