Pyrrhonists

Renaissance magic was an attempt to supply Platonism with a philosophy of nature that could compete with Aristotelian physics. It was expected to heal the increasing breach between science and faith. However, the basic presupposition of every magic worldview, the notion of a living universe, favors immanentism and arguably hastened the rise of secularism. Secularism, it should be noted, was not an identifiable set of theories but a process towards modernity with its correspondent philosophical theology. Three different stages in that (...) development can be shown in the philosophical systems of three famous Renaissance magicians: Henry Cornelius Agrippa, Giordano Bruno, and Tommaso Campanella. (shrink)

Pyrrho of Elis advises us not to trust our sensations and opinions, but instead to be without opinions about individual things. He suggests that such a state is to be achieved by saying, concerning each individual thing, that it is “no more” a certain way than it is not. This paper argues that the current metaphysical reading of Pyrrho’s views falls short of explaining why we should not trust our sensations and opinions; in addition, it does not explain how to (...) achieve the state of being “without opinions” about individual things. It is argued that a Fregean analysis of Pyrrho’s views can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. The purpose of the paper, however, is to refine, rather than rebut, the metaphysical reading. (shrink)

Agrippa was the main expounder of the occult philosophy, which is the knowledge of the hidden causes of things and is finalized to their manipulation by magic. Magic, in turn, is the highest form and the end of philosophy. According to his De occulta philosophia, magic is threefold: natural (concerning sublunar world), celestial (concerning stars and heavenly intelligences), and divine (concerning God and higher angels). It consists of the manipulation of concrete objects and of the summoning of intelligences and God, (...) which is performed on the basis of the precepts of the Kabbalah. Agrippa’s overall aim was to purify magic from its necromantic and irrational components: this would enable the restoration of the prelapsarian condition of man (in accordance with the Hermetic ideal of deification) and a Christian reform of culture. The critique of philosophical knowledge and of every science, presented in Agrippa’s De vanitate, and his critique to the subordination of woman typical of Scholastic theology, contained in the De nobilitate foeminei sexus, are functional to these ends. (shrink)

In this chapter, Robb Dunphy is concerned with the nature of G.E. Schulze's scepticism as he presents it in his 1792 work Aenesidemus, and with its relation to the metaphysical projects of Kant, Reinhold, and later German Idealists. After introducing Schulze's text, Dunphy turns to a recent interpretation offered by Jessica Berry, who claims that the extent to which Schulze endorsed a genuinely Pyrrhonian Scepticism has gone unacknowledged, both by his idealist contemporaries and by the majority of the secondary literature (...) on the period. Berry suggests that this unacknowledged Pyrrhonism in Aenesidemus provides the resources for a more radical criticism of the German Idealists' scientific, systematic metaphysical ambitions, to which they remain fundamentally vulnerable. Despite agreeing that an exploration of Schulze's debt to Pyrrhonism represents a valuable addition to our understanding of his scepticism, in the latter parts of the chapter Dunphy suggests that the Berry's attribution of a Pyrrhonian Scepticism to Schulze should to some extent be rejected, and that such a scepticism is perhaps not quite as problematic for the projects of Kant and the German Idealists as she suggests. (shrink)

In a day in which there are different religious system vying for acceptance and probably even dominance, it is high time to identify a peaceful model for inter-religious understanding and communication. St. Paul had several interactions with the Jewish leaders, monarchs and government officials on religious topics and issues in between A.D. 60 to A.D 62 at Caesarea. His interaction with King Agrippa II and Governor Festus can be used as a paradigm for contemporary inter-religious understanding and communication. Even though (...) Paul’s life was hanging on a balance as a prisoner about to be transported to Rome, he did not resort to violence, verbal abuse or rain down curses, when his religious claims were questioned. Instead, he argued as a seasoned philosopher, prayed as a pious saint and appealed as a prisoner in chains with humility for the ‘veracity and the reasonability’ of his truth claim. The article will interact with few philosophical themes that surface during this discourse and dialogue and also attempt to trace St Paul’s use of rhetoric in his discourse. The title of this article is ‘St. Paul’s discourse and dialogue with King Agrippa and Governor Festus as a model for contemporary inter-religious understanding and communication’. The primary source for this article is the book of Acts in the New Testament and the secondary source would be dictionaries and books. (shrink)

This essay develops an intercultural approach to the skeptical way of life through an interpretation of two classical traditions: the Pyrrhonian tradition of ancient Greece and the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition of classical India. The skeptical way of life is characterized by several important features, including a goal of tranquility or of freedom from disturbance and suffering, a philosophical strategy of dialectical argument that terminates in the suspension of judgment or the abandonment of views, a purgative philosophic therapy, and life without (...) belief. A constellation of practical questions that emerge from the skeptical way of life are also considered, including the skeptic’s character, conformity, and care. One of the principal aims of the essay will be to develop this intercultural account of the skeptical way of life and to show by way of this illustrative example how our understanding of skepticism and ancient philosophy is enhanced through an intercultural approach. (shrink)

t. 1. Dve knigi protiv logikov. Dve knigi protiv fizikov.--t. 2. Protiv uchenykh. Tri knigi Pirronovykh polozheniĭ.

