About this topic
Summary

Rational requirements, as the expression has come to be used, are requirements of coherence – for instance, the requirements to be consistent in your beliefs and in your intentions, and to intend what you take to be the necessary means to the ends you intend. The central questions about such requirements include: (i) how are rational requirements best formulated? For instance, should we accept so-called wide- or narrow-scope formulations of rational requirements (ii) Are there reasons to comply with rational requirements (that is, to be coherent)? If not, in what sense, if any, is rationality normative? (iii) How do rational requirements relate to other kinds of requirements (for instance, requirements of morality or prudence) and other normative notions, such as reasons, ‘ought’, and good reasoning?

Key works Much recent work on this topic takes off from Broome 1999 and Kolodny 2005
Introductions Way 2010
Related categories

286 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 286
  1. added 2020-05-24
    Falsificationism and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-05-23
    Savage's Response to Allais as Broomean Reasoning.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - manuscript
    Leonard Savage famously contravened his own theory when first confronting the Allais Paradox, but then convinced himself that he had made an error. We examine the formal structure of Savage’s ‘error-correcting’ reasoning in the light of (i) behavioural economists’ claims to identify the latent preferences of individuals who violate conventional rationality requirements and (ii) John Broome’s critique of arguments which presuppose that rationality requirements can be achieved through reasoning. We argue that Savage’s reasoning is not vulnerable to Broome’s critique, but (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-05-17
    Collectivistic Individualism: Dewey and MacIntyre.Lee A. McBride - 2006 - Contemporary Pragmatism 3 (1):69-83.
    John Dewey and Alasdair MacIntyre are seldom considered philosophically compatible. Yet, both critique contemporary liberalism by focusing on the pervasiveness of atomistic, pecuniary, laissez-faire individualism. I argue that Dewey and MacIntyre have not abandoned individualism as much as reconstructed the concept. Dewey's and MacIntyre's conceptions of human flourishing rely on a nuanced conception of individualism, which I term "collectivistic individualism.".
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. added 2020-05-09
    Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence.John Brunero - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Rationality requires that we intend the means that we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. Instrumental Rationality explores the formulation and status of this requirement of means-ends coherence. In particular, it is concerned with understanding what means-ends coherence requires of us as believers and agents, and why.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2020-05-08
    Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
    As Socrates famously noted, there is perhaps no more important question than how we ought to live. And the answer to this question depends on how the reasons that we have for living in various different ways combine and compete. To illustrate, suppose that I’ve just received a substantial raise from my employer. What should I do with the extra money? It seems that I have most moral reason to donate it to effective charities but most self-interested reason to spend (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2020-04-30
    Immorality and Irrationality.Alex Worsnip* - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    Does immorality necessarily involve irrationality? The question is often taken to be among the deepest in moral philosophy. But apparently deep questions sometimes admit of deflationary answers. In this case we can make way for a deflationary answer by appealing to dualism about rationality, according to which there are two fundamentally distinct notions of rationality: structural rationality and substantive rationality. I have defended dualism elsewhere. Here, I’ll argue that it allows us to embrace a sensible – I will not say (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. added 2020-04-23
    On the Normativity of Intentions.Bruno Verbeek - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):87-101.
    Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. added 2020-04-23
    The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (3):454-471.
    I admire Audi's intentions in discussing the rationality of beliefs, desires, and actions together, and doubt that this can be done internalistically, as he tries.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2020-04-23
    Decision, Probability and Utility: Selected Readings.Peter Gärdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin (eds.) - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
    Decision theory and the theory of rational choice have recently been the subjects of considerable research by philosophers and economists. However, no adequate anthology exists which can be used to introduce students to the field. This volume is designed to meet that need. The essays included are organized into five parts covering the foundations of decision theory, the conceptualization of probability and utility, pholosophical difficulties with the rules of rationality and with the assessment of probability, and causal decision theory. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  10. added 2020-04-21
    Belief, Rational and Justified.Wes Siscoe - forthcoming - Mind.
    It is clear that beliefs can be assessed both as to their justification and their rationality. What is not as clear, however, is how the rationality and justification of belief relate to one another. Stewart Cohen has stumped for the popular proposal that rationality and justification come to the same thing, that rational beliefs just are justified beliefs, supporting his view by arguing that ‘justified belief’ and ‘rational belief’ are synonymous. In this paper, I will give reason to think that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2020-04-20
    Belief and Settledness.Wooram Lee - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper elucidates the sense in which belief is a question-settling attitude. In her recent work, Jane Friedman suggests that we understand the settledness of belief in terms of a normative principle about belief and inquiry: one ought not inquire into a question and believe the answer to the question at the same time. On the basis of the distinction between dispositional and occurrent belief, I argue against Friedman that there is no principle linking belief and inquiry that is both (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2020-04-11
    The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2020-03-17
    On the Rationality of Vow‐Making.Alida Liberman - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):881-900.
