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Summary The Quine-Duhem thesis is a form of the thesis of the underdetermination of theory by empirical evidence.  The basic problem is that individual theoretical claims are unable to be confirmed or falsified on their own, in isolation from surrounding hypotheses.  For this reason, the acceptance or rejection of a theoretical claim is underdetermined by observation.  The thesis can be interpreted in a more radical form that tends to be associated with the epistemic holism of Willard V. O. Quine or in a more restricted form associated with Pierre Duhem.  It is primarily an epistemic thesis about the relation between evidence and theory, though in Quine's case it also has semantic overtones connected with his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction.
Key works The two main references are Quine 1951, reprinted as Quine 1953, and Duhem 1954.  Relevant extracts of both Quine and Duhem may be found in Curd & Cover 1998.
Introductions Ariew 1984; Ariew 2008; Gillies 1993; Hylton 2010; Krips 1982; Vuillemin 1979
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126 found
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1 — 50 / 126
  1. Evidential Equivalence.Ioannis Votsis - manuscript
    In this article I probe the consequences and limits of the underdetermination thesis and the empirical equivalence thesis, using Laudan and Leplin's fecund article as a springboard. Although a realist at heart, my primary intention is not to undermine the anti-realist arguments but rather to try to precisify the challenge the realist, and more generally the participant in the scientific realism debate, faces.
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  2. How to Do Things with Theory: The Instrumental Role of Auxiliary Hypotheses in Testing.Corey Dethier - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Pierre Duhem’s influential argument for holism relies on a view of the role that background theory plays in testing: according to this still common account of “auxiliary hypotheses,” elements of background theory serve as truth-apt premises in arguments for or against a hypothesis. I argue that this view is mistaken. Rather than serving as truth-apt premises in arguments, auxiliary hypotheses are employed as “epistemic tools”: instruments that perform specific tasks in connecting our theoretical questions with the world but that are (...)
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  3. Falsifiability and the Duhem Problem.Danny Frederick - 2020 - In Against the Philosophical Tide. Yeovil: Critias Publishing. pp. 15-19.
    It is often claimed that the Duhem problem shows that the notion of falsifiability is inapplicable to scientific theories. I explain why the claim is false.
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  4. Fault-Tracing: Against Quine-Duhem: A Defense of the Objectivity of Scientific Justification.Sam Mitchell - 2020 - De Gruyter.
    The Quine-Duhem thesis states that we always have a choice about how praise or blame are distributed in cases of scientific justification. But in many scientific examples, there is simply no room to doubt that a particular hypothesis is responsible for a refutation or established by the observations. Fault Tracing gives a theory of independent justification from different sets of evidence. Using both real and artificial examples, it shows how to play independently established hypotheses against each other to determine whether (...)
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  5. Aspectos da Filosofia da Ciência de Pierre Duhem: Variedades de Subdeterminação Empírica E a Função Do Bom Senso Na Escolha Entre Teorias.Alexander Maar - 2018 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 74 (1):59-84.
    As a philosopher of science, Pierre Duhem is most often remembered as the earliest contributor to what became known as the Duhem-Quine thesis. This thesis casts doubt on our ability to isolate and test theories, and to choose between empirically equivalent rivals. By extension, it offers important criticism of the rationality of deductivist science. In contrast with the vast literature produced during the 20th century addressing the problem of empirical underdetermination of theories, little has been said on the viability of (...)
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  6. Evidential Holism.Joe Morrison - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (6):e12417.
    Evidential holism begins with something like the claim that “it is only jointly as a theory that scientific statements imply their observable consequences.” This is the holistic claim that Elliott Sober tells us is an “unexceptional observation”. But variations on this “unexceptional” claim feature as a premise in a series of controversial arguments for radical conclusions, such as that there is no analytic or synthetic distinction that the meaning of a sentence cannot be understood without understanding the whole language of (...)
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  7. Algunas relaciones entre el holismo de la confirmación y el holismo semántico: estudio de caso.Santiago Ginnobili - 2016 - Metatheoria 6 (1):95-106.
    La tesis del holismo de la confirmación aparece por primera vez presentada de manera explícita y extensa en los escritos de Duhem. Años después, es defendida por Quine, pero no en base a la discusión de teorías científicas particulares, sino en relación con su posición semántica. Desde entonces las relaciones entre el holismo semántico y el holismo de la contrastación han sido discutidas, aunque generalmente de un modo algo despegado del análisis de teorías específicas y sus relaciones. Pretendo mostrar a (...)
