About this topic
Summary Reasoning is the reasoned change of belief (and related mental states). Reasoning differs, for example, from daydreaming and from spontaneous changes of belief. A central issue in the study of reasoning is to characterize reasoning: Just what is it to reason as opposed to change one's beliefs in some other way? A second issue in the study of reasoning is normative. Some reasoning counts as good reasoning. Other counts as bad reasoning. Which forms of reasoning are good -- that is, are rational, or preserve justification or knowledge? What makes it the case that those kinds of reasoning are good? Reasoning is typically divided into two kinds -- deductive and inductive (or ampliative). In a good deductive inference, the premises of the reasoning logically entail the conclusion. In a good inductive inference, the premises of the reasoning do not entail the conclusion though they do support it. Part of the philosophical study of reasoning involves the study of these kinds of reasoning (and various further sub-kinds).
Key works Reasoning is a highly heterogenous topic. It is recommended that the key works of the sub-categories be consulted.
Related categories
Subcategories:See also:History/traditions: Reasoning

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  1. Tener fe en la razón. Una reflexión de Benedicto XVI.Francisco Fernández Labastida - 2016 - Pamplona (Spain): EUNSA.
    Centrando la mirada en Cristo, las enseñanzas de Benedicto XVI desarrollan la íntima conexión que existe entre las tres virtudes teologales y la Verdad Encarnada, el Hijo de Dios hecho hombre. En efecto, no nos es posible creer en Jesucristo, amarlo y esperar en Él, si no conocemos su verdadero rostro, que se revela al intelecto humano iluminado por la fe. Este hecho pone en evidencia que el hombre necesita su natural capacidad de conocer la verdad para poder descubrir el (...)
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  2. Savage’s Response to Allais as Broomean Reasoning.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - 2020 - Journal of Economic Methodology 28 (2).
    Savage famously contravened his own theory when first confronting the Allais Paradox, but then convinced himself that he had made an error. We examine the formal structure of Savage’s ‘error-correcting’ reasoning in the light of (i) behavioural economists’ claims to identify the latent preferences of individuals who violate conventional rationality requirements and (ii) Broome’s critique of arguments which presuppose that rationality requirements can be achieved through reasoning. We argue that Savage’s reasoning is not vulnerable to Broome’s critique, but does not (...)
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  3. Dual-Process Reflective Equilibrium: Rethinking the Interplay Between Intuition and Reflection in Moral Reasoning.Dario Cecchini - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-17.
    Dual-process theories of the mind emphasize how reasoning is an interplay between intuitive and reflective thinking. This paper aims to understand how the two types of processing interact in the moral domain. According to a ‘default-interventionist’ model of moral reasoning intuition and reflection are conflicting cognitions: intuitive thinking would elicit heuristic and deontological responses, whereas reflection would favour utilitarian judgements. However, the evidence for the default interventionist view is inconclusive and challenged by a growing amount of counterevidence in recent years. (...)
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  4. Inference From Absence: The Case of Archaeology.Efraim Wallach - 2019 - Palgrave Communications 5 (94):1-10.
    Inferences from the absence of evidence to something are common in ordinary speech, but when used in scientific argumentations are usually considered deficient or outright false. Yet, as demonstrated here with the help of various examples, archaeologists frequently use inferences and reasoning from absence, often allowing it a status on par with inferences from tangible evidence. This discrepancy has not been examined so far. The article analyses it drawing on philosophical discussions concerning the validity of inference from absence, using probabilistic (...)
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  5. Presupposing, Believing, Having Faith.Carlos Miguel Gómez Rincón - 2021 - Sophia 60 (1):103-121.
    This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...)
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  6. The Guise of Good Reason.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-21.
    The paper argues for a version of the Guise of the Good thesis, namely the claim that if someone acts as the result of practical reasoning, then she takes her premises to jointly provide a sufficient and undefeated reason for her action. I argue for this by showing, first, that it is an application of Boghossian's Taking Condition on inference to practical reasoning and, second, that the motivations for the Taking Condition for theoretical reasoning carry over to practical reasoning. I (...)
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  7. Conflicting Judgments and Weakness of Will.Nora Heinzelmann - 2020 - Philosophia 1 (1):255-269.
    This paper shows that our popular account of weakness of will is inconsistent with dilemmas. In dilemmas, agents judge that they ought to do one thing, that they ought to do something else, and that they cannot do both. They must act against either of their two judgments. But such action is commonly understood as weakness of will. An agent is weak-willed in doing something if she judges that she ought to and could do something else instead. Thus, it seems (...)
