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115 found
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1 — 50 / 115
  1. added 2019-01-12
    The Puzzle of Transparency and How to Solve It.Wolfgang Barz - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
    According to the transparency approach, achievement of self-knowledge is a two-stage process: first, the subject arrives at the judgment ‘p’; second, the subject proceeds to the judgment ‘I believe that p.’ The puzzle of transparency is to understand why the transition from the first to the second judgment is rationally permissible. After revisiting the debate between Byrne and Boyle on this matter, I present a novel solution according to which the transition is rationally permissible in virtue of a justifying argument (...)
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  2. added 2018-09-26
    Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Mind:fzy061.
    Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not (at least in a straightforward sense) lying, but yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she’s doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking (...)
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  3. added 2018-08-29
    Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge.Eric Marcus & John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one is asserting is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm “Assert that p only if you believe that p”. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s (...)
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  4. added 2018-08-24
    Moran on Self‐Knowledge.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):391-401.
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  5. added 2018-06-27
    Reasoning and Self-Knowledge.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2018 - Análisis Filosófico 38 (1):33-55.
    What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker (1988), a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, versions of which can be found in Shoemaker (1988 and 2009) and Byrne (...)
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  6. added 2018-03-25
    Categories and Language.Jesús Gerardo Martínez del Castillo - 2015 - International Journal of Language and Linguistics 3 (6-1):96-104.
    Language exists because human subjects define themselves in the circumstance they are in. This is possible because they are able to know, not directly through their senses only, but adding something new to the construct they create in their conscience. The main thing they add to the construct created is categories, something invented or fabricated by the human subject at the moment of speaking.
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  7. added 2018-03-13
    Cardinal Moran: Rerum Novarum, Federation and the Australian Labour Party.Race Mathews - 2010 - The Chesterton Review 36 (1/2):114-145.
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  8. added 2018-02-17
    Evans and First Person Authority.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a belief and (...)
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  9. added 2018-02-16
    The Problem Of Self-Knowledge.Karsten R. Stueber - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (3):269-296.
    This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledge that is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facie incompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that if one conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive of belief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the agent has knowledge of his beliefs. Accepting such a constitutive account of self-knowledge does not, however, preclude the conceptual possibility (...)
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  10. added 2018-01-20
    If You Believe You Believe, You Believe. A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own Beliefs.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Logos and Episteme:389-416.
    Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that (...)
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  11. added 2017-11-15
    Explicaciones "racionalistas" de la autoridad de la primera persona.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2010 - In Jaime Labastida & Violeta Aréchiga (eds.), Identidad y diferencia. Vol. 3: La filosofía y la ciencia. México, D.F.: Siglo XXI and Asociación Filosófica de México. pp. 211-226.
    Conocemos la propia mente mejor que la mente de otras personas. Explicaciones racionalistas dicen que este fenómeno se debe a nuestra racionalidad: Somos capaces de ajustar nuestras creencias e intenciones racionalmente en vista de su coherencia o de nueva evidencia y tal ajuste requiere que conozcamos nuestras creencias e intenciones con la autoridad de la primera persona. Examino pasajes de McGinn, Shoemaker y Burge, criticando el argumento en tres puntos: (1) Es posible pensar racionalmente sin autoconocimiento. (2) Los requerimientos racionalistas (...)
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  12. added 2017-10-08
    Meaning and Fulfilment in Life: The Roles of Criticism, Self-Discovery and Autobiography.Tony Summer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy of Life 7 (3):391-405.
    I offer a personal case-study to show how poor self-knowledge due in part to self-deception led to wasted life, a life lacking in meaning, and descent into severe anxiety and depression. A meaningful human life connects with things of value outside of itself and provides fulfilment for its bearer. For humans, fulfilment depends upon self-discovery, which requires a process of conjecture and refutation, a willingness to question and criticise received views and to welcome challenges and criticism to views that one (...)
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  13. added 2017-10-05
    Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Jordi Fernandez. Oxford: OUP, 2013, Xx + 245 Pp. ISBN 978-0-19-966402-3 Hb £42.00. [REVIEW]Matthew Parrott - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (S1):e19-e22.
  14. added 2017-05-31
    Koncepcja realności w późnej filozofii Nietzschego.Konrad Pyznar - 2013 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 3 (1):81-96.
    W tekście rozważane są zagadnienie realności i związana z nim tematyka epistemologiczna w trzecim okresie filozofii Fryderyka Nietzschego. Analizując ten obszar filozofii Nietzschego, autor zwraca szczególną uwagę na problem życia. Opisuje go za pomocą metafory pnącej się wzwyż spirali. Metafora ta rozwijana jest przez autora w kontekście koncepcji „ekstatycznego tańca kratofanicznego” Zbigniewa Kaźmierczaka. Autor rozpoczyna rozważania od interpretacji stanowiska Nietzschego na temat trzech władz poznawczych: świadomości, rozumu i języka metafizycznego. Następnie stara się opisać wpływ, jaki — zdaniem filozofa — wywierają (...)
