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  1. Interpretations of Life and Mind: Essays Around the Problem of Reduction. [REVIEW]S. C. A. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):126-127.
  2. One, Multiple, Multiplicity/Ies.Alain Badiou - 2000 - Multitudes 1.
    The philosopher replies to reactions provoked by his book about Gilles Deleuze in 1997, that were published by Futur Antérieur.
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  3. The Compatibility of Complex Systems and Reduction: A Case Analysis of Memory Research. [REVIEW]William P. Bechtel - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (4):483-502.
    Some theorists who emphasize the complexity of biological and cognitive systems and who advocate the employment of the tools of dynamical systems theory in explaining them construe complexity and reduction as exclusive alternatives. This paper argues that reduction, an approach to explanation that decomposes complex activities and localizes the components within the complex system, is not only compatible with an emphasis on complexity, but provides the foundation for dynamical analysis. Explanation via decomposition and localization is nonetheless extremely challenging, and an (...)
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  4. Reduction, Integration, and the Unity of Science: Natural, Behavioral, and Social Sciences and the Humanities.William P. Bechtel & Andrew Hamilton - 2007 - In T. Kuipers (ed.), Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (Volume 1 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science). Elsevier.
    1. A Historical Look at Unity 2. Field Guide to Modern Concepts of Reduction and Unity 3. Kitcher's Revisionist Account of Unification 4. Critics of Unity 5. Integration Instead of Unity 6. Reduction via Mechanisms 7. Case Studies in Reduction and Unification across the Disciplines.
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  5. Physicalism and New Wave Reductionism.Ansgar Beckermann - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:257-261.
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  6. Property Physicalism, Reduction, and Realization.Ansgar Beckermann - 1997 - In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press. pp. 303--321.
    Ansgar Beckermann Once, a mind-body theory based upon the idea of supervenience seemed to be a promising alternative to the various kinds of reductionistic physicalism. In recent years, however, Jaegwon Kim has subjected his own brainchild to a very thorough criticism. With most of Kim’s arguments I agree wholeheartedly - not least because they converge with my own thoughts.2 In order to explain the few points of divergence with Kim’s views, I shall have to prepare the ground a little. In (...)
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  7. Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.John Bickle - manuscript
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  8. Psychoneural Reductionism: The New Wave.John Bickle - 1997 - MIT Press.
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  9. New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats.John Bickle - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):57-78.
  10. The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground.Ned Block - 2015 - In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-133.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  11. Searle on the Brink.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - Psyche 1 (5).
    In his recent _The Rediscovery of the Mind_ John Searle tries to destroy cognitive science _and_ preserve a future in which a ``perfect science of the brain'' (1992, p. 235) arrives. I show that Searle can't accomplish both objectives. The ammunition he uses to realise the first stirs up a maelstrom of consciousness so wild it precludes securing the second.
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  12. How to Perform a Reduction.D. H. M. Brooks - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):803-14.
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  13. Reductionism and the Mental.Martin Bunzl - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (April):181-9.
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  14. Interpretations of Life and Mind.A. S. C. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):126-127.
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  15. Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind.Martin Carrier & Peter Machamer (eds.) - 1997 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Leading scholars in the fields of philosophy and the sciences of the mind have contributed to this newest volume in the prestigious Pittsburgh-Konstanz series. Among the problem areas discussed are folk psychology, meanings as conceptual structures, functional and qualitative properties of colors, the role of conscious mental states, representation and mental content, the impact of connectionism on the philosophy of the mind, and supervenience, emergence, and realization. Most of the essays are followed by commentaries that reflect ongoing debates in the (...)
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  16. Attribute Identities in Microreductions.Robert L. Causey - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (August):407-22.
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  17. Overcoming Reductionism.John B. Cobb Jr - 1984 - In Charles Hartshorne, John B. Cobb & Franklin I. Gamwell (eds.), Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne. University of Chicago Press.
