About this topic
Summary The Quine-Duhem thesis is a form of the thesis of the underdetermination of theory by empirical evidence.  The basic problem is that individual theoretical claims are unable to be confirmed or falsified on their own, in isolation from surrounding hypotheses.  For this reason, the acceptance or rejection of a theoretical claim is underdetermined by observation.  The thesis can be interpreted in a more radical form that tends to be associated with the epistemic holism of Willard V. O. Quine or in a more restricted form associated with Pierre Duhem.  It is primarily an epistemic thesis about the relation between evidence and theory, though in Quine's case it also has semantic overtones connected with his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction.
Key works The two main references are Quine 1951, reprinted as Quine 1953, and Duhem 1954.  Relevant extracts of both Quine and Duhem may be found in Curd & Cover 1998.
Introductions Ariew 1984; Ariew 2008; Gillies 1993; Hylton 2010; Krips 1982; Vuillemin 1979
Related categories

82 found
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  1. added 2018-11-02
    Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
  2. added 2018-05-18
    Experiment in Biology (2018 Update).Marcel Weber - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. added 2018-04-19
    Falsifiability and the Duhem Problem.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    It is often claimed that the Duhem problem shows that the notion of falsifiability is inapplicable to scientific theories. I explain why the claim is false.
  4. added 2018-02-17
    Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine-Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):333-338.
    By and large, we think is a useful reply to our original critique of his article on the Quine–Duhem problem. But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply. Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD.
  5. added 2017-10-24
    Evidential Holism.Joe Morrison - 2017 - Philosophy Compass (6):e12417.
    Evidential holism begins with something like the claim that “it is only jointly as a theory that scientific statements imply their observable consequences.” This is the holistic claim that Elliott Sober tells us is an “unexceptional observation”. But variations on this “unexceptional” claim feature as a premise in a series of controversial arguments for radical conclusions, such as that there is no analytic or synthetic distinction that the meaning of a sentence cannot be understood without understanding the whole language of (...)
  6. added 2017-10-11
    Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory.Philippe Mongin - 2009 - In Anastasios Brenner and Jean Gayon (ed.), French Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 303-357.
    This monographic chapter explains how expected utility (EU) theory arose in von Neumann and Morgenstern, how it was called into question by Allais and others, and how it gave way to non-EU theories, at least among the specialized quarters of decion theory. I organize the narrative around the idea that the successive theoretical moves amounted to resolving Duhem-Quine underdetermination problems, so they can be assessed in terms of the philosophical recommendations made to overcome these problems. I actually follow Duhem's recommendation, (...)
  7. added 2017-06-07
    Duhem's Problem and its Solutions.Zhao Xiaofen - 2005 - Modern Philosophy 1:017.
  8. added 2016-12-12
    “Plausible Insofar as It is Intelligible”: Quine on Underdetermination.Rogério Passos Severo - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):141-165.
    Quine’s thesis of underdetermination is significantly weaker than it has been taken to be in the recent literature, for the following reasons: (i) it does not hold for all theories, but only for some global theories, (ii) it does not require the existence of empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible theories, (iii) it does not rule out the possibility that all perceived rivalry between empirically equivalent theories might be merely apparent and eliminable through translation, (iv) it is not a fundamental thesis (...)
  9. added 2016-06-30
    Confirmation Versus Falsificationism.Ray Scott Percival - 2015 - In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology.
    Confirmation and falsification are different strategies for testing theories and characterizing the outcomes of those tests. Roughly speaking, confirmation is the act of using evidence or reason to verify or certify that a statement is true, definite, or approximately true, whereas falsification is the act of classifying a statement as false in the light of observation reports. After expounding the intellectual history behind confirmation and falsificationism, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, I survey some of the main controversial issues and (...)
  10. added 2015-12-22
    The Development of the Neurath Principle: Unearthing the Romantic Link.Gábor Á Zemplén - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (4):585-609.
    Otto Neurath’s thoroughgoing anti-foundationalism is connected to the recognition that protocol sentences are not inviolable, that is they are fallible and their choice cannot be determined: ‘Poincaré, Duhem and others have adequately shown that even if we have agreed on the protocol statements, there is a not limited number of equally applicable, possible systems of hypotheses. We have extended this tenet of the uncertainty of systems of hypotheses to all statements, including protocol statements that are alterable in principle’ . Later (...)