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  15. added 2017-03-05
    Transparency and Introspective Unification.Kateryna Samoilova - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).
    Gareth Evans has observed that one merely needs to ‘look outward’ to discover one’s own beliefs. This observation of what has become known as belief ‘transparency’ has formed a basis for a cluster of views on the nature of introspection. These views may be well suited to account for our introspective access to beliefs, but whether similar transparency-based accounts of our introspective access to mental states other than belief can be given is not obvious. The question of whether a transparency-based (...)
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  16. added 2017-03-05
    First-Person Privilege, Judgment, and Avowal.Kateryna Samoilova - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):169-182.
    It is a common intuition that I am in a better position to know my own mental states than someone else's. One view that takes this intuition very seriously is Neo-Expressivism, providing a “non-epistemic” account of first-person privilege. But some have denied that we enjoy any principled first-person privilege, as do those who have the Third-Person View, according to which there is no deep difference in our epistemic position with regard to our own and others' mental states. Despite their apparently (...)
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  17. added 2017-03-02
    Knowing Our Degrees of Belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.
    The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...)
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  18. added 2017-02-08
    Reply to Shoemaker.David Wiggins - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):594-609.
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  19. added 2017-02-01
    Comments on Authority and Estrangement. [REVIEW]George M. Wilson - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):440–447.
  20. added 2017-01-21
    Critical Notice of Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Sebastian Gardner - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (2):249 - 267.
  21. added 2017-01-18
    Moran's Authority and Estrangement. [REVIEW]Jane Heal - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):427–432.
  22. added 2017-01-16
    Recensão A: SOARES, C.; FIALHO, M.C.; MORÁN, M.C.A; MONTIEL, R.M.I - Norma & Transgressão II.Fábio de Souza Lessa - 2012 - Humanitas 64:304-310.
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  23. added 2016-12-12
    The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
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  24. added 2016-12-08
    Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief.Sydney Shoemaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):35-51.
    The paper defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are “available” in the sense that (...)
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  25. added 2016-12-08
    Self-Knowing Agents.Lucy O'Brien - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.
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  26. added 2016-11-05
    Knowing What One Believes – In Defense of a Dispositional Reliabilist Extrospective Account.Michael Roche - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):365-379.
    We seem to enjoy a special kind of access to our beliefs. We seem able to know about them via a distinctively first-personal method, and such knowledge seems epistemically superior to any knowledge that others might attain of our beliefs. This paper defends a novel account of this access. The account is extrospective in that it explains this access in terms of our ability to think about the (non-mental) world. Moreover, it does not require the contentious claim that judging that (...)
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  27. added 2016-10-17
    Rational Irrationality.Alfred Mele - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 26 (26):31-32.
    Alfred Mele argues we shouldn't try too hard to rid ourselves of all delusions.
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  28. added 2016-06-07
    Husserl on Reason, Reflection, and Attention.Hanne Jacobs - 2016 - Research in Phenomenology 46 (2):257-276.
    This paper spells out Husserl’s account of the exercise of rationality and shows how it is tied to the capacity for critical reflection. I first discuss Husserl’s views on what rationally constrains our intentionality. Then I localize the exercise of rationality in the positing that characterizes attentive forms of intentionality and argue that, on Husserl’s account, when we are attentive to something we are also pre-reflectively aware of what speaks for and against our taking something to be a certain way. (...)
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  29. added 2016-05-16
    Transparency and the KK Principle.Nilanjan Das & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):3-23.
    An important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of self-knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version (...)
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  30. added 2016-04-17
    Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that what I call the simple theory of introspection can be extended to account for our introspective knowledge of what we believe as well as what we consciously experience. In section one, I present the simple theory of introspection and motivate the extension from experience to belief. In section two, I argue that extending the simple theory provides a solution to Moore’s paradox by explaining why believing Moorean conjunctions always involves some degree (...)
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  31. added 2016-04-06
    Self‐Knowledge for Humans, by Quassim Cassam (Oxford University Press, 2014). [REVIEW]Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (1):113-119.
  32. added 2016-03-25
    Knowing One's Own Desires.Jonathan Webber - 2016 - In Daniel Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Routledge. pp. 165-179.
    Do you know your own desires in some way that other people cannot know them? Richard Moran claims that his influential theory of first-person authority over beliefs and intentions can also cover desires. However, his deliberative model can apply to desire only if one already has some other way of knowing one’s own desires. Jean-Paul Sartre’s conception of pure reflection, on the other hand, portrays a direct epistemic access to one’s own desires that can ground fundamental first-person authority over desires (...)
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  33. added 2016-01-24
    Self-Knowledge and Its Limits.John Schwenkler - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (1):85-95.
