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  1. added 2020-06-05
    Eine einheitliche Konzeption von Rationalität.Stefan Gosepath - 1994 - ProtoSociology 6:114-133.
    This article argues for the thesis that there is only one basic form of rationality, which is applied in different areas. First of all, there is one meaning of the term "rational" which applies to all situations in which the term is used: "justified." If "rational" means simply "justified", then rationality can be broken down into as many types as there are kinds of justification. Two distinctions between kinds of justification seem particularly plausible: 1. relative vs. absolute justifications and 2. (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-05
    Aufgeklärtes Eigeninteresse. Eine Theorie Theoretischer Und Praktischer Rationalität [Enlightened Self-Interest. A Theory of Theoretical and Practical Rationality].Stefan Gosepath - 1992 - Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland: Suhrkamp.
    The subject of my dissertation is "rationality". In this book I undertake a comprehensive, systematic and independent treatment of the problem of rationality. This furthers progress toward a general theory of rationality, one that represents and defends a uniform conception of reason. The structure and general outline are as follows: Part I: General Definition of the Concept; Part II: Rationality in the Theoretical Realm; Part III: Rationality in the Practical Realm (parts II and III are divided respectively into A. Relative (...)
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  3. added 2020-06-04
    Suspension of Judgment, Rationality's Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic.Errol Lord - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 126-145.
    Errol Lord explores the boundaries of epistemic normativity. He argues that we can understand these better by thinking about which mental states are competitors in rationality’s competition. He argues that belief, disbelief, and two kinds of suspension of judgment are competitors. Lord shows that there are non-evidential reasons for suspension of judgment. One upshot is an independent motivation for a certain sort of pragmatist view of epistemic rationality.
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  4. added 2020-06-04
    Two Kinds of Rationality.Gerhard Ernst - 2020 - In Gerhard Ernst & Sebastian Schmidt (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 177-190.
    Gerhard Ernst tries to clarify the nature of rationality. He does this by distinguishing two fundamentally different kinds of rationality: rationality in the “adjustment-sense” and rationality in the “evaluation-sense.” A person is rational in the adjustment-sense if her mental states are well adjusted to each other, i.e. if her beliefs, emotions and intentions fit together (in a sense Ernst explains); a person is rational in the evaluation-sense if she has evaluative beliefs which are adequate on the basis of her non-evaluative (...)
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  5. added 2020-05-18
    Rationality and Responsibility.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
    Broome takes himself and his opponents to be concerned with the ordinary use of 'ra-tional'. I argue that this is at best misleading. For the object of current theories of rationality is determined by a specific use of 'rational' that is intimately connected to blame and praise. I call the property it refers to 'rationalityRESP'. This focus on rationalityRESP, I argue, has two significant implications for Broome's critique of theories of rationality as reasons-responsiveness. First, ra-tionalityRESP is plausibly conceived of as (...)
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  6. added 2020-05-05
    Transmission Failures.Stephen White - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):719-732.
    According to a natural view of instrumental normativity, if you ought to do X, and doing Y is a necessary means for you to do X, then you ought to do Y. In “Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle,” Benjamin Kiesewetter defends this principle against certain actualist-inspired counterexamples. In this article I argue that Kiesewetter’s defense of the transmission principle fails. His arguments rely on certain principles—Joint Satisfiability and Reason Transmission--which we should not accept in the unqualified forms (...)
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  7. added 2020-05-01
    Evidentialism in Action.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse. But this debate (...)
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  8. added 2020-04-30
    Immorality and Irrationality.Alex Worsnip* - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    Does immorality necessarily involve irrationality? The question is often taken to be among the deepest in moral philosophy. But apparently deep questions sometimes admit of deflationary answers. In this case we can make way for a deflationary answer by appealing to dualism about rationality, according to which there are two fundamentally distinct notions of rationality: structural rationality and substantive rationality. I have defended dualism elsewhere. Here, I’ll argue that it allows us to embrace a sensible – I will not say (...)
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  9. added 2020-04-29
    Normative Metaphysics for Accountants.Barry Maguire & Justin Snedegar - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    We use normative reasons in a bewildering variety of different ways. And yet, as many recent theorists have shown, one can discern systematic distinctions underlying this complexity. This paper is a contribution to this project of constructive normative metaphysics. We aim to bring a black sheep back into the flock: the balancing model of weighing reasons. This model is threatened by a variety of cases in which distinct reasons overlap, in the sense that they do not contribute separate weight for (...)
