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  1. The Space of Reasons as Self-Consciousness.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    In reasoning, we draw conclusions from multiple premises. But thinkers can be fragmented. And if there is no single fragment of the agent that thinks all of the premises, then the agent cannot draw any conclusions from them. It follows that reasoning from multiple premises depends on their being thought together. But what is it to think premises together? What is the condition that contrasts with fragmentation? This paper provides an answer to this question that is simple but compelling: to (...)
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  2. Limits of Demythologization, Critique of Ideology, Postmodern Critique of Reason and Critique of the Other: Unsuccessful Moments in the History of Modern Rationality.Fasil Merawi - forthcoming - E-Logos.
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  3. The Ontology of Economic Rationality.S. M. Reza Amiri Tehrani - forthcoming - Tehran, Iran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies Publications.
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  4. Review of Hichem Naar: The Rationality of Love[REVIEW]Troy Jollimore - 2024 - Ethics 134 (3):431-435.
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  5. Permissive Divergence.Simon Graf - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Within collective epistemology, there is a class of theories that understand the epistemic status of collective attitude ascriptions, such as ‘the college union knows that the industrial action is going to plan’, or ‘the jury justifiedly believes that the suspect is guilty’, as saying that a sufficient subset of group member attitudes have the relevant epistemic status. In this paper, I will demonstrate that these summativist approaches to collective epistemology are incompatible with epistemic permissivism, the doctrine that a single body (...)
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  6. Autonomy, rationality, and religious initiation: replies to Hand, Wareham, Gheaus, Lewin, and Clayton.John Tillson - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 58 (1):143-151.
    John Tillson concludes the symposium on his Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence by replying to his five respondents. The reply focusses on Michael Hand’s defence of parental rights to raise their children in their faith; Ruth Wareham’s suggestion that the value of autonomy rules out a wider range of impermissible religious influences than Tillson’s account is able to; David Lewin’s alternative criteria for ethical influence and scepticism about rationality’s objectivity; Anca Gheaus’ proposal that initiation into multiple contradictory religious (...)
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  7. Is future bias a manifestation of the temporal value asymmetry?Eugene Caruso, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive states of affairs to be located in the future not the past, and for negative states of affairs to be located in the past not the future. Three explanations for future-bias have been posited: the temporal metaphysics explanation, the practical irrelevance explanation, and the three mechanisms explanation. Understanding what explains future-bias is important not only for better understanding the phenomenon itself, but also because many philosophers think that which explanation is (...)
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  8. Preferences, Proxies, and Rationality.Chrisoula Andreou - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-11.
    This paper uses the idea of a proxy, which figures in discussions of bounded rationality, to construct an argument for a revisionary conclusion about ideal instrumental rationality. I consider how subjective responses can figure as proxies in heuristics and develop the following argument: (1) Proxies, even if relatively easy to recognize, can sometimes be messy, prompting incomplete or cyclic preferences. (2) From the point of view of ideal instrumental rationality, it is permissible for an agent to be concerned with a (...)
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  9. What’s So Special About Reasoning? Rationality, Belief Updating, and Internalism.Wade Munroe - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
    In updating our beliefs on the basis of our background attitudes and evidence we frequently employ objects in our environment to represent pertinent information. For example, we may write our premises and lemmas on a whiteboard to aid in a proof or move the beads of an abacus to assist in a calculation. In both cases, we generate extramental (that is, occurring outside of the mind) representational states, and, at least in the case of the abacus, we operate over these (...)
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  10. Beyond Mythology:Understanding The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate.Justin Masters - 2018 - Dissertation, San Francisco State University
    In this thesis I examine the debate between John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus. I narrow the debate down to what I believe is its most fundamental concern: the extent to which conceptual rationality plays a role in our skillful engagement with the world. I provide an exposition of the main arguments presented by each thinker in an attempt to lead the reader to a clearer understanding of the debate. I side with McDowell, I claim that his distinction between two psychological (...)
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  11. Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Requirements of Structural Rationality, Alex Worsnip, Oxford University Press, 2021, xvii + 335 pages. [REVIEW]Richard Bradley - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):228-233.
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  12. Experiencing the Conflict: The Rationality of Ambivalence.Dario Cecchini - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (1):1-12.
