Reasons

Edited by Errol Lord (University of Pennsylvania)
Related categories

2131 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 2131
Material to categorize
  1. Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Gregory Alexander - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality.Maria Alvarez - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. Part II. Roles and Reasons.Arthur Isak Applbaum - 2000 - In Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life. Princeton University Press. pp. 43-110.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Experience and Inference in the Grounding of Theoretical and Practical Reasons. [REVIEW]Robert Audi - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):202 - 221.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Objectivity and the Internal-External Reasons Controversy.Robert Audi - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):395-400.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Review: Objectivity and the Internal-External Reasons Controversy: A Study of Paul K. Moser's Philosophy After Objectivity. [REVIEW]Robert Audi - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):395 - 400.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Belief, Control, and Conclusive Reasons.Gordon Barnes - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):315-325.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. On the Generality of Critical Reasons.Monroe C. Beardsley - 1962 - Journal of Philosophy 59 (18):477-486.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Explaining Actions by Reasons.Ansgar Beckermann - 2015 - In Ralf Stoecker & Marco Iorio (eds.), Actions, Reasons and Reason. De Gruyter. pp. 27-44.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Can Reason Establish the Goals of Action? Assessing Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Agency.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - forthcoming - Discusiones Filosóficas.
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Defaulting on Reasons.Daniel Bonevac - 2016 - Noûs.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Constructivism, Agency, and the Problem of Alignment.Michael E. Bratman - 2012 - In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 81.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. Needs , Projects , and Reasons.Sarah Buss - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (8):373-402.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  14. Reasoning Together: Temptations, Dangers, and Cautions.Chris Campolo & Dale Turner - 2002 - Argumentation 16 (1):3-19.
    In the appropriate contexts reasoning is a powerful tool for producing intersubjective agreement about what counts as the best answer to a question that generates inquiry; sometimes employing arguments can lead to agreement about what is the right answer. In this paper we hope to show, however, that unabashed optimism about the power of argument is misplaced. Such optimism rests on an implausible picture of the power of articulation. Sentences cashed out as reasons to believe another sentence is true cannot (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. On Having Reasons.James Cargile - 1966 - Analysis 26 (6):189 - 192.
    Thesis: Even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. (Hume) Antithesis: A man who knows of at least one case of an X being a Y, and who does not know of any positive reason for thinking that an X might not be a Y, has some reason for thinking that all X's are Y's (p. 81). When (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Practical Reasons, Person, and Common Good.Alejandra Carrasco - 2000 - Vera Lex 1 (1/2):73-98.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Armstrong on Reasons.W. R. Carter - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):251 – 256.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Rigorous Reasoning.Peter Cave - 1994 - Philosophy Now 9:14-17.
  19. Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action?Ruth Chang - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. pp. 56--90.
    What sorts of consideration can be normative reasons for action? If we systematize the wide variety of considerations that can be cited as normative reasons, do we find that there is a single kind of consideration that can always be a reason? Desire-based theorists think that the fact that you want something or would want it under certain evaluatively neutral conditions can always be your normative reason for action. Value-based theorists, by contrast, think that what plays that role are evaluative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  20. Review: Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW]Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447 - 453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. On Reflection, by Hilary Kornblith.Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1319-1322.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Practical Steps and Reasons for Action.Philip Clark - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):17 - 45.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. Reasons, Justifications and Excuses.Zvi Y. Cohen - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Austin lamented philosophers' obsession with justifications and disregard for other forms of reasoned defense. He urged attention to another way in which reasons function, which he described in terms of "excuses" and "the opposite number of excuses". I articulate a conception of reasons founded on Austin's distinction. The conception is heterogeneous, in that it construes reasons as defined by an inherent duality of function: their roles in both justifying and making excuses. The conception applies uniformly in both speculative and practical (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. The Roots of Reasons.Rachel Cohon - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):63-85.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25. Public Reasons and Practical Solipsism.Mary Clayton Coleman - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):317-336.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. The Sources of Normativity.L. W. Colter - 1998 - Review of Metaphysics 51 (4):940-941.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):189-207.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Against Internalism About Reasons—Gert's Rational Options. [REVIEW]David Copp - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):455–461.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. The Context-Undermining of Practical Reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):8-34.
    Can one fact deprive another of the status of a reason for action—a status the second fact would have had, but for the presence of the first? Claims of this kind are often made, but they face substantial obstacles. This article sets out those obstacles but then argues that there are at least three different ways in which this does happen.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Collingwood, Psychologism and Internalism.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):163–177.
    The paper defends Collingwood's account of rational explanation against two objections. The first is that he psychologizes the concept of practical reason. The second is that he fails to distinguish mere rationalizations from rationalizations that have causal power. I argue that Collingwood endorses a form of nonpsychologizing internalism which rests on the view that the appropriate explanans for actions are neither empirical facts (as externalists claim), nor psychological facts (as some internalists claim), but propositional facts. I then defend this form (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. Response to Mark Schroeder's Slaves of the Passions. [REVIEW]Jonathan Dancy - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):455-462.
    Response to Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the passions Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9656-3 Authors Jonathan Dancy, The University of Reading, Reading, UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32. Acting in Ignorance.Jonathan Dancy - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):345-357.
    This paper considers and rejects the arguments that have been given in favour of the view that one can only act for the reason that p if one knows that p . The paper contrasts it with the view I hold, which is that one can act for the reason that p even if it is not the case that p.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Enticing Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Clarendon Press.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  38. Two Ways of Explaining Actions.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:25-42.
    In my Practical Reality I argued that the reasons for which we act are not to be conceived of as psychological states of ourselves, but as real states of the world. The main reason for saying this was that only thus can we make sense of the idea that it is possible to act for a good reason. The good reasons we have for doing this action rather than that one consist mainly of features of the situations in which we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. How is Moorean Value Related to Reasons for Action?Stephen Darwall - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   79 citations  
  44. Reason to Promotion Inferences.Joshua DiPaolo & Jeff Behrends - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-10.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  45. Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation.Sabine A. Döring - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.
    Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   44 citations  
  46. Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
    Though one believes that P is true, one can have reasons for thinking it false. Yet, it seems that one cannot know that P is true and (still) have reasons for thinking it false. Why is this so? What feature of knowledge (or of reasons) precludes having reasons or evidence to believe (true) what you know to be false? If the connection between reasons (evidence) and what one believes is expressible as a probability relation, it would seem that the only (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47. New Essays on the Explanation of Action, by Constantine Sandis. [REVIEW]Robert Dunn - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):193-196.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Reasons, Attitudes and the Breakdown of Reasons.Robert Dunn - 1991 - Philosophia 21 (1-2):53-67.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  49. Agent, Action, and Reason. Edited by Robert Binkley, Richard Bronaugh [and] Ausonio Marras. --.Robert Williams ed Binkley, Richard jt ed Bronaugh, Ausonio Marras & Ont London - 1971 - University of Toronto Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Tartaglia's Ragioni: A Maestro d'Abaco's Mixed Approach to the Bombardier's Problem.Karin Ekholm - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Science 43 (2):181-207.
    In La nova scientia , Niccolò Tartaglia analyses trajectories of cannonballs by means of different forms of reasoning, including ‘physical and geometrical reasoning’, ‘demonstrative geometrical reasoning’, ‘Archimedean reasoning’, and ‘algebraic reasoning’. I consider what he understood by each of these methods and how he used them to render the quick succession of a projectile's positions into a single entity that he could explore and explain. I argue that our understanding of his methods and style is greatly enriched by considering the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 2131