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  1. Epistemicism and the Combined Spectrum.Alter Torin & Rachels Stuart - 2004 - Ratio 17 (3):241-255.
    Derek Parfit's combined-spectrum argument seems to conflict with epistemicism, a viable theory of vagueness. While Parfit argues for the indeterminacy of personhood, epistemicism denies indeterminacy. But, we argue, the linguistically based determinacy that epistemicism supports lacks the sort of normative or ontological significance that concerns Parfit. Thus, we reformulate his argument to make it consistent with epistemicism. We also dispute Roy Sorensen's suggestion that Parfit's argument relies on an assumption that fuels resistance to epistemicism, namely, that 'the magnitude of a (...)
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  2. Head-Counting Vs. Heart-Counting: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins From Malta.Y. Michael Barilan - 2002 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 45 (4):593-603.
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  3. Animal Interrupted, or Why Accepting Pascal's Wager Might Be the Last Thing You Ever Do.Sam Baron & Christina Dyke - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):109-133.
    According to conventionalist accounts of personal identity, persons are constituted in part by practices and attitudes of certain sorts of care. In this paper, we concentrate on the most well-developed and defended version of conventionalism currently on offer (namely, that proposed by David Braddon-Mitchell, Caroline West, and Kristie Miller) and discuss how the conventionalist appears forced either (1) to accept arbitrariness concerning from which perspective to judge one's survival or (2) to maintain egalitarianism at the cost of making “transfiguring” decisions (...)
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  4. Technological Fictions and Personal Identity: On Ricoeur, Schechtman and Analytic Thought Experiments.Simon Beck - 2016 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 47 (2):117-132.
    Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman express grave doubts about the acceptability and informativeness of the thought-experiments employed by analytic philosophers (notably Derek Parfit) in the debate about personal identity, and for what appear to be related reasons. I consider their reasoning and argue that their reasons fail to justify their doubts. I go on to argue that, from this discussion of possible problems concerning select thought-experiments, something positive can be learned about personal identity.
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  5. Transplant Thought-Experiments: Two Costly Mistakes in Discounting Them.Simon Beck - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):189-199.
    ‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another, have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to (...)
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  6. These Bizarre Fictions: Thought-Experiments, Our Psychology and Our Selves.Simon Beck - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54.
    Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.
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  7. Points of Concern.Simon Beck - 2000 - Theoria 47:121-130.
    This is a critical review of Raymond Martin's 'Self-Concern' (1998), focusing especially on his criticism of Parfit's use of fission thought-experiments and his own 'fission rejuvenation' thought-experiment.
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  8. Should We Tolerate People Who Split?Simon Beck - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17.
    Thought-experiments in which one person divides into two have been important in the literature on personal identity. I consider three influential arguments which aim to undermine the force of these thought-experiments – arguments from David Wiggins, Patricia Kitcher and Kathleen Wilkes. I argue that all three fail, leaving us to face the consequences of splitting, whatever those may be.
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  9. Should We Tolerate People Who Split?Simon Beck - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17.
    Thought-experiments in which one person divides into two have been important in the literature on personal identity. I consider three influential arguments which aim to undermine the force of these thought-experiments – arguments from David Wiggins, Patricia Kitcher and Kathleen Wilkes. I argue that all three fail, leaving us to face the consequences of splitting, whatever those may be.
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  10. Parfit and the Russians.Simon Beck - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):205.
    The paper takes a close look at Derek Parfit’s example of the Nineteenth Century Russian in 'Reasons and Persons'. Parfit presents it as an example which illustrates the moral consequences of adopting his reductionist view of personal identity in a positive light. I argue that things turn out to be more complex than he envisages, and that it might be far more difficult to live in his world than he allows.
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  11. Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.
    The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in twins who are conjoined below the neck. Human dicephalic twins look like a two-headed person, with each brain supporting a distinct mental life. Jeff McMahan has recently argued that, because they instance two of us but only one animal, dicephalic twins provide a counterexample to the animalist's claim that each of us is identical with a human animal. To the contrary, I (...)
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  12. Coital Frequency and Twinning.B. Bønnelykke, J. Olsen & J. Nielsen - 1990 - Journal of Biosocial Science 22 (2):191-6.
  13. Can You Survive a Brain-Zap?Scott Campbell - 2004 - Theoria 70 (1):22-27.
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  14. On Two Arguments for the Indeterminacy of Personal Identity.Helen Morris Cartwright - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):241-273.
    Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, A=B and A=C have no truth value. In the other, a series or spectrum of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that (...)
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  15. On Singularities and Simulations.Barry Dainton - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (1):42.
  16. Kass, Leon R., and James Q. Wilson. The Ethics of Human Cloning.Gary E. Dann - 2000 - Review of Metaphysics 53 (3):710-711.
  17. Rationality, Time and Normativity: On Hedden’s Time-Slice Rationality.Sabine Döring & Bahadir Eker - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):571-585.