  11. added 2015-12-22
    A Solution of Duhem's Problem on the Basis of the Logic of a Crucial Experiment.Young-eui Rhee - 2001 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton
    Duhem's thesis holds that there is no logical way to decide the issues between competing theories so that crucial experiments cannot exit. This dissertation shows, contrary to Duhem's thesis, that it is sometimes possible for scientists to perform crucial experiments and that those experiments follow the logic of a crucial experiment. To solve the problem raised by Duhem's thesis, first, this dissertation suggests a robust interpretation that Duhem's thesis consists of four sub-thesis. According to this interpretation, Duhem's thesis is different (...)
  12. added 2015-12-22
    Quine, I.Elliott Sober - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):237–280.
    In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Quine attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction and defends a doctrine that I call epistemological holism. Now, almost fifty years after the article's appearance, what are we to make of these ideas? I suggest that the philosophical naturalism that Quine did so much to promote should lead us to reject Quine's brief against the analytic/synthetic distinction; I also argue that Quine misunderstood Carnap's views on analyticity. As for epistemological holism, I claim that this thesis does not follow (...)
  13. added 2015-12-22
    Falsification, the Duhem-Quine Thesis, and Scientific Realism: From a Phenomenological Point of View.Darrin W. Belousek - 1998 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 29 (2):145-161.
  14. added 2015-12-22
    Quine and Davidson on Meaning and Holism.Chienkuo Mi - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Iowa
    Many discussions of holism fail to see the scope ambiguity and the subject ambiguity involved in the doctrine. With the different scopes or sizes, there are both moderate and extreme versions of holism. With respect to the different subjects, meaning holism can be distinguished from holism about confirmation or disconfirmation, about belief-fixation or belief-content, or about interpretation or understanding. The principal aim of this study is to disentangle the distinct doctrines involved in holism and to characterize and assess meaning holism (...)
  15. added 2015-12-22
    Intelligent Inference and the Web of Belief: In Defense of a Post-Foundationalist Epistemology.Ronald C. Pine - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    This thesis aims at casting the Copernican Revolution in a new light. By examining and articulating in much more detail the role of auxiliary hypotheses in debates related to the Duhem-Quine thesis, and by displaying the underlying rationality of the favorable appraisal scientists often give theories that rigorously determine parameters, this thesis attempts to walk the difficult path between what Popper called the myth of the framework and what Kitcher calls the myth of Legend . Unlike Legend, this thesis does (...)
  16. added 2015-12-22
    The Duhem-Popper-Quine Thesis.Thomas Michael Avery - 1995 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    In this dissertation I examine critically the scientific holism of Pierre Duhem, Karl Popper and W. V. Quine. I contend that there is a central thesis, which I have dubbed the "Duhem-Popper-Quine thesis," that is common to the work of these three authors but that in each author's work it is reflected differently. ;Duhem's holism was rather sweeping--he contended that no isolated hypothesis can be refuted by the results of experiment--but also rather restricted, being limited to physical science. I argue (...)
  17. added 2015-12-22
    Rationality Theory and the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: A Critique.Cassandra Lee Pinnick - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    Many thinkers believe currently that the collapse of foundationalist epistemology threatens the prospects for an empiricist epistemology. Arguments by Pierre Duhem, Willard Van Orman Quine, Thomas Kuhn, and Paul K. Feyerabend, each of which use the underdetermination thesis, are believed to demonstrate that rational analysis is nothing more than question-begging argumentation. Proponents of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge believe that these arguments necessitate a sociological analysis of scientific belief. ;I argue that by defining knowledge as true, (...)
  18. added 2015-12-22
    Theory and Experiment in Molecular Population Genetics.Michael Robert Dietrich - 1991 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    This dissertation is concerned with historical and philosophical issues pertaining to the classical/balance controversy and the neutralist/selectionist controversy in population genetics. Historically, the nature of the connection between these controversies is critically examined with special attention to the claim that the neutralist position is actually the classical position brought up to date. This account of the origins of the neutral theory provides the context for examining the decision to pursue the neutral theory. The pursuit-worthiness of the neutral theory and of (...)
  19. added 2015-12-22
    Das Problem der ''œentscheidenden Experimente''.Walter Kaiser - 1986 - Berichte Zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 9 (2):109-125.
    In this historical essay an attempt is made to discuss the problem of decisive experiments both from the point of view of History of Science and of Philosophy of Science. The first part deals with Francis Bacon's idea of instantiae crucis and with the use of the term experimentum crucis mainly in optics. With respect to the experimental confirmation of Maxwell's electrodynamics the Duhem-Quine Thesis is discussed. Duhem had argued that not a single hypothesis but only a complete theory is (...)
