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  1. added 2019-11-08
    Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (8):401-429.
  2. added 2019-10-29
    Autonomous Mental Causation and Mental‐Qua‐Mental Causation.Dwayne Moore - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (2):245-267.
    Nonreductive physicalists endorse autonomous mental causation, the view that mental causes, as distinct from physical causes, bring about mental and physical effects. The causal exclusion problem has recently pressured nonreductive physicalists to replace autonomous mental causation with reduced mental causation, the view that mental causes, as physical causes, bring about mental and physical effects. Reduced mental causation, in turn, faces the problem of mental quausation, according to which reduced mental causation only delivers mental‐as‐physical causation, not the requisite mental‐as‐mental causation. Proponents (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-21
    Reduction(?) to What? Comments on L. Sklar's "The Reduction (?) of Thermodynamics to Statistical Mechanics".Geoffrey Hellman - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1/2):203 - 214.
  4. added 2019-06-06
    Kim On Reduction.Ausonio Marras - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):231-257.
    In "Mind in a Physical World", Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of 'non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction -- a functional model of reduction -- is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially misleading; (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Attribute Identities in Microreductions.Robert L. Causey - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (14):407-422.
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  6. added 2019-06-05
    Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis.Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.) - 2009 - Ontos.
    This volume collects contributions comprising all these topics, including articles by Alexander Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, James Ladyman, Rohit Parikh, Gerhard ...
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  7. added 2018-09-10
    The Supervenience of Mental Content.Manuel García-Carpintero - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:117.
    The paper discusses the criticism of externalist theories of content which, on the basis of "Twin Earth" considerations, claims that such theories cannot make intentional properties supervenient on basic, intrinsic properties of the organism -- while supervenience is a necessary condition for the causal efficacy of any macro-property. The paper accepts the supervenience requirement, understood as arising from a requirement that macro- properties should be explained by micro- properties. It points out, however, that as a consequence of this, the modality (...)
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  8. added 2018-03-20
    The Whence and Whither of Experience.Nick Treanor - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1119-1138.
    Consider a toothache, or a feeling of intense pleasure, or the sensation you would have if you looked impassively at an expanse of colour. In each case, the experience can easily be thought to fill time by being present throughout a period. This way of thinking of conscious experience is natural enough, but it is in deep conflict with the view that physical processes are ultimately responsible for experience. The problem is that physical processes are related to durations in a (...)
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  9. added 2018-02-17
    Natural Minds.Thomas W. Polger - 2004 - Bradford.
    In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain -- that sensations are brain processes -- and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties -- a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily indentical to brains, a position held by (...)
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  10. added 2017-02-13
    Toward a Functional Theory of Reduction Transformations.Dean Delis & Anne Saxon Slater - 1977 - Cognition 5 (2):119-132.
  11. added 2016-12-08
    Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.
    It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higherlevel property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as differencemaking to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is (...)
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  12. added 2016-12-08
    Theory Reduction by Means of Functional Sub‐Types.Michael Esfeld & Christian Sachse - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):1 – 17.
    The paper sets out a new strategy for theory reduction by means of functional sub-types. This strategy is intended to get around the multiple realization objection. We use Kim's argument for token identity (ontological reductionism) based on the causal exclusion problem as starting point. We then extend ontological reductionism to epistemological reductionism (theory reduction). We show how one can distinguish within any functional type between functional sub-types. Each of these sub-types is coextensive with one type of realizer. By this means, (...)
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  13. added 2016-12-08
    Reduction, Autonomy, and Causal Exclusion Among Physical Properties.Alexander Rueger - 2004 - Synthese 139 (1):1 - 21.
    Is there a problem of causal exclusion between micro- and macro-level physical properties? I argue (following Kim) that the sorts of properties that in fact are in competition are macro properties, viz., the property of a (macro-) system of 'having such-and-such macro properties' (call this a 'macro-structural property') and the property of the same system of 'being constituted by such-and-such a micro- structure' (call this a 'micro-structural property'). I show that there are cases where, for lack of reducibility, there is (...)
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  14. added 2016-12-08
    Realization, Reduction and Psychological Autonomy.Schweizer Paul - 2001 - Synthese 126 (3):383-405.
    It is often thought that the computational paradigm provides a supporting case for the theoretical autonomy of the science of mind. However, I argue that computation is in fact incompatible with this alleged aspect of intentional explanation, and hence the foundational assumptions of orthodox cognitive science are mutually unstable. The most plausible way to relieve these foundational tensions is to relinquish the idea that the psychological level enjoys some special form of theoretical sovereignty. So, in contrast to well known antireductionist (...)
