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  1. Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
    Creeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I (...)
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  2. On Ground as a Guide to Realism.Emad H. Atiq - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):165-178.
    According to Fine (among others), a nonbasic factual proposition must be grounded in facts involving those of its constituents that are both real and fundamental. But the principle is vulnerable to several dialectically significant counterexamples. It entails, for example, that a logical Platonist cannot accept that true disjunctions are grounded in the truth of their disjuncts; that a Platonist about mathematical objects cannot accept that sets are grounded in their members; and that a color primitivist cannot accept that an object’s (...)
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  3. 22 Ethics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Intuitions and Quasi-Realism.Matt Bedke - 2013 - In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. pp. 416.
    You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified (...)
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  4. Quasirealism or Minimalism?Lars Binderup - 2003 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 38:65-83.
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  5. Review of Angela Coventry, Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation[REVIEW]John Biro - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).
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  6. Review of Robert N. Johnson and Michael Smith (Eds.), Passions & Projections: Themes From the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn[REVIEW]Noell Birondo - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):171-174.
    Simon Blackburn has not shied away from the use of vivid imagery in developing, over a long and prolific career, a large-scale philosophical vision. Here one might think, for instance, of ‘Practical Tortoise Raising’ or ‘Ramsey's Ladder’ or ‘Frege's Abyss’. Blackburn develops a ‘quasi-realist’ account of many of our philosophical and everyday commitments, both theoretical (e.g., modality and causation) and practical (e.g., moral judgement and normative reasons). Quasi-realism aims to provide a naturalistic treatment of its targeted phenomena while earning the (...)
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  7. Quasi-Realism, Absolutism, and Judgment-Internal Correctness Conditions.Gunnar Björnsson - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag. pp. 96-120.
    The traditional metaethical distinction between cognitivist absolutism,on the one hand, and speaker relativism or noncognitivism, on the other,seemed both clear and important. On the former view, moral judgmentswould be true or false independently on whose judgments they were, andmoral disagreement might be settled by the facts. Not so on the latter views. But noncognitivists and relativists, following what Simon Blackburn has called a “quasi-realist” strategy, have come a long way inmaking sense of talk about truth of moral judgments and itsindependence (...)
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  8. Truth and A Priori Possibility: Egan's Charge Against Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213.
    In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, and (...)
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  9. Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 146--162.
    Expressivism is the view that the function of normative sentences is not to represent a kind of fact, but to avow attitudes, prescribe behavior, or the like. The idea can be found in David Hume. In the 20th century, G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument provided important support for the view. Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “direction of fit,” which helped distinguish expressivism from a kind of naive subjectivism. The central advantage of expressivism is that it easily explains the motivational (...)
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  10. Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism.Simon Blackburn - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 322--338.
  11. Review: Précis of Ruling Passions. [REVIEW]Simon Blackburn - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):122 - 135.
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  12. Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?Simon Blackburn - 1999 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):213 – 227.
    This essay juxtaposes the position in metaethics defended, expressivism with quasirealistic trimmings, with the ancient problem of relativism. It argues that, perhaps surprisingly, there is less of a problem of normative truth on this approach than on others. Because ethics is not in the business of representing aspects of the world, there is no way to argue for a plurality of moral truths, simply from the existence of a plurality of moral opinions. The essay also argues that other approaches, which (...)
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  13. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. He maintains that we cannot get clear about ethics until we get clear about human nature. So these are the sorts of questions he addresses: Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers in an exploration of guilt, shame, disgust, and other moral emotions; he draws (...)
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  14. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):195-198.
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  15. Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist.Simon Blackburn - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Mark Timmons (ed.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 82--100.
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  16. Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn, one of our leading philosophers, explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgments relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism that (...)
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  17. Morals and Modals.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - In Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
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  18. Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.
    Provides a comprehensive introduction to the major philosophical theories attempting to explain the workings of language.
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  19. Supervenience Revisited.Simon W. Blackburn - 1984 - In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 59--74.
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  20. The Incompleat Projectivist: How to Be an Objectivist and an Attitudinist.T. D. J. Chappell - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):50-66.
    What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a set of (...)
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  21. The Delicate Causalist: Reply to My Critics on "Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation".Angela Coventry - 2009 - Manuscrito — Revista Internacional de Filosofia 32 (2).
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  22. Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation.Angela Coventry - 2006 - Continuum Books.
    Presents an interpretation of David Hume's account of what a 'cause' is. This book emphasises on the connections between Hume's theories of cause, space and time, morals, and aesthetics.
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  23. Moral Realism, QuasiRealism, and Skepticism.Terence Cuneo - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 176.
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  24. The Problem With (Quasi-Realist) Expressivism.Stephen Davey - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):33-41.
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  25. Meta‐Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.
    This is a paper about the problem of realism in meta-ethics (and, I hope, also in other areas, but that hope is so far pretty speculative). But it is not about the problem of whether realism is true. It is about the problem of what realism is. More specifically, it is about the question of what divides meta-ethical realists from irrealists. I start with a potted history of the Good Old Days.
