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  1. added 2019-11-13
    Epistemic Anxiety, Adaptive Cognition, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Juliette Vazard - 2018 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (Philosophical Perspectives on Af):137-158.
    Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...)
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  2. added 2019-11-13
    Cognitive Architecture and the Limits of Interpretationism.Philip Gerrans - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):42-48.
  3. added 2019-11-08
    Reflections on Insight: Dilemmas, Paradoxes, and Puzzles.Marga Reimer - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):85-89.
  4. added 2019-10-08
    The Availability Heuristic and Inference to the Best Explanation.Michael Shaffer - forthcoming - Logos and Episteme.
    This paper shows how the availability heuristic can be used to justify inference to the best explanation in such a way that van Fraassen's infamous "best of a bad lot" objection can be adroitly avoided. With this end in mind, a dynamic and contextual version of the erotetic model of explanation sufficient to ground this response is presented and defended.
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  5. added 2019-09-19
    The Predictive Mind and Chess-Playing: A Reply to Shand.Matteo Colombo & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):603-608.
    In a recent Analysis piece, John Shand (2014) argues that the Predictive Theory of Mind provides a unique explanation for why one cannot play chess against oneself. On the basis of this purported explanatory power, Shand concludes that we have an extra reason to believe that PTM is correct. In this reply, we first rectify the claim that one cannot play chess against oneself; then we move on to argue that even if this were the case, Shand’s argument does not (...)
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  6. added 2019-09-18
    The Descent of Preferences.David Spurrett - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz020.
    More attention has been devoted to providing evolutionary accounts of the development of beliefs, or belief-like states, than for desires or preferences. Here I articulate and defend an evolutionary rationale for the development of psychologically real preference states. Preferences token or represent the expected values available actions given discriminated states of world and agent. The argument is an application of the ‘environmental complexity thesis’ found in Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, although my conclusions differ from Sterelny’s. I argue that tokening expected utilities (...)
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  7. added 2019-09-09
    Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search.Vincenzo Crupi, Jonathan D. Nelson, Björn Meder, Gustavo Cevolani & Katya Tentori - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1410-1456.
    Searching for information is critical in many situations. In medicine, for instance, careful choice of a diagnostic test can help narrow down the range of plausible diseases that the patient might have. In a probabilistic framework, test selection is often modeled by assuming that people’s goal is to reduce uncertainty about possible states of the world. In cognitive science, psychology, and medical decision making, Shannon entropy is the most prominent and most widely used model to formalize probabilistic uncertainty and the (...)
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  8. added 2019-08-13
    A Description Logic Framework for Commonsense Conceptual Combination Integrating Typicality, Probabilities and Cognitive Heuristics.Antonio Lieto & Gian Luca Pozzato - 2019 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence:1-39.
    We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of the combination of prototypical concepts. The proposed logic relies on the logic of typicality ALC + TR, whose semantics is based on the notion of rational closure, as well as on the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics, and is equipped with a cognitive heuristic used by humans for concept composition. We first extend the logic of typicality ALC + TR by typicality inclusions of the (...)
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  9. added 2019-07-23
    Ideological Diversity, Hostility, and Discrimination in Philosophy.Uwe Peters, Nate Honeycutt, Andreas De Block & Lee Jussim - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Members of the field of philosophy have, just as other people, political convictions or, as psychologists call them, ideologies. How are different ideologies distributed and perceived in the field? Using the familiar distinction between the political left and right, we surveyed an international sample of 794 subjects in philosophy. We found that survey participants clearly leaned left (75%), while right-leaning individuals (14%) and moderates (11%) were underrepresented. Moreover, and strikingly, across the political spectrum, from very left-leaning individuals and moderates to (...)
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  10. added 2019-07-14
    Less is More for Bayesians, Too.Gregory Wheeler - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook on Bounded Rationality.
  11. added 2019-06-06
    Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. [REVIEW]V. Bradley Lewis - 2000 - Review of Metaphysics 53 (4):944-946.
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas?H. G. Callaway - 1992 - Dialectica 46 (3-4):225-242.
    SummaryThis paper argues that the influence of language on science, philosophy and other field is mediated by communicative practices. Where communications is more restrictive, established linguistic structures exercise a tighter control over innovations and scientifically motivated reforms of language. The viewpoint here centers on the thesis that argumentation is crucial in the understanding and evaluation of proposed reforms and that social practices which limit argumentation serve to erode scientific objectivity. Thus, a plea is made for a sociology of scientific belief (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-06
    Irrationality: An Essay on `Akrasia', Self-Deception, and Self-Control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
    Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behaviour is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationalityDSmost incontinent action and self-deceptionDSpose such difficult problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Alfred Mele shows that incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible.
