Reduction in Social Science

Edited by Cory Wright (California State University, Long Beach)
Assistant editor: Caitlin Mace (California State University, Long Beach)
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  1. added 2020-03-25
    Arguments for the Cognitive Social Sciences.Tuukka Kaidesoja, Matti Sarkia & Mikko Hyyryläinen - 2019 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 49 (4):480-498.
    This article analyses the arguments for the integration between the cognitive and social sciences. We understand interdisciplinary integration as an umbrella term that includes different ways of bringing scientific disciplines together. Our focus is on four arguments based on different ideas about how the cognitive sciences should be integrated with the social sciences: explanatory grounding, theoretical unification, constraint and complementarity. These arguments not only provide different reasons why the cognitive social sciences—i.e. disciplines and research programs that aim to integrate the (...)
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  2. added 2020-02-18
    Reductionism and Structural Anthropology.Ivan Strenski - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):73 – 89.
    The structural anthropology of Claude Lévi?Strauss is reductionist in at least two senses. This at once brings out structural anthropology's ambivalent relationship to positivist conceptions of science, and to the complex nature of reduction. Reduction can be interpreted in at least three broad ways, and need not be construed as pejorative or as particular to positivist philosophy of science. Non?positivist methods of reduction are at work when Lévi?Strauss attempts to substitute structural explanations of culture for non?structural explanations. Positivist methods of (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-18
    Methodological Individualism and the Reduction of Cultural Anthropology to Psychology.M. Martin - 1969 - Scientia 63:489.
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  4. added 2020-02-16
    Reductionist Philosophy of Technology.Kristin Shrader-Frechette - 2000 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 5 (1):21-28.
  5. added 2020-02-02
    Reshaping Social Theory From Complexity and Ecological Perspectives.John Smith & Chris Jenks - 2013 - Thesis Eleven 114 (1):61-75.
    This article argues that Durkheim’s founding insight – uniquely social phenomena – presents us with both a foundation for the discipline of sociology and the risk that the discipline will become isolated. This, we argue, has happened. Our contention is that the emergent social phenomena need to be understood in relation to, but not reduced to, their biological and psychological substrates. Similarly, there are a number of other characteristics, notably of self-organization, which are distinguishing properties of social phenomena but also (...)
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  6. added 2020-02-02
    For Emergence: Refining Archer's Account of Social Structure.Dave Elder-Vass - 2007 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (1):25–44.
    The question of social structure and its relationship to human agency remains one of the central problems of social theory. One of the most promising attempts to provide a solution has been Margaret Archer's morphogenetic approach, which invokes emergence to justify treating social structure as causally effective. Archer's argument, however, has been criticised by a number of authors who suggest that the examples she cites can be explained in reductionist terms and thus that they fail to sustain her claim for (...)
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  7. added 2020-02-02
    Fin de Siáecle Social Theory Relativism, Reduction, and the Problem of Reason.Jeffrey C. Alexander - 1995
  8. added 2020-02-02
    Structural Explanation in Social Theory.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 97--131.
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  9. added 2020-01-04
    Emergence and Reduction.Shaun Le Boutillier - 2013 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 43 (2):205-225.
    The question of the ontological status of social wholes has been formative to the development of key positions and debates within modern social theory. Intrinsic to this is the contested meaning of the concept of emergence and the idea that the collective whole is in some way more than the sum of its parts. This claim, in its contemporary form, gives exaggerated importance to a simple truism of re-description that concerns all wholes. In this paper I argue that a better (...)
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  10. added 2019-12-17
    Idealizing Reduction: The Microfoundations of Macroeconomics. [REVIEW]Kevin D. Hoover - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (3):329 - 347.
    The dominant view among macroeconomists is that macroeconomics reduces to microeconomics, both in the sense that all macroeconomic phenomena arise out of microeconomic phenomena and in the sense that macroeconomic theory—to the extent that it is correct—can be derived from microeconomic theory. More than that, the dominant view believes that macroeconomics should in practice use the reduced microeconomic theory: this is the program of microfoundations for macroeconomics to which the vast majority of macroeconomists adhere. The "microfoundational" models that they actually (...)
