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Summary One of the primary methods of argument with respect to the metaphysics of personal identity has been to pump intuitions on a wide variety of puzzle cases, many of which involve science fiction.  These include brain and body swaps, teletransportation, fission, fusion, and many more.  The basic idea is to test the limits of our conceptual commitments by prizing apart various features of our identity that are typically conjoined.  For example, what would happen if my body went in one direction and my psychological stream went in another?  Where would I go?  This method is highly controversial, however, with several theorists questioning both the possibility of such cases as well as their utility for determining the identity conditions for non-fictional creatures like us.
Key works John Locke offered the original body swap case between a Prince and a cobbler (see Perry 1975), and others who have appealed to many varieties of puzzle cases to argue for their conclusions about personal identity include Shoemaker 1963, Wiggins 1967, Nagel 1971, Lewis 1976, Parfit 1984, Noonan 1989, Martin 1997, and McMahan 2002.  Those wary or critical of this "method of puzzle cases" include Williams 1970, Wilkes 1988, Johnston 1989, Gendler 2002, and DeGrazia 2005.
Introductions Encyclopedia entry that includes discussion of identity and puzzle cases: Gallois 2008.  No introductory texts on puzzle cases alone, but an excellent (albeit challenging) deployment of the method is Part III of Parfit 1984, and an excellent (albeit challenging) discussion of its limits is Wilkes 1988.
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  1. Memory, Organisms and the Circle of Life.Rina Tzinman - 2018 - In Valerio Buonomo (ed.), The Persistence of Persons. Studies in the metaphysics of personal identity over time. Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: pp. 243-273.
  2. 'He Only Comes Out When I Drink My Gin’: DID, Personal Identity, and Moral Responsibility.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2016 - In Rocco J. Gennaro & Casey Harison (eds.), The Who and Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield: Lexington Press. pp. 121-134.
    This essay explores the topic of Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly called “Multiple Personality Disorder”) with special attention to such Quadrophenia masterpieces as “Dr. Jimmy” and “The Real Me.” A number of major philosophical questions arise: Can two or more “persons” really inhabit the same body? How can we hold Dr. Jimmy morally responsible for the reprehensible actions of Mr. Jim? Wouldn’t it be wrong to do so if they are really different people? What is it to be the “same” person (...)
  3. Personal Identity and Purgatory.David B. Hershenov & Rose Koch-Hershenov - 2006 - Religious Studies 42 (4):439.
    If Purgatory involves just an immaterial soul undergoing a transformation between our death and resurrection, then, as Aquinas recognized, it won't be us in Purgatory. Drawing upon Parfit's ideas about identity not being what matters to us, we explore whether the soul's experience of Purgatory could still be beneficial to it as well as the deceased human who didn't experience the purging yet would possess the purged soul upon resurrection. We also investigate an alternative non-Thomistic hylomorphic account of Purgatory in (...)
  4. Speaking About Oneself.Isidora Stojanovic - 2015 - In Stephan Torre & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. pp. 200-219.
    It has long been known (cf. Frege 1918, Castañeda 1968, Anscombe 1975 , Perry 1977, 1979, Lewis 1981) that de se attitudes, that is beliefs, desires, hopes etc. that one has about oneself as oneself,1 are interestingly different fromthe attitudes that one holds in a third-personal mode about some individual, who might or might not turn out to be them. Frege suggested that Dr. Lauben’s belief that he has been wounded is a belief that only Dr. Lauben himself can entertain. (...)
  5. The Subject in Neuropsychology: Individuating Minds in the Split‐Brain Case.Elizabeth Schechter - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):501-525.
    Many experimental findings with split-brain subjects intuitively suggest that each such subject has two minds. The conceptual and empirical basis of this duality intuition has never been fully articulated. This article fills that gap, by offering a reconstruction of early neuropsychological literature on the split-brain phenomenon. According to that work, the hemispheres operate independently of each other insofar as they interact via the mediation of effection and transduction—via behavior and sensation, essentially. This is how your mind and my mind interact (...)
  6. I Think, Therefore I Persist.Matt Duncan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):740-756.
    Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2 + 2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2 + 2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal (...)
  7. A Matter of Personal Survival Life After Death.M. MARSH - 1985 - The Theosophical Publishing House.
  8. Divided Consciousness, Divided Self.Kamuran Godelek - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    This work addresses issues of self integrity and self identity arising from cases of split brain and multiple personality disorder. It takes on the task of accounting for a unified conscious experience of oneself and, more importantly, a unified and continuous self within a multiple systems, information processing approach to consciousness and the self. Cases of split-brain syndrome are examined in detail, and the view that commissurotomy produces dual selves in one body, advanced by leading researchers in neuropsychology and philosophy, (...)
  9. The Poetics of Fission in Robinson Jeffers.Scott Mcclintock - 2008 - Clio: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History 37 (2):171-193.
  10. Lewis, H. D.-"The Self and Immortality". [REVIEW]H. H. Price - 1974 - Philosophy 49:102.
  11. Is Immortality Desirable?G. Lowes Dickinson - 1910 - Philosophical Review 19 (1):92-93.
  12. Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality Among the Greeks.Erwin Rohde & W. B. Hillis - 1926 - Philosophical Review 35 (3):267-269.
  13. Immortality.Josiah Royce - 1908 - Philosophical Review 17:241.
  14. Immortality.Count Hermann Keyserling - 1940 - Philosophical Review 49:92.
  15. Persons and Immortality.Kenneth A. Bryson (ed.) - 1999 - Rodopi.
    The religious belief in personal immortality depends on the evidence for the existence of God, an immaterial soul or mind, and human nature. We also need to support the view that God will always want to maintain relationships with us in the afterlife. So, immortality is a hard sell. The suffering of innocent victims suggests that the existence of a loving God is not self-evident. Furthermore, the soul's separation from the body at death raises the troublesome problem of personal identity. (...)