    Ambivalence, i.e., the simultaneous holding of negative and positive evaluations toward the same object, is an empirically well-documented phenomenon and an important aspect of ordinary experience. However, it has not received sufficient philosophical attention. This essay accomplishes two aims: first, a comprehensive and empirically informed account of ambivalence is provided; second, the rationality of ambivalence in practical and nonpractical contexts is defended.
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  13. The Problematic Rationality of Private Property Rights in advance.Emmanuel Picavet - forthcoming - Environmental Ethics.
    The “private” dimension of social life is problematic, posing conceptual, political, and ecological challenges. Some of these problems arise from the very nature of private property as it is enshrined in social life, which demands special privileges be granted to “private” matters on the grounds that these are private, because the predominant representation of the involved rights is that they reflect claims of the holders, rather than legitimate claims of society as a whole in allocating responsibilities, benefits, and duties. The (...)
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  14. Unsettled thoughts: a theory of degrees of rationality, by Julia Staffel. - Oxford University Press, 2019.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2022 - .
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  15. Where does philosophy begin when rationality is denied? Tsenay Serequeberhan’s concept of a lived existence as a means of decolonizing philosophy.Justin Sands - 2024 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 50 (3):529-550.
    Tsenay Serequeberhan’s hermeneutics has been crucial to the development of African philosophy. Initially employed as a pathway through the ethno- and professional philosophical debates, scholars have engaged how Serequeberhan’s hermeneutics grapples with one’s own place within a socio-historical world in service of liberation/self-determination. However, this scholarship mainly has focused on his adaptation of Gadamer’s ‘effective-historical consciousness’ for his own concept of heritage. This consequently leaves his concept of a ‘lived existence’ – which is equally crucial – under-examined. This paper probes (...)
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  16. Proportionality, Comparability, and Parity: A Discussion on the Rationality of Balancing.Piero Ríos Carrillo - 2023 - Legal Theory 29 (4):257-288.
    This article analyses the rationality of the principle of proportionality as a justificatory method for solving cases involving conflicts of constitutional principles. It addresses the “problem of comparability”: a set of arguments claiming that proportionalists fail to understand what happens when constitutional principles collide. The problem of comparability suggests that balancing cannot be done if some conflicts of constitutional principles are, in reality, cases of noncomparability, incommensurability, incomparability, or vagueness. In this article, I challenge the views of both proportionalists and (...)
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  17. Rationality, Science and Theology.D. N. Yadav (ed.) - 2015 - Darshana Publication.
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  18. Rationality, Virtue and Practical Wisdom in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.Jonas Holst - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    The purpose of the paper is to study the interrelatedness of rationality, virtue, and practical wisdom in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics by offering a critical interpretation of the bipartition of the soul presented in Chap. 13 of the first book. Aristotle relies on the partition of the soul into a rational and a non-rational part when he distinguishes between ethical and intellectual virtues. The paper will question the adequacy of these divisions and show that Aristotle himself casts doubt on them while (...)
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  19. The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured (...)
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  20. Rational Hypothesis: Inquiry Direction Without Evidence.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    There are scenarios in which letting one’s own views on the question whether p direct one’s inquiry into that question brings about individual and collective epistemic benefits. However, these scenarios are also such that one’s evidence doesn’t support believing one’s own views. So, how to vindicate the epistemic benefits of directing one’s inquiry in such an asymmetric way, without asking one to hold a seemingly irrational doxastic attitude? To answer this question, the paper understands asymmetric inquiry direction in terms of (...)
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  21. Provisional Attitudes.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa & Jonathan Dancy (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (3rd edition).
  22. Review of Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, x + 288 pp. [REVIEW]Lennart B. Ackermans - 2024 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 16 (2):280–286.
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  23. Bounded Rationality: Heuristics, Judgement, and Public Policy Sanjit Dhami and Cass R. Sunstein. MIT Press, 2022, 533 pp. [REVIEW]Alejandro Hortal - 2023 - Behavioral Public Policy:1-7.
    Book review - Bounded Rationality: Heuristics, Judgement, and Public Policy Sanjit Dhami and Cass R. Sunstein. MIT Press, 2022, 533 pp.
