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  1. Reasoning In Versus About Attitudes: How Attitude Formation is Beyond Logic.Franz Dietrich & Antonios Staras - manuscript
    One reasons not just in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. For instance, one forms preferences from preferences, or intentions from beliefs and preferences. Formal logic has proved useful for modelling reasoning in beliefs -- the formation of beliefs from beliefs. Can logic also model reasoning in multiple attitudes? We identify principled obstacles. Logic can model reasoning about attitudes. But this models the discovery of attitudes of (usually) others, not the formation of one's own attitudes. Beliefs are (...)
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  2. When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - manuscript
    Different people reason differently, which means that sometimes they reach different conclusions from the same evidence. We maintain that this is not only natural, but rational. In this essay we explore the epistemology of that state of affairs. First we will canvass arguments for and against the claim that rational methods of reasoning must always reach the same conclusions from the same evidence. Then we will consider whether the acknowledgment that people have divergent rational reasoning methods should undermine one’s confidence (...)
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  3. Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning.John Brunero - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to φ is a premise in a pattern of sound reasoning leading to the conclusion to φ. But how should the Reasoning View account for reasons that are outweighed? One very promising proposal is to appeal to defeasible reasoning. On this proposal, when a reason is outweighed, the associated pattern of sound reasoning is defeated. Both Jonathan Way and Sam Asarnow have recently developed this idea in different ways. I argue that this (...)
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  4. Reasoning Beyond Belief Acquisition.Daniel Drucker - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I argue that we can reason not only to new beliefs but to basically any change in attitude we can think of, including the abandonment of belief (contra John Broome), the acquisition of non-belief attitudes like relief and admiration, and the elimination of the same. To argue for this position, which I call generalism, I defend a sufficient condition on reasoning, roughly that we can reason to any change in attitude that is expressed by the conclusion of an argument we (...)
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  5. ODNI as an Analytic Ombudsman: Is Intelligence Community Directive 203 Up to the Task?Alexandru Marcoci, Ans Vercammen & Mark Burgman - forthcoming - Intelligence and National Security.
    In the wake of 9/11 and the assessment of Iraq's WMD, several inquiries placed the blame primarily on the Intelligence Community. Part of the reform that followed was a codification of analytic tradecraft standards into Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 and the appointment of an analytic ombudsman in the newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence charged with monitoring the quality of analytic products from across the intelligence community. In this paper we identify three assumptions behind ICD203: (1) (...)
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  6. Reasons and Basing in Commonsense Epistemology: Evidence From Two Experiments.John Turri - forthcoming - In J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge.
    I accomplish two things in this paper. I explain the motivation for including experimental research in philosophical projects on epistemic reasons and the basing relation. And I present the first experimental contributions to these projects. The results from two experiments advance our understanding of the ordinary concepts of reasons and basing and set the stage for further research on the topics. More specifically, the results support a causal theory of the basing relation, according to which reasons are causes, and a (...)
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  7. Isolating Correct Reasoning.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This paper tries to do three things. First, it tries to make it plausible that correct rules of reasoning do not always preserve justification: in other words, if you begin with a justified attitude, and reason correctly from that premise, it can nevertheless happen that you’ll nevertheless arrive at an unjustified attitude. Attempts to show that such cases in fact involve following an incorrect rule of reasoning cannot be vindicated. Second, it also argues that correct rules of reasoning do not (...)
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  8. Using Computer-Assisted Argument Mapping to Teach Reasoning to Students.Martin Davies, Ashley Barnett & Tim van Gelder - 2021 - In J. Anthony Blair (ed.), Studies in Critical Thinking (2nd Edition). Windsor, ON, Canada: Windsor Studies in Argumentation. pp. 115-152.
    Argument mapping is a way of diagramming the logical structure of an argument to explicitly and concisely represent reasoning. The use of argument mapping in critical thinking instruction has increased dramatically in recent decades. This paper overviews the innovation and provides a procedural approach for new teaches wanting to use argument mapping in the classroom. A brief history of argument mapping is provided at the end of this paper.
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  9. How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.
    Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...)
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  10. Düşünmenin Alfabesi.Yasin Ramazan Basaran - 2020 - İstanbul, Turkey: Babil Kitap.
