This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

231 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 231
  1. The Biology of the Interest in Money.Joseph Agassi - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):176-176.
    Why are people interested in money? This question is too broad: there are many kinds of money, interest, and people. The biological approach of Lea & Webley (L&W) makes them seek the roots of this interest, and they contend that tool making and addiction qualify as the roots. Curiosity and the quest for power, however, qualify too. As L&W rightly admit, other approaches supplement their biological one. (Published Online April 5 2006).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. The Notion of the Modern Nation-State: Popper and Nationalism.Joseph Agassi - 1999 - In I. C. Jarvie & Sandra Pralong (eds.), Popper's Open Society After Fifty Years: The Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper. Routledge.
  3. The Subjective Approach to Ambiguity: A Critical Assessment.Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. M. Augier and J. G. March : Models of a Man: Essays in Memory of Herbert Simon. [REVIEW]Patrick Allo - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):221-224.
    Herbert Simon was definitely 20th century’s most influential proponent of bounded rationality. His work was of a highly philosophical nature, but—as made clear time and again in this book—his ideas did not originate in philosophy at all. If the present collection of essays has any value to the philosophically oriented reader, it lies in the way it shows how a traditionally philosophical topic as human rationality and action cannot be claimed by philosophy alone. Even more, it shows that important contributions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Why Exactly is Commitment Important for Rationality?S. E. N. Amartya - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):5-14.
    Gary Becker and others have done important work to broaden the content of self interest, but have not departed from seeing rationality in terms of the exclusive pursuit of self-interest. One reason why committed behavior is important is that a person can have good reason to pursue objectives other than self interest maximization (no matter how broadly it is construed). Indeed, one can also follow rules of behavior that go beyond the pursuit of one's own goals, even if the goals (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Bayes's Theorem (Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 113), Edited by Richard Swinburne, Oxford University Press, 2002, 160 Pages. [REVIEW]Paul Anand - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):139-142.
  7. Rationality and Methodology: Symposium.Paul Anand & Jochen Runde - 1997 - Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (1).
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms.Elizabeth Anderson - 2000 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2):170-200.
  9. Explanations of an Empirical Puzzle: What Can Be Learnt From a Test of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis?Heather M. Anderson - 1999 - Journal of Economic Methodology 6 (1):31-59.
    This paper illustrates the interplay between theory development and data analysis by considering the ability of the rational expectations hypothesis to explain the empirical cointegration structure found in the term structure. It finds that although a standard no-arbitrage theory that incorporates rational expectations can explain some of the properties of Treasury Bill yields, this theoretical explanation is incomplete. A broader-based explanation that accounts for government debt and time-varying risk premia can improve predictions of yield movements, relative to those predictions based (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Levi's Account of Preference Reversals.Erik Angner - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):287-302.
    This paper argues that Isaac Levi's account of preference reversals is only a limited success. Levi succeeds in showing that an agent acting in accord with his theory may exhibit reversals. Nevertheless, the specific account that Levi presents in order to accommodate the behavior of experimental subjects appears to be disconfirmed by available evidence.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality, Koons Robert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, Xii + 174 Pages. [REVIEW]Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (2):305.
  12. Economics is a Serious and Difficult Subject.Roger E. Backhouse - 2012 - Journal of Economic Methodology 19 (3):231-241.
    This paper argues that by focusing on simple problems that can be resolved by the use of simple economic logic, usually involving the assumption that agents are rational, the economics-as-fun literature inevitably distracts from more difficult problems that are harder to solve and which may need to be tackled in different ways and may create a bias towards solutions that rely on the market.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. The Fixation of Economic Beliefs.Roger E. Backhouse - 1994 - Journal of Economic Methodology 1 (1):33-42.
  14. New Economics of Science, Economics of Scientific Knowledge and Sociology of Science: The Case of Paul David.Matthieu Ballandonne - 2012 - Journal of Economic Methodology 19 (4):391-406.
    For a little more than twenty years, the terminology used in the economics of science has changed significantly with the development of expressions such as ?new economics of science? (NES) and ?economics of scientific knowledge? (ESK). This article seeks to shed light on the use of these different terminologies by studying the work of the economist of science Paul David. We aim to use his work as a case study in order to argue for a difference between NES and ESK (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. The Naked Emperor: Seeking a More Plausible Genetic Basis for Psychological Altruism.C. Daniel Batson - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (2):149-164.