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  24. Inquiring and Making Sure.Eliran Haziza - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    It can be rational to inquire into what you already know, as cases of double-checking suggest. But, I argue, this is compatible with a knowledge aim of inquiry. In general, it can be rational to pursue an aim you’ve already achieved, and inquiry is no different. In particular, I argue that to double-check what you already know is to make sure you have knowledge, and that is still to aim at knowledge.
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  25. Norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    Epistemologists have recently proposed a number of norms governing rational inquiry. My aim in this paper is to unify and explain recently proposed norms of inquiry by developing a general account of the conditions under which inquiries are rational, analogous to theories such as evidentialism and reliabilism for rational belief. I begin with a reason-responsiveness conception of rationality as responding correctly to possessed normative reasons. I extend this account with a series of claims about the normative reasons for inquiry that (...)
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  26. Towards a philosophy of education built on fragile parts: Technological rationality and knowledge of pathos.Fumio Ono - 2024 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 56 (2):182-191.
    The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between education and technological rationality from the perspective of the philosophy of education, and to show that while education is deeply related to technique, skills, or technology, it can never be reduced to technical knowledge, and that there are things in education that overflow technical knowledge. I will here ask why there is something in education that overflows technical knowledge — I will define it as knowledge of pathos — and (...)
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  27. The Rationality and Flexibility of Motor Representations in Skilled Performance.Gabriele Ferretti & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (5):2517-2542.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists have been debating about the nature of practical knowledge in skilled action. A big challenge is that of establishing whether and how practical knowledge (knowledge-how) is influenced by, or related to propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). This becomes even more challenging when trying to understand how propositional and motor representations may cooperate in making action performance flexible, while also remaining rational. In this paper, we offer an account that explains how practical knowledge leads to the execution of our (...)
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  28. The Epistemology of Attention.Catharine Saint-Croix - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Jonathan Dancy, Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    Root, branch, and blossom, attention is intertwined with epistemology. It is essential to our capacity to learn and decisive of the evidence we obtain, it influences the intellectual connections we forge and those we remember, and it is the cognitive tool whereby we enact decisions about inquiry. Moreover, because it is both an epistemic practice and a site of agency, attention is a natural locus for questions about epistemic morality. This article surveys the emerging epistemology of attention, reviewing the existing (...)
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  29. A generalization of Campbell and Kelly’s trade-off theorem.Susumu Cato & Yohei Sekiguchi - 2012 - Social Choice and Welfare 38:237–246.
    This article considers social choice theory without the Pareto principle. We revisit the trade-off theorem developed by Campbell and Kelly (Econometrica 61:1355–1365, 1993) and generalize their result. By introducing an alternative measure of decisive structure, a dominance relation, we show that if a social welfare function dominates another social welfare function, then the number of pairs of alternatives which social ranking is independently of individual preferences under the former is not more than that under the latter. Moreover, we offer two (...)
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  30. Weak independence and social semi-orders.Susumu Cato - 2015 - Japanese Economic Review 66:311–321.
    This paper provides variants of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which states that there exists no non-dictatorial aggregation rule satisfying weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and collective rationality. In this paper, independence of irrelevant alternatives and collective rationality are simultaneously relaxed. Weak independence is imposed instead of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Social preferences are assumed to satisfy the semi-order properties of semi-transitivity and the interval-order property. We prove that there exists a vetoer when the number of alternatives is greater than or (...)
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  31. Szpilrajn, Arrow and Suzumura: concise proofs of extension theorems and an extension.Susumu Cato - 2012 - Metroeconomica 63 (2):235–249.
    This paper extends the classical extension theorem established by Edward Szpilrajn (Fundamenta Mathematicae, 16, pp. 386–389, 1930). Szpilrajn's theorem states that every quasi‐ordering has an ordering extension. Because of its usefulness in various themes of economics, it has been applied by many researchers. Important generalizations have been presented by two authors, Kenneth Arrow and Kotaro Suzumura, among others. First, we provide concise proofs of four extension theorems by Szpilrajn, Arrow and Suzumura. We then show an extension of their extension theorems.