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  11. added 2019-12-17
    Is Macroeconomics for Real?Kevin D. Hoover - 1995 - The Monist 78 (3):235-257.
    Argues that ontological reduction of macroeconomics to microeconomics is untenable. Existence of macroeconomic aggregates; Microfoundations of macroeconomics; Examinations of the general price level; Limits of the scientific development of microeconomics.
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  12. added 2019-12-17
    Some Issues Surrounding the Reduction of Macroeconomics to Microeconomics.Alan Nelson - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):573–594.
    This paper examines the relationship between modern theories of microeconomics and macroeconomics and, more generally, it evaluates the prospects of theoretically reducing macroeconomics to microeconomics. Many economists have shown strong interest in providing "microfoundations" for macroeconomics and much of their work is germane to the issue of theoretical reduction. Especially relevant is the work that has been done on what is called The Problem of Aggregation. On some accounts, The Problem of Aggregation just is the problem of reducing macroeconomics to (...)
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  13. added 2019-12-17
    The Reduction of Society: D. H. Mellor.D. H. Mellor - 1982 - Philosophy 57 (219):51-75.
    How does the study of society relate to the study of the people it comprises? This longstanding question is partly one of method, but mainly one of fact, of how independent the objects of these two studies, societies and people, are. It is commonly put as a question of reduction, and I shall tackle it in that form: does sociology reduce in principle to individual psychology? I follow custom in calling the claim that it does ‘individualism’ and its denial ‘holism’.
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  14. added 2019-12-14
    On the Connection Between Agent-Based Simulation and Methodological Individualism.Francesco Di Iorio & Shu-Heng Chen - 2019 - Social Science Information 58 (2):354-376.
    This paper investigates the relationship between methodological individualism and agent-based simulation. We use a thesis defended by Caterina Marchionni and Petri Ylikoski as the starting point of our approach. According to this thesis, since MI is often considered to be a reductionist orientation, it is confusing and meaningless to assume that ABS, which is a non-reductionist and emergentist explanatory model, is committed to MI. We criticise this view and focus on the problem of the proper definition of MI. We explain (...)
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  15. added 2019-12-14
    Reducible and Nonsensical Uses of Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2):247-266.
    The mathematical tools of game theory are frequently used in the social sciences and economic consultancy. But how do they explain social phenomena and support prescriptive judgments? And is the use of game theory really necessary? I analyze the logical form of explanatory and prescriptive game theoretical statements, and argue for two claims: (1) explanatory game theory can and should be reduced to rational choice theory in all cases; and (2) prescriptive game theory gives bad advice in some cases, is (...)
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  16. added 2019-12-06
    Why the Social Sciences Are Irreducible.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4961-4987.
    It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position is the Fodorian multiple realizability argument. Its defenders endorse token–token identities between “higher-level” social objects and pluralities/sums of “lower-level” individuals, but they maintain that the properties expressed by social science predicates are often multiply realizable, entailing that type–type identities between social and individualistic properties are ruled out. In this paper I argue that the multiple realizability argument for explanatory (...)
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  17. added 2019-12-06
    Social mechanisms and their relationship with the micro-macro distinction.Felipe González - 2016 - Cinta de Moebio 55:16-28.
    The notion of social mechanisms has experienced an increasing use in the social sciences as an alternative explanatory framework to the logic of co-variation present in multivariate analyses, emphasizing the causal explanation of social phenomena over their mere description. This paper seeks two goals. In the one hand, summarise recent literature on social mechanisms in order to clarify their meanings, different modes of use and their contribution to empirical research. In the other hand, we will shed some light onto the (...)
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  18. added 2019-12-06
    Reduction in Sociology.W. McGinley - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):370-398.