  20. added 2015-12-22
    The Duhem/Quines Thesis and the Falsifiability of Theories.Karl Waterman Krause - 1981 - Dissertation, Northwestern University
    The Duhem/Quine thesis, as it is customarily understood, asserts that empirical evidence cannot falsify a scientific theory. This dissertation has three general objectives. First, I make the customary version of the thesis percise. Second, I argue that, as I have formulated it, it is true, but not for the reasons often cited. I further argue that once the genuine reasons for its truth are understood, the limits of the thesis are apparent. Third, I explore the relationship between my precise version (...)
  21. added 2015-12-22
    Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Quine-Duhem Thesis edited by Sandra Harding. [REVIEW]Jean Largeault - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (1):112-115.
  22. added 2015-12-22
    Duhem-Quine Thesis: Rationality, Progress and Scientific Methodology.O. Costa - 1979 - Scientia 73 (14):517.
  23. added 2015-12-22
    Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis by Sandra G. Harding. [REVIEW]John Post - 1978 - Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 69:148-149.
  24. added 2015-12-22
    Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis.Sandra G. Harding - 1976 - Reidel.
  25. added 2015-10-13
    Experimental Knowledge in Cognitive Neuroscience.Emrah Aktunc - 2011 - Dissertation, Virginia Tech
    This is a work in the epistemology of functional neuroimaging (fNI) and it applies the error-statistical (ES) philosophy to inferential problems in fNI to formulate and address these problems. This gives us a clear, accurate, and more complete understanding of what we can learn from fNI and how we can learn it. I review the works in the epistemology of fNI which I group into two categories; the first category consists of discussions of the theoretical significance of fNI findings and (...)
  26. added 2014-09-21
    A Bayesian Treatment of Duhem's Thesis: The Case of the 'Farm Problem' in Agricultural Economics.David Dearmont & David A. Bessler - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (2):149-158.
    In this paper we consider a Bayesian treatment of ‘Duhem's thesis’, the proposition that theories are never refuted on empirical grounds because they cannot be tested in isolation from auxiliary hypotheses about initial conditions or the operation of scientific instruments. Sawyer, Beed, and Sankey (1997) consider Duhem's thesis (and its restatement in stronger and weaker forms as the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’) and its role in hypothesis testing, using four theories from economics and finance as examples. Here we consider Duhem's thesis in (...)
  27. added 2014-04-08
    The Epistemic Requirement of Scientific Realism in the Light of the Duhem-Quine Thesis.Milos Taliga - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20:178-195.
  28. added 2014-04-08
    Fundamental Physical Constants, Null Experiments and the Duhem-Quine Thesis.F. Weinert - 1998 - Philosophia Naturalis 35 (2):225-252.
  29. added 2014-04-08
    The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis.Donald Gillies - 1998 - In Martin Curd & Jan Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. Norton. pp. 302--319.
  30. added 2014-04-08
    The Relevance of Duhem and Quine Thesis in the Light of Kant Cognitive Theory.N. Avgelis - 1991 - Kant-Studien 82 (3):285-302.
  31. added 2014-04-08
    Duhem-Thesis, Quine-Thesis and Duhem-Quine Thesis.A. Derecin & S. Guccione - 1985 - Epistemologia 8 (1):77-102.
  32. added 2014-04-03
    Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism: The "Theory-Informity" of Observation and the Quine-Duhem Thesis.John D. Greenwood - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):553-574.
    It is argued that neither the "theory-informity" of observations nor the Quine-Duhem thesis pose any in principle threat to the objectivity of theory evaluation. The employment of exploratory theories does not generate incommensurability, but on the contrary is responsible for the mensurability and commensurability of explanatory theories, since exploratory theories enable scientists to make observations which are critical in the evaluation of explanatory theories. The employment of exploratory theories and other auxiliary hypotheses does not enable a theory to always accommodate (...)
  33. added 2014-04-02
    Is Popper's 'Criterion of Demarcation' Outmoded ?Sebastian Boţic - 2010 - Cultura 7 (1):41-53.
    This paper is concerned with the ′criterion of demarcation′ that Karl Popper put forward, while trying to show that it can be safely said that it is still standing. In doing so, I turn to two main objections to it: a Lakatos-Kuhn vision on the growth of science, and the famous Quine-Duhem thesis. The point that I hopefully made here is that the basic message of this prescriptive method is as respectful as ever, and, although not the subject of this (...)