    Yaşadığımız çağ bize emsalsiz miktarda bilgi, bir o kadar da karmaşa getiriyor. Düşüncelerimizi sağlıklı biçimde kurmak, safsatalara düşmekten kaçınmak hiç olmadığı kadar zor. Eleştirel düşünce başlı başına bir disipline dönüşmüş durumda. Yasin Ramazan, tüm bu keşmekeş içinde yolunu kaybetmeden tutarlı düşünceler üretmeye çalışan okura rehberlik etmeyi hedefliyor. Düşünmenin Alfabesi nasıl mantıklı düşüneceğinizi öğretmeyi hedeflese de bir mantık kitabı değil. Teorikten ziyade pratik, anlayarak yola koyulmayı teşvik eden bir metin. Sadece başkalarının düşüncelerini kritik etmeyi değil, kendi öğrenme ve düşünme serüvenimizi de (...)
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  11. Reasoning in Physics (Ed.).Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2020 - Synthese:1-5.
    The way in which philosophers have thought about the scientific method and the nature of good scientific reasoning over the last few centuries has been consistently and heavily influenced by the examples set by physics. The astounding achievements of 19th and 20th century physics demonstrated that physicists had successfully identified methodologies and reasoning patterns that were uniquely well suited to discovering fundamental truths about the natural world. Inspired by this success, generations of philosophers set themselves the goal of taxonomising, codifying, (...)
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  12. Assimilation and Control: Belief at the Lowest Levels.Eric Mandelbaum - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):441-447.
    The core of Zimmerman’s picture posits an inverse correlation between an action’s automaticity and belief’s role in the action’s execution. This proposal faces serious problems. First, high-attention, high-control actions don’t seem to heighten awareness of one’s beliefs. Second, low-attention, low-control actions are caused by the same states at play when executing high-attention, high-control actions, in which case there is no ontological difference in the states involved in these behaviors. Third, on Zimmerman’s view it is unclear what it is for a (...)
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  13. Can Resources Save Rationality? ‘Anti-Bayesian’ Updating in Cognition and Perception.Eric Mandelbaum, Isabel Won, Steven Gross & Chaz Firestone - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 143:e16.
    Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two phenomena — belief polarization and the size-weight illusion — that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them?
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  14. La Estructura Lógica de Conciencia.Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    Es mi afirmación que la tabla de intencionalidad (racionalidad, mente, pensamiento, lenguaje, personalidad, etc.) que presenta prominentemente aquí describe más o menos con precisión, o al menos sirve como heurística para, cómo pensamos y nos comportamos, y por lo tanto no abarca simplemente filosofía y psicología, sino todo lo demás (historia, literatura, matemáticas, política, etc.). Tenga en cuenta especialmente que la intencionalidad y racionalidad como yo (junto con Searle, Wittgenstein y otros) lo veo, incluye tanto el Sistema Linguístico deliberativo consciente (...)
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  15. The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2020 - Routledge.
    This book is concerned with the conditions under which epistemic reasons provide justification for beliefs. The author draws on metaethical theories of reasons and normativity and then applies his theory to various contemporary debates in epistemology. In the first part of the book, the author outlines what he calls the dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons. The author offers and defends a dispositional account of how propositional and doxastic justification are related to one another. He then argues that the dispositional view (...)
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  16. Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):156-173.
    In this paper I deal with epistemological issues that stem from the hypothesis that reasoning is not only a means of transmitting knowledge from premise-beliefs to conclusion-beliefs, but also a primary source of knowledge in its own right. The idea is that one can gain new knowledge on the basis of suppositional reasoning. After making some preliminary distinctions, I argue that there are no good reasons to think that purported examples of knowledge grounded on pure reasoning are just examples of (...)
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  17. Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules.Joshua Schechter - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We are justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens (or one much like it) as basic in our reasoning. By contrast, we are not justified in employing a rule of inference that permits inferring to some difficult mathematical theorem from the relevant axioms in a single step. Such an inferential step is intuitively “too large” to count as justified. What accounts for this difference? In this paper, I canvass several possible explanations. I argue that the most promising approach (...)