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  10. added 2020-04-23
    On the Normativity of Intentions.Bruno Verbeek - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):87-101.
    Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended (...)
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  11. added 2020-04-23
    The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (3):454-471.
    I admire Audi's intentions in discussing the rationality of beliefs, desires, and actions together, and doubt that this can be done internalistically, as he tries.
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  12. added 2020-04-17
    Der Ort der Vernunft in Einer Natürlichen Welt. Logische Und an­Thro­Pologi­Sche Ortsbestimmungen.Wolf-Jürgen Cramm & Geert Keil (eds.) - 2008 - Velbrück Wissenschaft.
    Wie ist der Ort der Vernunft in einer natürlichen Welt zu bestimmen? Diese Frage hat wörtliche und metaphorische Lesarten. Im wörtlichen Sinne kann die Vernunft schwerlich einen Ort haben, wohingegen wir als vernunftfähige Wesen zugleich in der natürlichen Welt situiert sind. Man kann aber sinnvoll nach dem logischen Ort der Vernunft fragen, also danach, wie sich die Rede über Vernünftiges oder potentiell Vernünftiges zur Rede über Natürliches verhält. In der metaphorischen Lesart lautet die Frage, in welchem logischen oder begrifflichen Verhältnis (...)
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  13. added 2020-03-31
    When No Reason for is a Reason Against.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):426-431.
    We provide a Bayesian justification of the idea that, under certain conditions, the absence of an argument in favour of the truth of a hypothesis H constitutes a good argument against the truth of H.
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  14. added 2020-03-17
    Introduction to the Collection.Andrea Sauchelli - 2020 - In Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. London, UK: pp. 1-9.
  15. added 2020-03-15
    Normative Uncertainty and the Dependence Problem.Abelard Podgorski - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):43-70.
    In this paper, I enter the debate between those who hold that our normative uncertainty matters for what we ought to do, and those who hold that only our descriptive uncertainty matters. I argue that existing views in both camps have unacceptable implications in cases where our descriptive beliefs depend on our normative beliefs. I go on to propose a fix which is available only to those who hold that normative uncertainty matters, ultimately leaving the challenge as a threat to (...)
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  16. added 2020-03-13
    Reconceiving Rationality: Situating Rationality Into Radically Enactive Cognition.Giovanni Rolla - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    Rational beliefs and actions are typically evaluated against certain benchmarks, e.g., those of classical logic or probability theory. Rationality therefore is traditionally taken to involve some sort of reasoning, which in turn implies contentful cognition. Radically Enactive views of Cognition, on the other hand, claim that not all cognition is contentful. In order to show that rationality does not need to lie outside of REC’s scope of radicalizing cognition, I develop a Radically Enactive notion of Rationality, according to which rationality (...)
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  17. added 2020-03-11
    Gründe, Rationalität und Parenthetikalismus. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.
    This is a review of Tim Henning's 'From a Rational Point of View' (Oxford 2019).
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  18. added 2020-03-03
    Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness.Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
    John Broome argues that rationality cannot consist in reasons-responsiveness since rationality supervenes on the mind, while reasons-responsiveness does not supervene on the mind. I here defend this conception of rationality by way of defending the assumption that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind. Given the many advantages of an analysis of rationality in terms of reasons-responsiveness, and in light of independent considerations in favour of the view that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind, we should take seriously the backup view, a hypothesis (...)
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  19. added 2020-03-02
    I Knew I Shouldn’T Do It; But I Did It: Davidson on Causal Strength and Weakness of Will.Rafael Martins - 2019 - Investigação Filosófica 10 (2):05-20.
    Reasons for action is a widely employed methodology in practical philosophy, and especially in moral philosophy. Reasons are facts that explain and justify actions. But, conceptually, if reasons were causes, incontinent actions would be impossible. When an agent ranks an evaluation about what to do as his best judgement, it entails that he has a reason for acting as that judgement prescribes. But when an agent acts incontinently, he acts in accordance to an intention that is not aligned with his (...)
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  20. added 2020-02-28
    The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    In this paper, I offer a novel view of the coherence (or structural) requirements on belief and intention, according to which they are not norms, but rather principles describing how your belief and intention operate. I first argue, on the basis of the unintelligibility of some relevant attitudes-reports, that there are conditions under which you simply do not count as believing or intending unless your beliefs and intentions satisfy the requirements: the conditions under which all of your relevant attitudes are (...)