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  8. Objectivity. Polity Press, 2015. Introduction and T. Of Contents.Guy Axtell - 2015 - Polity; Wiley.
    “Objectivity” is an important theoretical concept with diverse applications in our collective practices of inquiry. It is also a concept attended in recent decades by vigorous debate, debate that includes but is not restricted to scientists and philosophers. The special authority of science as a source of knowledge of the natural and social world has been a matter of much controversy. In part because the authority of science is supposed to result from the objectivity of its methods and results, objectivity (...)
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  9. Confirmation Versus Falsificationism.Ray Scott Percival - 2015 - In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology.
    Confirmation and falsification are different strategies for testing theories and characterizing the outcomes of those tests. Roughly speaking, confirmation is the act of using evidence or reason to verify or certify that a statement is true, definite, or approximately true, whereas falsification is the act of classifying a statement as false in the light of observation reports. After expounding the intellectual history behind confirmation and falsificationism, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, I survey some of the main controversial issues and (...)
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  10. Theory-Ladenness Special Issue: Introduction.Ioannis Votsis, Michela Tacca & Gerhard Schurz - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):83-86.
    Are sensory experiences, perceptual beliefs and observation reports faithful encoders of truthful information about the world? The theory-ladenness thesis poses an important challenge to answering this question in the affirmative. Roughly the thesis holds that theoretical factors affect the content of those experiences, beliefs and reports. In other words, it holds that their content is laden with theory. Theoretical factors here are construed broadly so as to include scientific theories, beliefs and cognitive processes. Two crucial questions arise in relation to (...)
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  11. Bridging a Fault Line: On Underdetermination and the Ampliative Adequacy of Competing Theories.Guy Axtell - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Synthese Library. pp. 227-245.
    This paper pursues Ernan McMullin‘s claim ("Virtues of a Good Theory" and related papers on theory-choice) that talk of theory virtues exposes a fault-line in philosophy of science separating "very different visions" of scientific theorizing. It argues that connections between theory virtues and virtue epistemology are substantive rather than ornamental, since both address underdetermination problems in science, helping us to understand the objectivity of theory choice and more specifically what I term the ampliative adequacy of scientific theories. The paper argues (...)
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  12. Theory-Laden Observations and Empirical Equivalence of Theories.Lukáš Bielik - 2013 - Filozofia 68 (7).
  13. Photographic Evidence and the Problem of Theory-Ladenness.Nicola Mößner - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):111–125.
    Scientists use visualisations of different kinds in a variety of ways in their scientific work. In the following article, we will take a closer look at the use of photographic pictures as scientific evidence. In accordance with Patrick Maynard’s thesis, photography will be regarded as a family of technologies serving different purposes in divergent contexts. One of these is its ability to detect certain phenomena. Nonetheless, with regard to the philosophical thesis of theory-ladenness of observation, we encounter certain reservations concerning (...)
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  14. The Epistemic Requirement of Scientific Realism in the Light of the Duhem-Quine Thesis.Milos Taliga - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20:178-195.
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  15. Popper's Critical Rationalism: A Philosophical Investigation.Monica Aufrecht - 2012 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):223-225.
  16. Duhem–Quine Virtue Epistemology.Abrol Fairweather - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):673-692.
    The Duhem-Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and W. V. Quine. Duhem resolves underdetermination by (...)
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  17. The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.Abrol Fairweather - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):139-146.
  18. Evidential Holism and Indispensability Arguments.Joe Morrison - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):263-278.
    The indispensability argument is a method for showing that abstract mathematical objects exist. Various versions of this argument have been proposed. Lately, commentators seem to have agreed that a holistic indispensability argument will not work, and that an explanatory indispensability argument is the best candidate. In this paper I argue that the dominant reasons for rejecting the holistic indispensability argument are mistaken. This is largely due to an overestimation of the consequences that follow from evidential holism. Nevertheless, the holistic indispensability (...)
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  19. Experimental Knowledge in Cognitive Neuroscience.Emrah Aktunc - 2011 - Dissertation, Virginia Tech
    This is a work in the epistemology of functional neuroimaging (fNI) and it applies the error-statistical (ES) philosophy to inferential problems in fNI to formulate and address these problems. This gives us a clear, accurate, and more complete understanding of what we can learn from fNI and how we can learn it. I review the works in the epistemology of fNI which I group into two categories; the first category consists of discussions of the theoretical significance of fNI findings and (...)