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  18. Evidence Linking Brain Activity Modulation to Age and to Deductive Training.Paula Álvarez-Merino, Carmen Requena & Francisco Salto - 2018 - Neural Plasticity 2018:1-20.
    Electrical brain activity modulation in terms of changes in its intensity and spatial distribution is a function of age and task demand. However, the dynamics of brain modulation is unknown when it depends on external factors such as training. The aim of this research is to verify the effect of deductive reasoning training on the modulation in the brain activity of healthy younger and older adults ( (mean age of 21 ± 3.39) and (mean age of 68.92 ± 5.72)). The (...)
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  19. An Introduction to Critical Thinking and Symbolic Logic Volume 2: Informal Reasoning Assignments.Rebeka Ferreira & Anthony Ferrucci - 2018 - Open Educational Resource: OpenStax-CNX and Canvas Commons.
    This textbook is not a textbook in the traditional sense. Here, what we have attempted is compile a set of assignments and exercise that may be used in critical thinking courses. To that end, we have tried to make these assignments as diverse as possible while leaving flexibility in their application within the classroom. Of course these assignments and exercises could certainly be used in other classes as well. Our view is that critical thinking courses work best when they are (...)
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  20. Better Together: Reliable Application of the Post-9/11 and Post-Iraq US Intelligence Tradecraft Standards Requires Collective Analysis.Alexandru Marcoci, Mark Burgman, Ariel Kruger, Elizabeth Silver, Marissa McBride, Felix Singleton Thorn, Hannah Fraser, Bonnie C. Wintle, Fiona Fidler & Ans Vercammen - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology.
    Background. The events of 9/11 and the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction precipitated fundamental changes within the US Intelligence Community. As part of the reform, analytic tradecraft standards were revised and codified into a policy document – Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 – and an analytic ombudsman was appointed in the newly created Office for the Director of National Intelligence to ensure compliance across the intelligence community. In this paper we investigate (...)
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  21. What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.
    What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning—both theoretical and practical—according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds that the standards of (...)
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  22. Arguments From Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):175-195.
    Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert (...)
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  23. Variables de Medida del Razonamiento Deductivo.Francisco Salto, Paula Alvarez-Merino & Carmen Requena - 2018 - Revista Iberoamericana de Diagnstico y Evaluación Psicológica 49 (4):59-75.
    Hay doble pulsión en el centro de la discusión del razonamiento deductivo. Una conduce aparentemente a la abstracción y dominios arbitrarios, mientras que la otra conduce a la concreción y la dependencia del contenido. El objetivo de esta investigación es diseñar, aplicar y validar un instrumento de evaluación que nos permita corroborar si el razonamiento deductivo maneja reglas lógicas o contenidos. La muestra de estudio se compuso de 80 participantes (edad 18-77 años). El test consta de 60 ítems categorizados en: (...)
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  24. Reasonable Responses: The Thought of Trudy Govier.Hundleby Catherine (ed.) - 2017 - Windsor: University of Windsor.
    This tribute to the breadth and influence of Trudy Govier’s philosophical work begins with her early scholarship in argumentation theory, paying special attention to its pedagogical expression. Most people first encounter Trudy Govier’s work and many people only encounter it through her textbooks, especially A Practical Study of Argument, published in many editions. In addition to the work on argumentation that has continued throughout her career, much of Govier’s later work addresses social philosophy and the problems of trust and response (...)
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  25. Causal Argument.Ulrike Hahn, Frank Zenker & Roland Bluhm - 2017 - In Michael R. Waldmann (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 475-494.
    In this chapter, we outline the range of argument forms involving causation that can be found in everyday discourse. We also survey empirical work concerned with the generation and evaluation of such arguments. This survey makes clear that there is presently no unified body of research concerned with causal argument. We highlight the benefits of a unified treatment both for those interested in causal cognition and those interested in argumentation, and identify the key challenges that must be met for a (...)
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  26. There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning.Michael Huemer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):592-613.
    The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence theorems, subjective (...)
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  27. Does Persuasion Really Come at the "End of Reasons"?Pietro Salis - 2017 - In P. L. Lecis, G. Lorini, V. Busacchi, Pietro Salis & O. G. Loddo (eds.), Verità, Immagine, Normatività. Truth, Image, and Normativity. Macerata: Quodlibet Studio. pp. 77-100.
