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Reasons

Edited by Errol Lord (University of Pennsylvania)
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  1. Gregory Alexander, Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?
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  2. Maria Alvarez (forthcoming). Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality. Synthese:1-18.
    What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are (...)
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  3. Arthur Isak Applbaum (2000). Part II. Roles and Reasons. In Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life. Princeton University Press. pp. 43-110.
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  4. Monroe C. Beardsley (1962). On the Generality of Critical Reasons. Journal of Philosophy 59 (18):477-486.
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  5. Ansgar Beckermann (2015). Explaining Actions by Reasons. In Ralf Stoecker & Marco Iorio (eds.), Actions, Reasons and Reason. De Gruyter. pp. 27-44.
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  6. Daniel Bonevac (2016). Defaulting on Reasons. Noûs 50 (3).
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  7. Sarah Buss (2006). Needs , Projects , and Reasons. Journal of Philosophy 103 (8):373-402.
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  8. James Cargile (1966). On Having Reasons. Analysis 26 (6):189 - 192.
    Thesis: Even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. (Hume) Antithesis: A man who knows of at least one case of an X being a Y, and who does not know of any positive reason for thinking that an X might not be a Y, has some reason for thinking that all X's are Y's (p. 81). When (...)
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  9. Alejandra Carrasco (2000). Practical Reasons, Person, and Common Good. Vera Lex 1 (1/2):73-98.
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  10. W. R. Carter (1974). Armstrong on Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):251 – 256.
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  11. Ruth Chang (2004). Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action? In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. pp. 56--90.
    What sorts of consideration can be normative reasons for action? If we systematize the wide variety of considerations that can be cited as normative reasons, do we find that there is a single kind of consideration that can always be a reason? Desire-based theorists think that the fact that you want something or would want it under certain evaluatively neutral conditions can always be your normative reason for action. Value-based theorists, by contrast, think that what plays that role are evaluative (...)
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  12. Ruth Chang (2001). Review: Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447 - 453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
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  13. Philip Clark (1997). Practical Steps and Reasons for Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):17 - 45.
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  14. Zvi Y. Cohen (1999). Reasons, Justifications and Excuses. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Austin lamented philosophers' obsession with justifications and disregard for other forms of reasoned defense. He urged attention to another way in which reasons function, which he described in terms of "excuses" and "the opposite number of excuses". I articulate a conception of reasons founded on Austin's distinction. The conception is heterogeneous, in that it construes reasons as defined by an inherent duality of function: their roles in both justifying and making excuses. The conception applies uniformly in both speculative and practical (...)
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  15. Rachel Cohon (2000). The Roots of Reasons. Philosophical Review 109 (1):63-85.
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  16. Mary Clayton Coleman (2005). Public Reasons and Practical Solipsism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):317-336.
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  17. L. W. Colter (1998). The Sources of Normativity. Review of Metaphysics 51 (4):940-941.
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  18. Juan Comesaña (2015). Can We Believe for Practical Reasons? Philosophical Issues 25 (1):189-207.
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  19. David Copp (2001). Against Internalism About Reasons—Gert's Rational Options. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):455–461.
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  20. Garrett Cullity (2013). The Context-Undermining of Practical Reasons. Ethics 124 (1):8-34.
    Can one fact deprive another of the status of a reason for action—a status the second fact would have had, but for the presence of the first? Claims of this kind are often made, but they face substantial obstacles. This article sets out those obstacles but then argues that there are at least three different ways in which this does happen.
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  21. Giuseppina D'Oro (2004). Collingwood, Psychologism and Internalism. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):163–177.
    The paper defends Collingwood's account of rational explanation against two objections. The first is that he psychologizes the concept of practical reason. The second is that he fails to distinguish mere rationalizations from rationalizations that have causal power. I argue that Collingwood endorses a form of nonpsychologizing internalism which rests on the view that the appropriate explanans for actions are neither empirical facts (as externalists claim), nor psychological facts (as some internalists claim), but propositional facts. I then defend this form (...)
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  22. Jonathan Dancy (2012). Response to Mark Schroeder's Slaves of the Passions. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 157 (3):455-462.
    Response to Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the passions Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9656-3 Authors Jonathan Dancy, The University of Reading, Reading, UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  23. Jonathan Dancy (2011). Acting in Ignorance. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):345-357.
    This paper considers and rejects the arguments that have been given in favour of the view that one can only act for the reason that p if one knows that p . The paper contrasts it with the view I hold, which is that one can act for the reason that p even if it is not the case that p.