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  20. Underdetermination as an Epistemological Test Tube: Expounding Hidden Values of the Scientific Community.Martin Carrier - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):189 - 204.
    Duhem—Quine underdetermination plays a constructive role in epistemology by pinpointing the impact of non-empirical virtues or cognitive values on theory choice. Underdetermination thus contributes to illuminating the nature of scientific rationality. Scientists prefer and accept one account among empirical equivalent alternatives. The non-empirical virtues operating in science are laid open in such theory choice decisions. The latter act as an epistemological test tube in making explicit commitments to how scientific knowledge should be like.
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  21. Is Popper’s ‘Criterion of Demarcation’ Outmoded?Sebastian Boţic - 2010 - Cultura 7 (1):41-53.
    This paper is concerned with the ′criterion of demarcation′ that Karl Popper put forward, while trying to show that it can be safely said that it is still standing. In doing so, I turn to two main objections to it: a Lakatos-Kuhn vision on the growth of science, and the famous Quine-Duhem thesis. The point that I hopefully made here is that the basic message of this prescriptive method is as respectful as ever, and, although not the subject of this (...)
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  22. Learning From Error, Severe Testing, and the Growth of Theoretical Knowledge.Deborah G. Mayo - 2010 - In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press. pp. 28.
  23. Just How Controversial is Evidential Holism?Joe Morrison - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):335-352.
    This paper is an examination of evidential holism, a prominent position in epistemology and the philosophy of science which claims that experiments only ever confirm or refute entire theories. The position is historically associated with W.V. Quine, and it is at once both popular and notorious, as well as being largely under-described. But even though there’s no univocal statement of what holism is or what it does, philosophers have nevertheless made substantial assumptions about its content and its truth. Moreover they (...)
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  24. Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective Makes a Difference.Wolfgang Pietsch - 2010 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 303--313.
    The old antagonism between the Quinean and the Duhemian view on underdetermination is reexamined. In this respect, two theses will be defended. First, it is argued that the main differences between Quine's and Duhem's versions of underdetermination derive from a different attitude towards the history of science. While Quine considered underdetermination from an ahistorical, a logical point of view, Duhem approached it as a distinguished historian of physics. On this basis, a logical and a historical version of the underdetermination thesis (...)
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  25. Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem’s Thesis Revisited.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
    This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.
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  26. The Discovery of Argon: A Case for Learning From Data?Aris Spanos - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):359-380.
    Rayleigh and Ramsay discovered the inert gas argon in the atmospheric air in 1895 using a carefully designed sequence of experiments guided by an informal statistical analysis of the resulting data. The primary objective of this article is to revisit this remarkable historical episode in order to make a case that the error‐statistical perspective can be used to bring out and systematize (not to reconstruct) these scientists' resourceful ways and strategies for detecting and eliminating error, as well as dealing with (...)
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  27. Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory.Philippe Mongin - 2009 - In Anastasios Brenner and Jean Gayon (ed.), French Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 303-357.
    This monographic chapter explains how expected utility (EU) theory arose in von Neumann and Morgenstern, how it was called into question by Allais and others, and how it gave way to non-EU theories, at least among the specialized quarters of decion theory. I organize the narrative around the idea that the successive theoretical moves amounted to resolving Duhem-Quine underdetermination problems, so they can be assessed in terms of the philosophical recommendations made to overcome these problems. I actually follow Duhem's recommendation, (...)
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  28. The Crux of Crucial Experiments: Duhem’s Problems and Inference to the Best Explanation.Marcel Weber - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):19-49.
    Going back at least to Duhem, there is a tradition of thinking that crucial experiments are impossible in science. I analyse Duhem's arguments and show that they are based on the excessively strong assumption that only deductive reasoning is permissible in experimental science. This opens the possibility that some principle of inductive inference could provide a sufficient reason for preferring one among a group of hypotheses on the basis of an appropriately controlled experiment. To be sure, there are analogues to (...)
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  29. Pierre Duhem.Roger Ariew - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  30. Observation.A. Kukla - 2008 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
  31. “Plausible Insofar as It is Intelligible”: Quine on Underdetermination.Rogério Passos Severo - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):141-165.