    I offer a philosophical account of vowing and the rationality of vow-making. I argue that vows are most productively understood as exceptionless resolutions that do not have any excusing conditions. I then articulate an apparent problem for exceptionless vow-making: how can it be rational to bind yourself unconditionally, when circumstances might change unexpectedly and make it the case that vow-keeping no longer makes sense for you? As a solution, I propose that vows can be rational to make only if they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2020-03-10
    Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):203-226.
    Kripke’s puzzle has put pressure on the intuitive idea that one can believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly. If this idea is wrong then many theories of belief and belief ascription are built from faulty data. I argue that part of the proper analysis of Kripke’s puzzle refutes the closure principles that show up in many important arguments in epistemology, e.g. if S is rational and knows that P and that P entails Q, then (...)
    No categories
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2020-03-03
    Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness.Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
    John Broome argues that rationality cannot consist in reasons-responsiveness since rationality supervenes on the mind, while reasons-responsiveness does not supervene on the mind. I here defend this conception of rationality by way of defending the assumption that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind. Given the many advantages of an analysis of rationality in terms of reasons-responsiveness, and in light of independent considerations in favour of the view that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind, we should take seriously the backup view, a hypothesis (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2020-02-28
    The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    In this paper, I offer a novel view of the coherence (or structural) requirements on belief and intention, according to which they are not norms, but rather principles describing how your belief and intention operate. I first argue, on the basis of the unintelligibility of some relevant attitudes-reports, that there are conditions under which you simply do not count as believing or intending unless your beliefs and intentions satisfy the requirements: the conditions under which all of your relevant attitudes are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2020-02-14
    The Normativity of Rationality.Nicholas Shackel - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):167-189.
    Rationality appears to have some intimate relation with normativity: exactly what relation is in dispute. John Broome devotes a chapter of his recent book to rebutting the view that rationality has 'true' normativity, which he equates with the kind of normativity that I call directivity. In particular, he offers a number of arguments against derivative accounts of thenormativity of rationality. In this paper I defend my instrumentalist account from those arguments. In so doing I bring into view the grounds of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. added 2020-02-14
    Practical Reasoning About Final Ends.Henry S. Richardson - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  19. added 2020-02-14
    Practical Reasoning About Final Ends.Henry S. Richardson - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  20. added 2020-02-07
    Must We Believe in the Realizability of Our Ends? On a Premise of Kant’s Argument for the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason.Marcus Willaschek - 2016 - In Thomas Höwing (ed.), The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 223-244.
  21. added 2020-01-31
    Deontic Modality in Rationality and Reasoning.Alessandra Marra - 2019 - Dissertation, Tilburg University
    The present dissertation investigates certain facets of the logical structure of oughts – where “ought” is used as a noun, roughly meaning obligation. I do so by following two lines of inquiry. The first part of the thesis places oughts in the context of practical rationality. The second part of the thesis concerns the inference rules governing arguments about oughts, and specifically the inference rule of Reasoning by Cases. These two lines of inquiry, together, aim to expound upon oughts in (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2020-01-24
    The Form of Practical Knowledge and Implicit Cognition: A Critique of Kantian Constitutivism.Amir Saemi - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (4):733-747.
    Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are constitutive principles of practical reason. In particular, on Stephen Engstrom’s account, willing involves making a practical judgment. To will well, and thus to have practical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is good), the content (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2020-01-17
    Ambivalence, Incoherence, and Self-Governance.John Brunero - forthcoming - In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. London, UK: Routledge.
    The paper develops two objections to Michael Bratman’s self-governance approach to the normativity of rational requirements. Bratman, drawing upon work by Harry Frankfurt, argues that having a place where one stands is a necessary, constitutive element of self-governance, and that violations of the consistency and coherence requirements on intentions make one lack a place where one stands. This allows for reasons of self-governance to ground reasons to comply with these rational requirements, thereby vindicating the normativity of rationality. The first objection (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2020-01-12
    Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity.M. Silar & F. S. Augier (eds.) - 2009 - Ziur Navarra.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2020-01-12
    Do We Have Reasons to Do as We Believe We Ought to Do?Julian Fink - 2009 - In M. Silar & F. S. Augier (eds.), Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity. Ziur Navarra. pp. 65-79.
