Reasoning

If the problem of induction were soluble, it should be solved inductively: by observing how scientists observe, etc. The fact is that scientific research is successful, and the real question is, will it be so in future? If there is a formula of induction by which success is achieved, then by this formula we can say, as long as it will be used science will succeed. If there is no formula it looks as if future success in scientific research is (...) most doubtful. Hence, a transcendental argument for induction goes, there is an inductive formula. Since, however, such a view of induction is rejected even by inductivists as naive, the argument collapses. Hence the question is, on what basis do we project the future success of science? My answer is that this future success is built into our social institutions and is partially institutionally safeguarded. (shrink)

We present a framework for verifying systems composed of heterogeneous reasoning agents, in which each agent may have differing knowledge and inferential capabilities, and where the resources each agent is prepared to commit to a goal (time, memory and communication bandwidth) are bounded. The framework allows us to investigate, for example, whether a goal can be achieved if a particular agent, perhaps possessing key information or inferential capabilities, is unable (or unwilling) to contribute more than a given portion of its (...) available computational resources or bandwidth to the problem. We present a novel temporal epistemic logic, BMCL-CTL , which allows us to describe a set of reasoning agents with bounds on time, memory and the number of messages they can exchange. The bounds on memory and communication are expressed as axioms in the logic. As an example, we show how to axiomatise a system of agents which reason using resolution and prove that the resulting logic is sound and complete. We then show how to encode a simple system of reasoning agents specified in BMCL-CTL in the description language of the Mocha model checker (Alur et al., Proceedings of the tenth international conference on computer-aided verification (CAV) , 1998), and verify that the agents can achieve a goal only if they are prepared to commit certain time, memory and communication resources. (shrink)

The motivation behind the collection of papers presented in this THEORIA forum on Abductive reasoning is my book Abductive Reasoning: Logical Investigations into the Processes of Discovery and Explanation. These contributions raise fundamental questions. One of them concerns the conjectural character of abduction. The choice of a logical framework for abduction is also discussed in detail, both its inferential aspect and search strategies. Abduction is also analyzed as inference to the best explanation, as well as a process of epistemic change, (...) both of which chal-lenge the argument-like format of abduction. Finally, the psychological question of whether humans reason abduc-tively according to the models proposed is also addressed. I offer a brief summary of my book and then comment on and respond to several challenges that were posed to my work by the contributors to this issue. (shrink)

Assuming for the sake of discussion that there is an external world, The "core" thesis of scientific realism is that some of our empirical beliefs (including the so-Called theoretical beliefs) succeed in correctly describing, In some important measure, The external world. Classical scientific realism also asserts that we are able to say justifiably just "which" of our beliefs so succeed in correctly describing the external world. This paper does not examine this last claim. Rather it seeks to defend the core (...) thesis of scientific realism and will assume (for reasons of limited space) the existence of an external world. In defending the core thesis, This paper returns to and defends the explanationist defense which asserts that the core thesis offers the best available explanation for the long-Term predictive success of "some" empirical or scientific hypotheses. The defense consists in examining and rejecting all available alternative explanations as well as all objections to the explanationist defense as offered in this paper. (shrink)

A fundamental question in reasoning about change is, what information does a reasoning agent infer about later times from earlier times? I will argue that reasoning about change by an agent is to be modeled in terms of the persistence of the agent''s beliefs over time rather than the persistence of truth and that such persistence is explained by pragmatic factors about how agents acquire information from other agents rather than by general principles of persistence about states of the world. (...) AI accounts of persistence have focused on closed world examples of change, in which the agent believes that the truth of a proposition is unaltered so long as he or she has no evidence that it has been changed. AI principles of persistence seem plausible in a closed world where one assumes the agent knows everything that is happening. If one drops the assumption of omniscience, however, the analysis of persistence is implausible. To get a good account of persistence and reasoning about change, I argue we should examine open world examples of change, in which the agent is ignorant of some of the changes occurring in the world. In open world examples of change, persistence must be formulated, I argue, as a pragmatic principle about the persistence of beliefs. After elaborating my criticisms of current accounts of persistence, I examine how such pragmatic principles fare with the notorious examples of reasoning about action that have collectively characterized the so-called frame problem. (shrink)