  16. Implications of Immortality.R. J. Hankinson - 1990 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 6 (1):1-27.
  17. Fission, Freedom, and the Fall.Hud Hudson - 2009 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.
  18. Imminent Immortality?Ewa Bartnik - 2000 - Dialogue and Universalism 10:39.
  19. Survival and Immortality.William Ralph Inge - 1917 - Hibbert Journal 15 (4).
  20. Immortality.Anthony Flew - 1967 - In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. pp. 3--139.
  21. Is My Head a Person?Michael B. Burke - 2003 - In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 107-125.
    It is hard to see why the head and other brain-containing parts of a person are not themselves persons, or at least thinking, conscious beings. Some theorists have sought to reconcile us to the existence of thinking person-parts. Others have sought ways to avoid them, but have relied on radical theories at odds with the metaphysic implicit in ordinary ways of thinking. This paper offers a novel, conservative solution, one on which the heads and other brain-containing parts of persons do (...)
  22. Attention in Split-Brain Patients.Todd C. Handy & Michael S. Gazzaniga - 2005 - In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press.
  23. The Faces of Immortality.Kai Nielsen - 1994 - In John Donnelly (ed.), Language, Metaphysics, and Death. Fordham University Press. pp. 237--264.
  24. Split‐Brain Research.Maryse Lassonde - 2002 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
  25. Understanding Metaphors with the Two Hemispheres of the Brain.Nlkolaj Frandsen - 1996 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 31:49.
  26. The Awareness of Immortality: The Other in Us?Juraj Cap - 2011 - Filozofia 66 (4):315-324.
  27. Furries and the Limits of Species Identity Disorder: A Response to Gerbasi Et Al.Fiona Probyn-Rapsey - 2011 - Society and Animals 19 (3):294-301.
    This is a response to an article published inSociety & Animals in 2008 that argued for the existence of a “species identity disorder” in some furries. Species identity disorder is modeled on gender identity disorder, itself a highly controversial diagnosis that has been criticized for pathologizing homosexuality and transgendered people. This response examines the claims of the article and suggests that the typology it constructs is based on unexamined assumptions about what constitutes “human” identity and regulatory fictions of gender identity.
  28. The Self and Immortality.Antony Flew - 1974 - Philosophical Books 15 (2):12-14.
  29. The Other Within: The Marranos, Split Identity, and Emerging Modernity.Henry Kamen - 2013 - Common Knowledge 19 (1):146-147.
  30. Immortality.Johannes Borgstein - 2005 - Ludus Vitalis 13 (24):199-202.
  31. A Computational Analysis of Mental Image Generation: Evidence From Functional Dissociations in Split-Brain Patients.Stephen M. Kosslyn, Jeffrey D. Holtzman, Martha J. Farah & Michael S. Gazzaniga - 1985 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 114 (3):311-341.
  32. The Immortality That Is Now.George John Romanes - 1893 - The Monist 4 (4):481-481.
  33. The Fission of Being, Essences, and Absolute Visibility (Abstract).Paolo Gambazzi - 1999 - Chiasmi International 1:273-273.
  34. Immortality.Les Reid - 1994 - Philosophy Now 9:40-41.
  35. Immortality.Paul Weiss - 1947 - Review of Metaphysics 1 (4):87 - 103.
  36. The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation.Charles Hartshorne - 1953 - Review of Metaphysics 7 (1):98 - 112.
  37. Roland Puccetti 1924-1995.Judith Fox - 1996 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 69 (5):135 - 136.
  38. Immortality.A. Bronson Alcott - 1885 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19 (2):221 - 222.
  39. Adverbs, Identity, and Multiple Personalities.J. J. MacIntosh - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):301 - 321.
  40. Split-Brain Theory and Education.Geoffrey Yarlott - 1986 - British Journal of Educational Studies 34 (3):235 - 248.
  41. The Immortality of Infusoria.Alfred Binet - 1890 - The Monist 1 (1):21-37.
  42. Intimidations of Immortality.H. R. Friedman - 1976 - The Monist 59 (2):234-248.
  43. Immortality.George M. Gould - 1890 - The Monist 1 (3):372-392.
  44. Reflections on Immortality.C. W. Kendall - 1913 - The Monist 23 (4):595-596.
  45. Immortality and Monadistic Idealism.Radoslav A. Tsanoff - 1920 - The Monist 30 (2):292-306.
  46. Immortality and Monadistic Idealism.J. Ellis McTaggart - 1921 - The Monist 31 (2):316-317.
  47. Epistemological Fission.Paul K. Moser - 1998 - The Monist 81 (3):353-370.
  48. We Believe in Immortality.Edward A. Pace - 1929 - New Scholasticism 3 (2):216-219.
  49. Counting the Minds of Split-Brain Patients.Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst - 1996 - Logique Et Analyse 39 (155-6):315-324.
  50. Non-Branching Clause.Huiyuhl Yi - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (2):191-210.
    The central claim of the Parfitian psychological approach to personal identity is that the fact about personal identity is underpinned by a non-branching psychological continuity relation. Hence, for the advocates of the Parfitian view, it is important to understand what it is for a relation to take or not take a branching form. Nonetheless, very few attempts have been made in the literature of personal identity to define the non-branching clause. This paper undertakes this task. Drawing upon a recent debate (...)
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