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  26. The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment. [REVIEW]James Dreier - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):136–143.
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  27. Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth.James Dreier - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
    This paper is about Truth Minimalism, Norm Expressivism, and the relation between them. In particular, it is about whether Truth Minimalism can help to solve a problem thought to plague Norm Expressivism. To start with, let me explain what I mean by 'Truth Minimalism' and 'Norm Expressivism.'.
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  28. Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence.Jamie Dreier - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):269-287.
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  29. Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error.Andy Egan - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.
    A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick - an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is (...)
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  30. Book Review:Essays in Quasi-Realism. Simon Blackburn. [REVIEW]Arthur Fine - 1995 - Ethics 105 (3):646-.
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  31. Critical Notice.A. Gibbard - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):331 - 335.
    Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5.
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  32. Projection, Quasi-Realism, and Sophisticated Realism.Allan Gibbard - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):331-335.
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  33. Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn Out of Frege's Abyss? [REVIEW]Bob Hale - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):144–149.
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  34. Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances.Edward Harcourt - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):249-275.
    The paper develops an attack on quasi-realism in ethics, according to which expressivism about ethical discourse—understood as the thesis that the states that discourse expresses are non-representational—is consistent with some of the discourse's familiar surface features, thus ‘saving the ethical appearances’. A dilemma is posed for the quasi-realist. Either ethical discourse appears, thanks to those surface features, to express representational states, or else there is no such thing as its appearing to express such states. If the former then, by expressivism, (...)
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  35. The Realism in Quasi-Realism.Deborah K. Heikes - 1996 - Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1):75-83.
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  36. Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement.Robert Hopkins - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166–189.
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one's mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can (...)
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  37. Kant, Quasi‐Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement.Robert Hopkins - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166-189.
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one’s mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can (...)
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  38. Blessed Are the Cheesemakers.R. Ichard Barnett - 2008 - Annals of Science 65 (3):445-451.
    In this paper I explore the points of similarity and difference that distinguish expressivists such as myself from the position known as Cornell realism. I argue that there are considerable overlaps of doctrine, although these doctrines are arrived at in very different ways. I urge that Cornell realism can only benefit by taking on some of the commitments of expressivism.
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  39. From Relative Truth to Finean Non-Factualism.Alexander Jackson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3):971-989.
    This paper compares two ‘relativist’ theories about deliciousness: truth-relativism, and Kit Fine’s non-factualism about a subject-matter. Contemporary truth-relativism is presented as a linguistic thesis; its metaphysical underpinning is often neglected. I distinguish three views about the obtaining of worldly states of affairs concerning deliciousness, and argue that none yields a satisfactory version of truth-relativism. Finean non-factualism about deliciousness is not subject to the problems with truth-relativism. I conclude that Finean non-factualism is the better relativist theory. As I explain, non-facualism about (...)
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  40. Lewis and Blackburn on Quasi-Realism and Fictionalism.C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):315–319.
    Lewis has argued that quasi-realism is fictionalism. Blackburn denies this, offering reasons which rely on a descriptive reading of quasi-realism. This note offers a different, more general argument against Lewis's claim, available to prescriptive as well as descriptive quasi-realists.
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  41. Scientific Quasi-Realism.Richard Jennings - 1989 - Mind 98 (390):225-245.
  42. Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory, and Ethical Relativism.Simon Kirchin - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):413 – 427.
    This paper is a reply to Simon Blackburn's 'Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?' Inquiry 42, pp. 213-28. Blackburn attempts to show how his version of non-cognitivism - quasi-realist projectivism - can evade the threat of ethical relativism, the thought that all ways of living are as ethically good as each other and every ethical judgment is as ethically true as any other. He further attempts to show that his position is superior in this respect to, amongst (...)
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  43. Metaethical Quietism.Douglas Kremm & Karl Schafer - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 643-658.
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  44. Improvement and Truth in Quasi-Realism.Iain Law - 1996 - Cogito 10 (3):189-193.
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  45. Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism.David Lewis - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Moral Fictionalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 314-321.
  46. Quasi-Realism in Mathematics.Per Lindström - 2000 - The Monist 83 (1):122-149.
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  47. Quasi-Realism and the Humean Defense of Normative Non-Factualism.Matthew McGrath - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (2):113-127.
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  48. Quasi-Realism and Relativism. [REVIEW]A. W. Moore - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):150–156.
  49. Review: Quasi-Realism and Relativism. [REVIEW]A. W. Moore - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):150 - 156.
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  50. Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
    In this paper we introduce a distinct metaethical position, fictionalism about morality. We clarify and defend the position, showing that it is a way to save the 'moral phenomena' while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, we distinguish moral fictionalism from moral quasi-realism, and we show that fictionalism possesses the virtues of quasi-realism about morality, but avoids its vices.
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