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  8. Epistemic Closure and Epistemological Optimism.Claudio de Almeida - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):113-131.
    Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However, none of the familiar pro-closure moves works against the counterexamples on display here. It is argued that these counterexamples pose the following dilemma: either accept that epistemic closure principles are false, and steal the thunder from those who attack classical logic on the basis of similarly problematic cases—specifically, relevance logicians and (...)
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  9. Magical Thinking: The Intersection of Quantum Entanglement and Self-Referential Recursion.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.
    The superposition of magical thinking, quantum entanglement, and self-referential recursion explains the relationship between human and machine intelligence (universal intelligence).
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  10. A Neglected Chapter in the History of Philosophy of Mathematical Thought Experiments: Edmond Goblot and His Interpretation by Jean Piaget.Marco Buzzoni - forthcoming - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science.
  11. Poznawczy status eksperymentów myślowych. Platonizm, empiryzm, modele mentalne i analogia.Przemysław Zawadzki - 2017 - Filozofia Nauki 98 (2):121-135.
    The paper begins with a characterization of thought experiments, followed by a general outline of contemporary debates in the field. The discussion reveals that the most significant controversyinvolved is the dispute over the epistemic status of thought experiments between empiricists, Platonists, and the proponents of mental models. After a critical analysis of these approaches, a new theoretical framework proposed by Paul Bartha is introduced. It is suggested that Bartha’s approach, which appeals to a theory of analogy, offers new insights into (...)
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  12. Confirmation Bias Without Rhyme or Reason.Matthias Michel & Megan A. K. Peters - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that there is evidence that confirmation bias (...)
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  13. Nathan Ballantyne, Knowing Our Limits[REVIEW]Gary Bartlett - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
  14. Enigmas of Reason.B. Voorhees - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):228-251.
    What is human reason, how did it arise, how is it connected to animal reason? In The Enigma of Reason (ER) Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber (2017) suggest that reason evolved driven by the need to support communication and coordination in small human groups. They contrast this to the idea that the function of reason is to enable humans to make better decisions and develop more accurate beliefs. After a summation of the ER argument, the theory is critiqued and two (...)
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  15. Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation.Lee Elkin - forthcoming - Ergo.
    It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This paper compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able to satisfy the (...)
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  16. Illustrations of the Logic of Science.Charles Sanders Peirce & Cornelis de Waal (eds.) - 2014 - Chicago, Illinois: Open Court.
    Charles Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science is an early work in the philosophy of science and the official birthplace of pragmatism. It contains Peirce’s two most influential papers: “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” as well as discussions on the theory of probability, the ground of induction, the relation between science and religion, and the logic of abduction. Unsatisfied with the result and driven by a constant, almost feverish urge to improve his work, (...)
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  17. Reasoning with Heuristics.Brett Karlan - forthcoming - Ratio.
    Which rules should guide our reasoning? Human reasoners often use reasoning shortcuts, called heuristics, which function well in some contexts but lack the universality of reasoning rules like deductive implication or inference to the best explanation. Does it follow that human reasoning is hopelessly irrational? I argue: no. Heuristic reasoning often represents human reasoners reaching a local rational maximum, reasoning more accurately than if they try to implement more “ideal” rules of reasoning. I argue this is a genuine rational achievement. (...)
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  18. Four Approaches to Supposition.Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. The introduction of either type of supposition initiates judgments that may be either qualitative, binary judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable or quantitative, numerical ones about how acceptable it is. As such, accounts of qualitative/quantitative judgment under indicative/subjunctive supposition have been developed in the literature. We explore these four different types of theories by systematically explicating the relationships canonical representatives of each. Our representative qualitative accounts of indicative (...)
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  19. Beyond Belief: Logic in Multiple Attitudes.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - manuscript
    Choice-theoretic and philosophical accounts of rationality and reasoning address a multi-attitude psychology, including beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. By contrast, logicians traditionally focus on beliefs only. Yet there is 'logic' in multiple attitudes. We propose a generalization of the three standard logical requirements on beliefs -- consistency, completeness, and deductive closedness -- towards multiple attitudes. How do these three logical requirements relate to rational requirements, e.g., of transitive preferences or non-akratic intentions? We establish a systematic correspondence: each logical requirement (consistency, completeness, (...)
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  20. Book Review of Pasternack's Guidebook to Kant on Religion. [REVIEW]Stephen R. Palmquist - 2017 - Kant-Studien 108:467-471.
