Contents
200 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 200
  1. Weak Supervenience.J. Kim - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. A nonreductive physicalist libertarian free will.Dwayne Moore - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that the same agential states can cause different possible actions. Nonreductive physicalism is, roughly, the view that mental states cause actions to occur, while these actions also have sufficient physical causes. Though libertarian free will and nonreductive physicalism have overlapping subject matter, and while libertarian free will is currently trending at the same time as nonreductive physicalism is a dominant metaphysical posture, there are few sustained expositions of a nonreductive physicalist model of libertarian (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind.Simone Gozzano - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):371-391.
    In this paper, I present a two-pronged argument devoted to defending the type-identity theory of mind against the argument presented by Kripke in _Naming and Necessity_. In the first part, the interpersonal case, I show that since it is not possible to establish the metaphysical conditions for phenomenal identity, it is not possible to argue that there can be physical differences between two subjects despite their phenomenal identity. In the second part, the intrapersonal case, I consider the possibility of imagining (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Why Lewis Would Have Rejected Grounding.Fraser MacBride & Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2022 - In Helen Beebee & A. R. J. Fisher (eds.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of David K Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 66-91.
    We argue that Lewis would have rejected recent appeals to the notions of ‘metaphysical dependency’, ‘grounding’ and ‘ontological priority’, because he would have held that they’re not needed and they’re not intelligible. We argue our case by drawing upon Lewis’s views on supervenience, the metaphysics of singletons and the dubiousness of Kripke’s essentialism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Mental causation as joint causation.Chiwook Won - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4917-4937.
    This paper explores and defends the idea that mental properties and their physical bases jointly cause their physical effects. The paper evaluates the view as an emergentist response to the exclusion problem, comparing it with a competing nonreductive physicalist solution, the compatibilist solution, and argues that the joint causation view is more defensible than commonly supposed. Specifically, the paper distinguishes two theses of closure, Strong Closure and Weak Closure, two causal exclusion problems, the overdetermination problem and the supervenience problem, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. The Josephson Junction.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.
    What the Josephson Junction proves. The Josephson-Yardley 'connection.'.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Mentality and Object: Computational and Cognitive Diachronic Emergence.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 20 (2):296-356.
    Espousing non-reductive physicalism, how do we pick out the specific relevant physical notion(s) from physical facts, specifically in relation to phenomenal experience? Beginning with a historical review of Gilbert Ryle’s behaviorism and moving through Hilary Putnam’s machine-state functionalism and Wilfrid Sellars’ inferential framework, up to more contemporaneous computationalist- and cognitivist-functionalism (Gualtiero Piccinini), we survey accounts of mentality that countenance the emergence of mental states vide input- and output-scheme. Ultimately arriving at the conclusion that functionalism cannot account for problems such as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Emergentism and Sadra’s psychology; a common physicalistic challenge.Mahdi Homazadeh - 2019 - Asian Philosophy 29 (3):221-230.
    This paper first explores in detail a regenerated theory in philosophy of mind, known among contemporary philosophers as ‘emergentism’. By distinguishing strong and weak versions of the theory, I explain two important explanatory challenges presented by physicalists against this theory. In the following, I provide a brief overview of Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s theory of the incipience and degrees of the soul, examining similarities and differences between this theory and strong emergentism. Then, underlining the main aspects of similarity between the two theories, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Christian Materialism and Demonic Temptation.Matthew J. Hart - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (2):481–496.
    Demons have the power to cause temptations in us, and Christian materialism implies the supervenience of temptations on brain states. This in turn implies that demons bring about temptations by causally interfering with our brains. But if they have such an ability to affect the physical world, it is mysterious why they do not wreak more havoc than they do both to our brains and in the world more generally. Substance dualism provides an elegant solution: demonic temptation is not a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. What's Wrong With Brute Supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and Superdupervenience.Kevin Morris - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):256-280.