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  14. added 2019-06-05
    Implicit Bias, Ideological Bias, and Epistemic Risks in Philosophy.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):393-419.
    It has been argued that implicit biases are operative in philosophy and lead to significant epistemic costs in the field. Philosophers working on this issue have focussed mainly on implicit gender and race biases. They have overlooked ideological bias, which targets political orientations. Psychologists have found ideological bias in their field and have argued that it has negative epistemic effects on scientific research. I relate this debate to the field of philosophy and argue that if, as some studies suggest, the (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-05
    Where is My Mind? Mark Rowlands on the Vehicles of Cognition.Andreas Elpidorou - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):145-160.
    Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Rowlands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly structures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and mental processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position.
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  16. added 2019-06-03
    Reasoning About Uncertain Conditionals.Niki Pfeifer - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):849-866.
    There is a long tradition in formal epistemology and in the psychology of reasoning to investigate indicative conditionals. In psychology, the propositional calculus was taken for granted to be the normative standard of reference. Experimental tasks, evaluation of the participants’ responses and psychological model building, were inspired by the semantics of the material conditional. Recent empirical work on indicative conditionals focuses on uncertainty. Consequently, the normative standard of reference has changed. I argue why neither logic nor standard probability theory provide (...)
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  17. added 2019-05-28
    Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality.Michael J. Shaffer - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (4):563-579.
    This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it is contended that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. However, it is also true that it appears to be the case that it is still (...)
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  18. added 2019-05-21
    Reason Better: An Interdisciplinary Guide to Critical Thinking.David Manley - 2019 - Toronto, ON, Canada: Tophat Monocle.
    This book is the result of rethinking the standard playbook for critical thinking courses, to include only the most useful skills from the toolkits of philosophy, cognitive psychology, and behavioral economics. -/- The text focuses on: -/- - a mindset that avoids systematic error, more than the ability to persuade others - the logic of probability and decisions, more than than the logic of deductive arguments - a unified treatment of evidence, covering statistical, causal, and best-explanation inferences -/- The unified (...)
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  19. added 2019-05-17
    On the Automaticity and Ethics of Belief.Uwe Peters - 2017 - Teoria:99–115..
    Recently, philosophers have appealed to empirical studies to argue that whenever we think that p, we automatically believe that p (Millikan 2004; Mandelbaum 2014; Levy and Mandelbaum 2014). Levy and Mandelbaum (2014) have gone further and claimed that the automaticity of believing has implications for the ethics of belief in that it creates epistemic obligations for those who know about their automatic belief acquisition. I use theoretical considerations and psychological findings to raise doubts about the empirical case for the view (...)
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  20. added 2019-05-14
    Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy079.
    In the philosophy of science, it is a common proposal that values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted whenever they drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions. Drawing on recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Advocates of it have overlooked that values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level even when they (...)
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  21. added 2019-05-10
    Teleology and Mentalizing in the Explanation of Action.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    In empirically informed research on action explanation, philosophers and developmental psychologists have recently proposed a teleological account of the way in which we make sense of people’s intentional behavior. It holds that we typically don’t explain an agent’s action by appealing to her mental states but by referring to the objective, publically accessible facts of the world that count in favor of performing the action so as to achieve a certain goal. Advocates of the teleological account claim that this strategy (...)
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  22. added 2019-04-30
    Can Evolution Get Us Off the Hook? Evaluating the Ecological Defence of Human Rationality.Maarten Boudry, Michael Vlerick & Ryan McKay - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:524-535.
    This paper discusses the ecological case for epistemic innocence: does biased cognition have evolutionary benefits, and if so, does that exculpate human reasoners from irrationality? Proponents of ‘ecological rationality’ have challenged the bleak view of human reasoning emerging from research on biases and fallacies. If we approach the human mind as an adaptive toolbox, tailored to the structure of the environment, many alleged biases and fallacies turn out to be artefacts of narrow norms and artificial set-ups. However, we argue that (...)
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  23. added 2019-04-22
    Rationality, Reasoning Well, and Extramental Props.Wade Munroe - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):175-198.
    Recently, a cottage industry has formed with the expressed intent of analyzing the nature of personal-level reasoning and inference. The dominant position in the extant philosophical literature is that reasoning consists in rule-governed operations over propositional attitudes. In addition, it is widely assumed that our attitude updating procedures are purely cognitive. Any non-cognitive activity performed in service of updating our attitudes is external to the updating process—at least in terms of rational evaluation. In this paper, I argue that whether one (...)