    In grappling with the micro-macro problem in sociology, philosophers of the field are finding it increasingly useful to associate micro-sociology with theory reduction. In this article I argue that the association is ungrounded and undesirable. Although of a reductive "disposition," micro-sociological theories instantiate something more like "reductive explanation," whereby the causal roles of social wholes are explained in terms of their psychological parts. In this form, micro-sociological theories may actually have a better shot at closing the sociology–psychology explanatory gap, and (...)
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  19. added 2019-12-06
    Complexity, Configurations and Cases.D. Byrne - 2005 - Theory, Culture and Society 22 (5):95-111.
    How can we make complexity work as part of a programme of engaged social science? This article attempts to answer that question by arguing that one way to do this is through a reconstruction of a central tool of a distinctively social science – the comparative method – understood as a procedure for elucidating the complex and multiple systems of causation that generate particular trajectories towards a desired future from the multiple sets of available futures. The article distinguishes between ‘simplistic (...)
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  20. added 2019-12-06
    Cultural Evolution, Reductionism in the Social Sciences, and Explanatory Pluralism.Jean Lachapelle - 2000 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (3):331-361.
    This article argues that it is possible to bring the social sciences into evolutionary focus without being committed to a thesis the author calls ontological reductionism, which is a widespread predilection for lower-level explanations. After showing why we should reject ontological reductionism, the author argues that there is a way to construe cultural evolution that does justice to the autonomy of social science explanations. This paves the way for a liberal approach to explanation the author calls explanatory pluralism, which allows (...)
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  21. added 2019-12-06
    Methodological Individualism and Vertical Integration in the Social Sciences.Anthony Walsh - 1997 - Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2):121 - 136.
    This paper argues against the false dichotomy between reductionism and holism in the social sciences. I make the points that reductionism is the mark of a mature science, that the social sciences will never progress until they drop their opposition to reductionism, that higher-level explanations, even when more appropriate and coherent than reductionist explanations, must not violate principles established at lower levels of explanation, and that reductionist explanations almost always absorb the explanatory efficiency of broad social categorizations and add incremental (...)
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  22. added 2019-11-24
    Sociology as a Naïve Science: Alfred Schütz and the Phenomenological Theory of Attitudes.Greg Yudin - 2016 - Human Studies 39 (4):547-568.
    Alfred Schütz is often credited with providing sociology with a firm ground derived from phenomenology of science and justifying it as a science operating within natural attitude. Although his project of social science draws extensively on Edmund Husserl’s theory of attitudes, it would be incorrect to assume that Schütz shares with the founder of phenomenology his conception of science. This paper compares Husserl’s and Schütz’s views on the structure and meaning of science and traces the roots of their radical divergence. (...)
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  23. added 2019-11-24
    Emergence a la Systems Theory: Epistemological Totalausschluss or Ontological Novelty?P. Y.-Z. Wan - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (2):178-210.
    In this article, I examine Luhmann’s, Bunge’s and others’ views on emergence, and argue that Luhmann’s epistemological construal of emergence in terms of Totalausschluss (total exclusion) is both ontologically flawed and detrimental to an appropriate understanding of the distinctive features of social emergence. By contrast, Bunge’s rational emergentism, his CESM model, and Wimsatt’s characterization of emergence as nonaggregativity provide a useful framework to investigate emergence. While researchers in the field of social theory and sociology tend to regard Luhmann as the (...)
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  24. added 2019-11-24
    Generating Sense.Bryan Smyth - 2011 - Schutzian Research 3:121-132.
    The aim of phenomenology is to provide a critical account of the origins and genesis of the world. This implies that the standpoint of the phenomenologicalreduction is properly extramundane. But it remains an outstanding task to formulate a credible account of the reduction that would be adequate to this seemingly impossible methodological condition. This paper contributes to rethinking the reduction accordingly. Building on efforts to thematize its intersubjective and corporeal aspects, the reduction is approached as a kind of transcendental practice (...)
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  25. added 2019-11-24
    The Phenomenological Life-World Analysis and the Methodology of the Social Sciences.Thomas S. Eberle - 2010 - Human Studies 33 (2-3):123-139.
