Reasons

Edited by Errol Lord (University of Pennsylvania)
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  1. Always Choose to Live or Choose to Always Live?Daniel Coren - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):89-104.
    Bernard Williams (1973) famously argued that if given the choice to relinquish our mortality we should refuse. We should not choose to always live. His piece provoked an entire literature on the desirability of immortality. Intending to contradict Williams, Thomas Nagel claimed that if given the choice between living for a week and dying in five minutes he would always choose to live. I argue that (1) Nagel’s iterating scenario is closer to the original Makropulos case (Čapek’s) that inspired Williams’s (...)
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  2. Can There Be Government House Reasons for Action?Hille Paakunainen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):56-93.
    I defend the relatively orthodox view that reasons for action are premises in good practical reasoning, against recent counterexamples that suggest that, like “government house” moral justifications, some reasons are to be ignored in deliberation. I also explain, positively, what is right about the orthodoxy. Unless reasons are premises in good practical reasoning, reasons cannot be normative in the way they are usually taken to be, and relatedly, are unfit to play certain familiar theoretical and related everyday roles that give (...)
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  3. Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.
    What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are (...)
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  4. Defeating Pragmatic Encroachment?Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7).
    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores two ways (...)
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  5. Ethics and Practical Reason. [REVIEW]James Mahon - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 7:119-120.
    In this review of essays on the topic of practical reason, the neo-Humeanism of philosophers such as James Drier, according to whom reasons are instrumental, is shown to be susceptible to the objections of Kantian philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard: the fact that you desire to X can never entail that you ought to X. Kantianism, however, comes under attack from neo-Aristotelian philosophers such as Berys Gaut, who argues that it is a mistake to identify goodness with being the object (...)
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  6. Review of Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome. [REVIEW]Barry Maguire - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1.
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  7. Can Reason Establish the Goals of Action? Assessing Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Agency.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - forthcoming - Discusiones Filosóficas.
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...)
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  8. Reasoning with Reasons.Daniel Star - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 241-59.
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  9. Introduction.Daniel Star - forthcoming - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  10. Reasons Internalism.Errol Lord & David Plunkett - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 324-339.
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  11. Reasons or Fittingness First?Richard Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.
    Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.
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  12. Defaulting on Reasons.Daniel Bonevac - 2016 - Noûs:229-259.
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  13. In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.
    Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according (...)
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  14. The Epistemology of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):57-84.
    This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience, and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View. It then challenges two (...)
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  15. Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to Oughts.Bradford Hooker - unknown
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  16. Justifying Practical Reasons.Georg Spielthenner - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1).
    : This paper is about the nature of practical reasons. More specifically, my primary goal is to explore when an agent has a justifying reason for action¾that is, a reason that can be used for justifying an action that has been done or that the agent is planning to do. This concept of reason is central to ethics and to practical philosophy in general. I defend an account of reason according to which a piece of practical reasoning gives an agent (...)
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  17. Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to Oughts.Bradford Hooker - unknown
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  18. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
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  19. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
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  20. Why Pass Every Buck? On Skorupski's Buck‐Passing Account of Normativity.Richard Rowland - 2011 - Ratio 24 (3):340-348.
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  21. Reasons.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Critica 7 (21):3-17.
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  22. Internalising Practical Reasons.Rowland Stout - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):231-245.
    Practical reasons figure in both the justification and the causal explanation of action. It is usually assumed that the agent's state of believing rather than what they believe must figure in the causal explanation of action. But, that the agent believes something is not a reason in the sense of being part of the justification of what they do. So it is often concluded that the justifying reason is a different sort of thing from the causally motivating reason. But this (...)
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  23. Desires, Whims and Values.Donald C. Hubin - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 7 (3):315-335.
    Neo-Humean instrumentalists hold that an agent's reasons for acting are grounded in the agent's desires. Numerous objections have been leveled against this view, but the most compelling concerns the problem of "alien desires" - desires with which the agent does not identify. The standard version of neo-Humeanism holds that these desires, like any others, generate reasons for acting. A variant of neo-Humeanism that grounds an agent's reasons on her values, rather than all of her desires, avoids this implication, but at (...)
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  24. 2. Human Agents as Strong Evaluators.Arto Laitinen - 2008 - In Strong Evaluation Without Moral Sources: On Charles Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 61-105.
    In this chapter I discuss Taylor’s claim that strong evaluation is inevitable for human agency: without a framework of strong evaluations human agents would be in a crisis which Taylor calls, perhaps misleadingly, “an identity crisis”. With a broad brush I introduce some of the essential background in first three sections, and scrutinize the inevitability of strong evaluation more closely in the last three sections. I introduce first the distinction between the engaged perspective, which in Taylor’s view provides the correct (...)
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  25. IV. Two Problems About Reasons for Actions.D. F. Pears - 1971 - In Ausonio Marras, R. N. Bronaugh & Robert W. Binkley (eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason. University of Toronto Press. pp. 128-166.