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  15. added 2016-12-05
    Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind.Martin Carrier & Peter Machamer (eds.) - 1997 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Leading scholars in the fields of philosophy and the sciences of the mind have contributed to this newest volume in the prestigious Pittsburgh-Konstanz series. Among the problem areas discussed are folk psychology, meanings as conceptual structures, functional and qualitative properties of colors, the role of conscious mental states, representation and mental content, the impact of connectionism on the philosophy of the mind, and supervenience, emergence, and realization. Most of the essays are followed by commentaries that reflect ongoing debates in the (...)
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  16. added 2016-10-09
    Exclusion, Still Not Tracted.Douglas Keaton & Thomas W. Polger - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):135-148.
    Karen Bennett has recently articulated and defended a “compatibilist” solution to the causal exclusion problem. Bennett’s solution works by rejecting the exclusion principle on the grounds that even though physical realizers are distinct from the mental states or properties that they realize, they necessarily co-occur such that they fail to satisfy standard accounts of causal over-determination. This is the case, Bennett argues, because the causal background conditions for core realizers being sufficient causes of their effects are identical to the “surround” (...)
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  17. added 2016-10-09
    Some Metaphysical Anxieties of Reductionism.Thomas W. Polger - 2007 - In M. Schouten & H. Looren de Jong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction,. Blackwell.
    By now it is cliché to observe that so-called reductionism is not one mammoth doctrine. There are, as it were, many reductionisms. Needless to say, there are at least as many antireductionisms. Despite the fact that neither reductionisms nor their counterparts are single and unified doctrines there do seem to be some family resemblances. One, it seems to me, is that both reductionisms and antireductionisms are acute responses to certain metaphysical worries. Some of these worries are metaphysical in nature, and (...)
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  18. added 2016-06-20
    Physicalism, Truthmaking, and Levels of Reality: Prospects and Problems.Kevin Morris - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):473-482.
    This paper considers the extent to which the notion of truthmaking can play a substantive role in defining physicalism. While a truthmaking-based approach to physicalism is prima facie attractive, there is some reason to doubt that truthmaking can do much work when it comes to understanding physicalism, and perhaps austere metaphysical frameworks in general. First, despite promising to dispense with higher-level properties and states, truthmaking appears to make little progress on issues concerning higher-level items and how they are related to (...)
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  19. added 2016-02-03
    Subset Realization and Physical Identification.Kevin Morris - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):317-335.
    According to a prominent line of thought, we can be physicalists, but not reductive physicalists, by holding that mental and other ‘higher-level’ or ‘nonbasic’ properties — properties that are not obviously physical properties — are all physically realized. Spelling this out requires an account of realization, an account of what it is for one property to realize another. And while several accounts of realization have been advanced in recent years,1 my interest here is in the ‘subset view,’ which has often (...)
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  20. added 2016-01-22
    Mapping the Mind: Bridge Laws and the Psycho-Neural Interface.Marco J. Nathan & Guillermo Del Pinal - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2):637-657.
    Recent advancements in the brain sciences have enabled researchers to determine, with increasing accuracy, patterns and locations of neural activation associated with various psychological functions. These techniques have revived a longstanding debate regarding the relation between the mind and the brain: while many authors claim that neuroscientific data can be employed to advance theories of higher cognition, others defend the so-called ‘autonomy’ of psychology. Settling this significant issue requires understanding the nature of the bridge laws used at the psycho-neural interface. (...)
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  21. added 2015-12-24
    Philip Ball on Neuroaesthetics.Simon van Rysewyk - 2013
  22. added 2015-12-24
    Richet's Feeble Reductionism.S. Guccione & A. Ruffilli - 2007 - Metalogicon 2:83-94.
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  23. added 2015-12-24
    Reductionism: How Did We Fall Into It and Can We Emerge From It?Nancey Murphy - 2007 - In Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.), Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons. Oxford University Press. pp. 60--19.
  24. added 2015-12-24
    Reductionist and Anti-Reductionist Perspectives on Dynamics.Catholijn M. Jonker, Jan Treur & Wouter C. A. Wijngaards - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):381 – 409.
    In this paper, reduction and its pragmatics are discussed in light of the development in computer science of languages to describe processes. The design of higher-level description languages within computer science has had the aim of allowing for description of the dynamics of processes in the (physical) world on a higher level avoiding all (physical) details of these processes. The higher description levels developed have dramatically increased the complexity of applications that came within reach. The pragmatic attitude of a (scientific) (...)
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  25. added 2015-12-24
    Rorty und der Eliminative Materialismus – eine Mesalliance?Geert Keil - 2001 - In Thomas Schäfer, Udo Tietz & Rüdiger Zill (eds.), Hinter den Spiegeln. Beiträge zur Philosophie Richard Rortys. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. pp. 56-72.