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  32. A note on the extension of a binary relation on a set to the power set.Susumu Cato - 2012 - Economics Letters 116 (1):46–48.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of extending an antisymmetric binary relation on a set to a linear order on the power set. A necessary and sufficient condition is offered.
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  33. Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy.Kevin Dorst - manuscript
    The gambler’s fallacy is the tendency to expect random processes to switch more often than they actually do—for example, to think that after a string of tails, a heads is more likely. It’s often taken to be evidence for irrationality. It isn’t. Rather, it’s to be expected from a group of Bayesians who begin with causal uncertainty, and then observe unbiased data from an (in fact) statistically independent process. Although they converge toward the truth, they do so in an asymmetric (...)
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  34. Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer.Susumu Cato - 2015 - Economics Letters 131:59–61.
    This paper is concerned with an aggregation of individual preferences. We introduce the concept of weak independent decisiveness, which is a weakening of Sen’s independent decisiveness. We show that a Paretian social welfare function satisfies weak independent decisiveness if and only if the family of weakly decisive sets forms an ultrafilter.
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  35. Extended anonymity and Paretian relations on infinite utility streams.Tsuyoshi Adachi, Susumu Cato & Kohei Kamaga - 2014 - Mathematical Social Sciences 2014 (72):24-32.
    We examine the range of anonymity that is compatible with a Paretian social welfare relation (SWR) on infinite utility streams. Three alternative coherence properties of an SWR are considered, namely, acyclicity, quasi-transitivity, and Suzumura consistency. For each case, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a set of permutations to be the set of permissible permutations of some Paretian SWR is given by the cyclicity of permutations and a weakening of group structure. Further, for each case of coherence (...)
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  36. Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making.Susumu Cato - 2014 - Review of Economic Design 18:265–287.
    This paper examines an extended framework of Arrovian social choice theory. We consider two classes of values: consequential values and non-consequential values. Each individual has a comprehensive preference based on the two. Non-consequential values are assumed to be homogeneous among individuals. It is shown that a social ordering function satisfying Arrovian conditions must be non-consequential: a social comprehensive preference gives unequivocal priority to non-consequential values. We clarify the role of common preferences over non-consequential features.
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  37. Weak independence and the Pareto principle.Susumu Cato - 2016 - Social Choice and Welfare 47:295–314.
    In this paper, the independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto principle are simultaneously weakened in the Arrovian framework of social choice. Moreover, we also relax transitivity of social preferences. We show that impossibility remains under weaker versions of Arrow’s original conditions. Our results complement the recent work by Coban and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 43(4):953–961, 2014).
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  38. Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population.Susumu Cato - 2017 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 71:28–35.
    This paper is concerned with the implications of unanimity and anonymity for the Arrovian social choice theory when population is infinite. Contrary to the finite population case, various unanimity and anonymity axioms can be formulated. We show a tension between unanimity and anonymity by providing possibility and impossibility results. We also examine the case in which social preferences are allowed to be quasi-transitive.
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  39. Decisive coalitions and positive responsiveness.Susumu Cato - 2018 - Metroeconomica 69 (1):308–323.
    This paper addresses the Arrovian social choice problem. Our focus is the role of positive responsiveness, which requires social judgments to be strongly monotonic with respect to individual judgments. We clarify the structure of decisive coalitions associated with collective choice rules that satisfy positive responsiveness and Arrow's axioms. Transitivity of social preferences is relaxed to quasi‐transitivity or acyclicity.
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  40. Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules.Susumu Cato - 2013 - Mathematical Social Sciences 65 (1):40–47.
    Suzumura consistency is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weak-order extension. This paper provides some remarks on collective choice rules that generate Suzumura consistent social preferences. We examine the properties of such collective choice rules by introducing a procedural condition on collective choice rules. As applications of the procedural condition, we first investigate the decisive structure of a Paretian collective choice rule, and then consider the assignment of individual rights. In our analysis, the concept of semi-decisiveness (...)
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  41. Menu dependence and group decision making.Susumu Cato - 2014 - Group Decision and Negotiation 23:561–577.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of group decision making. We introduce the notion of a collective system rule. A collective system rule maps each preference profile to a group-preference system, which is a collection of social preferences on the subsets of the alternatives. By formulating the Arrovian conditions, we show the Arrow-type impossibility theorems. We also discuss how our approach is related to the standard group decision-making process.