This is the first dedicated commentary to Sextus Empiricus’ treatise _Against the Arithmeticians_, dealing with crucial issues in the history of the sceptical, Platonic and Pythagorean traditions and in the ancient philosophy of mathematics.

This article considers two alternative responses to the question of the motivation behind the suspensive argumentation developed by the Pyrrhonic version of the ancient scepticism and also shows their respective difficulties: a) the therapeutic motivation, that takes the suspension of assent for the condition to reach not only a state of mental tranquillity concerning matters of opinion but also a moderate attitude towards passions; b) the epistemic motivation, which states that the suspension corresponds to the unique possibility to preserve philosophical (...) life in the absence of rational criteria to decide among competing philosophical theories. The latter kind of motivation, which consists in creating propitious conditions for the search for the truth, has nothing to do with the methodic motivation characterizing the modern reception of ancient scepticism. Although this motivation was not present in the Pyrrhonic scepticism, it could not be unknown to the academic sceptics because of their Socratic origins. (shrink)

Outlines of Scepticism, by the Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, is a work of major importance. It is the fullest extant account of ancient Scepticism, and also one of our most copious sources of information about the other Hellenistic philosophies. Moreover, the rediscovery of Sextus in the sixteenth century brought about a revolution in philosophy. Anyone interested in the history of philosophy must have at least an acquaintance with Sextus, and for students of Hellenistic philosophy his writings are indispensable. Julia Annas (...) and Jonathan Barnes provide an accurate and readable English translation of the Outlines, with a short introduction and brief annotation. (shrink)

双子のようによく似たギリシャ懐疑哲学と仏教の〈空〉の思想。両者を丹念に読み解くとき、透徹した「縁起=言語ゲーム」の世界に揺らめくわれわれの生の真実が浮かびあがる。ウィトゲンシュタインを起点に世界史的規 模で展開する哲学の本当の意味を求める旅。.

I offer reasons against reading Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. I argue that Hume's scepticism is motivated differently, that his sceptical strategies are not analogous to Pyrrhonism's, and that it is profitable to read Hume as a critic of Pyrrhonism. I hold that the most informative point of comparison between Hume and Sextus Empiricus is a point of difference, namely, their stands on the connection between suspension of judgement (epochê) and tranquillity (ataraxia). For Sextus, tranquillity flows naturally from suspending judgement (...) on all opinions. Hume, by contrast, consistently treats radical suspension of judgement as resulting in despair and social detachment. I take a firmer stance than past commentators on this issue by affirming that Hume and Sextus do not merely disagree on this issue, but that Hume's view is more plausible. Reading Hume's sceptical crisis, I propose, reveals an insightful criticism of Pyrrhonism, one that sheds light on human nature's response to radical doubt. (shrink)

Recently there has been a debate on whether Pyrrho’s philosophy could be influenced by Indian Buddhist philosophy. Discussions revealing striking similarities between them often point out Pyrrho’s complicated sentence, referred to as tetralemma, as one of the most striking similarities. The central question of this paper is whether Pyrrho’s sentence is of the tetralemmatic kind. Authors argue that if Pyrrho’s sentence is not fourfold in structure it could scarcely be classified as similar to the Buddhist tetralemma. A careful analysis of (...) the question is provided, arguing that the approach to the problem of tetralemmatic structure cannot be carried out solely on syntactic grounds. An aspect of a deeper philosophical meaning of the formula is applied, which alone enables us (if at all) to link Pyrrho’s philosophy to Buddhism. (shrink)

Alan Bailey offers a clear exposition and defence of the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism.

This is the first complete English translation of Sextus Empiricus' Against Those in the Disciplines that includes substantial interpretive aids, including introduction, extensive notes, and glossary. The work discusses six specialized fields of study: grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology, and music.