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  24. added 2019-03-21
    Models of Rationality and the Psychology of Reasoning: From is to Ought, and Back.Crupi Vincenzo & Vittorio Girotto - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Diagnoses of rationality often arise from the experimental investigation of human reasoning. We suggest that such diagnoses can be disputed on various grounds and provide a classification. We then argue that much fruitful research done with classical experimental paradigms was triggered by normative concerns and yet fostered insight in properly psychological terms. Our examples include the selection task, the conjunction fallacy, and so-called pseudodiagnosticity. We conclude that normative considerations retain a constructive role in the psychology of reasoning, contrary to recent (...)
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  25. added 2019-03-09
    Rational Analysis, Intractability, and the Prospects of ‘as If’-Explanations.Iris Rooij, Cory Wright, Johan Kwisthout & Todd Wareham - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):491–510.
    The plausibility of so-called ‘rational explanations’ in cognitive science is often contested on the grounds of computational intractability. Some have argued that intractability is a pseudoproblem, however, because cognizers do not actually perform the rational calculations posited by rational models; rather, they only behave as if they do. Whether or not the problem of intractability is dissolved by this gambit critically depends, inter alia, on the semantics of the ‘as if’ connective. First, this paper examines the five most sensible explications (...)
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  26. added 2019-02-23
    A Master Wittgensteinian Surveys Human Nature -A Review of Human Nature-the Categorial Framework by PMS Hacker (2010) (Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Talking Monkeys -- Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 Michael Starks 3rd Edition. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 165-192.
    Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein and more recently by Searle to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the (...)
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  27. added 2019-02-03
    The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press.
    The lottery paradox involves a set of judgments that are individually easy, when we think intuitively, but ultimately hard to reconcile with each other, when we think reflectively. Empirical work on the natural representation of probability shows that a range of interestingly different intuitive and reflective processes are deployed when we think about possible outcomes in different contexts. Understanding the shifts in our natural ways of thinking can reduce the sense that the lottery paradox reveals something problematic about our concept (...)
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  28. added 2019-01-30
    The “Rationality Wars” in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go.Thomas Sturm - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):66-81.
    Current psychology of human reasoning is divided into several different approaches. For instance, there is a major dispute over the question whether human beings are able to apply norms of the formal models of rationality such as rules of logic, or probability and decision theory, correctly. While researchers following the “heuristics and biases” approach argue that we deviate systematically from these norms, and so are perhaps deeply irrational, defenders of the “bounded rationality” approach think not only that the evidence for (...)
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  29. added 2018-12-19
    On the Instrumental Value of Hypothetical and Counterfactual Thought.Thomas Icard, Fiery Cushman & Joshua Knobe - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
  30. added 2018-12-19
    Recenti studi intorno alla razionalità.Pietro Salis - 2018 - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 36 (3):547-560.
    The recent publication of the books La razionalità, by Paolo Labinaz, and I modi della razionalità, edited by Massimo Dell’Utri and Antonio Rainone, offers the opportunity to provide an overview of some important discussions on rationality. In particular, I highlight how the modern and Cartesian ideal of this notion is undergoing a transformation that is enhanced by results coming from empirical studies in the field of cognitive science. These transformations are visible in many ambits concerning rationality: this discussion privileges the (...)
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  31. added 2018-11-22
    The Descent of Preferences.David Spurrett - manuscript
    [A slightly revised version of this paper has been accepted by the BJPS] More attention has been devoted to providing evolutionary scenarios accounting for the development of beliefs, or belief-like states, than for desires or preferences. Here I articulate and defend an evolutionary rationale for the development of psychologically real preference states. Preferences token or represent the expected values of discriminated states, available actions, or action-state pairings. The argument is an application the ‘environmental complexity thesis’ found in Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, (...)
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  32. added 2018-11-15
    Implicit Bias and the Idealized Rational Self.Nora Berenstain - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:445-485.
    The underrepresentation of women, people of color, and especially women of color—and the corresponding overrepresentation of white men—is more pronounced in philosophy than in many of the sciences. I suggest that part of the explanation for this lies in the role played by the idealized rational self, a concept that is relatively influential in philosophy but rarely employed in the sciences. The idealized rational self models the mind as consistent, unified, rationally transcendent, and introspectively transparent. I hypothesize that acceptance of (...)
