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  1. added 2018-11-30
    Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood & James Griffin - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (3):447.
    This is a review of James Griffin's book "Value-Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs".
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  2. added 2018-11-28
    Goodman E o Equilíbrio Reflexivo.Eros Moreira Carvalho - 2013 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 58 (3):467-481.
    Goodman sustentou que o ajuste mútuo entre inferências indutivas particulares e princípios indutivos constitui a única justificação necessária para ambos. Porém, a sua caracterização desse ajuste, posteriormente denominado de “equilíbrio reflexivo”, foi superficial. Isso levantou dúvida sobre a sua adequação. Neste artigo, argumento que o equilíbrio reflexivo, corretamente caracterizado, fornece a única justificação necessária e a melhor que podemos dar para a prática indutiva.
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  3. added 2018-08-23
    Uma análise da desigualdade social sob a perspectiva do princípio da diferença na teoria da justiça de John Rawls.L. N. Igansi - 2014 - Saberes 1 (9):5-15.
    Tomarei no presente artigo o princípio da diferença contido na formulação do segundo princípio de justiça para instituições do liberalismo político de Rawls, entendido como a justiça como equidade, para tratar de tão controverso tópico que é a desigualdade social. Quais seus aspectos negativos ou positivos, se existentes? Devemos evitá-la pelos perjúrios que causa ou abraçá-la incondicionalmente por ser fruto de uma sociedade pluralista? As respostas jazem num deflacionamento do conceito de justiça, não mais aqui como metafisicamente embasada na tradição (...)
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  4. added 2018-08-01
    Non-Naturalist Moral Realism and the Limits of Rational Reflection.Max Khan Hayward - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):724-737.
    This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection (...)
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  5. added 2018-07-23
    Is the Debate Between Rawlsians and Liberal Perfectionists About Aesthetics?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Does the debate between Rawlsians and liberal perfectionists boil down to the following: for liberal perfectionists, the government should fund aesthetic projects that are in good taste; for Rawlsians, the government should be neutral on the aesthetic value of anything? If so, liberal perfectionists are committed to the view that there is objective aesthetic value. In this paper, I argue that within the Rawlsian system is a thesis that is difficult to reconcile with objectivity about aesthetics.
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  6. added 2018-07-18
    Methodology and Justification in Rawls' Theory of Justice.Robert Scott Harnsberger - 1981 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    John Rawls has articulated a comprehensive and sophisticated theory concerning the issues of justification and objectivity in ethics. The core of his view is found in his monumental book A Theory of Justice published in 1971. This book serves as the focus of my dissertation, although relevant portions of his other published works are referred to as is needed for a fuller understanding of his position. ;The first chapter of my dissertation introduces in a general way the outlines of Rawls' (...)
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  7. added 2018-06-15
    Consequentialist Demands, Intuitions and Experimental Methodology (with Joe Sweetman).Attila Tanyi - manuscript
    Can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. We take the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given and are also not concerned with finding the best response to the Objection. Instead, our main aim is to explicate the intuitive background of the Objection and to see how this background could be investigated. This double aim (...)
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  8. added 2018-02-17
    Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry.Michael R. DePaul - 1993 - Routledge.
    We all have moral beliefs. But what if one beleif conflicts with another? DePaul argues that we have to make our beliefs cohere, but that the current coherence methods are seriously flawed. It is not just the arguments that need to be considered in moral enquiry. DePaul asserts that the ability to make sensitive moral judgements is vital to any philosophical inquiry into morality. The inquirer must consider how her life experiences and experiences with literature, film and theatre have influenced (...)
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  9. added 2017-10-27
    The Methodological Irrelevance of Reflective Equilibrium.Tristram McPherson - 2015 - In Chris Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 652-674.
    John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium is the most influential methodology in contemporary ethics.This paper argues that this influence is undeserved, for two reasons. First, reflective equilibrium fails to accomplish two tasks that give us reason to care about methodology. On the one hand, it fails to explain how (or whether) moral knowledge is possible.This is because the method is explicitly oriented towards the distinct (and less interesting) task of characterizing our moral sensibilities. On the other hand, the method fails (...)