This paper contains an analysis of conditional reasoning. The author uses, with such a purpose, a famous and controversial exercise: Peter Wason's four cards selection task. The interest of this task is that adult experimental characters with normal intellectual capacities are habitually unable to execute this simple logical problem correctly. There are several theories that have arisen since 1966, the year in which Wason presented his original version of the task, until today, with the desire of explaining the anomalous results (...) that are almost all times observed when the task is presented to a group of subjects. The author examines and analyzes most of these theoretical approaches and infers, starting from such an intellectual trip and from experiments devised by him, that some of those positions are not necessarily incompatible, since, among them, compatibilities can be established. However, the fundamental discovery of this work is the influence that, in logical and rational activities, educational, emotional, social,... experiences can exert. In this way, the author introduces the expression "mental context" with the intention of synthesizing such factors that, coming from each subject's characteristic casuistry, are involved in human reasoning. It is tried to be demonstrated, in the same way, that participants in the experiments often build mental representations very far from the literal expressions of the exercises and that, for this reason, when the created scenario in the task allows it, they can transform, even without being aware of it, problems of reasoning-about in activities of reasoning from . This means, in other words, that an individual that executes an exercise with the opportune characteristics can come, sometimes unconsciously, to operate mentally as if he had to locate the hypothetical transgressor of a supposed social law, when, in fact, what he is being requested is to check the veracity or the falsehood of a sentence. (shrink)

According to decision theory, the rational initial action in a sequential decision-problem may be found by backward induction or folding back. But the reasoning which underwrites this claim appeals to the agent's beliefs about what she will later believe, about what she will later believe she will still later believe, and so forth. There are limits to the depth of people's beliefs. Do these limits pose a threat to the standard theory of rational sequential choice? It is argued, first, that (...) the traditional solutions of certain games depend on knowledge which exceeds depth limits, and that these solutions therefore cannot be shown rational in the usual sense. Then, for that related reason even folding back solutions of one-person problems cannot be! A revision of our notion of rational choice is proposed, analogous to the reliabilist account of knowledge of Goldman and others, by which this paradox is resolved. (shrink)

Inductive reasoning is fundamental to human cognition, yet it remains unclear how we develop this ability and what might influence our inductive choices. We created novel categories in which crucial factors such as domain and category structure were manipulated orthogonally. We trained 403 4–9-year-old children to categorise well-matched natural kind and artefact stimuli with either featural or relational category structure, followed by induction tasks. This wide age range allowed for the first full exploration of the developmental trajectory of inductive reasoning (...) in both domains. We found a gradual transition from perceptual to categorical induction with age. This pattern was stable across domains, but interestingly, children showed a category bias one year later for relational categories. We hypothesise that the ability to use category information in inductive reasoning develops gradually, but is delayed when children need to process and apply more complex category structures. (shrink)

The second edition of this popular compendium provides the necessary intellectual equipment to engage with and participate in effective philosophical argument, reading, and reflection Features significantly revised, updated and expanded entries, and an entirely new section drawn from methods in the history of philosophy This edition has a broad, pluralistic approach--appealing to readers in both continental philosophy and the history of philosophy, as well as analytic philosophy Explains difficult concepts in an easily accessible manner, and addresses the use and application (...) of these concepts Proven useful to philosophy students at both beginning and advanced levels. (shrink)