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  18. Ockhamite Reductionism.Richard Combes - 1988 - International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (September):325-36.
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  19. Popper and the Human Sciences.Gregory Currie & Alan Musgrave (eds.) - 1985 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    ... THIRD WORLD EPISTEMOLOGY L. Jonathan Cohen . Sir Karl Popper's striking hypothesis about a third world of objective knowledge deserves careful scrutiny ...
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  20. Toward a Functional Theory of Reduction Transformations.Dean Delis & Anne Saxon Slater - 1977 - Cognition 5 (2):119-132.
  21. Identity Statements and Microreductions.Berent Enc - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (June):285-306.
    The view that scientific reduction succeeds by establishing property identities is challenged. it is argued that, instead of identity statements making reductions successful, the fact that a reduction is successful makes the identity statements possible. the argument proceeds first by showing that an explanatory asymmetry is generated by statements expressing property identities, second by locating the source of the asymmetry in a "generative relation" that obtains between the two properties. it is then argued that reduction succeeds only if the reducing (...)
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  22. Theory Reduction by Means of Functional Sub-Types.Michael Esfeld & Christian Sachse - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):1 – 17.
    The paper sets out a new strategy for theory reduction by means of functional sub-types. This strategy is intended to get around the multiple realization objection. We use Kim's argument for token identity (ontological reductionism) based on the causal exclusion problem as starting point. We then extend ontological reductionism to epistemological reductionism (theory reduction). We show how one can distinguish within any functional type between functional sub-types. Each of these sub-types is coextensive with one type of realizer. By this means, (...)
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  23. Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (8):401-29.
  24. Whether Mentality is "Higher-Level".Robert Francescotti - 2002 - Philosophical Inquiry 24 (3-4):65-76.
  25. The Metaphysics of Mechanisms and the Challenge of the New Reductionism.Carl Gillett - 2007 - In Maurice K. D. Schouten & H. L. De Joong (eds.), The Matter of Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Blackwell.
    Over the last century, as Figure 1 graphically illustrates, scientific investigations have given us a detailed account of many natural phenomena, from molecules to manic depression, through so-called.
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  26. Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction.Carl Gillett - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):193-216.
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  27. Consciousness and the Brain.Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell & I. Savodnik (eds.) - 1975 - Plenum Press.
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  28. Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press. pp. 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  29. Interpretations Of Life And Mind: Essays Around The Problem Of Reduction.Marjorie G. Grene (ed.) - 1971 - Humanities Press.
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  30. Richet's Feeble Reductionism.S. Guccione & A. Ruffilli - 2007 - Metalogicon 2:83-94.
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  31. Multiple Review.James Hampton - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):264-269.
  32. Reduction and elimination in philosophy and the sciences : papers of the 31th International Wittgenstein Symposium.Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb (ed.) - 2008 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
  33. Multiple Review.Margaret Harris - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (4):350-353.
    Language and Experience: Evidence from the Blind Child. By BARBARA LANDAU and LILA R. GLEITMAN.
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  34. Reduction(?) To What?Geoffrey Hellman - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):203-214.
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  35. Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis.Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.) - 2009 - Ontos.
    This volume collects contributions comprising all these topics, including articles by Alexander Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, James Ladyman, Rohit Parikh, Gerhard ...
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  36. In Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1984 - Synthese 59 (June):295-320.
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  37. Yoshida: Reductionism.C. A. Hooker - 1979 - Dialogue 18 (1):81.
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  38. Beyond Reduction: What Can Philosophy of Mind Learn From Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science?Steven Horst - 2010 - The Order Project: Online Discussion Papers.
    Recent debates about the metaphysics of mind have tended to assume that inter-theoretic reductions are the norm in the natural sciences. With this assumption in place, the apparent explanatory gaps surrounding consciousness and intentionality seem unique, fascinating, and perhaps metaphysically significant. Over the past several decades, however, philosophers of science have largely rejected the notions that inter-theoretic reduction is either widespread in the natural sciences or a litmus for the legitimacy of the special sciences. If we adopt a post-reductionist philosophy (...)