    The adequacy of currently popular accounts of the genetic basis for psychological altruism, including inclusive fitness (kin selection), reciprocal altruism, sociality, and group selection, is questioned. Problems exist both with the evidence cited as supporting these accounts and with the relevance of the accounts to what is being explained. Based on the empathy-altruism hypothesis, a more plausible account is proposed: generalized parental nurturance. It is suggested that four evolutionary developments combined to provide a genetic basis for psychological altruism. First is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Towards Bounded Rationality Within Rational Expectations: Some Comments From an Economic Point of View.Lutz Beinsen & Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:141-152.
    Rationality has been a principle widely assumed in economics from early on. In contrast, rationality in the formation of economic expectations is rather new. Since the term “rational expectations” has meanwhile become a kind of slogan for diverse issues in economics as in related fields, there is some danger of authors’ not always being aware of the true meaning of this technical term. Sometimes it is used, in a context where expectation formation about uncertain events is essential, as if rational (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Economics and Hermeneutics.Lawrence A. Berger - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (2):209.
    In a recent article in this journal, D. Wade Hands reviewed Charles Taylor's two-volume work, Philosophical Papers. Hands predicts that Taylor's work will have no impact on the philosophy of economics. This may indeed turn out to be the case; but if so, it will only be because the profession is not listening. Of course, it is typical of the profession to be more interested in exporting its product than in learning from other disciplines. This is exemplified in Hands's use (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Rational Decisions , Ken Binmore. Princeton University Press, 2009, X + 200 Pages. [REVIEW]José Luis Bermúdez - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):95-101.
  19. Choice, Internal Consistency and Rationality.Aditi Bhattacharyya, Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):123-149.
    The classical theory of rational choice is built on several important internal consistency conditions. In recent years, the reasonableness of those internal consistency conditions has been questioned and criticized, and several responses to accommodate such criticisms have been proposed in the literature. This paper develops a general framework to accommodate the issues raised by the criticisms of classical rational choice theory, and examines the broad impact of these criticisms from both normative and positive points of view.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  20. Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior.C. Bicchieri - 2010 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
    This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21. Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not.C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao & R. Muldoon - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  22. Rationality and Predictability in Economics.Cristina Bicchieri - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):501-513.
  23. Rationality and Backward Induction.Ken Binmore - 1997 - Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (1):23-41.
    This paper uses the Centipede Game to criticize formal arguments that have recently been offered for and against backward induction as a rationality principle. It is argued that the crucial issues concerning the interpretation of counterfactuals depend on contextual questions that are abstracted away in current formalisms. I have a text, it always is the same, And always has been, Since I learnt the game. Chaucer, The Pardoner's Tale.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  24. Modeling Rational Players: Part II.Ken Binmore - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (1):9.
    This is the second part of a two-part paper. It can be read independently of the first part provided that the reader is prepared to go along with the unorthodox views on game theory which were advanced in Part I and are summarized below. The body of the paper is an attempt to study some of the positive implications of such a viewpoint. This requires an exploration of what is involved in modeling “rational players” as computing machines.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  25. Modeling Rational Players: Part I.Ken Binmore - 1987 - Economics and Philosophy 3 (2):179.
    Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  26. The Ramifications of John Searle's Social Philosophy in Economics.Stephan Boehm - 2002 - Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (1):1-10.
    John Searle is well known for his contributions to the philosophy of language and to the philosophy of mind. In recent years he has extended his investigation to focus on the nature of social reality. In particular, he is intrigued by the creation of institutional facts, such as money, marriages and football matches. He postulates three primitive notions - 'collective intentionality', 'the assignment of function' and 'constitutive rules' - that are needed for the construction of institutional reality. The papers and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Rationality and Coordination, Bicchieri Cristina. Cambridge University Press, 1994, Xiii + 270 Pages. [REVIEW]Giacomo Bonanno - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):359.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information.Giacomo Bonanno - 1991 - Economics and Philosophy 7 (1):37-65.