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  10. added 2017-10-17
    Three Assumptions of Rawlsian Reflective Equilibrium.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    John Rawls recommends a method for evaluating which principles institutions should abide by, known as reflective equilibrium. In this paper, I identify and challenge three assumptions that he makes.
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  11. added 2017-10-17
    Review of Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. [REVIEW]Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):159-63.
    This piece is a short review of a volume of papers on ethical intuitionism (Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations, ed. Philip Stratton-Lake, Oxford University Press, 2002).
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  12. added 2017-08-08
    Thought Experiments in Ethics.Georg Brun - 2017 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach J. H. Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. pp. 195–210.
    This chapter suggests a scheme of reconstruction, which explains how scenarios, questions and arguments figure in thought experiments. It then develops a typology of ethical thought experiments according to their function, which can be epistemic, illustrative, rhetorical, heuristic or theory-internal. Epistemic functions of supporting or refuting ethical claims rely on metaethical assumptions, for example, an epistemological background of reflective equilibrium. In this context, thought experiments may involve intuitive as well as explicitly argued judgements; they can be used to generate moral (...)
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  13. added 2017-03-23
    On Being ‘Rational’ About Norms.Rem B. Edwards - 1967 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):180-186.
    The theses of this paper i: I. that the attempt to found absolute norns on rationality presupposes the availability of a single universal absolute conception of rationality but that no such conception is available; and II. that any conception of rationality which might be available for justifying one's ultimate normative commitments is itself evaluative. “Rationality” itself is a value-laden concept, as are all its philosophical sub-divisions—logic, ethics, aesthetics, axiology, etc. Choosing ultimate value principles under conditions of freedom, enlightenment, and impartiality (...)
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  14. added 2017-02-14
    Rules, Equilibrium, Beliefs and Social Mathematics.Norman Schofield - 1996 - In David Braybrooke (ed.), Social Rules. Westview.
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  15. added 2017-02-14
    Theory of Equilibrium and the Dahrendorfs Theory of Conflict.S. Adam - 1979 - Filosoficky Casopis 27 (5):672-683.
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  16. added 2017-02-08
    Ideal Motivations and Reflective Understanding.Kwong-Loi Shun - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):91 - 104.
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  17. added 2017-02-06
    Fanciful Examples.Ian Stoner & Jason Swartwood - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):325-344.
    This article defends the use of fanciful examples within the method of wide reflective equilibrium. First, it characterizes the general persuasive role of described cases within that method. Second, it suggests three criteria any example must meet in order to succeed in this persuasive role; fancifulness has little or nothing to do with whether an example is able to meet these criteria. Third, it discusses several general objections to fanciful examples and concludes that they are objections to the abuse of (...)
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  18. added 2017-02-02
    The Hypostatisation of the Concept of Equilibrium in Neoclassical Economics.Andy Denis - 2007 - In Valeria Mosini (ed.), Equilibrium in Economics: Scope and Limits.
    The concept of equilibrium has long been a focus for dissent between orthodox and heterodox schools of thought in economics. The paper explores the meanings of ‘equilibrium’ and attempts to tease apart salient appropriate and inappropriate modes of deployment of the concept. Under far-from-equilibrium conditions, equilibrium is not even an approximate description of the condition of the system, but an abstraction – a state of affairs which might obtain should a process under consideration run to its conclusion. The order of (...)
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  19. added 2017-01-29
    Theory and Practice: Gap or Equilibrium.Tone Kvernbekk - unknown
    It is not uncommon, in argumentation and in various professions, to diagnose a gap between theory and practice; and in the next step argue that they should be brought into line with each other. But what does this mean? I shall argue that some version of a gap is sound, as it leaves theory with a critical, independent role in relation to practice—something that an equilibrium view does not.
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  20. added 2017-01-28
    Reflective Inquiry and Language.Lewis Hahn - 1982 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):245.
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  21. added 2017-01-26
    Reflective Equilibrium as a Normative Empirical Model.Ghislaine Jmw| van Delden van Thiel & Johannes Jm van Delden - 2010 - Ethical Perspectives 17 (2):183.
    People who work and live in a certain moral practice usually possess a specific form of moral wisdom. If we manage to incorporate their moral intuitions in ethical reasoning, we can arrive at judgements and theories that grasp a moral experience that generally cannot be found outside the said practice. To achieve this goal, we need a legitimate way to balance moral intuitions, ethical principles and general theories. In the present contribution, we describe a version of the model of Reflective (...)