    Im Beitrag von Geert Keil geht es um das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft. Keil geht der Frage nach, inwiefern Rortys frühes Eintreten für den Eliminativen Materialismus mit seinen entspannten Auffassungen zum Status der Wissenschaften vereinbar ist. Allgemein sieht Rorty die Wissenschaften als eine Reihe etablierter sozialer Praktiken an, als Werkzeuge, mit bestimmten Teilen der Welt zurechtzukommen. Dieses pragmatistisch-instrumentalistische Wissenschaftsverständnis steht in auffallendem Kontrast zu der Rolle, die den Naturwissenschaften im Rahmen des Eliminativen Materialismus zufallen soll. Dieser Lösungsvorschlag für das (...)
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  26. added 2015-12-24
    One, Multiple, Multiplicity/Ies.Alain Badiou - 2000 - Multitudes 1.
    The philosopher replies to reactions provoked by his book about Gilles Deleuze in 1997, that were published by Futur Antérieur.
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  27. added 2015-12-24
    Hannan, B.-Subjectivity and Reduction.D. Pugmire - 1997 - Philosophical Books 38:76-76.
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  28. added 2015-12-24
    The Grain Problem.Michael Lockwood - 1993 - In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 271-291.
  29. added 2015-12-24
    Multiple Review.Margaret Harris - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (4):350-353.
    Language and Experience: Evidence from the Blind Child. By BARBARA LANDAU and LILA R. GLEITMAN.
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  30. added 2015-12-24
    Multiple Review.James Hampton - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):264-269.
  31. added 2015-12-24
    Overcoming Reductionism.John B. Cobb Jr - 1984 - In Charles Hartshorne, John B. Cobb & Franklin I. Gamwell (eds.), Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne. University of Chicago Press.
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  32. added 2015-12-24
    Yoshida: Reductionism.C. A. Hooker - 1979 - Dialogue 18 (1):81.
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  33. added 2015-12-24
    Two Sorts of Concept Reduction.John Davis Messer - 1977 - Dissertation, University of Georgia
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  34. added 2015-12-24
    Reductionism.David Lamb - 1975 - Radical Philosophy 10:22.
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  35. added 2015-12-24
    Interpretations of Life and Mind: Essays Around the Problem of Reduction. [REVIEW]S. C. A. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):126-127.
    This book is an excellent collection of papers which partly spring from, and partly bear on the Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge held in various universities, October, 1967-March, 1970. The papers all bear on the problem of reduction. In "Unity of Physical Law and Levels of Description," Ilya Prigogine argues that organized structures need physical laws of organization, not of entropy only, to explain their genesis and operation." The editor’s paper, "Reducibility: Another Side Issue," argues, following Polanyi, that (...)
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  36. added 2015-12-24
    Interpretations of Life and Mind: Essays Around the Problem of Reduction.A. S. C. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):126-127.
    This book is an excellent collection of papers which partly spring from, and partly bear on the Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge held in various universities, October, 1967-March, 1970. The papers all bear on the problem of reduction. In "Unity of Physical Law and Levels of Description," Ilya Prigogine argues that organized structures need physical laws of organization, not of entropy only, to explain their genesis and operation." The editor’s paper, "Reducibility: Another Side Issue," argues, following Polanyi, that (...)
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  37. added 2015-12-24
    The Psychology of Levels of Will.Margaret Masterman - 1948 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48:75.
  38. added 2015-11-20
    A Pluralist Theory of the Mind.David Ludwig - 2015 - Springer.
    This book challenges common debates in philosophy of mind by questioning the framework of placement problems in contemporary metaphysics. The author argues that placement problems arise when exactly one fundamental ontology serves as the base for all entities, and will propose a pluralist alternative that takes the diversity of our conceptual resources and ontologies seriously. This general pluralist account is applied to issues in philosophy of mind to argue that contemporary debates about the mind-body problem are built on this problematic (...)
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  39. added 2015-08-26
    Beyond Reduction: What Can Philosophy of Mind Learn From Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science?Steven Horst - 2010 - The Order Project: Online Discussion Papers.
    Recent debates about the metaphysics of mind have tended to assume that inter-theoretic reductions are the norm in the natural sciences. With this assumption in place, the apparent explanatory gaps surrounding consciousness and intentionality seem unique, fascinating, and perhaps metaphysically significant. Over the past several decades, however, philosophers of science have largely rejected the notions that inter-theoretic reduction is either widespread in the natural sciences or a litmus for the legitimacy of the special sciences. If we adopt a post-reductionist philosophy (...)
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  40. added 2015-06-29
    Eliminativist Undercurrents in the New Wave Model of Psychoneural Reduction.Cory Wright - 2000 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 21 (4):413-436.
