Reasons

Edited by Errol Lord (University of Pennsylvania)
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  1. Semantics for Reasons, by Bryan Weaver and Kevin Scharp. [REVIEW]Daniel Fogal & Peter Van Elswyk - forthcoming - Ethics.
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  2. Egoism and humanism.Andrej Poleev - 2020 - Enzymes 18.
    В противостоянии эгоизма и гуманизма лишь „возделывание души“ может предотвратить всеобщее падение в пропасть безумия и мракобесия.
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  3. Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: A Defense of Indefinability.Miles Tucker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2261-2276.
    Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. Though the fitting-attitude analysis is powerful, the Moorean view is still attractive. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and Jacobson; (...)
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  4. Aristotle on Motion in Incomplete Animals.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science.
    I explain what Aristotle means when, after puzzling about the matter of motion in incomplete animals (those without sight, smell, hearing), he suggests in De Anima III 11.433b31-434a5 that just as incomplete animals are moved indeterminately, desire and phantasia are present in those animals, but present indeterminately. I argue that self-motion and its directing faculties in incomplete animals differ in degree but not in kind from those of complete animals. I examine how an object of desire differs for an incomplete (...)
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  5. In Defense of Exclusionary Reasons.N. P. Adams - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense (...)
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  6. Normative Reasons for Mentalism.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 97-120.
    The aim of this paper is to connect the traditional epistemological issue of justification with what one might call the “new reasons paradigm” coming from the philosophy of action and metaethics. More specifically, I will show that Conee and Feldman’s mentalism, a version of internalism about justification, can profitably be spelled out in terms of subjective normative reasons. On the way to achieving this aim, I will argue that it is important to ask not just the oft-discussed ontological question about (...)
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  7. Norm-Establishing and Norm-Following in Autonomous Agency.Xabier Barandiaran & Matthew Egbert - 2013 - Artificial Life 91 (2):1-24.
    Living agency is subject to a normative dimension (good-bad, adaptive-maladaptive) that is absent from other types of interaction. We review current and historical attempts to naturalize normativity from an organism-centered perspective, identifying two central problems and their solution: (1) How to define the topology of the viability space so as to include a sense of gradation that permits reversible failure, and (2) how to relate both the processes that establish norms and those that result in norm-following behavior. We present a (...)
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  8. Vertical precedents in formal models of precedential constraint.Gabriel L. Broughton - 2019 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 27 (3):253-307.
    The standard model of precedential constraint holds that a court is equally free to modify a precedent of its own and a precedent of a superior court—overruling aside, it does not differentiate horizontal and vertical precedents. This paper shows that no model can capture the U.S. doctrine of precedent without making that distinction. A precise model is then developed that does just that. This requires situating precedent cases in a formal representation of a hierarchical legal structure, and adjusting the constraint (...)
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  9. Are Desires Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Avery Archer - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    There has been an ongoing debate about whether desires are beliefs. Call the claim that they are the desire-as-belief thesis (DAB). This paper sets out to impugn the two versions of DAB that have enjoyed the most support in the philosophical literature: the guise of the good and the guise of reasons accounts. According to the guise of the good version of DAB, the desire to X is identical to the belief that X is good. According to the guise of (...)
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  10. The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Richard Rowland - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on (...)
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  11. Wanting is Believing: A Theory of Human Behaviour and its Rationality.Alex Gregory - manuscript
    Under contract with Oxford University Press. -/- The book defends desire-as-belief, according to which the word “desire” just picks out a special subset of our beliefs: beliefs about reasons. On this view, wanting to do something is just the same thing as believing that there is reason to do it. This view allows us to see how human behaviour should be explained: by appeal to our desires, which is to say, our beliefs about reasons. This view also allows us to (...)
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  12. Conflicts, Bounded Rationality and Collective Wisdom in a Networked Society.J. Francisco Alvarez - 2016 - In Giovanni Scarafile & Leah Gruenpeter Gold (eds.), Paradoxes of Conflicts. Springer. pp. 85-95.
    Álvarez J.F. (2016) Conflicts, Bounded Rationality and Collective Wisdom in a Networked Society. In: Scarafile G., Gruenpeter Gold L. (eds) Paradoxes of Conflicts. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning (Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Humanities and Social Sciences), vol 12. Springer, Cham -/- The adoption of an individualistic perspective on reasoning, choice and decision is a spring of paradoxes of conflicts. Usually the agents immerse in conflicts are drawn or modelled as rational individuals with targets well defined and full capabilities to access to (...)