    For the past 20 years or so the literature on noncooperative games has been centered on the search for an equilibrium concept that expresses the notion of rational behavior in interactive situations. A basic tenet in this literature is that if a “rational solution” exists, it must be a Nash equilibrium. The consensus view, however, is that not all Nash equilibria can be accepted as rational solutions. Consider, for example, the game of Figure 1.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  29. Introduction to the Special Issue of Economics and Philosophy on Ambiguity Aversion.Giacomo Bonanno, Martin van Hees, Christian List & Bertil Tungodden - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):247-248.
    The paradigm for modelling decision-making under uncertainty has undoubtedly been the theory of Expected Utility, which was first developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and later extended by Savage (1954) to the case of subjective uncertainty. The inadequacy of the theory of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) as a descriptive theory was soon pointed out in experiments, most famously by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). The observed departures from SEU noticed by Allais and Ellsberg became known as “paradoxes”. The Ellsberg (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. External Norms and Rationality of Choice.Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):139-152.
    Ever since Sen criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms. We introduce a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and show that external norms can be made compatible with the methods underlying the traditional rationalizability approach. To do so, we characterize norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitable modifications of revealed preference axioms that are well established in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31. Evaluating Life or Death Prospects.Luc Bovens & Marc Fleurbaey - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):217-249.
    We consider a special set of risky prospects in which the outcomes are either life or death. There are various alternatives to the utilitarian objective of minimizing the expected loss of lives in such prospects. We start off with the two-person case with independent risks and construct taxonomies of ex ante and ex post evaluations for such prospects. We examine the relationship between the ex ante and the ex post in this restrictive framework: There are more possibilities to respect ex (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy.Thomas A. Boylan & Ruvin Gekker (eds.) - 2009 - Routledge.
    Following Amartya Sen’s insistence to expand the framework of rational choice theory by taking into account ‘non-utility information,’ economists, political scientists and philosophers have recently concentrated their efforts in analysing the issues related to rights, freedom, diversity intentions and equality. Thomas Boylan and Ruvin Gekker have gathered essays that reflect this trend. The particular themes addressed in this volume include: the measurement of diversity and freedom, formal analysis of individual rights and intentions, judgment aggregation under constraints and strategic manipulation in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Politics, Economics and Rationality.E. A. Brett - 1969 - Social Science Information 8 (2):49-67.
  34. Introduction.Claire Brossaud & Bernard Reber - 2010 - In Bernard Reber & Claire Brossaud (eds.), Archives de Philosophie du Droit. Wiley. pp. 274-285.
  35. What Does Economics Assume About People's Knowledge?António Caleiro - unknown
    The purpose of the paper is to explore, from an assessment viewpoint, the following ideas. Economics, as a social science, has always considered sets of individuals with assumed characteristics (namely, the level of knowledge), although in an implicit way, in most of the cases. In this sense, an influential approach in economics assumed that society, as a global set of individuals, was characterized by a certain level of knowledge, that, indeed, could be associated with one of its representative agents. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. The Potential of Neuroeconomics.Colin F. Camerer - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):369-379.
    The goal of neuroeconomics is a mathematical theory of how the brain implements decisions, that is tied to behaviour. This theory is likely to show some decisions for which rational-choice theory is a good approximation (particularly for evolutionarily sculpted or highly learned choices), to provide a deeper level of distinction among competing behavioural alternatives, and to provide empirical inspiration for economics to incorporate more nuanced ideas about endogeneity of preferences, individual difference, emotions, endogeneous regulation of states, and so forth. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  37. Human Nature and the Limits of Science, John Dupré. Clarendon Press, 2001, 211 Pages. [REVIEW]Peter Carruthers - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):351-385.
  38. Homo Œconomicus: Paradigma, Critiche, Revisioni: Saggio Sui (Discutibili) Presupposti Antropologici Della Razionalità Utilitaria E Sulle Implicazioni Ideologiche Della Loro Entificazione.Sergio Caruso - 2012 - Firenze University Press.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Hayek in the Lab. Austrian School, Game Theory, and Experimental Economics.Gustavo Cevolani - 2011 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 9 (1):429-436.