    Persuasion is a special aspect of our social and linguistic practices – one where an interlocutor, or an audience, is induced, to perform a certain action or to endorse a certain belief, and these episodes are not due to the force of the better reason. When we come near persuasion, it seems that, in general, we are somehow giving up factual discourse and the principles of logic, since persuading must be understood as almost different from convincing rationally. Sometimes, for example, (...)
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  28. Rationalization in Philosophical and Moral Thought.Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Ellis - 2017 - In Jean-Francois Bonnefon & Bastien Trémolière (eds.), Moral Inferences.
    Rationalization, in our intended sense of the term, occurs when a person favors a particular conclusion as a result of some factor (such as self-interest) that is of little justificatory epistemic relevance, if that factor then biases the person’s subsequent search for, and assessment of, potential justifications for the conclusion. Empirical evidence suggests that rationalization is common in people’s moral and philosophical thought. We argue that it is likely that the moral and philosophical thought of philosophers and moral psychologists is (...)
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  29. Relevance Differently Affects the Truth, Acceptability, and Probability Evaluations of “and”, “but”, “Therefore”, and “If–Then”.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, David Kellen, Hannes Krahl & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (4):449-482.
    In this study we investigate the influence of reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals and ‘and’/‘but’/‘therefore’ sentences on various cognitive assessments. According to the Frege-Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading of these sentences should affect participants’ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their truth value. In two experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance manipulation into the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participants’ acceptability and probability evaluations. Across (...)
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  30. THINKING,‭ ‬SENSATION,‭ ‬UNDERSTANDING,‭ ‬REASON,‭ ‬ARGUMENTATION,‭ ‬EMOTIONS,‭ ‬EXPERIENCE,‭ ‬WISDOM.de Balbin Ulrich - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    Ulrich de Balbian Meta-Philosophy Research Center -/- Do not talk about or use the misleading,‭ ‬umbrella-word like mind and consciousness,‭ ‬or mental processes and phenomena.‭ ‬Even Hume realized this and emphasized the need for accurate definitions of those words and processes we wish to investigate.‭ ‬Talk about and investigate specific processes or‭ ‬‘notions and activities‭’‬ like thinking,‭ ‬reasoning,‭ ‬sensing and experience/ing,‭ ‬arguments and argumentation,‭ ‬etc‭ ‬.I intend to explore the notions of thought‭ (‬thinking‭)‬,‭ ‬sensation,‭ ‬feeling,‭ ‬understanding and insight,‭ ‬reason/ing and (...)
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  31. Powers of the Mind.Robert James M. Boyles, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin & Mark Anthony Dacela - 2016 - In Elizabeth M. Nuncio (ed.), Personal Development. Anvil Publishing, Inc. pp. 61–81.
    This article is a general introduction to the psychology of reasoning. Specifically, it focuses on the dual process theory of human cognition. Proponents of the said two-system view hold that human cognition involves two processes (viz., System 1 and System 2). System 1 is an automatic, intuitive thinking process where judgments and reasoning rely on fast thinking and ready-to-hand data. On the other hand, System 2 is a slow, logical cognitive process where our judgments and reasoning rely on reflective, careful (...)
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  32. Fodor on Global Cognition and Scientific Inference.Sheldon Chow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):157-178.
    This paper addresses the extent to which quotidian cognition is like scientific inference by focusing on Jerry Fodor's famous analogy. I specifically consider and rebut a recent attempt made by Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels to deny the usefulness of Fodor's analogy. In so doing, I reveal some subtleties of Fodor's arguments overlooked by Fuller and Samuels and others. Recognizing these subtleties provides a richer appreciation of the analogy, allowing us to gain better traction on the issue concerning the extent (...)
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  33. In Order to Be Rational You Need to Know How to Reason. Munaretti - 2016 - Philosophical Inquiries 4 (1):25-39.