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  39. From Reduction to Type-Type Identity. [REVIEW]Frank Jackson - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):644-647.
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  40. Reductionist and Anti-Reductionist Perspectives on Dynamics.Catholijn M. Jonker, Jan Treur & Wouter C. A. Wijngaards - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):381 – 409.
    In this paper, reduction and its pragmatics are discussed in light of the development in computer science of languages to describe processes. The design of higher-level description languages within computer science has had the aim of allowing for description of the dynamics of processes in the (physical) world on a higher level avoiding all (physical) details of these processes. The higher description levels developed have dramatically increased the complexity of applications that came within reach. The pragmatic attitude of a (scientific) (...)
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  41. Exclusion, Still Not Tracted.Douglas Keaton & Thomas W. Polger - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):135-148.
    Karen Bennett has recently articulated and defended a “compatibilist” solution to the causal exclusion problem. Bennett’s solution works by rejecting the exclusion principle on the grounds that even though physical realizers are distinct from the mental states or properties that they realize, they necessarily co-occur such that they fail to satisfy standard accounts of causal over-determination. This is the case, Bennett argues, because the causal background conditions for core realizers being sufficient causes of their effects are identical to the “surround” (...)
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  42. Rorty und der Eliminative Materialismus – eine Mesalliance?Geert Keil - 2001 - In Thomas Schäfer, Udo Tietz & Rüdiger Zill (eds.), Hinter den Spiegeln. Beiträge zur Philosophie Richard Rortys. Suhrkamp. pp. 56-72.
    Im Beitrag von Geert Keil geht es um das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern Rortys frühes Eintreten für den Eliminativen Materialismus mit seinen entspannten Auffassungen zum Status der Wissenschaften vereinbar ist. Allgemein sieht Rorty die Wissenschaften als eine Reihe etablierter sozialer Praktiken an, als Werkzeuge, mit bestimmten Teilen der Welt zurechtzukommen. Dieses pragmatistisch-instrumentalistische Wissenschaftsverständnis steht in auffallendem Kontrast zu der Rolle, die den Naturwissenschaften im Rahmen des Eliminativen Materialismus zufallen soll. Dieser Lösungsvorschlag für (...)
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  43. Is Functional Reduction Logical Reduction?Max Kistler - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (14):219-234.
    The functionalist conception of mental properties, together with their multiple realizability, is often taken to entail their irreducibility. It might seem that the only way to revise that judgement is to weaken the requirements traditionally imposed on reduction. However, Jaegwon Kim has recently argued that we should, on the contrary, strengthen those requirements, and construe reduction as what I propose to call “logical reduction”, a model of reduction inspired by emergentism. Moreover, Kim claims that what he calls “functional reduction” allows (...)
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  44. How to Reduce a Functional Psychology.P. S. Kitcher - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (1):134-40.
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  45. Discussion: How to Reduce a Functional Psychology?Patricia Kitcher - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (March):134-140.
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  46. Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (Volume 1 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science).T. Kuipers (ed.) - 2007 - Elsevier.
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  47. Reductionism.David Lamb - 1975 - Radical Philosophy 10:22.
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  48. Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.
    It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higherlevel property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as differencemaking to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is (...)
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  49. The Grain Problem.Michael Lockwood - 1993 - In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 271-291.
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  50. A Pluralist Theory of the Mind.David Ludwig - 2015 - Springer.
    This book challenges common debates in philosophy of mind by questioning the framework of placement problems in contemporary metaphysics. The author argues that placement problems arise when exactly one fundamental ontology serves as the base for all entities, and will propose a pluralist alternative that takes the diversity of our conceptual resources and ontologies seriously. This general pluralist account is applied to issues in philosophy of mind to argue that contemporary debates about the mind-body problem are built on this problematic (...)
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