    This paper offers a qualified defense of Terry Horgan’s view of brute, inexplicable supervenience theses as physically unacceptable—as having no place in physicalist metaphysics—and his corresponding emphasis on the importance of “superdupervenience”, metaphysical supervenience that can be explained in a “materialistically acceptable” way. I argue, in response to Tom Polger, that it may be possible to ground the physical unacceptability of brute supervenience in its relation physically unacceptable properties supervening on physical properties; moreover, I argue that Horgan’s emphasis on the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. physicalism, truth, and the Pinocchio paradox.Laureano Luna - 2016 - Mind and Matter 14 (1):77-86.
    We develop an argument sketched by Luna (2011) based on the Pinocchio paradox, which was proposed by Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge- Smith (2010). We show that, upon plausible assumptions, the claim that mental states supervene on bodily states leads to the conclusion that some proposition is both paradoxical and not paradoxical. In order to show how the presence of paradoxes can be harnessed for philosophical argumentation, we present as well a couple of related arguments.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (3):281-338.
    Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition attributing any particular meaning to an expression is modally plastic: its truth depends very sensitively on the exact microphysical state of the world. However, such plasticity seems to threaten ordinary counterfactuals whose consequents contain speech reports, since it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  13. Interventionism and Supervenience: A New Problem and Provisional Solution.Markus8 Eronen & Daniel Brooks - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):185-202.
    The causal exclusion argument suggests that mental causes are excluded in favour of the underlying physical causes that do all the causal work. Recently, a debate has emerged concerning the possibility of avoiding this conclusion by adopting Woodward's interventionist theory of causation. Both proponents and opponents of the interventionist solution crucially rely on the notion of supervenience when formulating their positions. In this article, we consider the relation between interventionism and supervenience in detail and argue that importing supervenience relations into (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  14. The role of supervenience and constitution in neuroscientific research.Jens Harbecke - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-19.
    This paper is concerned with the notions of supervenience and mechanistic constitution as they have been discussed in the philosophy of neuroscience. Since both notions essentially involve specific dependence and determination relations among properties and sets of properties, the question arises whether the notions are systematically connected and how they connect to science. In a first step, some definitions of supervenience and mechanistic constitution are presented and tested for logical independence. Afterwards, certain assumptions fundamental to neuroscientific inquiry are made explicit (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  15. Additive Property and the Physical Reducibility of the Mind.Kwangho Hyun - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):91-95.
  16. The delocalized mind. Judgements, vehicles, and persons.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):1-24.
    Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  17. Physicalism and the argument from supervenience.Gbenga Fasiku - 2013 - Annales Philosophici 6:26-38.
    This paper challenges the viability of argument from supervenience in defense of a physicalist position on the place of qualia, the subjective properties of consciousness, in a physical or material world. Physicalism, being an ontological thesis that asserts that the only things that really exist are either physical entities or properties, affirms that every mental attribute must be a physical attribute. However, the existence of a quale as an attribute of a mental state falsifies this affirmation. The physicalist argues that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Aesthetic Supervenience vs. Aesthetic Grounding.Jiri Benovsky - 2012 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 49 (2):166–178.
    The claim that the having of aesthetic properties supervenes on the having of non-aesthetic properties has been widely discussed and, in various ways, defended. In this paper, I will show that even if it is sometimes true that a supervenience relation holds between aesthetic properties and the 'subvenient' non-aesthetic ones, it is not the interesting relation in the neighbourhood. As we shall see, a richer, asymmetric and irreflexive relation is required, and I shall defend the claim that the more-and-more-popular relation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  19. A Threat for Physicalism: a new Gedankenexperiment.Claudio Calosi & Vincenzo Fano - 2012 - Epistemologia 1:130-140.
    We present a new thought experiment that raises a threat for Minimal Physicalism, i.e. the thesis according to which mental properties supervene on physical properties. Our proposal is an example of the so called hard problems in philosophy of mind, in particular the problem of maximal consciousness. We do not however presuppose anything about its very nature apart from the minimal, weak assumption that it is determined by first order mental properties. We argue that either Minimal Physicalism is unable to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious Experience.Liam P. Dempsey - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (3):373-395.