    In Section 1, we make some preliminary remarks about the concept of epis‐ temic entitlement, understood in terms of ex ante rationality. In Section 2, we argue that a certain epistemological view – one according to which ex ante rationality is solely a func- tion of available reasons – is inadequate. In Sections 3-4 we will esh out an alternative view about ex ante rationality, one according to which forming a certain belief is rational for a subject S only when (...)
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  34. Dynamic Conservatism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    According to a family of views under the label of epistemic conservatism, the fact that one already believes something can make it rational to continue to believe it. A number of philosophers have found conservatism attractive, but traditional views are vulnerable to several powerful criticisms. In this paper, I develop an alternative to standard views by identifying a widespread assumption shared by conservatives and their critics - that rational norms govern states of mind like belief, and showing how rejecting this (...)
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  35. Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that all reasons to believe p are evidence for p. Pragmatists hold that pragmatic considerations – incentives for believing – can also be reasons to believe. Nishi Shah, Thomas Kelly and others have argued for evidentialism on the grounds that incentives for belief fail a ‘reasoning constraint’ on reasons: roughly, reasons must be considerations we can reason from, but we cannot reason from incentives to belief. In the first half of the paper, I show that this (...)
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  36. Debunking Biased Thinkers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141--162.
    ABSTRACT: Most of what we believe comes to us from the word of others, but we do not always believe what we are told. We often reject thinkers' reports by attributing biases to them. We may call this debunking. In this essay, I consider how debunking might work and then examine whether, and how often, it can help to preserve rational belief in the face of disagreement.
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  37. Many Meanings of ‘Heuristic’.Sheldon J. Chow - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):977-1016.
    A survey of contemporary philosophical and scientific literatures reveals that different authors employ the term ‘heuristic’ in ways that deviate from, and are sometimes inconsistent with, one another. Given its widespread use in philosophy and cognitive science generally, it is striking that there appears to be little concern for a clear account of what phenomena heuristics pick out or refer to. In response, I consider several accounts of ‘heuristic’, and I draw a number of distinctions between different sorts of heuristics (...)
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  38. The Last Straw Fallacy: Another Causal Fallacy and Its Harmful Effects.Carolyn Cusick & Mark Peter - 2015 - Argumentation 29 (4):457-474.
    We have noticed a pattern of arguments that exhibit a type of irrationality or a particular informal logical fallacy that is not fully captured by any existing fallacy. This fallacy can be explored through three examples where one misattributes a cause by focusing on a smaller portion of a larger set—specifically, the last or least known—and claiming that that cause holds a unique priority over other contributing factors for the occurrence of an event. We propose to call this fallacy the (...)
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  39. Denying Antecedents and Affirming Consequents: The State of the Art.David Godden & Frank Zenker - 2015 - Informal Logic 35 (1):88-134.
    Recent work on conditional reasoning argues that denying the antecedent [DA] and affirming the consequent [AC] are defeasible but cogent patterns of argument, either because they are effective, rational, albeit heuristic applications of Bayesian probability, or because they are licensed by the principle of total evidence. Against this, we show that on any prevailing interpretation of indicative conditionals the premises of DA and AC arguments do not license their conclusions without additional assumptions. The cogency of DA and AC inferences rather (...)
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  40. A Theory of Argumentation: Harald R. Wohlrapp: The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation, Translated by Tim Personn in Cooperation with Michael Weh. Dordrecht: Springer, 2014, Lxii+443 Pp, $179.00 HB. [REVIEW]Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Metascience 24 (3):503-506.
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  41. El rol de las heurísticas sociales en la deliberación.María G. Navarro - 2015 - Bajo Palabra. Revista de Filosofía 10:123-134.
    Este artículo muestra la conexión entre heurísticas sociales y deliberación. En lugar de caracterizar las heurísticas según disciplinas o campos, aquí se proyectan sobre nuestros enclaves deliberativos. La autora sostiene que el empleo de heurísticas sociales orienta el flujo de la información y la participación en las distintas fases deliberativas, y es necesario analizarlas para establecer indicadores con los que medir grados de deliberación. Esta hipótesis da lugar a una visión pluralista sobre la función social de las heurísticas entendidas como (...)
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  42. An Essay on the Ancient Ideal of ‘Enraonar’.Enric Trillas & María Navarro - 2015 - Archives for the Philosophy and History of Soft Computing 2015 (1):1-28.