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  33. added 2018-11-06
    ODNI as an Analytic Ombudsman: Is Intelligence Community Directive 203 Up to the Task?Alexandru Marcoci, Ans Vercammen & Mark Burgman - forthcoming - Intelligence and National Security.
    In the wake of 9/11 and the assessment of Iraq's WMD, several inquiries placed the blame primarily on the Intelligence Community. Part of the reform that followed was a codification of analytic tradecraft standards into Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 and the appointment of an analytic ombudsman in the newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence charged with monitoring the quality of analytic products from across the intelligence community. In this paper we identify three assumptions behind ICD203: (1) (...)
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  34. added 2018-09-24
    Delusions and the Background of Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
    I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson need to be met for the background (...)
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  35. added 2018-09-18
    Rationality: An Advanced Review.Clifford Sosis & Michael Bishop - 2013 - WIREs Cognitive Science.
    A theory of rationality is a theory that evaluates instances of reasoning as rational, irrational, or (ir)rational to some degree. Theories can be categorized as rule-based or consequentialist. Rule-based theories say that rational reasoning accords with certain rules (e.g., of logic or probability). Consequentialist theories say that rational reasoning tends to produce good consequences. For instance, the reliabilist takes rationality to be reasoning that tends to produce mostly true beliefs. The pragmatist takes it to be reasoning that tends to produce (...)
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  36. added 2018-08-14
    Troubles with Bayesianism: An Introduction to the Psychological Immune System.Eric Mandelbaum - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (2):141-157.
    A Bayesian mind is, at its core, a rational mind. Bayesianism is thus well-suited to predict and explain mental processes that best exemplify our ability to be rational. However, evidence from belief acquisition and change appears to show that we do not acquire and update information in a Bayesian way. Instead, the principles of belief acquisition and updating seem grounded in maintaining a psychological immune system rather than in approximating a Bayesian processor.
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  37. added 2018-07-15
    A Response to Prelec.Luc Bovens - 2013 - In Adam Oliver (ed.), Essays in Behavioural Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 228-33.
    At the heart of Drazen Prelec’s chapter is the distinction between outcome utility and diagnostic utility. There is a particular distinction in the literature on causal networks (Pearl 2000), namely the distinction between observing and intervening, that maps onto Prelec’s distinction between diagnostic and outcome utility. I will explore the connection between both frameworks.
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  38. added 2018-06-19
    The Architecture of Belief: An Essay on the Unbearable Automaticity of Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2010 - Dissertation, UNC-Chapel Hill
    People cannot contemplate a proposition without believing that proposition. A model of belief fixation is sketched and used to explain hitherto disparate, recalcitrant, and somewhat mysterious psychological phenomena and philosophical paradoxes. Toward this end I also contend that our intuitive understanding of the workings of introspection is mistaken. In particular, I argue that propositional attitudes are beyond the grasp of our introspective capacities. We learn about our beliefs from observing our behavior, not from introspecting our stock beliefs. -/- The model (...)
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  39. added 2018-06-08
    The Incoherence of Heuristically Explaining Coherence.Iris van Rooij & Cory Wright - 2006 - In Ron Sun (ed.), Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ 07430, USA: pp. 2622.
    Advancement in cognitive science depends, in part, on doing some occasional ‘theoretical housekeeping’. We highlight some conceptual confusions lurking in an important attempt at explaining the human capacity for rational or coherent thought: Thagard & Verbeurgt’s computational-level model of humans’ capacity for making reasonable and truth-conducive abductive inferences (1998; Thagard, 2000). Thagard & Verbeurgt’s model assumes that humans make such inferences by computing a coherence function (f_coh), which takes as input representation networks and their pair-wise constraints and gives as output (...)
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  40. added 2018-06-05
    Introduction to Special Issue of Perspectives on Science.Yiftach Fehige & Michael T. Stuart - 2014 - Perspectives on Science 22 (2):167-178.
    This is an introduction to a special issue of Perspectives on Science, the outcome of a workshop entitled "Thought Experiments in Science: Four Blind Spots," held at the University of Toronto, March 23rd, 2012. The recent revival in philosophical study of thought experiments has been limited to fields like epistemology, science studies, and metaphilosophy. With this issue we hope to facilitate a discussion about how some other disciplinary perspectives might bear on the subject; specifically, the history of philosophy, literary studies, (...)
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  41. added 2018-04-30
    Optimism, Agency, and Success.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (3):1-15.
    Does optimism lead to success? Friends of optimism argue that positive beliefs about ourselves and our future contribute to fitness and mental health, and are correlated with good functioning, productivity, resilience, and pro-social behaviour. Sceptics, instead, claim that when we are optimistic we fail to react constructively to negative feedback, and put ourselves at risk because we underestimate threats. Thus, it is controversial whether optimistic beliefs are conducive to success, intended as the fulfilment of our goals in a given domain. (...)