    Focusing on the work of Friedrich von Hayek and Vernon Smith, we discuss some conceptual links between Austrian economics and recent work in behavioral game theory and experimental economics. After a brief survey of the main methodological aspects of Austrian and experimental economics, we suggest that common views on subjectivism, individualism, and the role of qualitative explanations and predictions in social science may favour a fruitful interaction between these two research programs.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. The Morality of Economic Behaviour.Vangelis Chiotis - 2015 - Journal of Global Ethics 11 (2):188-204.
    One approach to moral economy wishes to show that it is rational to be moral. As rational morality has received little attention from economics, as opposed to political philosophy, this article examines it in an economics framework. Rational morality refers primarily to individual behaviour so that one may also speak of it as moral microeconomics. When a group of agents are disposed to constrain their maximisation, that behaviour may be considered rational. However, this relies on ‘moralised’ assumptions about individual behaviour. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Methodological Individualism, Cognitive Homogeneity and Environmental Determinism.André Clark - 2003 - Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (1):79-85.
    A study encompassing a number of UK Universities identified a widespread implicit environmental determinism employed in the teaching of Economics to business studies undergraduates. In this paper the author argues that this bias is an inevitable by-product of the methodological individualism adopted within mainstream economics. The author concludes that methodological individualism is, therefore, flawed both as a mechanism for accessing the reality of the business world and the power of firms within it, and for teaching others about that reality, particularly (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Belief Revision in Games of Perfect Information.Thorsten Clausing - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):89-115.
    A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43. Introduction: Capabilities and Identity.Flavio Comim & Miriam Teschl - 2006 - Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (3):293-298.
  44. Risk and Business Cycles: Reply to Rosser.Tyler Cowen - 2000 - Critical Review 14 (1):89-94.
    Abstract Rosser's thoughtful and careful review of my book on business cycles reflects a different methodological stance than my own. I believe that economic theory and macroeconomics cannot escape using the concept of risk, even though, as Rosser points out, risk is not a simple unidimensional magnitude in many circumstances. I view the rational expectations assumption as a useful way of presenting a theory, rather than as a descriptive account of real?world expectations.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  45. 'Practical Comparability' and Ends in Economics.Ricardo F. Crespo - 2007 - Journal of Economic Methodology 14 (3):371-393.
    This paper endeavours to summarize a variety of arguments for a reconsideration of ends in Economics. The logical structure of the rationality of ends (practical rationality) differs from the one of means (instrumental rationality). The paper sets out to explain the differences between both rationalities and some of the implications of incorporating this new emphasis on ends, given that Economics adopts the means rationality. The emergence of the topics of incommensurability and incomparability of ends is presented and a possible way (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Capability and Agency.David Crocker & Ingrid Robeyns - 2009 - In Christopher W. Morris (ed.), Amartya Sen. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47. Experiments and the Domain of Economic Theory.Robin Cubitt - 2005 - Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (2):197-210.
    This paper distinguishes the base domain of an economic theory (in which predictions are relatively unambiguous) from, respectively, the domains of intended application and of legitimate testing; it argues that the domain of legitimate testing is not generally restricted to that of intended application; and discusses the obligations on researchers imposed by a position that presumes experimental environments in the base domain of a theory to provide legitimate test, unless there is compelling reason to expect behaviour in the domain of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  48. On the Possibility of Rational Dilemmas: An Axiomatic Approach.Robin P. Cubitt - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):1.
    In this paper, I address two connected issues that arise when one considers a rational agent facing a decision problem. One is whether or not the agent may find that the dictates of rationality are such that they cannot all be followed. For example, one may ask whether or not the requirements on the agent's actions imposed by rationality can conflict in an irreconcilable way, making it impossible to satisfy all of them. Put differently, one may ask whether or not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Discovered Preferences and the Experimental Evidence of Violations of Expected Utility Theory.Robin P. Cubitt, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden - 2001 - Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (3):385-414.
    The discovered preference hypothesis appears to insulate expected utility theory (EU) from disconfirming experimental evidence. It asserts that individuals have coherent underlying preferences, which experiments may not reveal unless subjects have adequate opportunities and incentives to discover which actions best satisfy their preferences. We identify the confounding effects to be expected in experiments, were that hypothesis true, and consider how they might be controlled for. We argue for a design in which each subject faces just one distinct choice task for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  50. Identity Economics by Akerlof and Kranton [Review].John Davis - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy.
1 — 50 / 231