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  24. Jonathan Dancy, What Do Reasons Do?
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  25. Jonathan Dancy (2004). Enticing Reasons. In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Clarendon Press.
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  26. Jonathan Dancy (2004). Two Ways of Explaining Actions. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:25-42.
    In my Practical Reality I argued that the reasons for which we act are not to be conceived of as psychological states of ourselves, but as real states of the world. The main reason for saying this was that only thus can we make sense of the idea that it is possible to act for a good reason. The good reasons we have for doing this action rather than that one consist mainly of features of the situations in which we (...)
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  27. Jonathan Dancy, What Do Reasons Do?
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  28. Stephen Darwall (2007). How is Moorean Value Related to Reasons for Action? In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.
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  29. Donald Davidson (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
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  30. Joshua DiPaolo & Jeff Behrends (2015). Reason to Promotion Inferences. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-10.
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  31. Sabine A. Döring (2007). Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation. Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.
    Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...)
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  32. Fred I. Dretske (1971). Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
    Though one believes that P is true, one can have reasons for thinking it false. Yet, it seems that one cannot know that P is true and (still) have reasons for thinking it false. Why is this so? What feature of knowledge (or of reasons) precludes having reasons or evidence to believe (true) what you know to be false? If the connection between reasons (evidence) and what one believes is expressible as a probability relation, it would seem that the only (...)
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  33. Robert Dunn (2010). New Essays on the Explanation of Action, by Constantine Sandis. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):193-196.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  34. Robert Dunn (1991). Reasons, Attitudes and the Breakdown of Reasons. Philosophia 21 (1-2):53-67.
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  35. Robert Williams ed Binkley, Richard jt ed Bronaugh, Ausonio Marras & Ont London (1971). Agent, Action, and Reason. Edited by Robert Binkley, Richard Bronaugh [and] Ausonio Marras. --. University of Toronto Press.
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  36. Paulus Esterhazy (2014). Reasons for Action. Lulu.com.
    Reasons for action are considerations in the light of which we act. But just what is it that we attribute to a person when we credit her with a good reason? What sort of entity is on our minds when we deliberate about what we have reason to do? This book examines this question and evaluates a number of approaches to the philosophy of reasons, including normative realism, psychologism and Humeanism. The second half of the book contains the defense of (...)
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  37. Donald Evans (1982). Reason and Action — II. Philosophical Investigations 5 (4):279-300.
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  38. Stephen Everson, Motivating Reasons.
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  39. John F. Horty (2012). Reasons as Defaults. Oxford University Press USA.
    Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reasons interact to support the actions or conclusions they do. In this book, John F. Horty attempts to answer this question by providing a precise, concrete account of reasons and their interaction, based on the logic of default reasoning. The book begins with an intuitive, accessible introduction to default logic itself, and then argues that (...)
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  40. Simon Feldman (2013). Reasons, Motivating and Normative. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  41. David R. Finn (1969). Dretske on Reasons and Justification. Analysis 29 (3):101 - 102.
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  42. Walter R. Fisher (1980). Rationality and the Logic of Good Reasons. Philosophy and Rhetoric 13 (2):121 - 130.
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  43. Patrick Fleming (2008). On a Purported Principle of Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:143-162.
    A number of philosophers are attracted to the Principle of the Priority of Belief (or PPB) in practical matters. PPB has two parts: (1) it is a principle of practical reason to adjust your desires in accordance with your evaluative beliefs and (2) you should not adjust your evaluative beliefs in accordance with your desires. The central claim of this principle is that beliefs rightly govern desires and that desires have no authority over beliefs. This paper advances conceptual and empiricalarguments (...)
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  44. Richard Foley (1991). ``Evidence and Reasons for Belief". Analysis 51:98-102.
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  45. Richard Foley (1991). Evidence and Reasons for Belief. Analysis 51 (2):98 - 102.
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  46. Corbin Fowler (1980). Bruce Aune, "Reason and Action". [REVIEW] Metaphilosophy 11:303.
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  47. Christine Ladd Franklin (1893). Intuition and Reason. The Monist 3 (2):211-219.
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  48. R. Bruce Freed (1988). Reliability, Reasons, and Belief Contexts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):681 - 696.
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  49. J. L. A. García (1985). Morals, Roles and Reasons for Action. Critica 17 (50):29 - 44.
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  50. John Gardner & Timothy Macklem (2004). Reasons. In Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press.
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