    Suppose you believe you ought to A. Would a failure of yours to A imply that you are not entirely as you ought to be? Ought you to A if you believe you to ought to A? This paper argues for a qualified version of this claim. It is qualified in two ways. First, I assume that this can be so only if ‘if you believe you ought to A’ appears within the scope of ‘you ought’. That is, you ought (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2020-01-06
    On a Purported Principle of Practical Reason.Patrick Fleming - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:143-162.
    A number of philosophers are attracted to the Principle of the Priority of Belief in practical matters. PPB has two parts: it is a principle of practical reason to adjust your desires in accordance with your evaluative beliefs and you should not adjust your evaluative beliefs in accordance with your desires. The central claim of this principle is that beliefs rightly govern desires and that desires have no authority over beliefs. This paper advances conceptual and empiricalarguments against accepting PPB. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2020-01-06
    Practical Rationality: Some Kantian Reflections.Hugh J. McCann - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:57-77.
    Recent views on practical rationality harmonize well with a fundamentally Kantian conception of the foundations of morality. Rationality in practical thinking is not a matter of valid reasoning, or of foIlowing maximization principles. From an agent-centered perspective, it consists in observing certain standards of consistency. In themselves, these standards lack the force of duties, hence there can be no irresolvable conflict between rationality and morality. Furthermore, the Kantian test of universalization for maxims of action may be scen as adapting agent-centered (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2020-01-03
    Rational Analysis, Intractability, and the Prospects of ‘as If’-Explanations.Iris van Rooij, Cory D. Wright, Johan Kwisthout & Todd Wareham - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):491-510.
    Despite their success in describing and predicting cognitive behavior, the plausibility of so-called ‘rational explanations’ is often contested on the grounds of computational intractability. Several cognitive scientists have argued that such intractability is an orthogonal pseudoproblem, however, since rational explanations account for the ‘why’ of cognition but are agnostic about the ‘how’. Their central premise is that humans do not actually perform the rational calculations posited by their models, but only act as if they do. Whether or not the problem (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. added 2019-12-29
    Contextuality in Practical Reason. [REVIEW]A. Price - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):586-587.
    Anthony Price's recent book presents a contextualist approach to practical rationality. Price develops his proposal in four chapters. In the first one, he outlines a contextual account of the validity of practical inferences. This chapter deals with logicism. Logicism assumes that ‘there is a form of rationality within practical thinking that connects with the logical validity of a practical entailment’. Price argues that although the principles of logic are ‘invariant and universal’, their relevance in evaluating a practical inference is constrained (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  30. added 2019-12-11
    Minimal Disturbance: In Defence of Pragmatic Reasons of the Right Kind.Lisa Bastian - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2019-12-02
    Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277-284.
  32. added 2019-11-25
    Reasoning Under Scarcity.Jennifer M. Morton - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):543-559.
    Practical deliberation consists in thinking about what to do. Such deliberation is deemed rational when it conforms to certain normative requirements. What is often ignored is the role that an agent's context can play in so-called ‘failures’ of rationality. In this paper, I use recent cognitive science research investigating the effects of resource-scarcity on decision-making and cognitive function to argue that context plays an important role in determining which norms should structure an agent's deliberation. This evidence undermines the view that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. added 2019-11-11
    Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
    In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that epistemologists should pay attention (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  34. added 2019-11-11
    Practical Rationality at Work – A New Argumentation Model.João Sàágua & Michael D. Baumtrog - 2018 - In António Marques & João Sàágua (eds.), Essays on Values and Practical Rationality. Peter Lang. pp. 193-250.
  35. added 2019-11-11
    Improving Practical Reasoning and Argumentation.Michael D. Baumtrog - 2015 - Dissertation, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
    This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively easily able (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. added 2019-10-10
    Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which "essentially indexical" information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. added 2019-10-07
    Dos teorías acerca del valor de la racionalidad. [REVIEW]Julen Ibarrondo - 2019 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 38:115-127.
    En esta nota crítica presento las recientes aportaciones de Wedgwood y Kiesewetter al debate sobre la normatividad de la racionalidad y reconstruyo sus argumentos para ponerlos en diálogo. Mi conclusión es que ninguna de las dos propuestas, la racionalidad como responder a evidencias o como minimizar las expectativas de fracaso son completamente satisfactorias para explicar cómo la racionalidad guía nuestra deliberación y desempeña un papel crucial en diversas prácticas.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2019-09-30
    Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.
    Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true, but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2019-09-24
    Enkrasia or Evidentialism? Learning to Love Mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.