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  42. added 2018-04-09
    Confabulations About Personal Memories, Normal and Abnormal.William Hirstein - 2011 - In Suzanne Nalbantian (ed.), The Memory Process: Neuroscientific and Humanistic Perspectives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 217-232.
  43. added 2018-03-18
    Cognitive Science and Thought Experiments: A Refutation of Paul Thagard's Skepticism.Michael T. Stuart - 2014 - Perspectives on Science 22 (2):264-287.
    Paul Thagard has recently argued that thought experiments are dangerous and misleading when we try to use them as evidence for claims. This paper refutes his skepticism. Building on Thagard’s own work in cognitive science, I suggest that Thagard has much that is positive to say about how thought experiments work. My last section presents some new directions for research on the intersection between thought experiments and cognitive science.
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  44. added 2018-03-06
    Hipoteza Sapira-Whorfa - Przegl¸Ad Argumentów Zwolenników I Przeciwników.Andrzej Klimczuk - 2013 - Kultura-Społeczeństwo-Edukacja 1:165--182.
    Współcześnie rośnie znaczenie badań interdyscyplinarnych oraz z zakresu zróżnicowania kulturowego, wielokulturowości i współpracy międzykulturowej. Istotne jest także uwzględnianie globalnych procesów zmian związanych z upowszechnianiem cyfrowych technologii informatycznych i telekomunikacyjnych. Jedną z teorii mających podstawowe znaczenie w tym obszarze badań jest koncepcja autorstwa E. Sapira i B.L. Whorfa. Celem artykułu jest przybliżenie aktualności sporu naukowego dotyczącego poglądów tych autorów na relacje pomiędzy językiem a poznaniem. Opracowanie opiera się na krytycznej analizie literatury przedmiotu. W podsumowaniu wskazane zostały główne wnioski i rekomendacje co (...)
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  45. added 2018-03-05
    Frege Puzzles and Mental Files.Henry Clarke - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):351-366.
    This paper proposes a novel conception of mental files, aimed at addressing Frege puzzles. Classical Frege puzzles involve ignorance and discovery of identity. These may be addressed by accounting for a more basic way for identity to figure in thought—the treatment of beliefs by the believer as being about the same thing. This manifests itself in rational inferences that presuppose the identity of what the beliefs are about. Mental files help to provide a functional characterization of a mind capable of (...)
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  46. added 2018-02-17
    Overselling the Case Against Normativism.Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):255-255.
    Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First, rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&E seek. Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive version of normativism.
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  47. added 2018-02-16
    The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents.Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, concerns the fundamental architecture (...)
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  48. added 2018-01-14
    Symmetry in Cognition, and its Reflection in Society.Miro Brada - 2016 - In Ioannis Vandoulakis (ed.), Symmetry: Art and Science. Adeilaide: International Symmetry Society. pp. 34-37.
    Cognitive tests show that identity and symmetry reflect intellect. 'Guess of other guess' creates various symmetries, while only one is right: 'absolute symmetry', which can be outvoted by the majority. Prejudices result from differences between ME (my identity) and others. Unbiased judgement is symmetrical, always in the middle: neither in favor, nor against ME. Intelligence reduces prejudices, but the lack of opportunities can counterbalance it. That's why type of bias differs in various groups: people from war zones, people in therapy, (...)
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  49. added 2017-12-01
    Rationality: Constraints and Contexts, 1st Edition.T. W. Hung & Timothy Joseph Lane (eds.) - 2016 - San Diego: Academic Press.
    For half a century the idea of rational thought has been challenged by discoveries that call into question some of its foundations. How we actually think seems to be at odds with descriptive and prescriptive models that once held sway in the development of modern science and scholarship. One response to these challenges has been a loss of nerve. Another—the one on display in Rationality: Contexts and Constraints—is an active attempt to revise those models, so as to enhance their compatibility (...)
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  50. added 2017-10-27
    Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-28.
    A surge of empirical research demonstrating flexible cognition in animals and young infants has raised interest in the possibility of rational decision-making in the absence of language. A venerable position, which I here call “Classical Inferentialism”, holds that nonlinguistic agents are incapable of rational inferences. Against this position, I defend a model of nonlinguistic inferences that shows how they could be practically rational. This model vindicates the Lockean idea that we can intuitively grasp rational connections between thoughts by developing the (...)
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