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  42. Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence.Susumu Cato - 2018 - Social Choice and Welfare 50:305–328.
    Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that if an aggregation rule satisfies unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and collective rationality, then there exists a dictator. Among others, Arrow’s postulate of collective rationality is controversial. We propose a new axiom for an aggregation rule, decisiveness coherence, which is weaker than collective rationality. It is shown that given the Arrovian axioms other than collective rationality, a dictatorship arises if and only if decisiveness coherence is satisfied. Moreover, we introduce weak versions of (...)
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  43. Choice functions and weak Nash axioms.Susumu Cato - 2018 - Review of Economic Design 22:159–176.
    The Nash axiom is a basic property of consistency in choice. This paper proposes weaker versions of the axiom and examines their logical implications. In particular, we demonstrate that weak Nash axioms are useful to understand the relationship between the Nash axiom and the path independence axiom. We provide an application of weak Nash axioms to the no-envy approach. We present a possibility result and an impossibility result.
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  44. Rationality of the Tax System and Taxation Principles in the Context of Contemporary Fiscal Crisis (Analysis from the Perspective of the New Institutional Economics).Marian Zalesko, Mariusz Mak, Aneta Kargol-Wasiluk & Emilia Jankowska-Ambroziak - 2023 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 68 (1):329-345.
    The paper presents, in the synthetic way, the issue of the rationality of the tax system and taxation principles in relation to the clearly visible fiscal crisis in the 21st century caused by, among others, COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis which is theoretical (descriptive, comparative) was carried out by using tools indicated in the area of New Institutional Economics (NIE). Attention was devoted primarily to the importance of specific institutional arrangements, broadly understood as the “rules of the game” applicable in the (...)
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  45. Incompleteness, regularity, and collective preference.Susumu Cato - 2020 - Metroeconomica 71 (2):333–344.
    This paper examines the incompleteness of collective preference. We provide a series of Arrovian impossibility theorems without completeness. First, we consider the notion of regularity introduced by Eliaz and Ok (2006, Games and Economic Behavior 56, 61–86); it is an appropriate richness property for strict preference when preference is allowed to be incomplete. We examine the implication of imposing regularity on collective preference. Second, we propose responsiveness, a variation of positive responsiveness. This axiom requires that some changes in individual preferences (...)
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  46. On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of ownership of a thought (...)
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  47. Extending the intersection approach.Susumu Cato - 2020 - Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 21 (3):230-248.
    The intersection approach is a common method of overcoming a conflict among multiple values. Under this approach, a state is more desirable than another if it is so for all criteria in question. A fundamental difficulty is that judgment under the intersection approach lacks completeness in too many cases. We propose alternative methods that extend the intersection approach: the union and union-intersection approaches. Our methods generate a (quasi-)coherence judgment which is more completed and can be applied to most problems of (...)
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  48. Rationality and Operators: The Formal Structure of Preferences.Susumu Cato - 2016 - Springer.
    -/- This unique book develops an operational approach to preference and rationality as the author employs operators over binary relations to capture the concept of rationality. -/- A preference is a basis of individual behavior and social judgment and is mathematically regarded as a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Traditionally, an individual/social preference is assumed to satisfy completeness and transitivity. However, each of the two conditions is often considered to be too demanding; and then, weaker rationality conditions are (...)
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  49. Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations.Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata - 2010 - Social Choice and Welfare 34:611–630.
    The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and the interval order (...)
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  50. Ordinary Rationality Theory (ORT) According to Raymond Boudon.Jean-Michel Morin - 2023 - In Nathalie Bulle & Francesco Di Iorio (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Methodological Individualism: Volume I. Springer Verlag. pp. 227-249.
    Ordinary rationality theory (ORT) picks up Weber’s famous distinction between instrumental rationality and axiological rationality. Nonetheless, Boudon does not incorporate the affective or traditional dimensions proposed by the great German scholar. However, he adds a cognitive dimension which proves decisive. Modelled in this way, the reasons for acting or believing become the heart of a method for social science to analyse human behaviour. Boudon establishes an inextricable link between these individual reasons, the initial social contexts, and the resulting collective effects. (...)
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1 — 50 / 2871