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  21. added 2020-02-19
    Prudence, Sunk Costs, and the Temporally Extended Self.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Many find it reasonable to take our past actions into account when making choices for the future. In this paper, I address two important issues regarding taking past investments into account in prudential deliberation. The first is the charge that doing so commits the fallacy of honoring sunk costs. I argue that while it is indeed irrational to care about sunk costs, past investments are not sunk costs when we can change their teleological significance, roughly their contribution to our excellence (...)
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  22. added 2020-02-15
    Competing Reasons.Justin Snedegar - forthcoming - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  23. added 2020-02-13
    La Estructura Lógica de Conciencia.Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    Es mi afirmación que la tabla de intencionalidad (racionalidad, mente, pensamiento, lenguaje, personalidad, etc.) que presenta prominentemente aquí describe más o menos con precisión, o al menos sirve como heurística para, cómo pensamos y nos comportamos, y por lo tanto no abarca simplemente filosofía y psicología, sino todo lo demás (historia, literatura, matemáticas, política, etc.). Tenga en cuenta especialmente que la intencionalidad y racionalidad como yo (junto con Searle, Wittgenstein y otros) lo veo, incluye tanto el Sistema Linguístico deliberativo consciente (...)
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  24. added 2020-02-13
    A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência.Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    É minha afirmação que a tabela da intencionalidade (racionalidade, mente, pensamento, linguagem, personalidade etc.) que apresenta proeminentemente aqui descreve mais ou menos precisamente, ou pelo menos serve como um heurista para, como pensamos e nos comportamos, e por isso engloba não meramente filosofia e psicologia, mas tudo o resto (história, literatura, matemática, política etc.). Note especialmente que a intencionalidade e a racionalidade como eu (juntamente com Searle, Wittgenstein e outros) a vêem, inclui tanto ações ou reflexos automatizados inconscientes do Sistema (...)
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  25. added 2020-02-12
    Having Reasons: An Essay on Rationality and Sociality.Edward J. Green - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):28-33.
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  26. added 2020-01-31
    Besteht Libertarische Freiheit Darin, Beste Gründe in den Wind Zu Schlagen?Geert Keil - 2019 - In Klaus von Stosch (ed.), Streit um die Freiheit. Philosophische und theologische Perspektiven. Paderborn: Schöningh. pp. 23-39.
    1. Ein klassischer Einwand gegen die libertarische Freiheitsauffassung 2. Eine Flurbereinigung: Buridan-Situationen 3. Freiheit zur Unvernunft 4. Freiheit zur Unmoral 5. Du kannst, weil du sollst? 6. Freiheit als Zwei-Wege-Vermögen.
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  27. added 2020-01-25
    Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - In Gerhard Ernst & Sebastian Schmidt (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: pp. 149-175.
    I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons for attitudes. (...)
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  28. added 2020-01-24
    Unity of Reasons.Adam Cureton - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):877-895.
    There are at least two basic normative notions: rationality and reasons. The dominant normative account of reasons nowadays, which I call primitive pluralism about reasons, holds that some reasons are normatively basic and there is no underlying normative explanation of them in terms of other normative notions. Kantian constructivism about reasons, understood as a normative rather than a metaethical view, holds that rationality is the primitive normative notion that picks out which non-normative facts are reasons for what and explains why (...)
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  29. added 2020-01-17
    Ambivalence, Incoherence, and Self-Governance.John Brunero - forthcoming - In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. London, UK: Routledge.
    The paper develops two objections to Michael Bratman’s self-governance approach to the normativity of rational requirements. Bratman, drawing upon work by Harry Frankfurt, argues that having a place where one stands is a necessary, constitutive element of self-governance, and that violations of the consistency and coherence requirements on intentions make one lack a place where one stands. This allows for reasons of self-governance to ground reasons to comply with these rational requirements, thereby vindicating the normativity of rationality. The first objection (...)
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  30. added 2019-12-11
    Minimal Disturbance: In Defence of Pragmatic Reasons of the Right Kind.Lisa Bastian - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons (...)
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  31. added 2019-11-14
    The Good, the Bad, and the Uncertain: Intentional Action Under Normative Uncertainty.Fabienne Peter - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):57-70.