    "New wave" reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a "smooth" pole (theoretical identity) and a "bumpy" pole (extremely revisionary). It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy. The new wave predicts that (...)
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  41. added 2015-01-15
    Does Functional Reduction Need Bridge Laws? A Response to Marras.Kevin Morris - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):647-657.
    In his recent article ‘Consciousness and Reduction’, Ausonio Marras argues that functional reduction must appeal to bridge laws and thus does not represent a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. In response, I first argue that even if functional reduction must use bridge laws, it still represents a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. Further, I argue that Marras does not succeed in showing that functional reduction must use bridge laws. Introduction Nagelian Reduction, Functional Reduction, and Bridge Laws Marras on Functional Reduction (...)
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  42. added 2014-04-30
    The Concept of Reduction.Raphael van Riel - 2014 - Springer.
    This volume investigates the notion of reduction. Building on the idea that philosophers employ the term ‘reduction’ to reconcile diversity and directionality with unity, without relying on elimination, the book offers a powerful explication of an “ontological” notion of reduction the extension of which is (primarily) formed by properties, kinds, individuals, or processes. It argues that related notions of reduction, such as theory-reduction and functional reduction, should be defined in terms of this explication. Thereby, the book offers a coherent framework, (...)
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  43. added 2014-04-03
    Models of Reduction and Categories of Reductionism.Sahotra Sarkar - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):167-94.
    A classification of models of reduction into three categories — theory reductionism, explanatory reductionism, and constitutive reductionism — is presented. It is shown that this classification helps clarify the relations between various explications of reduction that have been offered in the past, especially if a distinction is maintained between the various epistemological and ontological issues that arise. A relatively new model of explanatory reduction, one that emphasizes that reduction is the explanation of a whole in terms of its parts is (...)
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  44. added 2014-04-02
    Identity, Asymmetry, and the Relevance of Meanings for Models of Reduction.R. van Riel - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):747-761.
    Assume that water reduces to H2O. If so water is identical to H2O. At the same time, if water reduces to H2O then H2O does not reduce to water–the reduction relation is asymmetric. This generates a puzzle–if water just is H2O it is hard to see how we can account for the asymmetry of the reduction relation. The paper proposes a solution to this puzzle. It is argued that the reduction predicate generates intensional contexts and that in order to account (...)
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  45. added 2014-04-02
    Whether Mentality is "Higher-Level".Robert Francescotti - 2002 - Philosophical Inquiry 24 (3-4):65-76.
  46. added 2014-04-01
    Psychophysical Reductionism Without Type Identities.Justin Tiehen - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):223-236.
    Nonreductive physicalists have a causal exclusion problem. Given certain theses all physicalists accept, including psychophysical supervenience and the causal closure of the physical realm, it is difficult to see how irreducible mental phenomena could make a causal difference to the world. The upshot, according to those who push the problem, is that we must embrace reductive physicalism. Only then is mental causation saved. -/- Grant the argument, at least provisionally. Here our focus is the conditional question: What form should one's (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-26
    The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction.Maurice Kenneth Davy Schouten & Huibert Looren de Jong (eds.) - 2007 - Blackwell.
    The Matter of the Mind addresses and illuminates the relationship between psychology and neuroscience by focusing on the topic of reduction. Written by leading philosophers in the field Discusses recent theorizing in the mind-brain sciences and reviews and weighs the evidence in favour of reductionism against the backdrop of recent important advances within psychology and the neurosciences Collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behaviour, reward systems, consciousness, (...)
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  48. added 2014-03-26
    The Compatibility of Complex Systems and Reduction: A Case Analysis of Memory Research. [REVIEW]William Bechtel - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (4):483-502.
    Some theorists who emphasize the complexity of biological and cognitive systems and who advocate the employment of the tools of dynamical systems theory in explaining them construe complexity and reduction as exclusive alternatives. This paper argues that reduction, an approach to explanation that decomposes complex activities and localizes the components within the complex system, is not only compatible with an emphasis on complexity, but provides the foundation for dynamical analysis. Explanation via decomposition and localization is nonetheless extremely challenging, and an (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-22
    Physicalism and New Wave Reductionism.Ansgar Beckermann - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):257-261.
  50. added 2014-03-22
    Historical Kinds and the "Special Sciences".Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.
    There are no "special sciences" in Fodor's sense. There is a large group of sciences, "historical sciences," that differ fundamentally from the physical sciences because they quantify over a different kind of natural or real kind, nor are the generalizations supported by these kinds exceptionless. Heterogeneity, however, is not characteristic of these kinds. That there could be an univocal empirical science that ranged over multiple realizations of a functional property is quite problematic. If psychological predicates name multiply realized functionalist properties, (...)
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