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  26. Agent, Action, and Reason.Ausonio Marras, R. N. Bronaugh & Robert W. Binkley - unknown
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  27. Reasons and Reason.Barbara Held - 1999 - Symposium 3 (1):43-52.
    Katherine Morrison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, I failed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodern therapy, because I failed to establish the motive behind that movement’s adoption of antirealism. In fact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism over antirealism, reasons which do not depend upon the motives of narrative therapists, whatever they may be.Katherine Morrison prétend que dans (...)
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  28. Reasons to Care About Reasons for Action. Trujillo Jr - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2):43-48.
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  29. Can Subjectismgive a Good Account of the Relationship Between Agents, Desires and Reasons?Guillermo Valverde - unknown
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  30. A Theory of Reasons for Action.G. R. Grice & David A. J. Richards - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (1):139.
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  31. Reasons for Actions: A Critique of Utilitarian Rationality.David Gauthier & Richard Norman - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (4):545.
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  32. The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of the paper introduces a number of theoretically puzzling features of normative reasons. These include weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons. It is argued that the Value-Based Theory of Reasons elegantly accounts for these features. This paper is programmatic. Its goal is to put the promising but surprisingly overlooked Value-Based Theory of Reasons on the table in discussions of normative reasons, and to draw attention (...)
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  33. Are Reasons Causes?Severin Schroeder - unknown
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  34. Review of Errol Lord and Barry Maguire's (Eds.) Weighing Reasons. [REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016 (7).
    This is a short review of a collection of articles entitled Weighing Reasons edited by Errol Lord and Barry Maguire.
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  35. Needs , Projects , and Reasons.Sarah Buss - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (8):373-402.
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  36. Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
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  37. Belief and Reasons for Belief.A. Phillips Griffiths & Donald McQueen - 1973 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 47 (1):53-86.
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  38. Part Three: Truth and Rationality.Nenad Miscevic - 2000 - In Rationality and Cognition: Against Relativism-Pragmatism. University of Toronto Press. pp. 134-226.
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  39. Reason Explanation:A First-Order Normative Account.Neil C. Manson - unknown
    How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to why questions that assuage agents puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such (...)
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  40. Reasons Why.Bradford Skow - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book first argues that what philosophers are really after, or at least should be after, when they seek a theory of explanation, is a theory of answers to why-questions. The book's main thesis, then, is a theory of reasons why. Every reason why some event happened is either a cause, or a ground, of that event. Challenging this thesis are many examples philosophers have thought they have found of "non-causal explanations." Reasons Why uses two ideas to show that these (...)
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  41. Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought's.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.
    One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. And one of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. But I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually also poses two closely related problems for this popular idea in moral philosophy. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic (...)
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  42. Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought's.Gopal Shyam Nair - unknown
    One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. And one of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. But I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually also poses two closely related problems for this popular idea in moral philosophy. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic (...)
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  43. The Logic of Reasons.Gopal Shyam Nair & John Horty - unknown
    Reasons figure large in our ordinary talk of deliberating about or justifying actions or conclusions. Suppose, for example, you want to convince a friend to dine with you at Obelisk tonight. Typically, you will offer reasons—there is a new chef, the reviews have been excellent. Or suppose you want to explain why you believe raccoons have been in the backyard. You will offer your evidence, again, typically, in the form of reasons—the garbage was broken into, those tracks look like raccoon (...)
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  44. Foley's Evidence and His Epistemic Reasons.S. C. Hetherington - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):122-126.
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  45. Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that (...)
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  46. Reasons Why.Charles Tilly - 2004 - Sociological Theory 22 (3):445-454.
    Reasons-organized answers to the question "Why does (did, should) X do Y?"-vary between formulas and cause-effect accounts in one dimension and between popular and specialized statements on the other. Conventions, explanatory stories, codified justifications, and technical accounts all qualify as reasons. Choices among types of reasons and contents within each type vary as a function of social relations between givers and receivers. As professional analysts of reasons for social processes as well as of reasons that social actors provide for their (...)
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  47. Why I’M Still a Proportionalist.Travis N. Rieder - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):251-270.
    Mark Schroeder has, rather famously, defended a powerful Humean Theory of Reasons. In doing so, he abandons what many take to be the default Humean view of weighting reasons—namely, proportionalism. On Schroeder’s view, the pressure that Humeans feel to adopt proportionalism is illusory, and proportionalism is unable to make sense of the fact that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. He thus offers his own ‘Recursive View’, which directly explains how it is that the weight of reasons is (...)
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  48. Reasons as Defaults.John F. Horty - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?
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  49. Practical Reasons and Moral ".Patricia Greenspan - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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  50. Weighing Reasons.Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Normative reasons have become a popular theoretical tool in recent decades. One helpful feature of normative reasons is their weight. The fourteen new essays in this book theorize about many different aspects of weight. Topics range from foundational issues to applications of weight in debates across philosophy.
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1 — 50 / 2267