    My focus in this paper is on a type of bad actions, namely actions that appear to be done for reasons that are not good reasons. I take such bad actions to be ubiquitous. But their ubiquity gives rise to a puzzle, especially if we assume that intentional actions are performed for what one believes or takes to be good reasons. The puzzle I aim to solve in this paper is: why do we seem to be getting it wrong so (...)
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  32. added 2019-10-30
    Wholehearted Love: An Augustinian Reconstruction of Frankfurt.Alexander Jech - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Harry G. Frankfurt’s work on agency and reflexivity represents one of the most important attempts in the current philosophical literature to elaborate the structure of agency. Frankfurt wishes to provide an account of what I call the “deep structures” of agency—those features of agency, such as care and love, in virtue of which the surface features, such as desire, are to be explained and understood. These deep structures are important because of their power to explain unified diachronic patterns in our (...)
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  33. added 2019-10-29
    Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry.Andrea Sauchelli (ed.) - 2020 - Routledge.
    Derek Parfit (1942–2017) is widely considered to be one of the most important moral philosophers of the twentieth century. Reasons and Persons is arguably the most influential of the two books published in his lifetime and hailed as a classic work of ethics and personal identity. Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry is an outstanding introduction to and assessment of Parfit’s book, with chapters by leading scholars of ethics, metaphysics and of Parfit’s work. Part I provides (...)
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  34. added 2019-10-24
    There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Barry Maguire - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):779-805.
    A dogma of contemporary ethical theory maintains that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is the very same as the nature of normative support for actions. The prevailing view is that normative reasons provide the support across the board. I argue that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is importantly different from the nature of normative support for actions. Actions are indeed supported by reasons. Reasons are gradable and contributory. The support relations for affective attitudes are (...)
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  35. added 2019-10-20
    Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance.Anne Meylan - forthcoming - Brill Studies in Skepticism.
    That we have practical reasons to believe certain propositions even if sceptical arguments are cogent is nothing new. As Hume puts it, if sceptical principles were steadily accepted, “men would remain in a total lethargy until their miserable lives came to an end through lack of food, drink and shelter.” (Enquiry, 12, 2). This heart-breaking projection fails to move contemporary epistemologists who, for the most part, brush off pragmatist stances on scepticism. In this paper, I argue that the pragmatist stance (...)
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  36. added 2019-10-18
    The Importance of Being Rational, by Errol Lord. [REVIEW]Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):523-527.
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  37. added 2019-10-12
    On What We Should Believe (and When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should Not Believe).Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties.
    A theory of what we should believe should include a theory of what we should believe when we are uncertain about what we should believe and/or uncertain about the factors that determine what we should believe. In this paper, I present a novel theory of what we should believe that gives normative externalists a way of responding to a suite of objections having to do with various kinds of error, ignorance, and uncertainty. This theory is inspired by recent work in (...)
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  38. added 2019-10-07
    Evidentialism Doesn’T Make an Exception for Belief.Keshav Singh - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    Susanna Rinard has recently offered a new argument for pragmatism and against evidentialism. According to Rinard, evidentialists must hold that the rationality of belief is determined in a way that is different from how the rationality of other states is determined. She argues that we should instead endorse a view she calls Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of all states is determined in the same way. In this paper, I show that Rinard’s claims are mistaken, and that evidentialism (...)
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  39. added 2019-10-07
    Dos teorías acerca del valor de la racionalidad. [REVIEW]Julen Ibarrondo - 2019 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 38:115-127.
    En esta nota crítica presento las recientes aportaciones de Wedgwood y Kiesewetter al debate sobre la normatividad de la racionalidad y reconstruyo sus argumentos para ponerlos en diálogo. Mi conclusión es que ninguna de las dos propuestas, la racionalidad como responder a evidencias o como minimizar las expectativas de fracaso son completamente satisfactorias para explicar cómo la racionalidad guía nuestra deliberación y desempeña un papel crucial en diversas prácticas.
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  40. added 2019-10-05
    Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, we propose a new theory of rationality defeat. We propose that defeaters are indicators of ignorance, evidence that we’re not in a position to know some target proposition. When the evidence that we’re not in a position to know is sufficiently strong and the probability that we can know is too low, it is not rational to believe. We think that this account retains all the virtues of the more familiar approaches that characterise defeat in terms of (...)
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  41. added 2019-10-03
    Scope or Focus? Normative Focus and the Metaphysics of Normative Relations.Nicholas Shackel - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (6):281-312.