    In this paper, I argue that while supervenience accounts of mental causation in general have difficulty avoiding epiphenomenalism, the situation is particularly bad in the case of conscious experiences since the function-realizer relation, arguably present in the case of intentional properties, does not obtain, and thus, the metaphysical link between supervenient and subvenient properties is absent. I contend, however, that the identification of experiential types with their neural correlates dispels the spectre epiphenomenalism, squares nicely both with the phenomenology of embodiment (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Irreverent Physicalism.Barbara Gail Montero - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):91-102.
    Imagine that our world were such that the entities, properties, laws, and relations of fundamental physics did not determine what goes on at the mental level; imagine that duplicating our fundamental physics would fail to duplicate the pleasures, feelings of joy, and experiences of wonder that we know and love; in other words, imagine that the mental realm did not supervene on the physical realm. Would our world, then, be a world in which physicalism is false? A good number of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. Two Myths of Psychophysical Reductionism.Restrepo Ricardo - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):75.
    This paper focuses on two prominent arguments claiming that physicalism entails reductionism. One is Kim’s causal exclusion argument (CEA), and the other is Papineau’s causal argument. The paper argues that Kim’s CEA is not logically valid and that it is driven by two implausible justifications. One is “Edward’s dictum”, which is alien to non-reductive physicalism and should be rejected. The other is by endorsement of Papineau’s conception of the physical, immanent in Papineau’s causal argument. This argument only arrives at the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. Supervenience, Dynamical Systems Theory, and Non-Reductive Physicalism.Jeffrey Yoshimi - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):373-398.
    It is often claimed (1) that levels of nature are related by supervenience, and (2) that processes occurring at particular levels of nature should be studied using dynamical systems theory. However, there has been little consideration of how these claims are related. To address the issue, I show how supervenience relations give rise to ‘supervenience functions’, and use these functions to show how dynamical systems at different levels are related to one another. I then use this analysis to describe a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  24. Does the supervenience argument generalize?Suzanne Bliss & Jordi Fernández - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):321-346.
    We evaluate the scope of Jaegwon Kim's “supervenience argument” for reduction. Does its conclusion apply only to psychology, or does it generalize to all the special sciences? The claim that the supervenience argument generalizes to all the special sciences if it goes through for psychology is often raised as an objection to the supervenience argument. We argue that this objection is ambiguous. We distinguish three readings of it and suggest that some of them make it a plausible claim, whereas other (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Supervenience and Mind.Robert Francescotti - 2011 - In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Rule-following, Intentionality and Non-reductive Physicalism.Antti Heikinheimo - 2011 - SATS 12 (1):36-59.
  27. Supervenience and neuroscience.Pete Mandik - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.
    The philosophical technical term "supervenience" is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28. A brief history of supervenience in the controversy space of recent philosophy of mind.Diana Pérez - 2011 - In Oscar Nudler (ed.), Controversy Spaces: A Model of Scientific and Philosophical Change. John Benjamins.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Supervenience and Anomalism are Compatible.Oron Shagrir - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):241-266.
    I explore a Davidsonian proposal for the reconciliation of two theses. One is the supervenience of the mental on the physical, the other is the anomalism of the mental. The gist of the proposal is that supervenience and anomalism are theses about interpretation. Starting with supervenience, the claim is that it should not be understood in terms of deeper metaphysical relations, but as a constraint on the relations between the applications of physical and mental predicates. Regarding anomalism, the claim is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30. Purpose, Cause, and Supervenience.Michael L. Corrado - 2010 - Essays in Philosophy 11 (1).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. The problem of mental causation formalized.Jens Harbecke - 2010 - Mind and Matter 8 (1):63-91.
    By formalizing the problem of mental causation, we first prove rigorously that the premises of the problem are jointly incompatible. Before the background of the formalizations, we clarify and assess the anti-physicalist argument by Scott Sturgeon and the supervenience argument by Jaegwon Kim. We demonstrate that, contrary to what has sometimes been contended, the negation of the non-identity premise of Kim's version of the supervenience argument is not tantamount to the claim that all mental events are identical to physical events, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. Kim's Supervenience Argument and the Nature of Total Realizers.Douglas Keaton - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):243-259.