    In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality. One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from (...)
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  18. Metaphysical and Ethical Perspectives on Creating Animal-Human Chimeras.J. T. Eberl & R. A. Ballard - 2009 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (5):470-486.
    This paper addresses several questions related to the nature, production, and use of animal-human (a-h) chimeras. At the heart of the issue is whether certain types of a-h chimeras should be brought into existence, and, if they are, how we should treat such creatures. In our current research environment, we recognize a dichotomy between research involving nonhuman animal subjects and research involving human subjects, and the classification of a research protocol into one of these categories will trigger different ethical standards (...)
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  19. Saving a Life but Losing the Patient.Mark Greene - 2013 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (6):479-498.
    Gregor Samsa awakes to find himself transformed into a gigantic bug. The creature’s inchoate flailing leads Gregor’s sister to conclude that Gregor is no more, having been replaced by a brute beast lacking any vestige of human understanding. Sadly, real cases of brain injury and disease can lead to psychological metamorphoses so profound that we cannot easily think that the survivor is the person we knew. I argue that there can be cases in which statements like, “It’s just not Gregor (...)
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  20. Boltzmannian Immortality.Christian Loew - 2016 - Erkenntnis (4):1-16.
    Plausible assumptions from Cosmology and Statistical Mechanics entail that it is overwhelmingly likely that there will be exact duplicates of us in the distant future long after our deaths. Call such persons “Boltzmann duplicates,” after the great pioneer of Statistical Mechanics. In this paper, I argue that if survival of death is possible at all, then we almost surely will survive our deaths because there almost surely will be Boltzmann duplicates of us in the distant future that stand in appropriate (...)
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  21. La identidad personal, el dialogo y la extensión: Por qué no existe el yo sin los otros.Ignacio Moya Arriagada - 2013 - Intus-Legere Filosofia 7 (1):59-77.
    (ENGLISH) In this paper I propose a concept of the self that allows us to address and solve some of the issues associated with problem of diachronic personal identity. That is, by virtue of what can we consider that I am today the same person I was yesterday? The problem of continuity in time of identity has a long history in analytic philosophy. I argue that the continuity of personal identity over time can be ensured by resorting to the concept (...)
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  22. The Significance of Personal Identity for Death.Duncan Purves - 2015 - Bioethics 29 (9):681-682.
    I respond to David Shoemaker's arguments for the conclusion that personal identity is irrelevant for death. I contend that we can accept Shoemaker's claim that loss of personal identity is not sufficient for death while nonetheless maintaining that there is an important theoretical relationship between death and personal identity. I argue that this relationship is also of practical importance for physicians' decisions about organ reallocation.
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  23. Personal Identity and Applied Ethics: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction.Andrea Sauchelli - 2017 - London: Routledge.
    ‘Soul’, ‘self’, ‘substance’ and ‘person’ are just four of the terms often used to refer to the human individual. Cutting across metaphysics, ethics, and religion the nature of personal identity is a fundamental and long-standing puzzle in philosophy. Personal Identity and Applied Ethics introduces and examines different conceptions of the self, our nature, and personal identity and considers the implications of these for applied ethics. A key feature of the book is that it considers a range of different approaches to (...)
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  24. The Problematic Nature of Parfitian Persons.Heidi Storl - 1992 - Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):123-31.
  25. I See Dead People: Disembodied Souls and Aquinas’s ‘Two-Person’ Problem.Christina Van Dyke - 2014 - In Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy. pp. 25-45.
    Aquinas’s account of the human soul is the key to his theory of human nature. The soul’s nature as the substantial form of the human body appears at times to be in tension with its nature as immaterial intellect, however, and nowhere is this tension more evident than in Aquinas’s discussion of the ‘separated’ soul. In this paper I use the Biblical story of the rich man and Lazarus (which Aquinas took to involve actual separated souls) to highlight what I (...)
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  26. Against Psychological Sequentialism.Huiyuhl Yi - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (2):247-262.
    Psychological Sequentialism holds that no causal constraint is necessary for the preservation of what matters in survival; rather, it is sufficient for preservation if two groups of mental states are similar enough and temporally close enough. Suppose that one’s body is instantaneously dematerialized and subsequently, by an amazing coincidence, a collection of molecules is configured to form a qualitatively identical human body. According to Psychological Sequentialism, these events preserve what matters in survival. In this article, I examine some of the (...)
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  27. One Self: The Logic of Experience.Arnold Zuboff - 1990 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):39-68.
    Imagine that you and a duplicate of yourself are lying unconscious, next to each other, about to undergo a complete step-by-step exchange of bits of your bodies. It certainly seems that at no stage in this exchange of bits will you have thereby switched places with your duplicate. Yet it also seems that the end-result, with all the bits exchanged, will be essentially that of the two of you having switched places. Where will you awaken? I claim that one and (...)
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