    Quine’s thesis of underdetermination is significantly weaker than it has been taken to be in the recent literature, for the following reasons: (i) it does not hold for all theories, but only for some global theories, (ii) it does not require the existence of empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible theories, (iii) it does not rule out the possibility that all perceived rivalry between empirically equivalent theories might be merely apparent and eliminable through translation, (iv) it is not a fundamental thesis (...)
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  32. Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):333-338.
    By and large, we think is a useful reply to our original critique of his article on the Quine–Duhem problem. But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply. Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD.
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  33. IBE and EBI: On Explanation Before Inference.Johannes Persson - 2007 - In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer. pp. 252--137.
    Inference to the best explanation is theoretically interesting in that it promises to throw new light on what an explanation is. IBE challenges the standard view of the relation between inference and explanation. But sometimes it seems that previous explanation is more independent of inference than IBE suggests. Sometimes we have explanation before inference which is not IBE. This chapter examines the possibility that the latter is the rule rather than the exception.
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  34. The Ethics and Science of Placebo-Controlled Trials: Assay Sensitivity and the Duhem–Quine Thesis.James Anderson - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (1):65 – 81.
    The principle of clinical equipoise requires that, aside from certain exceptional cases, second generation treatments ought to be tested against standard therapy. In violation of this principle, placebo-controlled trials (PCTs) continue to be used extensively in the development and licensure of second-generation treatments. This practice is typically justified by appeal to methodological arguments that purport to demonstrate that active-controlled trials (ACTs) are methodologically flawed. Foremost among these arguments is the so called assay sensitivity argument. In this paper, I take a (...)
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  35. The Development of the Neurath Principle: Unearthing the Romantic Link.Gábor Á Zemplén - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (4):585-609.
    Otto Neurath’s thoroughgoing anti-foundationalism is connected to the recognition that protocol sentences are not inviolable, that is they are fallible and their choice cannot be determined: ‘Poincaré, Duhem and others have adequately shown that even if we have agreed on the protocol statements, there is a not limited number of equally applicable, possible systems of hypotheses. We have extended this tenet of the uncertainty of systems of hypotheses to all statements, including protocol statements that are alterable in principle’. Later historiography (...)
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  36. What is the Best Empirically Equivalent Theory?: Reply to Igor Douven.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):310-313.
  37. Intension and Representation: Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis Revisited.Itay Shani - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):415 – 440.
    This paper re-addresses Quine's indeterminacy of translation/inscrutability of reference thesis, as a problem for cognitive theories of content. In contradistinction with Quine's behavioristic semantics, theories of meaning, or content, in the cognitivist tradition endorse intentional realism, and are prone to be unsympathetic to Quine's thesis. Yet, despite this fundamental difference, I argue that they are just as vulnerable to the indeterminacy. I then argue that the vulnerability is rooted in a theoretical commitment tacitly shared with Quine, namely, the commitment to (...)
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  38. The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman.Michael Strevens - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):913-918.
    Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim. The project Clarifications The negligibility argument Generalization and proof.
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  39. The Duhem‐Quine Thesis and Experimental Economics: A Reinterpretation.Morten Søberg - 2005 - Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (4):581-597.
    The Duhem?Quine thesis asserts that any empirical evaluation of a theory is in fact a composite test of several interconnected hypotheses. Recalcitrant evidence signals falsity within the conjunction of hypotheses, but logic alone cannot pinpoint the individual element(s) inside the theoretical cluster responsible for a false prediction. This paper considers the relevance of the Duhem?Quine thesis for experimental economics. A starting point is to detail how laboratory evaluations of economic hypotheses constitute composite tests. Another aim is to scrutinize the strategy (...)
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  40. Duhem's Problem and its Solutions.Zhao Xiaofen - 2005 - Modern Philosophy 1:017.
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  41. Review Essay on Dynamics of Reason by Michael Friedman. [REVIEW]Marc Lange - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):702–712.
    The first half of this book consists of Michael Friedman’s Kant Lectures in essentially the form in which they were delivered at Stanford University in 1999. In the second half, “Fruits of Discussion,” Friedman elaborates, refines, and defends the central ideas of these lectures. Taken together, these halves form an eminently readable, slim, yet rich and ambitious volume. It proves our fullest account to date not only of Friedman’s neo-Kantian, historicized, dynamical conception of relativized a priori principles of mathematics and (...)
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  42. La Observación Científica En El Proceso de Contrastación de Hipótesis Y Teorías (Scientific Observation in the Process of Testing Hypotheses and Theories).Juan Vázquez - 2004 - Theoria 19 (1):77-95.