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  13. Possessing Epistemic Reasons: The Role of Rational Capacities.Eva Schmidt - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):483-501.
    In this paper, I defend a reasons-first view of epistemic justification, according to which the justification of our beliefs arises entirely in virtue of the epistemic reasons we possess. I remove three obstacles for this view, which result from its presupposition that epistemic reasons have to be possessed by the subject: the problem that reasons-first accounts of justification are necessarily circular; the problem that they cannot give special epistemic significance to perceptual experience; the problem that they have to say that (...)
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  14. Can There Be Government House Reasons for Action?Hille Paakunainen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):56-93.
    I defend the relatively orthodox view that reasons for action are premises in good practical reasoning, against recent counterexamples that suggest that, like “government house” moral justifications, some reasons are to be ignored in deliberation. I also explain, positively, what is right about the orthodoxy. Unless reasons are premises in good practical reasoning, reasons cannot be normative in the way they are usually taken to be, and relatedly, are unfit to play certain familiar theoretical and related everyday roles that give (...)
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  15. Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.
    What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are (...)
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  16. Defeating Pragmatic Encroachment?Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7).
    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores two ways (...)
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  17. Ethics and Practical Reason. [REVIEW]James Mahon - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 7:119-120.
    In this review of essays on the topic of practical reason, the neo-Humeanism of philosophers such as James Drier, according to whom reasons are instrumental, is shown to be susceptible to the objections of Kantian philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard: the fact that you desire to X can never entail that you ought to X. Kantianism, however, comes under attack from neo-Aristotelian philosophers such as Berys Gaut, who argues that it is a mistake to identify goodness with being the object (...)
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  18. Review of Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome. [REVIEW]Barry Maguire - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1.
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  19. Objectivity and the Internal-External Reasons Controversy: A Study of Paul K. Moser’s Philosophy After Objectivity. [REVIEW]Robert Audi - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):395.
    This is a book that takes seriously both skepticism and the philosophical theories in tension with it. It argues with great force that there are plausible versions of skepticism that cannot, without question-begging, be refuted, yet it rejects the inference from that conclusion to the permissibility of an anything-goes attitude in philosophy. Instead, the book represents a distinctive kind of agnosticism: rejecting naive realism and adopting agnosticism even toward sophisticated realism forces us to adopt a kind of relativism, but leaves (...)
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  20. Two Notions of Intentional Action? Solving a Puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (3):578-602.
    The account of intentional action Anscombe provides in her Intention has had a huge influence on the development of contemporary action theory. But what is intentional action, according to Anscombe? She seems to give two different answers, saying first that they are actions to which a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ is applicable, and second that they form a sub-class of the things a person knows without observation. Anscombe gives no explicit account of how these two characterizations converge on (...)
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  21. Gert, Joshua. Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 218. $65.00. [REVIEW]Bart Streumer - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):608-612.
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  22. Book ReviewsRüdiger Bittner,. Doing Things for Reasons.New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 204. $35.00.Joseph Mendola - 2003 - Ethics 113 (2):393-396.
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  23. Book ReviewB. C. Postow, Reasons for Action: Toward a Normative Theory and Meta‐Level Criteria.Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. Pp. 204. $90.00. [REVIEW]Robert Noggle - 2001 - Ethics 112 (1):175-177.
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  24. Reasons as Defaults. [REVIEW]Stephen Finlay - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):286-289.
    Review of Jeff Horty's book REASONS AS DEFAULTS (OUP 2012).
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  25. Can Reason Establish the Goals of Action? Assessing Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Agency.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2017 - Discusiones Filosóficas 18 (30):35-62.
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...)
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  26. Reasoning with Reasons.Daniel Star - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 241-59.
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  27. Introduction.Daniel Star - forthcoming - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  28. Reasons Internalism.Errol Lord & David Plunkett - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 324-339.
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  29. Reasons or Fittingness First?Richard Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.
    Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.
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  30. Defaulting on Reasons.Daniel Bonevac - 2018 - Noûs:229-259.
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  31. In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.
    Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according (...)
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  32. Lewis Explains His Reasons for Distrusting the so-Called "Higher Criticism," and Warns About its Consequence to Modern Anglicanism.C. S. Lewis - 1991 - The Chesterton Review 17 (3):541-542.
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  33. The Epistemology of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):57-84.
    This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience, and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View. It then challenges two (...)