    This book review, published in Kant Studien 108.3 (Sept. 2017), pp.467-471, summarizes and assesses Lawrence R. Pasternack's book, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: An Interpretation and Defense (London and New York: Routledge, 2014).
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  21. Rethinking the Circularity Between Faith and Reason.Roberto Di Ceglie - 2019 - Philosophy and Theology 31 (1):59-77.
    In this article, I focus on the circular relationship that, in his 1998 encyclical, Jean Paul II argued there is between faith and reason. I first note that this image of circularity needs some explaining, because it is not clear where exactly the circular process begins and ends. I then argue that an explanation can be found in Aquinas’s reflection on the gift of understanding. Aquinas referred to the virtue of faith as caused by God, which promotes human reason, and (...)
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  22. The Talmudist Enlightenment: Talmudic Judaism’s Confrontational Rational Theology.Menachem Fisch - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (2):37-63.
    Robert Brandom's "The Pragmatist Enlightenment" describes the advent of American pragmatism as signaling a sea-change in our understanding of human reason away from the top-down Euclidian models of reasoning, warrant and knowledge inspired by the physical sciences, toward the far more bottom-up, narrative, inherently fallible and dialogical forms of reasoning of the life and human sciences. It is against this backdrop that Talmudic Judaism emerges not only as an early anticipation of the pragmatist enlightenment, but as going a substantial and (...)
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  23. Peter Ochs and the Logic of Scriptural Reasoning.Mark Randall James - forthcoming - Modern Theology.
  24. Ontology and Cognitive Outcomes.David Limbaugh, Jobst Landgrebe, David Kasmier, Ronald Rudnicki, James Llinas & Barry Smith - 2020 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 1 (1): 3-22.
    The term ‘intelligence’ as used in this paper refers to items of knowledge collected for the sake of assessing and maintaining national security. The intelligence community (IC) of the United States (US) is a community of organizations that collaborate in collecting and processing intelligence for the US. The IC relies on human-machine-based analytic strategies that 1) access and integrate vast amounts of information from disparate sources, 2) continuously process this information, so that, 3) a maximally comprehensive understanding of world actors (...)
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  25. Meinungsfreiheit Und Die Kommunikative Strategie der Rechtspopulisten.David Lanius - 2020 - In Tanjev Schultz (ed.), Was darf man sagen? Meinungsfreiheit im Zeitalter des Populismus. Stuttgart, Deutschland: Kohlhammer. pp. 75-112.
    Um die Presse- und Meinungsfreiheit wird Tag für Tag gerungen - auch in Deutschland, wo sie im Grundgesetz verankert ist. Was darf man sagen? Wie weit geht die Meinungsfreiheit? Wo endet die Toleranz? Diese Fragen müssen immer wieder auf ein Neues beantwortet werden. Auch in der Demokratie wird die Meinungsfreiheit bedroht. Politscher Populismus und verrohte Kommunikation im Internet stellen das Grundrecht auf die Probe. Rechtsextremisten inszenieren sich als Opfer einer vermeintlichen Meinungsdiktatur, Hasskommentare zerstören die Streitkultur und provozieren neue Gesetze, die (...)
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  26. Joshua Rasmussen, How Reason Can Lead to God: A Philosopher’s Bridge to Faith. [REVIEW]Todd Buras - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (2):453-457.
  27. Medieval Augustinism as the Source of Modern Illness?: Etienne Gilson's Thomistic Realism Vs Idealistic Augustinism.Joseph Lam - 2020 - The Australasian Catholic Record 97 (1):59.
    Being questioned about the nature of Christian faith, Mark Twain famously declared it as 'believing what you know ain't so'. Indeed, the role of reason for faith is a matter of dispute. Jesus, some argue, was not a philosopher or a teacher of wisdom. Rather, he is the saviour because of his unassuming sacrificial death and resurrection. Not reason, but the leap of faith is the ultimate condition of salvation. The Enlightenment however epitomises a Copernican revolution in favour of reason. (...)
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  28. Johannes Arnold, Der Wahre Logos des Kelsos. Eine Strukturanalyse, Aschendorff Verlag, Münster 2016.José Luis Narvaja - 2019 - Augustinianum 59 (2):568-569.
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  29. Moral Conscience Through the Ages: Fifth Century BCE to the Present. By Richard Sorabji. Pp. Ix, 265, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, £22.50. [REVIEW]Matthew T. Nowachek - 2020 - Heythrop Journal 61 (2):352-354.