    I formulate a resilient paradox about epistemic rationality, discuss and reject various solutions, and sketch a way out. The paradox exemplifies a tension between a wide range of views of epistemic justification, on the one hand, and enkratic requirements on rationality, on the other. According to the enkratic requirements, certain mismatched doxastic states are irrational, such as believing p, while believing that it is irrational for one to believe p. I focus on an evidentialist view of justification on which a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  40. added 2019-09-19
    Conflicts of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    The thesis contains my early work arguing against evidentialism for reasons for belief (chapter 1), my early argument that rationality is not normative (chapter 2), an argument that rationality is not responding reasons, at least understood in one way (chapter 2), a general discussion of how normative conflicts might (appear to) arise in many different ways (chapter 3), a discussion of how to weigh pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief (chapter 4), and a discussion of the general structure of normativity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  41. added 2019-09-13
    On Not Getting Out of Bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.
    This morning I intended to get out of bed when my alarm went off. Hearing my alarm, I formed the intention to get up now. Yet, for a time, I remained in bed, irrationally lazy. It seems I irrationally failed to execute my intention. Such cases of execution failure pose a challenge for Mentalists about rationality, who believe that facts about rationality supervene on facts about the mind. For, this morning, my mind was in order; it was my action that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. added 2019-09-13
    Tim Henning, From a Rational Point of View: How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse. [REVIEW]Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):113-118.
    Reasons internalists claim that facts about normative reasons for action are facts about which actions would promote an agent’s goals and values. Reasons internalism is popular, even though paradigmatic versions have moral consequences many find unwelcome. This article reconstructs an influential but understudied argument for reasons internalism, the “if I were you” argument, which is due to Bernard Williams and Kate Manne. I raise an objection to the argument and argue that replying to it requires reasons internalists to accept controversial (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. added 2019-08-29
    From Probabilities to Categorical Beliefs: Going Beyond Toy Models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.
    According to the Lockean thesis, a proposition is believed just in case it is highly probable. While this thesis enjoys strong intuitive support, it is known to conflict with seemingly plausible logical constraints on our beliefs. One way out of this conflict is to make probability 1 a requirement for belief, but most have rejected this option for entailing what they see as an untenable skepticism. Recently, two new solutions to the conflict have been proposed that are alleged to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. added 2019-08-29
    Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs.Hans Rott - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):167-197.
    There are two prominent ways of formally modelling human belief. One is in terms of plain beliefs, i.e., sets of propositions. The second one is in terms of degrees of beliefs, which are commonly taken to be representable by subjective probability functions. In relating these two ways of modelling human belief, the most natural idea is a thesis frequently attributed to John Locke: a proposition is or ought to be believed just in case its subjective probability exceeds a contextually fixed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  45. added 2019-08-17
    Nonrational Belief Paradoxes as Byzantine Failures.Ryan Miller - manuscript
    David Christensen and others argue that Dutch Strategies are more like peer disagreements than Dutch Books, and should not count against agents’ conformity to ideal rationality. I review these arguments, then show that Dutch Books, Dutch Strategies, and peer disagreements are only possible in the case of what computer scientists call Byzantine Failures—uncorrected Byzantine Faults which update arbitrary values. Yet such Byzantine Failures make agents equally vulnerable to all three kinds of epistemic inconsistencies, so there is no principled basis for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2019-07-25
    Perspectival Skeptical Theism.Jonathan Curtis Rutledge - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (2):244-264.
    Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not subject to closure-of-inquiry defeat; that is, a type of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2019-07-11
    Requirements of Intention in Light of Belief.Carlos Núñez - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. added 2019-06-30
    Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    This new volume addresses the central questions which surround the process of reasoning. This emerging topic of analytic philosophy intersects with numerous other areas of philosophy, such as epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and metaethics, and also psychological work on reasoning.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2019-06-09
    Aristotle Against (Unqualified) Self-Motion: Physics VII 1 Α241b35-242a49 / Β241b25-242a15.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Ancient Philosophy.
    It is well known that Aristotle tries to make room for self-motion – an idea he inherits to some extent from Plato – within his other commitments to causal determinism while at the same time modifying the idea. However, one argument in Physics VII 1 seems to pose a problem for the bare possibility of self-motion; in it he seems to argue that everything that moves must be moved by something else. The text in which this argument appears is itself (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. added 2019-06-06
    Following the Law Because It’s the Law: Obedience, Bootstrapping, and Practical Reason.Paul Schofield - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):400-411.
    Voluntarists in the early modern period speak of an agent’s following the law because she was ordered to do so or because it’s the law. Contemporary philosophers tend either to ignore or to dismiss the possibility of justified obedience of this sort – that is, they ignore or dismiss the possibility that something’s being the law could in itself constitute a good reason to act. In this paper, I suggest that this view isn’t taken seriously because of certain widespread beliefs (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 286