    This is a review essay of Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford, 2014) and John Doris, Talking to Our Selves (Oxford, 2015). In it I question whether Cassam succeeds in his challenge to Richard Moran's account of first-personal authority, and whether Doris is right that experimental evidence for unconscious influences on behavior generates skeptical worries on accounts that regard accurate self-knowledge as a precondition of agency.
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  34. added 2015-11-30
    Racionalidad y autoconocimiento en Shoemaker.Martin F. Fricke - 2012 - In Pedro Stepanenko (ed.), La primera persona y sus percepciones. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. pp. 53-73.
    En su artículo “On Knowing One’s Own Mind” (1988), Shoemaker argumenta en favor de tres afirmaciones: (1) se requiere un autoconocimiento directo (self-acquaintance) para la cooperación racional con otras personas (porque ésta depende de que podamos decirles qué es lo que creemos e intentamos hacer); (2) el autoconocimiento directo es necesario para la deliberación sobre qué creer y qué hacer (porque no podemos ajustar racionalmente creencias y deseos sin saber qué creencias y deseos tenemos); y (3) el autoconocimiento directo es (...)
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  35. added 2015-11-25
    Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism.Brie Gertler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):91-109.
    How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self-knowledge, our capacity for self-knowledge derives from our (...)
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  36. added 2015-11-25
    Self-Knowledge for Humans, by Quassim Cassam. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):269-280.
    With this provocative book, Quassim Cassam aspires to reorient the philosophical study of self-knowledge so as to bring its methodology and subject matter into line with recognizably human concerns. He pursues this reorientation on two fronts. He proposes replacing what he sees as the field’s standard subject, an ideally rational being he calls Homo Philosophicus, with a more realistic Homo Sapiens. And he proposes shifting the field’s primary focus from ‘narrow epistemological concerns’ to issues reflecting ‘what matters to humans’, such (...)
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  37. added 2015-09-10
    Self-Knowledge and the Phenomenological Transparency of Belief.Markos Valaris - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    I develop an account of our capacity to know what we consciously believe, which is based on an account of the phenomenology of conscious belief. While other recent authors have suggested that phenomenally conscious states play a role in the epistemology of self-ascriptions of belief, they have failed to give a satisfying account of how exactly the phenomenology is supposed to help with the epistemology — i.e., an account of the way “what it is like” for the subject of a (...)
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  38. added 2015-09-09
    Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I argue that the method of transparency --determining whether I believe that p by considering whether p -- does not explain our privileged access to our own beliefs. Looking outward to determine whether one believes that p leads to the formation of a judgment about whether p, which one can then self-attribute. But use of this process does not constitute genuine privileged access to whether one judges that p. And looking outward will not provide for access to (...)
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  39. added 2015-08-24
    Self-Knowledge, Edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis. [REVIEW]Will Small - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1091-1095.
  40. added 2015-03-26
    Habituation and First-Person Authority.Jonathan Webber - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge.
    Richard Moran’s theory of first-person authority as the agential authority to make up one’s own mind rests on a form of mind-body dualism that does not allow for habituation as part of normal psychological functioning. We have good intuitive and empirical reason to accept that habituation is central to the normal functioning of desire. There is some empirical support for the idea that habituation plays a parallel role in belief. In particular, at least one form of implicit bias seems better (...)
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  41. added 2015-03-22
    On Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement. Author's Reply.Josep E. Corbi, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Josep L. Prades, Hilan Bensusan, Manuel de Pinedo, Carla Bagnoli & Richard Moran - 2007 - Theoria 22 (58).
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  42. added 2015-03-21
    Entrevista a Fernando Morán.Antonio García Santesmases - 2003 - Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política 21:139-144.
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  43. added 2015-03-07
    Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
    This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and so (...)
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  44. added 2014-11-18
    Expressing First-Person Authority.Matthew Parrott - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2215-2237.
    Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or intentions, we presume she is right. According to standard views, this deferential trust is justified on the basis of certain epistemic properties of her assertion. In this paper, I offer a non-epistemic account of deference. I first motivate the account by noting two asymmetries between the kind of deference we show psychological self-ascriptions and the kind we grant to epistemic experts more generally. I then propose a novel agency-based account (...)
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  45. added 2014-11-11
    Deliberation and the First Person.David Owens - 2008 - In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief.
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  46. added 2014-06-10
    Rules of Language and First Person Authority.Martin F. Fricke - 2012 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):15-32.
    This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests that they might (...)
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  47. added 2014-05-20
    ‘‘In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15).
    It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I (...)
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  48. added 2014-04-01
    Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):91-116.
  49. added 2014-03-30
    Mental Action and Self-Awareness : Epistemology.Christopher Peacocke - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
    We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
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  50. added 2014-03-27
    Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2011 - Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
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1 — 50 / 115