    This Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture discusses the relationship between the phenomenological life-world analysis and the methodology of the social sciences, which was the central motive of Schutz’s work. I have set two major goals in this lecture. The first is to scrutinize the postulate of adequacy, as this postulate is the most crucial of Schutz’s methodological postulates. Max Weber devised the postulate ‘adequacy of meaning’ in analogy to the postulate of ‘causal adequacy’ (a concept used in jurisprudence) and regarded both (...)
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  26. added 2019-11-24
    Contextualism, Explanation and the Social Sciences.Harold Kincaid - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):201 – 218.
    Debates about explanation in the social sciences often proceed without any clear idea what an 'account' of explanation should do. In this paper I take a stance - what I will call contextualism - that denies there are purely formal and conceptual constraints on explanation and takes standards of explanation to be substantive empirical claims, paradigmatically claims about causation. I then use this standpoint to argue for position on issues in the philosophy of social science concerning reduction, idealized models, social (...)
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  27. added 2019-11-24
    Reduction, Supervenience, and the Autonomy of Social Scientific Laws.Lee C. McIntyre - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (2):101-122.
    Many have felt that it is impossible to defend autonomous laws of social science: where the regularities upheld are law-like it is argued that they are not at base social scientific, and where the phenomena to be explained would seem to require social descriptions, it is argued that laws governing the phenomena are unavailable at that level. But is it possible to develop an ontology that supports the dependence of the social on the physical, while nonetheless supporting the explanatory power (...)
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  28. added 2019-11-24
    Theorienreduktion in den Sozialwissenschaften. Eine Fallstudie Am Beispiel der Balancetheorien.Klaus Manhart - 1998 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (2):301-326.
    Theory Reduction in the Social Sciences. The example of balance theories. A central topic both in philosophy of science as well as in the empirical sciences is the reconstruction of the relations between theories. In the past comparisons of theories by means of traditional linguistic methods have proved to be extremely difficult and complicated. In this article the reconstruction of intertheoretical relations based on model-theoretical terms is propagated, as formulated within the structuralist view of theories. The efficiency of a model (...)
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  29. added 2019-11-24
    Intentionalistic Explanations in the Social Sciences.John R. Searle - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):332-344.
    The dispute between the empiricist and interpretivist conceptions of the social sciences is properly conceived not as a matter of reduction or covering laws. Features specific to the social sciences include the following. Explanations of human behavior make reference to intentional causation; social phenomena are permeated with mental components and are self-referential; social science explanations have not been as successful as those in natural science because of their concern with intentional causation, because their explanations must be identical with the propositional (...)
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  30. added 2019-11-24
    The Logic of Society. [REVIEW]P. M. M. - 1975 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (2):334-335.
    This work is a defense of positivism in social theory: Addis is committed to the view that the substantive concerns of physical and social science are essentially the same. Indeed, he states that an adequate philosophy of society presupposes an adequate philosophy of science. He therefore begins with an analysis of various themes from the latter: causation, the notions of process and closed systems, and determinism. It is in fact a basic presumption of the book that some refined theory of (...)
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  31. added 2019-11-24
    Objectivism and the Study of Man (Part II).Hans Skjervheim - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4):265-302.
    The purpose of the study (of which this is the concluding part) is to show that the distinctions made by Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber between the natural sciences and the ?Geistesvrissenschaften? are sound in principle, pace the arguments to the contrary within classical logical empiricism. It is held that intentional contexts are characteristic of social science. Intentional contexts are held to be more important in psychology than mental states, like toothache. If logical behaviourism is to have any plausibility, it (...)
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  32. added 2019-11-24
    Reduction, Correspondence and Identity.Jaegwon Kim - 1968 - The Monist 52 (3):424-438.
    Is social science ‘reducible’ to individual psychology, and ultimately to some physical theory? If a sociological theory, that is, a theory dealing with group phenomena, is ‘reduced’ in a relevant and appropriate sense to individual psychology, could we then say that the social phenomena in the domain of the sociological theory are just psychological phenomena of individuals? Conversely, if social events and processes are just individual psychological events and processes, then does it follow that any theory dealing with the former (...)