  34. added 2014-04-02
    The Duhem-Quine Thesis Revisited.F. Weinert - 1995 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):147 – 156.
    Abstract The Duhem?Quine thesis is generally presented as the radical underdetermi? nation of a theory by experimental evidence. But there is a much?neglected second aspect, i.e. the coherence or interrelatedness of the conceptual components of a theory. Although both Duhem and Quine recognised this aspect, they failed to see its consequences: it militates against the idea of radical underdetermination. Because scientific theories are coherent conceptual systems, empirical evidence penetrates, as it were, the periphery and allows the localisation of central, not (...)
  35. added 2014-04-02
    On Duhem's and Quine's Theses.Jules Vuillemin - 1979 - Grazer Philosophische Studien Graz 9:69-96.
    The "Duhem-Quine thesis" says that isolated hypotheses are not singularly verifiable by experience, only the whole body of a theory being able to be subjected to the test of experience. I first examine the rather divergent meanings this thesis takes when it is replaced in the different contexts of Duhem's and Quine'sphilosophies. Secondly, questions are asked about the acceptability of the thesis, its logical strength and its historical soundness. Finally, the consequences of some doubts raised by this inquiry are examined (...)
  36. added 2014-03-31
    Underdetermination in Economics. The Duhem-Quine Thesis.K. R. Sawyer, Clive Beed & H. Sankey - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):1-23.
    This paper considers the relevance of the Duhem-Quine thesis in economics. In the introductory discussion which follows, the meaning of the thesis and a brief history of its development are detailed. The purpose of the paper is to discuss the effects of the thesis in four specific and diverse theories in economics, and to illustrate the dependence of testing the theories on a set of auxiliary hypotheses. A general taxonomy of auxiliary hypotheses is provided to demonstrate the confounding of auxiliary (...)
  37. added 2014-03-31
    In Defense of the Quine-Duhem Thesis: A Reply to Greenwood.Robert Klee - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (3):487-491.
    While discussing the work of Kuhn and Hanson, John Greenwood (1990) misidentifies the nature of the relationship between the incommensurability of theories and the theory-ladenness of observation. After pointing out this error, I move on to consider Greenwood's main argument that the Quine-Duhem thesis suffers from a form of epistemological self-defeat if it is interpreted to mean that any recalcitrant observation can always be accommodated to any theory. Greenwood finds this interpretation implausible because some adjustments to auxiliary hypotheses undermine too (...)
  38. added 2014-03-29
    Duhem, Quine, and the Multiplicity of Scientific Tests.Yuri Balashov - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):608-628.
    Duhem's and Quine's holistic theses, when properly understood, allow methodologically responsible ways of resolving a conflict between a theoretical system and experience; they only deny the possibility of doing it in an epistemically persuasive way. By developing a "string" model of scientific tests I argue that the pattern of interaction between the elements of a theoretical system arising in response to multiple adverse data can be helpful in locating a "weak spot" in it. Combining this model with anti-holistic arguments of (...)
  39. added 2014-03-27
    The Underdetermination of Theory by Data and the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge.Samir Okasha - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):283 – 297.
    Advocates of the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge have argued that, because scientific theories are "underdetermined" by data, sociological factors must be invoked to explain why scientists believe the theories they do. I examine this argument, and the responses to it by J.R. Brown (1989) and L. Laudan (1996). I distinguish between a number of different versions of the underdetermination thesis, some trivial, some substantive. I show that Brown's and Laudan's attempts to refute the sociologists' argument fail. Nonetheless, (...)
  40. added 2014-03-27
    Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination.Husain Sarkar - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):187 – 197.
    Jarrett Leplin in A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism (1997) argues that if the thesis of empirical equivalence is cogent, then the thesis of underdetermination cannot even get off the ground. Part of Leplin's argument rests on the claim that auxiliary hypotheses can be independently confirmed, thus enabling us to determine the epistemic worth of a theory. This, in turn, helps in determining about what we should be realists. Leplin's claims are demonstrated to be problematic. Leplin wants, inconsistently, to use (...)
  41. added 2014-03-26
    Does the Quine/Duhem Thesis Prevent Us From Defining Analyticity? On Fallacy in Quine.Olaf Mueller - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (1):81 - 99.
    Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In "Word and Object," he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson (...)
  42. added 2014-03-23
    Pragmatism in Economic Methodology: The Duhem-Quine Thesis Revisited. [REVIEW]Thomas A. Boylan & Paschal F. O'Gorman - 2003 - Foundations of Science 8 (1):3-21.