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  22. added 2017-01-22
    Resonance, Moorean Theories and Reflective Endorsement.Patrick H. Yarnell - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):155-172.
    I argue that Moorean theories of value have a difficult time accommodating the resonance requirement, that is, the platitude that we should value what’s valuable, while a sophisticated reflective endorsement theory of value and the resonance requirement are perfectly consistent. To this extent, a sophisticated reflective endorsement theory has a significant advantage over the Moorean approach. The reflective endorsement theory that I endorse emphasizes systematic exposure to possible sources of satisfaction, as well as a similarity principle of practical rationality.
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  23. added 2017-01-21
    Reflective Equilibrium as a Normative Empirical Model.Ghislaine J. M. W. van Thiel & Johannes J. M. van Delden - 2010 - Ethical Perspectives 17 (2):183-202.
    People who work and live in a certain moral practice usually possess a specific form of moral wisdom. If we manage to incorporate their moral intuitions in ethical reasoning, we can arrive at judgements and theories that grasp a moral experience that generally cannot be found outside the said practice. To achieve this goal, we need a legitimate way to balance moral intuitions, ethical principles and general theories. In the present contribution, we describe a version of the model of Reflective (...)
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  24. added 2017-01-21
    The Ubiquity of the Notion of Equilibrium in Biology, and its Relation with Equilibrium in Economics.Louise Jarvis & Valeria Mosini - unknown
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  25. added 2017-01-21
    Resonance, Moorean Theories, and a Reflective Endorsement Approach to Value.Patrick H. Yarnell - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):155-172.
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  26. added 2017-01-19
    Philosophical Foundations of a New Concept of Equilibrium in the Social Sciences: Projected Equilibrium.Jean-Pierre Dupuy - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (3):323-345.
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  27. added 2017-01-19
    Equilibrium Explanation.Elliott Sober - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (2):201 - 210.
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  28. added 2017-01-18
    Equilibrium Norms.Howard Margolis - 1990 - Ethics 100 (4):821-837.
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  29. added 2017-01-17
    Reflective Equilibrium.Alice Baderin - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):1-28.
    The paper explores whether the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) in ethics and political philosophy should be individual or public in character. I defend a modestly public conception of RE, in which public opinion is used specifically as a source of considered judgments about cases. Public opinion is superior to philosophical opinion in delivering judgments that are untainted by principled commitments. A case-based approach also mitigates the methodological problems that commonly confront efforts to integrate philosophy with the investigation of popular (...)
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  30. added 2017-01-17
    Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice.Christopher McMahon & Norman Daniels - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (3):449.
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  31. added 2017-01-16
    Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Objectivity.Sem de Maagt - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (5):443-465.
    Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying (...)
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  32. added 2017-01-16
    The Reliability of Moral Intuitions : A Challenge From Neuroscience.Folke Tersman - unknown
    A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases elicited greater activity in certain areas of the brain associated with emotions compared with the other cases. It has been argued (...)
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  33. added 2017-01-16
    Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Practice.Norman Daniels - 1996 - In L. Wayne Sumner & Joseph Boyle (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics. University of Toronto Press. pp. 96-114.
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  34. added 2017-01-16
    On the Method of Eshelby, Frank and Nabarro for Calculating the Equilibrium Positions of Dislocations.A. K. Head & P. F. Thomson - 1962 - Philosophical Magazine 7 (75):439-449.
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  35. added 2017-01-15
    Out of Equilibrium.Mario Amendola & Jean-Luc Gaffard - 1998 - Oxford University Press UK.
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  36. added 2017-01-15
    Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs.Dan Sperber - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):67-83.
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  37. added 2017-01-15
    Sense of Equilibrium.T. A. Hunter - 1930 - Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 8 (4):302-305.
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  38. added 2017-01-14
    On Richard Brandt’s “The Science of Man and Wide Reflective Equilibrium”.Peter Railton - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1136-1141.