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  33. added 2019-09-30
    Causal Powers and Social Ontology.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1357-1377.
    Over the last few decades, philosophers and social scientists have applied the so-called powers ontology to the social domain. I argue that this application is highly problematic: many of the alleged powers in the social realm violate the intrinsicality condition, and those that can be coherently taken to be intrinsic to their bearers are arguably causally redundant. I end the paper by offering a diagnosis of why philosophers and social scientists have been tempted to think that there are powers in (...)
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  34. added 2019-06-06
    The Failure of the Best Arguments Against Social Reduction.Todd Jones - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):547-581.
    In this paper, I will argue that the most systematic arguments for the impossibility of reducing of social facts are not, in fact, good arguments. The best of these, the multiple realizability argument, has been very successful in convincing people to be non-reductionists in the philosophy of mind, and can plausibly be adapted to argue for anti-reductionism in the social sciences. But it, like the other arguments for the impossibility of social reduction, cannot deliver. Any preference we have for social (...)
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  35. added 2019-06-05
    Redescription, Reduction, and Emergence.Dave Elder-Vass - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (6):792-797.
    In response to Hansson Wahlberg, this paper argues, first, that he misunderstands the redescription principle developed in my book The Causal Power of Social Structures, and second, that his criticisms rest on an ontological individualism that is taken for granted but in fact lacks an adequate ontological justification of its own.
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  36. added 2018-08-29
    Modéliser le social. Méthodes fondatrices et évolutions récentes.Franck Varenne - 2011 - Paris, France: Dunod.
    Cet ouvrage très pédagogique informe les étudiants sur les méthodes quantitatives les plus classiques comme les plus récentes en sciences sociales, et notamment sur les différentes pratiques de modélisation et de simulation informatique des systèmes sociaux (sciences sociales computationnelles ou modèles informatiques).
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  37. added 2018-07-12
    Book Reviews : Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism. By Joseph Margolis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. Lvii Dordrecht—Holland/Boston—U.S.A.: D. Reidel, 1978. $26.00 , $11.95. [REVIEW]D. M. Armstrong - 1980 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10 (2):227-229.
  38. added 2017-10-25
    Is There Such a Thing as a Social Science?Robert Vinten - 2016 - Dokos 17:53-86.
    This paper looks at the centrality of action in social disciplines and examines the implications of this for whether social disciplines can be called scientific. Various reasons for calling social disciplines scientific are examined and rejected: (1) the claim that social disciplines are reducible to natural scientific ones, (2) the claim, from Donald Davidson, that reasons for action are to be construed in causal terms, (3) the claim that social disciplines employ, or should employ, the methodologies of the natural sciences. (...)
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  39. added 2017-02-02
    Reduction and Typical Individuals Again.Michael Martin - 1979 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 9 (1):77-79.
  40. added 2016-10-17
    Predictive Success and Non-Individualist Models in Social Science.Richard Lauer - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2):145-161.
    The predictive inadequacy of the social sciences is well documented, and philosophers have sought to diagnose it. This paper examines Brian Epstein’s recent diagnosis. He argues that the social sciences treat the social world as entirely composed of individual people. Instead, social scientists should recognize that material, non-individualistic entities determine the social world, as well. First, I argue that Epstein’s argument both begs the question against his opponents and is not sufficiently charitable. Second, I present doubts that his proposal will (...)
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  41. added 2016-08-29
    Micro, Macro, and Mechanisms.Petri Ylikoski - 2012 - In Harold Kincaid (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 21.
    is chapter takes a fresh look at micro-macro relations in the social sciences from the point of view of the mechanistic account of explanation. Traditionally, micro- macro issues have been assimilated to the problem of methodological individualism. It is not my intention to resurrect this notoriously unfruitful controversy. On the contrary, the main thrust of this chapter is to show that the cul-de-sac of that debate can be avoided if we give up some of its presuppositions. The debate about methodological (...)
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  42. added 2016-02-01
    Beyond Supervenience and Construction.David-Hillel Ruben - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):121-141.
