Rationalism

In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it’s true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate (...) explanationism from some recent objections offered by Gualtiero Piccinini, Dario Mortini, and Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon. Together, these authors present five purported counterexamples to the sufficiency of the explanationist analysis for knowledge. In addition, Mortini devises a clever argument that explanationism entails the violation of a plausible closure principle on knowledge. We will argue that explanationism is innocent of all these charges against it, and we hope that the strength of the defense we offer of explanationism is evidence in its favor, and a reason to investigate explanationism further as the long-elusive truth about the nature of knowledge. (shrink)

Following Avicenna, many Muslim philosophers and logicians have identified ‘intellectual universal’ (kullī ʿaqlī) with the very mental concept dependent on mind. Apart from the controversies about Platonic Forms, they argue that they cannot be the very universals in logic. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentators have interpreted his view on intellectual universal in the Avicennian framework. In this interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā has embraced Avicenna’s explanation about mind-dependent universal concepts; however, he has modified some details of the issue as per his theory of (...) the primacy of existence and Plato’s theory of Forms. Having explained Sabzawārī and Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in his article, the author goes to propose a different interpretation according to which intellectual universals are identical with Platonic Forms, rather than the mind-dependent universal concepts. This Platonic interpretation is supported by three sets of evidences from Mullā Ṣadrā’s own texts. It also shows how Mullā Ṣadrā has answered Avicenna’s objection about the use of Platonic universal in logic. (shrink)

On propagation of rationalism in Sri Lanka, pioneered by Abraham T. Kovoor, 1898-1978.

English summary: Philosophers have sought to apply laws of order, symmetry, and harmony to the observable universe. However, the mathematical work of Gregory Chaitin has shown that complexity, defined as the total absence of symmetry and order, appears everywhere, even in numbers. Complexity thus becomes the unsurpassable limit of reason, reducing the efforts of philosophers and scientists who would propose a system of values that every human should rationally admit. French description: Pour maitriser par la pensee et, - connaitre par (...) le langage l'accablante diversite du reel, les philosophies ont suppose l'existence d'un ordre sous-jacent se manifestant dans la symetrie, l'harmonie et la simplicite. Dans leurs efforts pour elucider et enoncer des lois concises regissant les rapports entre les elements constitutifs du monde observable, les scientifiques leur ont emboite le pas. Or, des recherches recentes en mathematiques de Gregory J. Chaitin, ont fait apparaitre que la complexite, definie comme absence totale d'ordre et de symetrie, se manifeste a tous les niveaux du reel, y compris dans les nombres. Irreductiblement rebelle a l'analyse, la complexite s'erige en limite indepassable de la raison, reduisant les pretentions des scientifiques et rendant irrealisable, comme l'avait deja compris Heidegger, le projet de philosophes qui, comme Platon et Kant, voulaient proposer un systeme de valeurs que tout etre humain devait rationnellement admettre. (shrink)

In the 16th century, western science made a great leap. Meanwhile, in China, the development of textual criticism (including scholars Gu Yanwu 1613-1682, Dai Zhen 1724-1777, Duan Yucai 1735-1815, Wang Niansun 1744-1832) also facilitated the development of scientific factors (Hu Shi 1967).This paper argues that Qian-Jia scholars爷work represented a new era of traditional research that the value of scholarships and intellectual work (starting from Gu Yanwu 1613-1682, Dai Zhen 1724-1777, Duan Yucai 1735-1815, Wang Niansun 1744-1832, etc.) is essentially based on (...) what they created and believed, overtly or overtly, the principle of logic certainty—a newly developed indigenous rationalism in the Chinese intellectual history. (shrink)