Przełożył, wstępem i przypisami opatrzył Zbigniew Nerczuk Zarysy Pyrrońskie – traktat w trzech księgach będący dziełem sceptyka Sekstusa Empiryka (II/III wiek n.e.), należy do kanonu tekstów filozoficznych, będąc jednym z niewielu zachowanych okruchów wielkiej tradycji krytycznej i sceptycznej, swymi źródłami sięgającej presokratyków, sofistyki i Sokratesa, rozwiniętej przez Pyrrona, a zwieńczonej wielkim dziełem Sekstusa Empiryka. Tradycja ta przez stulecia lekceważona i marginalizowana wskutek założonej przez kulturę europejską dominacji myśli Platona i Arystotelesa, odkryta i rozpowszechniona w XVI wieku, wyznaczyła kierunek rozwoju dalszej (...) myśli filozoficznej, zwracając ją w stronę rozważań dotyczących problemów poznawczych. Jedyne dotychczas opublikowane w języku polskim tłumaczenie Zarysów sporządzone przez Adama Krokiewicza ukazało się w 1931 roku i mimo jego niewątpliwej wnikliwości, niepowtarzalnego stylu, a także wielkiej roli, jaką odegrało w upowszechnianiu wiedzy o antycznym sceptycyzmie w Polsce, tak jak każdy przekład z biegiem czasu i ono powinno zostać skonfrontowane z nowszą wersją. Prezentując nowe tłumaczenie, jego Autor może mieć tylko nadzieję, że będzie ono stanowiło wartościową alternatywę dla niezwykłego dzieła Adama Krokiewicza. (shrink)

Sextus Empiricus (IIe-IIIe s. ap. J.-C.) est le dernier philosophe sceptique de l'Antiquite et le seul dont l'uvre soit en grande partie conservee. Son Contre les dogmatiques prend pour cible la connaissance philosophique. Cet ensemble de traites tres argumente est articule suivant la distinction, d'epoque hellenistique, entre trois parties de la philosophie, la logique, la physique et l'ethique. On donne ici la premiere traduction francaise de la premiere et plus importante partie de cet ouvrage, le Contre les logiciens, qui conteste (...) la possibilite meme de connaitre. Prenant appui sur la distinction entre " choses apparentes " et " choses cachees ", Sextus Empiricus traite en premier lieu du " critere de la verite " ou des voies d'acces a la connaissance des choses apparentes. Un long developpement doxographique qui conduit des philosophes presocratiques aux Stoiciens, aux Epicuriens et aux Academiciens precede l'expose des arguments qui plaident en faveur de l'inexistence d'un tel critere. Au livre II, Sextus Empiricus met en question, a propos des choses cachees, le " vrai " lui-meme, avant de faire ressortir la faiblesse de l'inference semiotique et celle de la demonstration. L'ouvrage porte ainsi a notre connaissance tout a la fois des doctrines dogmatiques - comme la logique stoicienne - auxquelles nous aurions moins acces sans son temoignage, et une bonne partie de l'argumentaire sceptique deploye depuis la renaissance du pyrrhonisme, a l'epoque d'Enesideme, qui serait autrement perdue. (shrink)

Dans L'Antéchrist, Nietzsche dit des Sceptiques, de quelques-uns d'entre eux du moins, qu'ils sont " le seul type convenable dans toute l'histoire de la philosophie " ; et il ajoute, dans la même œuvre, que " la force et la liberté issues de la vigueur et de la plénitude de l'esprit, se prouvent par le scepticisme ". On aurait pu craindre que l'influence des mathématiques sur la philosophie n'inclinât celle-ci vers le dogmatisme, comme une opinion courante en histoire de la (...) philosophie nous pousse à le penser.0Kant n'a-t-il pas dit que le cheminement de la philosophie était inverse de celui de la mathématique et que l'on faisait un mauvais travail en l'une comme en l'autre quand l'une imitait l'autre, et surtout quand la philosophie, croyant devenir plus forte en imitant le sérieux et la rigueur des mathématiques, ne parvenait qu'à être dogmatique? Le présent livre est destiné à montrer non seulement qu'il faut nuancer ce jugement, mais que c'est tout le contraire qui est vrai : le philosophe peut certes faire une lecture sceptique des mathématiques et leur apporter le scepticisme comme de l'extérieur, mais il peut aussi s'instruire des mathématiques pour en tirer de singulières leçons de scepticisme, de liberté d'esprit, d'inversion de ce qui est ordinairement tenu pour vrai.0Les auteurs qui ont participé à ce collectif ont tenté d'ouvrir ici un champ, en apprenant à ne plus fustiger ce dont nous recueillons des leçons de scepticisme et à ne plus tenir ce qui pouvait être réduit au scepticisme comme dérisoire, ridicule ou contenant quelque irrémédiable faute. (shrink)