    Abstract: I offer a novel objection to Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument. I argue that the Supervenience Argument relies upon an untenable conception of the base physical properties upon which mental properties are supposed to supervene: the base properties are required to be both ordinary physical/causal properties and also unconditionally sufficient for the properties that they subvene. But these requirements are mutually exclusive; as a result, at least two premises in the Supervenience Argument are false. I argue that this has disruptive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. Is there a conservative solution to the many thinkers problem?David Mark Kovacs - 2010 - Ratio 23 (3):275-290.
    On a widely shared assumption, our mental states supervene on our microphysical properties – that is, microphysical supervenience is true. When this thesis is combined with the apparent truism that human persons have proper parts, a grave difficulty arises: what prevents some of these proper parts from being themselves thinkers as well? How can I know that I am a human person and not a smaller thinker enclosed in a human person? Most solutions to this puzzle make radical, if not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  34. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays.Ernest Sosa (ed.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    Jaegwon Kim is one of the most pre-eminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the philosophy (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Emergence and Reduction in Dynamical Cognitive Science.Joel Walmsley - 2010 - New Ideas in Psychology 28:274-282.
    This paper examines the widespread intuition that the dynamical approach to cognitive science is importantly related to emergentism about the mind. The explanatory practices adopted by dynamical cognitive science rule out some conceptions of emergence; covering law explanations require a deducibility relationship between explanans and explanandum, whereas canonical theories of emergence require the absence of such deducibility. A response to this problem – one which would save the intuition that dynamics and emergence are related – is to reconstrue the concept (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Emergentism and supervenience physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):83 – 98.
    A purely metaphysical formulation of physicalism is surprisingly elusive. One popular slogan is, 'There is nothing over and above the physical'. Problems with this arise on two fronts. First, it is difficult to explain what makes a property 'physical' without appealing to the methodology of physics or to particular ways in which properties are known. This obviously introduces epistemic features into the core of a metaphysical issue. Second, it is difficult to cash out 'over-and-aboveness' in a way that is rigorous, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  37. Reduction and emergence: a critique of Kim.Paul Needham - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):93-116.
    In a recent critique of the doctrine of emergentism championed by its classic advocates up to C. D. Broad, Jaegwon Kim (Philosophical Studies 63:31–47, 1999) challenges their view about its applicability to the sciences and proposes a new account of how the opposing notion of reduction should be understood. Kim is critical of the classic conception advanced by Nagel and uses his new account in his criticism of emergentism. I question his claims about the successful reduction achieved in the sciences (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  38. Representationalism, symmetrical supervenience and identity.Dimitris Platchias - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):31-46.
    According to some representationalists (M. Tye, Ten problems of consciousness, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA, 1995; W.G. Lycan, Consciousness and experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1996; F. Dretske, Naturalising the mind, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA 1995), qualia are identical to external environmental states or features. When one perceives a red rose for instance, one is visually representing the actual redness of the rose. The represented redness of the rose is the actual redness of the rose itself. Thus redness is not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Supervenience, reductionism, and emergence.Howard Robinson - 2009 - In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
  40. Anomalism and supervenience: A critical survey.Oron Shagrir - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 237-272.
    The thesis that mental properties are dependent, or supervenient, on physical properties, but this dependence is not lawlike, has been influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is put forward explicitly in Donald Davidson's seminal ‘Mental Events.’ On the one hand, Davidson claims that the mental is anomalous, that ‘there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained’, and, in particular, that there are no strict psychophysical laws. On the other hand, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41. Emergent minds.Friedel Weinert - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):189-200.
  42. Causal Inheritance and Second-order Properties.Suzanne Bliss & Jordi Fernández - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (2):74-95.