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  34. New Trouble for “Reasons as Evidence”: Means That Don’T Justify the Ends.Eva Schmidt - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):708-718.
    In this article, I argue against Kearns and Star’s reasons-as-evidence view, which identifies normative reasons to ɸ with evidence that one ought to ɸ. I provide a new counterexample to their view, the student case, which involves an inference to the best explanation from means to end or, more generally, from a derivative to a more foundational “ought” proposition. It shows that evidence that one ought to act a certain way is not in all cases a reason so to act. (...)
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  35. Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to Oughts.Bradford Hooker - unknown
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  36. Justifying Practical Reasons.Georg Spielthenner - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1).
    : This paper is about the nature of practical reasons. More specifically, my primary goal is to explore when an agent has a justifying reason for action¾that is, a reason that can be used for justifying an action that has been done or that the agent is planning to do. This concept of reason is central to ethics and to practical philosophy in general. I defend an account of reason according to which a piece of practical reasoning gives an agent (...)
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  37. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
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  38. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
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  39. Two Ways of Explaining Actions.Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    In my Practical Reality I argued that the reasons for which we act are not to be conceived of as psychological states of ourselves, but as real states of the world. The main reason for saying this was that only thus can we make sense of the idea that it is possible to act for a good reason. The good reasons we have for doing this action rather than that one consist mainly of features of the situations in which we (...)
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  40. Out of the Space of Reasons: Argumentation, Agents, and Persons.Christopher W. Tindale - 2011 - Radical Philosophy Review of Books 19 (3):383-398.
    The paper investigates the `logical space of reasons' as a social space in which rational agents operate and persons in an important sense come to be. Building from an investigation of argumentative agents in Aristotle's Rhetoric, I discuss both interior and exterior criteria for personhood and propose that the latter shows how argumentation, as a principal activity of the space of reasons, results in the particular kinds of persons we recognize there as rational agents. The overall analysis is indebted to (...)
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  41. Useful Rhymes and Good Reasons.Edward A. Synan - 1977 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 51:171.
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  42. Why Pass Every Buck? On Skorupski's Buck‐Passing Account of Normativity.Richard Rowland - 2011 - Ratio 24 (3):340-348.
  43. Slaves of the Passions. By Mark Schroeder. (Oxford UP, 2007. Pp. 224. Price US$85.00.).James Lenman - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):384-387.
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  44. Agent, Action, and Reason.Roger Trigg - 1973 - Philosophical Quarterly 23 (90):87-89.
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  45. Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons.Theo Van Willigenburg - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1):45-62.
    Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical reasoning (...)
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  46. En la cuerda floja. El acceso normativo en Practical Reality.Antonio Gaitán Torres - 2005 - Critica 37 (109):65-97.
    Este artículo presenta una alternativa a la dicotomía entre razones motivacionales y razones normativas. En Practical Reality, Dancy mantiene que ambas razones se identifican con estados externos al agente--"tesis de la identidad" --. Hay dos argumentos en PR a favor de la TI: El primero se basa en una interpretación externista del significado de "tener una razón". El segundo presenta una vía indirecta, defendiendo que las adscripciones de razones según estados psicológicos internos no son casos centrales en las explicaciones normativas. (...)
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  47. Morals, Roles and Reasons for Action.J. L. A. García - 1985 - Critica 17 (50):29-44.
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  48. Reasons.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Critica 7 (21):3-17.
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  49. Constructing Normative Objectivity in Ethics: David B. Wong.David B. Wong - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):237-266.
    This essay explains the inescapability of moral demands. I deny that the individual has genuine reason to comply with these demands only if she has desires that would be served by doing so. Rather, the learning of moral reasons helps to shape and channel self- and other-interested motivations so as to facilitate and promote social cooperation. This shaping happens through the “embedding” of reasons in the intentional objects of motivational propensities. The dominance of the instrumental conception of reason, according to (...)
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  50. Desires, Whims and Values.Donald C. Hubin - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 7 (3):315-335.
    Neo-Humean instrumentalists hold that an agent's reasons for acting are grounded in the agent's desires. Numerous objections have been leveled against this view, but the most compelling concerns the problem of "alien desires" - desires with which the agent does not identify. The standard version of neo-Humeanism holds that these desires, like any others, generate reasons for acting. A variant of neo-Humeanism that grounds an agent's reasons on her values, rather than all of her desires, avoids this implication, but at (...)
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