    : Reasoning’ can be considered a general concept that, upon speaking, is the ‘enraonar’, a Catalan word that should not be mistaken with ‘explain’ nor with ‘discuss’ which imply more detail, and cover different situations. This article is presented as an essay on the ancient ideal of ‘enraonar’. To that end, it is explained in what sense ‘enraonar’ and reason are one of the most complex phenomena thought has to deal with. Here it is argued that these natural phenomena require (...)
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  43. An Essay on the Ancient Ideal of ‘Enraonar’.Enric Trillas & María G. Navarro - 2015 - Archives of Philosophy and History of Soft Computing (I):1-28.
    ‘Reasoning’ can be considered a general concept that, upon speaking, is the ‘enraonar’, a Catalan word that should not be mistaken with ‘explain’ nor with ‘discuss’ which imply more detail, and cover different situations. This article is presented as an essay on the ancient ideal of ‘enraonar’. To that end, it is explained in what sense ‘enraonar’ and reason are one of the most complex phenomena thought has to deal with. Here it is argued that these natural phenomena require a (...)
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  44. Modeling Corroborative Evidence: Inference to the Best Explanation as Counter–Rebuttal.David Godden - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (2):187-220.
    Corroborative evidence has a dual function in argument. Primarily, it functions to provide direct evidence supporting the main conclusion. But it also has a secondary, bolstering function which increases the probative value of some other piece of evidence in the argument. This paper argues that the bolstering effect of corroborative evidence is legitimate, and can be explained as counter–rebuttal achieved through inference to the best explanation. A model (argument diagram) of corroborative evidence, representing its structure and operation as a schematic (...)
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  45. Consequences of Reasoning with Conflicting Obligations.Shyam Nair - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):753-790.
    Since at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly, however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons (...)
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  46. The Embodied Embedded Character of System 1 Processing.Samuel Bellini-Leite - 2013 - Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):239-252.
    In the last thirty years, a relatively large group of cognitive scientists have begun characterising the mind in terms of two distinct, relatively autonomous systems. To account for paradoxes in empirical results of studies mainly on reasoning, Dual Process Theories were developed. Such Dual Process Theories generally agree that System 1 is rapid, automatic, parallel, and heuristic-based and System 2 is slow, capacity-demanding, sequential, and related to consciousness. While System 2 can still be decently understood from a traditional cognitivist approach, (...)
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  47. Critical Thinking and the Disciplines Reconsidered.Martin Davies - 2013 - Higher Education Research and Development 32 (4):529-544.
    This paper argues that Moore's specifist defence of critical thinking as ‘diverse modes of thought in the disciplines’, which appeared in Higher Education Research & Development, 30(3), 2011, is flawed as it entrenches relativist attitudes toward the important skill of critical thinking. The paper outlines the critical thinking debate, distinguishes between ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘relativist’ approaches and locates Moore's account therein. It uses examples from one discipline-specific area, namely, the discipline of Literature, to show that the generalist approach to critical (...)
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  48. How the Polls Can Be Both Spot On and Dead Wrong: Using Choice Blindness to Shift Political Attitudes and Voter Intentions.Lars Hall, Thomas Strandberg, Philip Pärnamets, Andreas Lind, Betty Tärning & Petter Johansson - 2013 - PLoS ONE 8 (4):e60554. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.
    Political candidates often believe they must focus their campaign efforts on a small number of swing voters open for ideological change. Based on the wisdom of opinion polls, this might seem like a good idea. But do most voters really hold their political attitudes so firmly that they are unreceptive to persuasion? We tested this premise during the most recent general election in Sweden, in which a left- and a right-wing coalition were locked in a close race. We asked our (...)
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  49. El poder de la imprecisión humana.María G. Navarro - 2013 - DIAGONAL 189:29.
    La lógica borrosa se ha definido como un sistema preciso de razonamiento, deducción y computación en el que los objetos del discurso se encuentran asociados a información que, por lo general, consideramos imprecisa, incompleta, incierta, poco fiable, parcialmente verdadera o parcialmente posible.
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  50. Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief?Julia Staffel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.
    In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees (...)
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