    A prolonged debate about the nature of norms has been conducted in terms of the scope of a modal operator. Here I argue that the features of what I call Normative Focus are more fundamental than scope. We shall see limitations of scope contrasted with better analysis in terms of Normative Focus. Some authors address such limitations by extending what they mean by scope. I show that scope is still not doing the work: what does it is their elicitation of (...)
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  42. added 2019-09-27
    Levinas and Analytic Philosophy: An Ethical Metaphysics of Reasons.Kevin Houser - 2018 - In Michael L. Morgan (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Levinas. pp. 587-614.
    Recent analytic philosophy often explains our responsibility to one another in terms of normative reasons. Emmanuel Levinas thinks this is backwards. We are not responsible to one another because we have reasons to be. For reasons are themselves something we are responsible to one another to have; and it is only because we are responsible to one another for them that we are able to have our own reasons. Put broadly: Reasons-responsiveness is a form of responsiveness to persons. Standard reasons-first (...)
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  43. added 2019-09-24
    Enkrasia or Evidentialism? Learning to Love Mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.
    I formulate a resilient paradox about epistemic rationality, discuss and reject various solutions, and sketch a way out. The paradox exemplifies a tension between a wide range of views of epistemic justification, on the one hand, and enkratic requirements on rationality, on the other. According to the enkratic requirements, certain mismatched doxastic states are irrational, such as believing p, while believing that it is irrational for one to believe p. I focus on an evidentialist view of justification on which a (...)
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  44. added 2019-09-23
    Brute Requirements: Critical Notice. [REVIEW]Sergio Tenenbaum - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):153-171.
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  45. added 2019-09-19
    Conflicts of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    The thesis contains my early work arguing against evidentialism for reasons for belief (chapter 1), my early argument that rationality is not normative (chapter 2), an argument that rationality is not responding reasons, at least understood in one way (chapter 2), a general discussion of how normative conflicts might (appear to) arise in many different ways (chapter 3), a discussion of how to weigh pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief (chapter 4), and a discussion of the general structure of normativity (...)
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  46. added 2019-09-17
    Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that our beliefs have been afflicted by motivated reasoning or other cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence. While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should impact our beliefs, it is less clear how and (...)
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  47. added 2019-09-13
    Tim Henning, From a Rational Point of View: How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse. [REVIEW]Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):113-118.
    Reasons internalists claim that facts about normative reasons for action are facts about which actions would promote an agent’s goals and values. Reasons internalism is popular, even though paradigmatic versions have moral consequences many find unwelcome. This article reconstructs an influential but understudied argument for reasons internalism, the “if I were you” argument, which is due to Bernard Williams and Kate Manne. I raise an objection to the argument and argue that replying to it requires reasons internalists to accept controversial (...)
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  48. added 2019-09-13
    Internal Reasons and the Boy Who Cried Wolf.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):32-58.
    Reasons internalists claim that facts about normative reasons for action are facts about which actions would promote an agent’s goals and values. Reasons internalism is popular, even though paradigmatic versions have moral consequences many find unwelcome. This article reconstructs an influential but understudied argument for reasons internalism, the “if I were you” argument, which is due to Bernard Williams and Kate Manne. I raise an objection to the argument and argue that replying to it requires reasons internalists to accept controversial (...)
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  49. added 2019-09-13
    Rational Internalism.Samuel Asarnow - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):147-178.
    I describe and motivate Rational Internalism, a principle concerning the relationship between motivating reasons (which explain actions) and normative reasons (which justify actions). I use this principle to construct a novel argument against Objectivist theories of normative reasons, which hold that facts about normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of an independently specified class of normative or evaluative facts. I then argue for an alternative theory of normative reasons, the Reasoning View, which is consistent with both Rational Internalism and (...)
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  50. added 2019-09-12
    Reasoning First.Pamela Hieronymi - forthcoming - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Practical Reasoning. New York, NY, USA:
    Many think of reasons as facts, propositions, or considerations that stand in some relation (or relations) to attitudes, actions, states of affairs. The relation may be an explanatory one or a “normative” one—though some are uncomfortable with irreducibly “normative” relations. I will suggest that we should, instead, see reasons as items in pieces of reasoning. They relate, in the first instance, not to psychological states or events or states of affairs, but to questions. That relation is neither explanatory nor “normative.” (...)
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