    Contemporary developments in economicmethodology have produced a vibrant agenda ofcompeting positions. These include, amongothers, constructivism, critical realism andrhetoric, with each contributing to the Realistvs. Pragmatism debate in the philosophies of thesocial sciences. A major development in theneo-pragmatist contribution to economicmethodology has been Quine's pragmatic assaulton the dogmas of empiricism, which are nowclearly acknowledged within contemporaryeconomic methodology. This assault isencapsulated in the celebrated Duhem-Quinethesis, which according to a number ofcontemporary leading philosophers of economics,poses a particularly serious methodologicalproblem for economics. This problem, (...)
  43. added 2014-03-20
    The Duhem‐Quine Thesis and Experimental Economics: A Reinterpretation.Morten Søberg - 2005 - Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (4):581-597.
    The Duhem?Quine thesis asserts that any empirical evaluation of a theory is in fact a composite test of several interconnected hypotheses. Recalcitrant evidence signals falsity within the conjunction of hypotheses, but logic alone cannot pinpoint the individual element(s) inside the theoretical cluster responsible for a false prediction. This paper considers the relevance of the Duhem?Quine thesis for experimental economics. A starting point is to detail how laboratory evaluations of economic hypotheses constitute composite tests. Another aim is to scrutinize the strategy (...)
  44. added 2014-03-19
    The Ethics and Science of Placebo-Controlled Trials: Assay Sensitivity and the Duhem-Quine Thesis.James A. Anderson - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (1):65 – 81.
    The principle of clinical equipoise requires that, aside from certain exceptional cases, second generation treatments ought to be tested against standard therapy. In violation of this principle, placebo-controlled trials (PCTs) continue to be used extensively in the development and licensure of second-generation treatments. This practice is typically justified by appeal to methodological arguments that purport to demonstrate that active-controlled trials (ACTs) are methodologically flawed. Foremost among these arguments is the so called assay sensitivity argument. In this paper, I take a (...)
  45. added 2014-03-18
    The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses.Michael Strevens - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537.
    This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine–Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question-begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable properties not possessed by the standard solution. This solution opens the way (...)
  46. added 2014-03-18
    Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):29-72.
    We appeal to the theory of Bayesian Networks to model different strategies for obtaining confirmation for a hypothesis from experimental test results provided by less than fully reliable instruments. In particular, we consider (i) repeated measurements of a single test consequence of the hypothesis, (ii) measurements of multiple test consequences of the hypothesis, (iii) theoretical support for the reliability of the instrument, and (iv) calibration procedures. We evaluate these strategies on their relative merits under idealized conditions and show some surprising (...)
  47. added 2014-03-14
    Intension and Representation: Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis Revisited.Itay Shani - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):415 – 440.
    This paper re-addresses Quine's indeterminacy of translation/inscrutability of reference thesis, as a problem for cognitive theories of content. In contradistinction with Quine's behavioristic semantics, theories of meaning, or content, in the cognitivist tradition endorse intentional realism, and are prone to be unsympathetic to Quine's thesis. Yet, despite this fundamental difference, I argue that they are just as vulnerable to the indeterminacy. I then argue that the vulnerability is rooted in a theoretical commitment tacitly shared with Quine, namely, the commitment to (...)
  48. added 2014-03-06
    The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman.Michael Strevens - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):913-918.
    Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim. The project Clarifications The negligibility argument Generalization and proof.
  49. added 2014-02-20
    Craig's Theorem and the Empirical Underdetermination Thesis Reassessed.Christian List - 1999 - Disputatio 7:28-39.
    This paper reassesses the question of whether Craig’s theorem poses a challenge to Quine's empirical underdetermination thesis. It will be demonstrated that Quine’s account of this issue in his paper “Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World” (1975) is flawed and that Quine makes too strong a concession to the Craigian challenge. It will further be pointed out that Craig’s theorem would threaten the empirical underdetermination thesis only if the set of all relevant observation conditionals could be shown to be recursively (...)
  50. added 2014-01-22
    Two Dogmas in Retrospect.W. V. Quine - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):265 - 274.
    In retrospecting "Two Dogmas" I find myself overshooting by twenty years. I think back to college days, 61 years agao. I majored in mathematics and was doing my honors reading in mathematical logic, a subject that had not yet penetrated the Oberlin curriculum. My new love, in the platonic sense, was Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica.
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