    En este trabajo se plantea, en primer lugar, la conveniencia de distinguir en el proceso de la contrastación empirica de hipótesis y teorías entre observación cientifíca y percepción y, en segundo lugar, se muestra como el munda procesado a través de la percepción se erige en base o soporte empírico del conocimiento científico. Una de las consecuencias del trabajo es que Ia tesis de “la carga teórica" de Ia observación ha sido mal planteada, al dar par sentado que esa carga (...)
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  43. Pragmatism in Economic Methodology: The Duhem-Quine Thesis Revisited. [REVIEW]Thomas A. Boylan & Paschal F. O'Gorman - 2003 - Foundations of Science 8 (1):3-21.
    Contemporary developments in economicmethodology have produced a vibrant agenda ofcompeting positions. These include, amongothers, constructivism, critical realism andrhetoric, with each contributing to the Realistvs. Pragmatism debate in the philosophies of thesocial sciences. A major development in theneo-pragmatist contribution to economicmethodology has been Quine's pragmatic assaulton the dogmas of empiricism, which are nowclearly acknowledged within contemporaryeconomic methodology. This assault isencapsulated in the celebrated Duhem-Quinethesis, which according to a number ofcontemporary leading philosophers of economics,poses a particularly serious methodologicalproblem for economics. This problem, (...)
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  44. Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):29-72.
    We appeal to the theory of Bayesian Networks to model different strategies for obtaining confirmation for a hypothesis from experimental test results provided by less than fully reliable instruments. In particular, we consider (i) repeated measurements of a single test consequence of the hypothesis, (ii) measurements of multiple test consequences of the hypothesis, (iii) theoretical support for the reliability of the instrument, and (iv) calibration procedures. We evaluate these strategies on their relative merits under idealized conditions and show some surprising (...)
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  45. The Complete Duhemian Underdetermination Argument: Scientific Language and Practice.Karen Merikangas Darling - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):511-533.
    Current discussion of scientific realism and antirealism often cites Pierre Duhem’s argument for the underdetermination of theory choice by evidence. Participants draw on an account of his underdetermination thesis that is familiar, but incomplete. The purpose of this article is to complete the familiar account. I argue that a closer look at Duhem’s The aim and structure of physical theory suggests that the rationale for his underdetermination thesis comes from his philosophy of scientific language. I explore how an understanding of (...)
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  46. From Within and From Without. Two Perspectives on Analytic Sentences.Olaf L. Müller - 2002 - In Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and meaning: Essays at the interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften.
    The analytic/synthetic distinction can be conceived from two points of view: from within or from without; from the perspective of one's own language or from the perspective of the language of others. From without, the central question is which sentences of a foreign language are to be classified as analytic. From within, by contrast, the question concerning the synthetic and the analytic acquires a normative dimension: which sentences am I not permitted to reject—if I want to avoid talking nonsense? Both (...)
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  47. The Weaknesses of Strong Inference.William O'Donohue & Jeffrey A. Buchanan - 2001 - Behavior and Philosophy 29:1 - 20.
    Platt's 1964 paper "Strong Inference" (SI), published in Science, has had considerable influence upon the conception of the nature of the scientific method held in both the social and physical sciences. Platt suggests that a four-step method of specifying hypotheses and conducting critical experiments that systematically eliminate alternatives has been responsible for progress in the history of the successful sciences and, if adopted, will allow the less successful sciences to make greater progress. This paper criticizes SI on a number of (...)
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  48. Translations and Theories: On the Difference Between Indeterminacy and Underdetermination.Jeanne Peijnenburg & Ronald Hunneman - 2001 - Ratio 14 (1):18–32.
  49. A Solution of Duhem's Problem on the Basis of the Logic of a Crucial Experiment.Young-eui Rhee - 2001 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton
    Duhem's thesis holds that there is no logical way to decide the issues between competing theories so that crucial experiments cannot exit. This dissertation shows, contrary to Duhem's thesis, that it is sometimes possible for scientists to perform crucial experiments and that those experiments follow the logic of a crucial experiment. To solve the problem raised by Duhem's thesis, first, this dissertation suggests a robust interpretation that Duhem's thesis consists of four sub-thesis. According to this interpretation, Duhem's thesis is different (...)
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  50. The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses.Michael Strevens - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537.
    This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine–Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question-begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable properties not possessed by the standard solution. This solution opens the way (...)
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