An experiment is reported examining dual-process models of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning using a problem complexity manipulation and an inspection-time method to monitor processing latencies for premises and conclusions. Endorsement rates indicated increased belief bias on complex problems, a finding that runs counter to the “belief-first” selective scrutiny model, but which is consistent with other theories, including “reasoning-first” and “parallel-process” models. Inspection-time data revealed a number of effects that, again, arbitrated against the selective scrutiny model. The most striking inspection-time (...) result was an interaction between logic and belief on premise-processing times, whereby belief - logic conflict problems promoted increased latencies relative to non-conflict problems. This finding challenges belief-first and reasoning-first models, but is directly predicted by parallel-process models, which assume that the outputs of simultaneous heuristic and analytic processing streams lead to an awareness of belief - logic conflicts than then require time-consuming resolution. (shrink)

Reasoning about mental states and processes is important in varioussubareas of the legal domain. A trial lawyer might need to reason andthe beliefs, reasoning and other mental states and processes of membersof a jury; a police officer might need to reason about the conjecturedbeliefs and reasoning of perpetrators; a judge may need to consider adefendant's mental states and processes for the purposes of sentencing;and so on. Further, the mental states in question may themselves beabout the mental states and processes of (...) other people. Therefore, if AIsystems are to assist with reasoning tasks in law, they may need to beable to reason about mental states and processes. Such reasoning isriddled with uncertainty, and this is true in particular in the legaldomain. The article discusses how various different types ofuncertainty arise, and shows how they greatly complicate the task ofreasoning about mental states and processes. The article concentrates onthe special case of states of belief and processes of reasoning, andsketches an implemented, prototype computer program (ATT-Meta) thatcopes with the various types of uncertainty in reasoning about beliefsand reasoning. In particular, the article outlines the system'sfacilities for handling conflict between different lines of argument,especially when these lie within the reasoning of different people. Thesystem's approach is illustrated by application to a real-life muggingexample. (shrink)

The unique collaborative effort of a professor of English and a professor of philosophy, Current Issues and Enduring Questions is a balanced and flexible book that provides the benefits of the authors’ dual expertise in effective persuasive writing and rigorous critical thinking. Refined through eight widely adopted editions, it has been revised to address current student interests and trends in argument, research, and writing. Its comprehensive coverage of classic and contemporary approaches to argument includes Aristotle, Toulmin, and a range of (...) alternative views, making it an extraordinarily versatile text. Readings on contemporary controversies (including environmental stewardship, student-teacher relationships, cyber bullying, and the limits of reproductive rights) and classical philosophical questions (such as How free is the will of the individual?) are sure to spark student interest and lively discussion and writing. No other text and reader offers such an extensive resource for teaching argument. (shrink)

Analogical arguments -- Philosophical theories -- Computational theories -- The articulation model -- Analogies in mathematics -- Similarity and patterns of generalization -- Analogy and epistemic values -- Analogy and symmetry -- A wider role for analogies.

By Parallel Reasoning is the first comprehensive philosophical examination of analogical reasoning in more than forty years designed to formulate and justify standards for the critical evaluation of analogical arguments. It proposes a normative theory with special focus on the use of analogies in mathematics and science. In recent decades, research on analogy has been dominated by computational theories whose objective has been to model analogical reasoning as a psychological process. These theories have devoted little attention to normative questions. In (...) this book Bartha proposes that a good analogical argument must articulate a clear relationship that is capable of generalization. This idea leads to a set of distinct models for the critical analysis of prominent forms of analogical argument. The same core principle makes it possible to relate analogical reasoning to norms and values of scientific practice. Reasoning by analogy is justified because it strikes an optimal balance between conservative values, such as simplicity and coherence, and progressive values, such as fruitfulness and theoretical unification. Analogical arguments are also justified by appeal to symmetry--like cases are to be treated alike. In elaborating the connection between analogy and these broad epistemic principles, By Parallel Reasoning offers a novel contribution to explaining how analogies can play an important role in the confirmation of scientific hypotheses. (shrink)