    Richard Sorabji presents a unique discussion of the development of moral conscience over a period of 2500 years, from the playwrights of the fifth century BCE to the present. He addresses key topics including the original meaning and continuing nature of conscience, the ideas of freedom of religion and conscience with climaxes in the early Christian centuries and the seventeenth, the disputes on absolution or 'terrorisation' of conscience, dilemmas of conscience,and moral double-bind, the reliability of conscience if it is shaped (...)
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  30. Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):183-201.
    In this paper, I examine a kind of delusion in which the patients judge that their occurrent thoughts are false and try to abandon them precisely because they are false, but fail to do so. I call this delusion transparent, since it is transparent to the sufferer that their thought is false. In explaining this phenomenon, I defend a particular two-factor theory of delusion that takes the proper integration of relevant reasoning processes as vital for thought-evaluation. On this proposal, which (...)
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  31. A Puzzle About Enkratic Reasoning.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Enkratic reasoning – reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing – seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is (...)
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  32. Reason and Faith: Themes From Richard Swinburne: Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey E. Brower (Eds.): Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 256 Pp, $72. [REVIEW]Isaac Choi - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (2):193-197.
  33. Voices of Madness in Foucault and Kierkegaard.Heather C. Ohaneson - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (1):27-54.
    The central idea of this paper is that Michel Foucault and Søren Kierkegaard are unexpected allies in the investigation into the relation between madness and reason. These thinkers criticize reason’s presumption of purity and call into question reason’s isolation from madness. Strategies of indirect communication and regard for paradox from Kierkegaard’s nineteenth-century works find new ground in Foucault’s twentieth-century archaeological undertaking as Foucault illuminates “both-and” moments in the history of madness, uncovering points where rationalism paradoxically conceives of madness or where (...)
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  34. Confabulating Reasons.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):189-201.
    In this paper, I will focus on a type of confabulation that emerges in relation to questions about mental attitudes whose causes we cannot introspectively access. I argue against two popular views that see confabulations as mainly offering a psychological story about ourselves. On these views, confabulations are the result of either a cause-tracking mechanism or a self-directed mindreading mechanism. In contrast, I propose the view that confabulations are mostly telling a normative story: they are arguments primarily offered to justify (...)
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  35. Presupposing, Believing, Having Faith.Carlos Miguel Gómez Rincón - 2021 - Sophia 60 (1):103-121.
    This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...)
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  36. Secular Translations: Nation‐State, Modern Self, and Calculative Reason by TalalAsad , Vii + 222 Pp.Timothy Jenkins - 2020 - Modern Theology 36 (1):218-220.
  37. A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (11):585-614.
    John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome’s central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of (...)
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  38. Presupposing, Believing, Having Faith.Carlos Miguel Gómez Rincón - 2021 - Sophia 60 (1):103-121.
    This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...)
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  39. Knowing Our Limits.Nathan Ballantyne - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Changing our minds isn't easy. Even when we recognize our views are disputed by intelligent and informed people, we rarely doubt our rightness. Why is this so? How can we become more open-minded, putting ourselves in a better position to tolerate conflict, advance collective inquiry, and learn from differing perspectives in a complex world? -/- Nathan Ballantyne defends the indispensable role of epistemology in tackling these issues. For early modern philosophers, the point of reflecting on inquiry was to understand how (...)
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  40. Influence of World Knowledge and Context on the Comprehension of Natural Language Translation of Logical Formulas.Luca Cilibrasi & Matteo Pascucci - 2013 - In Chiara Ciarlo & Davide Giannoni (eds.), Language Studies Working Papers. Reading: University of Reading. pp. 13-21.
    In this paper we present an approach to conditional reasoning tasks based on two main ideas. The first idea is that, in contrast with what is usually assumed, an ‘if… then…’ sentence is not an adequate translation in natural language of a logical formula containing a material implication as its principal operator. The second idea is that when subjects are required to check the validity of a sentence in a task, their inferences are not driven uniquely by the content of (...)
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  41. Review of The Paradoxical Rationality of Søren Kierkegaard. [REVIEW]Antony Aumann - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
    Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) has often been cast as an irrationalist -- an enemy of reason, logic, and perhaps even truth. It is easy to see why. Some of his works encourage us to "crucify" our understanding or to take a leap of faith beyond the evidence.[1] We also encounter texts suggesting that passionate beliefs are more important than true ones.[2] Perhaps his most frequently read book, Fear and Trembling, lauds Abraham for following God's commands "by virtue of the absurd."[3] Finally, (...)