    If reduction of the social to the physical fail, what options remain for understanding their relationship? Two such options are supervenience and constructivism. Both are vitiated by a similar fault. So the choices are limited: reduction after all, or emergence.
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  43. added 2016-01-04
    Do Customs Compete with Conditioning? Turf Battles and Division of Labor in Social Explanation.Todd Jones - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):407-430.
    We often face a bewildering array of different explanations for the same social facts (e.g. biological, psychological, economic, and historical accounts). But we have few guidelines for whether and when we should think of different accounts as competing or compatible. In this paper, I offer some guidelines for understanding when custom or norm accounts do and don’t compete with other types of accounts. I describe two families of non-competing accounts: (1) explanations of different (but similarly described) facts, and (2) accounts (...)
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  44. added 2015-12-16
    The Metaphysics of the Social World.David Hillel Ruben - 1985 - London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    A careful elaboration and defence of holism in the philosophy of social science, with regard to both particulars and properties.The last chapter addresses the issue of the irreducibility of holistic explanation in social science.
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  45. added 2015-09-24
    Editorial to “Reduction and the Special Sciences”.Mark Colyvan & Stephan Hartmann - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (3):293-293.
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  46. added 2014-11-15
    Emergence and Reduction.Shaun Le Boutillier - 2013 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 43 (2):205-225.
    The question of the ontological status of social wholes has been formative to the development of key positions and debates within modern social theory. Intrinsic to this is the contested meaning of the concept of emergence and the idea that the collective whole is in some way more than the sum of its parts. This claim, in its contemporary form, gives exaggerated importance to a simple truism of re-description that concerns all wholes. In this paper I argue that a better (...)
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  47. added 2014-04-08
    Response to R. Keith Sawyer.Jens Greve - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):246-256.
    R. Keith Sawyer rightly claimed that the formulation of several cross-level regularities does not disprove the “autonomy” of sciences. Nevertheless, first, this autonomy becomes gradual because cross-level regularities narrow the scope for strong emergence and, second, these examples do not disprove the metaphysical premises of Kim’s critique. Sawyer and I concur on the thesis according to which the proof of strong emergence is in part an empirical question. However, it also depends on the concept of individualism applied whether a description (...)
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  48. added 2014-04-08
    Luhmann and Emergentism: Competing Paradigms for Social Systems Theory?Dave Elder-Vass - 2007 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (4):408-432.
    Social systems theory has been dominated in recent years by the work of Niklas Luhmann, but there is another strand of systems thinking, which is receiving increasing attention in sociology: emergentism. For emergentism, the core problems of systems thinking are concerned with causation and reductionism; for Luhmann, they are questions of meaning and self-reference. Arguing from an emergentist perspective, the article finds that emergentism addresses its own core problem successfully, while Luhmann's approach is incapable of resolving questions of causation and (...)
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  49. added 2014-04-02
    Overcoming the Biases of Microfoundationalism Social Mechanisms and Collective Agents.Tuukka Kaidesoja - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (3):301-322.
    The article makes four interrelated claims: (1) The mechanism approach to social explanation does not presuppose a commitment to the individual-level microfoundationalism. (2) The microfoundationalist requirement that explanatory social mechanisms should always consists of interacting individuals has given rise to problematic methodological biases in social research. (3) It is possible to specify a number of plausible candidates for social macro-mechanisms where interacting collective agents (e.g. formal organizations) form the core actors. (4) The distributed cognition perspective combined with organization studies could (...)
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  50. added 2014-04-02
    Back to Cognitive Foundationalism?Michal Buchowski - 1995 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (3):384-395.
    Robin Horton has studied modes of thought for decades. His attitude is strongly "intellectualist" and directed against "symbolic" interpretation in anthropology A contrast between these two standpoints is regarded in this paper as axiomatic, derived from worldview assumptions presented as a scientific debate. Divergences concern isssues such as the objective status of human cognition, the degree of rationality of a given thought system, and the desirable status of anthropological interpretations of human thought. Horton's standpoint is criticized, mainly his views on (...)
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