Practical conflicts pervade human life. Agents have many different desires, goals, and commitments, all of which can come into conflict with each other. How can practical reasoning help to resolve these practical conflicts? In this collection of essays a distinguished roster of philosophers analyse the diverse forms of practical conflict. Their aim is to establish an understanding of the sources of these conflicts, to investigate the challenge they pose to an adequate conception of practical reasoning, and to assess the degree (...) to which that challenge can be met. These essays will serve as a major resource for students of philosophy but will also interest students and professionals in related fields of the social sciences such as psychology, political science, sociology and economics. (shrink)

In order to resolve the controversial discussion regarding content effects in deductive reasoning, we propose distinguishing between two inferential sources—an argument's form , and additional relations people associate with the argument's content —and analysing their interplay. Both sources are equally necessary in order to understand the role content plays in deductive reasoning. People make valid deductions from the content relations ( content competence ), but in thematic reasoning tasks, these deductions lead to the intriguing phenomenon known as content effects . (...) Focusing on the interplay of both sources of inferences, the dual source distinction enables a novel class of predictions to be made, namely the correct mastery of the logical connectors ( form competence ) in tasks that require the individual to think about an argument's form in relation to its content. To illustrate the dual source approach and its implications, the selection task paradigm of conditional reasoning with a point of view is used in combination with two content domains: conditional promises with cheating and non-cheating perspectives and technical systems with causal perspectives. Experimental findings corroborate all three phenomena: content competence, content effects, and form competence. The dual source distinction is discussed with regard to current theories of reasoning. (shrink)

Introduction: the Study of Argumentation Although our overall organization of the readings suggests one way of dividing our selected literature, ...

There has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This volume brings together the work of some of the pre-eminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and epistemology in the formal models of (...) knowledge, belief, deliberation and learning, and in the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded rationality and computational complexity. (shrink)

Two theories of propositional deductive reasoning are considered: the mental models of P. N. Johnson-Laird et al and the mental logic of M. D. Braine. The model theory is said to account for practically all of the known phenomena of deductive propositional reasoning, offer a general theory of conditionals, account for the most important aspects of Braine's theory, and predict new phenomena that rule theories cannot explain. It is argued that the model theory is flawed in a way that is (...) difficult to overcome, conditionals are seriously misrepresented, the algorithms proposed to implement it either allow invalid inferences or are psychologically useless, Braine's theory accounts for all of the new phenomena worth considering, and the model theory can predict Braine's results only at the cost of self-refutation. It is concluded that the mental model theory of propositional reasoning offers no reason to reject the program of mental logic. (shrink)

In Part I, I argue that deductive reasoning is a crucial area of interest both for the new cognitive psychology and for a series of philosophical problems. I lay down criteria for judging descriptive adequacy and psychological reality for a theory of reasoning. ;In Part II, I consider the mental logic hypothesis and the mental model hypothesis. I critically discuss their history, their structures, and the evidence for them. Contrarily to the general opinion, I conclude that the mental model hypothesis (...) is deeply flawed and does not solve the philosophical problems it supposedly solves. In part III I argue that at least for propositional reasoning the mental logic hypothesis can be considered psychologically real. I discuss the consequences of this conclusion for the language of thought hypothesis, for the syntactic theory of mind, and for the problem of rationality. (shrink)

The problem of cortical integration is described and various proposed solutions, including grandmother cells, cell assemblies, feed-forward structures, RAAM and synchronization, are reviewed. One method, involving complex attractors, that has received little attention in the literature, is explained and developed. I call this binding through annexation. A simulation study is then presented which suggests ways in which complex attractors could underlie our capacity to reason. The paper ends with a discussion of the efficiency and biological plausibility of the proposals as (...) integration mechanisms for different regions and functions of the brain. (shrink)

There is no philosophically interesting distinction to be made between inference-rules and premises. That there is such a distinction is often held to follow from the possibility of infinite regress illustrated by Carroll's story of Achilles and the tortoise. I will argue that this is wrong on three separate grounds. Consequently, Carroll's fable provides no motivation to abandon the traditional logical separation of arguments into their premises and conclusions. There is no proposition that must be taken to be a rule (...) and must not be taken as a premise. (shrink)