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  42. Bootstrapping, Dogmatism, and the Structure of Epistemic Justification.Shyam Nair - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Dogmatism is the view that perceptual experience provides immediate defeasible justification for certain beliefs. The bootstrapping problem for dogmatism is that it sanctions a certain defective form of reasoning that concludes in the belief that one's perceptual faculties are reliable. This paper argues that the only way for the dogmatist to avoid the bootstrapping problem is to claim that epistemic justification fails to have a structural property known as cut. This allows the dogmatist to admit that each step in the (...)
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  43. Crítica de la Razón Moderna.Juan Manuel Díaz-Torres (ed.) - 2008 - Valencia, España: Tirant lo Blanch.
    La superación del racionalismo y del relativismo no ha podido gestarse con fecundidad. Posiblemente porque el absolutismo racionalista -que salva la razón a costa de anular la vida- y el relativismo -que salva la vida negando la razón- se han desplazado en una dimensión única que imposibilitaba la insumisión a ese dilema vertebrado por una concepción absolutista de la verdad y que nos constriñe a instalarnos en alguno de sus términos. La constante aparición del nexo entre los problemas antropológicos más (...)
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  44. Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.
    There is consensus among computer scientists, logicians, and philosophers that good reasoning with qualitative beliefs must have the structural property of cumulative transitivity or, for short, cut. This consensus is typically explicitly argued for partially on the basis of practical and mathematical considerations. But the consensus is also implicit in the approach philosophers take to almost every puzzle about reasoning that involves multiple steps: philosophers typically assume that if each step in reasoning is acceptable considered on its own, the whole (...)
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  45. The Reliability of Inductive Inferences and Our Innate Capacities.Nathan Stemmer - 1978 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 9 (1):93-105.
    One of the important problems that have to be dealt with in the Philosophy of Science is to account for the high reliability of a very large part of our inductive inferences. This reliability is noteworthy because not only were many of these inferences made by ordinary people, even by children, but they were very often based on the observation of just a few positive instances. In the present paper, I deal with this problem by treating it as a normal (...)
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  46. Reasoning with Reasons.Daniel Star - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 241-59.
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  47. Defeasibility and Inferential Particularism.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1):80-98.
    In this paper I argue that defeasible inferences are occasion-sensitive: the inferential connections of a given claim depend on features of the circumstances surrounding the occasion of inference. More specifically, it is an occasion-sensitive matter which possible defeaters have to be considered explicitly by the premises of an inference and which possible defeaters may remain unconsidered, without making the inference enthymematic. As a result, a largely unexplored form of occasion-sensitivity arises in inferentialist theories of content that appeal to defeasible inferences.
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  48. A Multi-INT Semantic Reasoning Framework for Intelligence Analysis Support.Janssen Terry, Basik Herbert, Dean Mike & Barry Smith - 2010 - In L. Obrst, Terry Janssen & W. Ceusters (eds.), Ontologies and Semantic Technologies for the Intelligence Community. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press. pp. 57-69.
    Lockheed Martin Corp. has funded research to generate a framework and methodology for developing semantic reasoning applications to support the discipline oflntelligence Analysis. This chapter outlines that framework, discusses how it may be used to advance the information sharing and integrated analytic needs of the Intelligence Community, and suggests a system I software architecture for such applications.
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  49. Alfredo Deaño and the Non-Accidental Transition of Thought.Maria G. Navarro - 2016 - Archives for the Philosohy and History of Soft Computing (1):1-13.
    If the cultural variations concerning knowledge and research on ordinary reasoning are part of cultural history, what kind of historiographical method is needed in order to present the history of its evolution? This paper proposes to introduce the study of theories of reasoning into a historiographic perspective because we assume that the answer to the previous question does not only depend of internal controversies about how reasoning performance is explained by current theories of reasoning. [...].
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  50. Relevance and Reason Relations.Niels Skovgaard‐Olsen, Henrik Singmann & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S5):1202-1215.
    This paper examines precursors and consequents of perceived relevance of a proposition A for a proposition C. In Experiment 1, we test Spohn's assumption that ∆P = P − P is a good predictor of ratings of perceived relevance and reason relations, and we examine whether it is a better predictor than the difference measure − P). In Experiment 2, we examine the effects of relevance on probabilistic coherence in Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, and Over's uncertain “and-to-if” inferences. The results suggest (...)
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