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  39. added 2016-12-12
    Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice.Norman Daniels - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    We all have beliefs, even strong convictions, about what is just and fair in our social arrangements. How should these beliefs and the theories of justice that incorporate them guide our thinking about practical matters of justice? This wide-ranging collection of essays by one of the foremost medical ethicists in the USA explores the claim that justification in ethics, whether of matters of theory or practice, involves achieving coherence between our moral and non-moral beliefs. Amongst the practical issues addressed in (...)
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  40. added 2016-12-08
    The Argument From Moral Experience.Don Loeb - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.
    It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory. In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it (...)
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  41. added 2016-12-08
    The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium.K. Kappel - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):131-147.
    The paper addresses the possibility of providing a meta-justification of what appears to be crucial epistemic desiderata involved in the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that although the method of reflective equilibrium appears to be widely in use in moral theorising, the prospects of providing a meta-justification of crucial epistemic desiderata are rather bleak. Nor is the requirement that a meta-justification be provided obviously misguided. In addition, I briefly note some of the implications of these results for our use (...)
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  42. added 2016-12-08
    Ethics and Intuitions.Peter Singer - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):331-352.
    For millennia, philosophers have speculated about the origins of ethics. Recent research in evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences has shed light on that question. But this research also has normative significance. A standard way of arguing against a normative ethical theory is to show that in some circumstances the theory leads to judgments that are contrary to our common moral intuitions. If, however, these moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it is not clear why we should (...)
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  43. added 2016-12-08
    Reflection Without Equilibrium.Daniel Bonevac - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (7):363-388.
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  44. added 2016-11-23
    Accounting for the Data: Intuitions in Moral Theory Selection.Ben Eggleston - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):761-774.
    Reflective equilibrium is often credited with extending the idea of accounting for the data from its familiar home in the sciences to the realm of moral philosophy. But careful consideration of the main concepts of this idea—the data to be accounted for and the kind of accounting it is appropriate to expect of a moral theory—leads to a revised understanding of the “accounting for the data” perspective as it applies to the discipline of moral theory selection. This revised understanding is (...)
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  45. added 2016-08-17
    Reflective Equilibrium.Yuri Cath - 2016 - In H. Cappelen, T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford University Press. pp. 213-230.
    This article examines the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) and its role in philosophical inquiry. It begins with an overview of RE before discussing some of the subtleties involved in its interpretation, including challenges to the standard assumption that RE is a form of coherentism. It then evaluates some of the main objections to RE, in particular, the criticism that this method generates unreasonable beliefs. It concludes by considering how RE relates to recent debates about the role of intuitions in (...)
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  46. added 2016-06-21
    Replies to Cuneo, Driver, and Littlejohn.Daniel Star - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):728-744.
  47. added 2016-02-25
    Disagreement Behind the Veil of Ignorance.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Mark Colyvan, Carlo Martini, Giacomo Sillari & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):377-394.
    In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a (...)
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  48. added 2016-02-02
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 7, Edited by R. Shafer-Landau. [REVIEW]Dan Baras - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):359-362.
    This review article focuses on David Copp's article 'Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory'. Copp argues that recent developments in moral psychology challenge the common method in ethics, which infers moral truths from moral intuitions, as these intuitions are shown to likely be unreliable. Copp responds to the worry by arguing that even if moral intuitions cannot be trusted to indicate objective moral truths, the common method remains valuable for other reasons. In this article I raise several (...)
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  49. added 2015-10-12
    A Moorean Argument for the Full Moral Status of Those with Profound Intellectual Disability.Benjamin L. Curtis & Simo Vehmas - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1):41-45.
    This paper is about the moral status of those human beings with profound intellectual disabilities (PIDs). We hold the common sense view that they have equal status to ‘normal’ human beings, and a higher status than any non-human animal. We start with an admission, however: we don’t know how to give a fully satisfying theoretical account of the grounds of moral status that explains this view. And in fact, not only do we not know how to give such an account, (...)
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  50. added 2015-10-09
    Towards Criteria Choice for Practical Rationality.B. C. Postow - 1989 - Metaphilosophy 20 (2):152–162.
    What criteria shall we use to evaluate normative theories of practical rationality? one answer is provided by a version of the wide reflective equilibrium model (wre). What criteria shall we use to evaluate models on the level of wre? one answer is provided by a variant of the historical philosophy of science model. The latter answer may support the former.
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