    We defend Jaegwon Kim’s ‘causal inheritance’ principle from an objection raised by Jurgen Schröder. The objection is that the principle is inconsistent with a view about mental properties assumed by Kim, namely, that they are second-order properties. We argue that Schröder misconstrues the notion of second-order property. We distinguish three notions of second-order property and highlight their problems and virtues. Finally, we examine the consequence of Kim’s principle and discuss the issue of whether Kim’s ‘supervenience argument’ generalizes to all special (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Causal Relevance and Heterogeneity of Program Explanations in the Face of Explanatory Exclusion.Wilson Cooper - 2008 - Kritike 2 (1):95-109.
    In everyday causal explanations of human behaviour, known generally as folk psychology,' the causal powers of the mental seem to be taken for granted. Mental properties such as perceptions, beliefs, and desires, are all called upon in causal explanations of events that are deemed intentional. Jaegwon Kim's exclusion principle has led him to deny mental properties causal efficacy unless they are metaphysically reduced to physical properties, but what of their causal relevance? By giving up the assumption of causally efficacious mental (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Argument z superweniencji a niekonstruktywny naturalizm.Mariusz Grygianiec - 2008 - Filozofia Nauki 3.
    In a series of influential articles Jaegwon Kim has developed strong arguments against nonreductive physicalism as a possible solution to the problem of mental causation. One of them is the Supervenience Argument which states that assuming the mental/physical supervenience thesis, the causal closure principle, the exclusion principle with the no-overdetermination requirement and property dualism we obtain the conclusion that mental causation is unintelligible. On the other hand Collin McGinn has argued that a solution to the mind-body problem is forever beyond (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. The Supervenience Argument, Overdetermination, and Causal Drainage: Assessing Kim’s Master Argument.Sven Walter - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):673 – 696.
    This paper examines Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument (SA) against nonreductive physicalism, concentrating on Kim's response to two of the most important objections against the SA: First, the Overdetermination Argument, according to which Kim has no convincing argument against the possibility that mental causation might be a case of genuine or systematic overdetermination; second, the Generalization Argument, according to which the SA would entail that causation at any level gives way to causation at the next lower level, thereby leading to an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  46. Supervenience, Physicalist Reduction and Inverted Qualia.Jonas Dagys - 2007 - Problemos 71:108-115.
    Funkcinës psichiniø savybiø analizës atveriama jø materialiojo ákûnijimo ávairovës galimybë verèia materialistiná monizmà sàmonës filosofijoje formuluoti ne psichiniø ir fiziniø savybiø tapatumo, bet pirmøjø pareities nuo antrøjø tezæ. Pareities sàvoka sàmonës filosofijoje iðreiðkia minimalius reikalavimus fizikalistinëms teorijoms – paneigus pareities fizikalizmà bûtø paneigtos ir stipresnës fizikalizmoversijos. Straipsnyje tyrinëjama fizikalizmo kritika paremta vadinamuoju kokybiø perkeitimo galimybës argumentu. Parodoma, kad, viena vertus, toks argumentas negali bûti atremtas nuorodomis áempirinius duomenis, nes svarstoma hipotetinë situacija numano jos empiriná nestebimumà; kita vertus, jei svarstoma situacija (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Emergence.Robert Michael Francescotti - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):47 - 63.
    Here I offer a precise analysis of what it takes for a property to count as emergent. The features widely considered crucial to emergence include novelty, unpredictability, supervenience, relationality, and downward causal influence. By acknowledging each of these distinctive features, the definition provided below captures an important sense in which the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  48. CHAPTER 2. The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and Defended.Jaegwon Kim - 2007 - In Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 32-92.
  49. Physicalism, or something near enough. [REVIEW]Cynthia Macdonald - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (2):155-161.
  50. Mental causation and the supervenience argument.Jürgen Schröder - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):221 - 237.
    One of several problems concerning the possibility of mental causation is that the causal potential of a supervenient property seems to be absorbed by its supervenience base if that base and the supervenient property are not identical. If the causal powers of the supervenient property are a proper subset of the causal powers of the supervenience base then, according to the causal individuation of properties, the supervenience base seems to do all the causal work and the supervenient property appears to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 200