Relative Identity

Edited by A. P. Taylor (North Dakota State University, University of Leeds)
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  1. Identity and Cardinality: Geach and Frege.William P. Alston & Jonathan Bennett - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (4):553-567.
    P. T. Geach, notoriously, holds the Relative Identity Thesis, according to which a meaningful judgment of identity is always, implicitly or explicitly, relative to some general term. ‘The same’ is a fragmentary expression, and has no significance unless we say or mean ‘the same X’, where ‘X’ represents a general term (what Frege calls a Begriffswort or Begriffsausdruck). (P. T. Geach, Mental Acts (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 69. I maintain that it makes no sense to judge whether (...)
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  2. Loose Identity and Becoming Something Else.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):592–601.
    Armstrong has loose identity be an equivalence relation, yet in cases of something becoming something else, loose identity is not transitive. My alternate account has an attribution of loose identity be really two: a true attribution of an underlying relation (perhaps not transitive) and a false attribution--a Humean feigning-of strict identity. The feigning may become less appropriate as the underlying relation grows more distant. What makes it appropriate initially is that the underlying relation supports a predictable change in some collective. (...)
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  3. Relative Identity and Cardinality.Patricia Blanchette - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):205 - 223.
    Peter Geach famously holds that there is no such thing as absolute identity. There are rather, as Geach sees it, a variety of relative identity relations, each essentially connected with a particular monadic predicate. Though we can strictly and meaningfully say that an individual a is the same man as the individual b, or that a is the same statue as b, we cannot, on this view, strictly and meaningfully say that the individual a simply is b. It is difficult (...)
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  4. Diachronic Identity as Relative Identity.E. J. Borowski - 1975 - Philosophical Quarterly 25 (100):271-276.
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  5. The Logic of Relative Identity.James Wallace Cain - 1985 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
    My dissertation evaluates Peter Geach's theory of relative identity. Typically discussions of relative identity focus on predicative identity expressions of the form "is the same A as". My approach, following Geach, is broader: it also looks at how, if correct, the theory of relative identity must play into our accounts of proper names and quantifiers. ;Geach's theory is well known for denying the coherence of the concept of absolute identity, and for its espousal of a concept of identity allowing true (...)
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  6. Relative Identity: An Examination of a Theory by Peter Geach.Carl Arthur Calvert - 1973 - Dissertation, University of Washington
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  7. Relative Identity and the Number of Artifacts.Massimiliano Carrara - 2009 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 13 (2):108-122.
    Relativists maintain that identity is always relative to a general term. According to them, the notion of absolute identity has to be abandoned and replaced by a multiplicity of relative identity relations for which Leibniz’s Law does not hold. For relativists RI is at least as good as the Fregean cardinality thesis, which contends that an ascription of cardinality is always relative to a concept specifying what, in any specific case, counts as a unit. The same train of thought on (...)
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  8. Relative Identity and the Number of Artifacts.Massimiliano Carrara - 2009 - Techne 13 (2):108-122.
    Relativists maintain that identity is always relative to a general term (RI). According to them, the notion of absolute identity has to be abandoned and replaced by a multiplicity of relative identity relations for which Leibniz’s Law does not hold. For relativists RI is at least as good as the Fregean cardinality thesis (FC), which contends that an ascription of cardinality is always relative to a concept specifying what, in any specific case, counts as a unit. The same train of (...)
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  9. Cardinality and Identity.Massimiliano Carrara & Elisabetta Sacchi - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):539-556.
    P.T. Geach has maintained (see, e.g., Geach (1967/1968)) that identity (as well as dissimilarity) is always relative to a general term. According to him, the notion of absolute identity has to be abandoned and replaced by a multiplicity of relative identity relations for which Leibniz's Law - which says that if two objects are identical they have the same properties - does not hold. For Geach relative identity is at least as good as Frege's cardinality thesis which he takes to (...)
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  10. The Asperian Design.Thomas G. W. Crowther - 2017 - Spirituality Studies 3 (1):10-19.
    Reality is two-fold, composed of the lighted world as revealed in Genesis, and the darker primordiality which preceded it. The illuminated represents that which the human mind can comprehend, manipulate and re-order to its will: a “designed” and mechanical universe of parts. But behind it, in the backspace of reality, remains the darkness. A formless state of pre-creation, the darkness exists as an endless series of intertwining “signatures” – single possibilities waiting to be created in the illuminated forefront of reality. (...)
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  11. Relative Identity.Harry Deutsch - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  12. Spatially Coinciding Objects.Frederick Doeke - 1982 - Ratio:10--24.
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  13. Do We Need Relative Identity?George Englebretsen - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1):91-93.
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  14. Geach and Relativised Identity.Fred Feldman - 1968 - Review of Metaphysics 22.
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  15. Geach and Relative Identity [with Rejoinder and Reply].Fred Feldman & P. T. Geach - 1969 - Review of Metaphysics 22 (3):547 - 561.
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  16. Nicholas Griffin on Relative Identity.Richard H. Feldman - 1981 - Dialogue 20 (2):365-375.
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  17. Identity Over Time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...)
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  18. Subsumption and Relative Identity.P. Garbacz - 2004 - Axiomathes 14 (4):341-360.
    This paper is a modification of Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty's conception of the subsumption relation. Guarino and Welty require that that whether one property may subsume the other should depend on the modal metaproperties of those properties. I argue that the part of their account that concerns the metaproperty carrying a criterion of identity is essentially flawed. Subsequently, I propose to constrain the subsumption relation not, as Guarino and Welty require, by means of incompatible criteria of absolute identity but (...)
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  19. Logics of Relative Identity.Pawe? Garbacz - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (1):27-50.
    This paper is the first part of an exploration into the logical properties of relative identity. After providing the semantic grounds for various monadic logics of relative identity, I define the minimal system and its nine extensions. It is suggested that despite their purely formal origin at least some of them may contain nontrivial philosophical insights. All logics are axiomatized by means of sound and complete sequent calculi. I show their affinities with existing formalizations.
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  20. Geach and Relative Identity-Reply.P. T. Geach - 1969 - Review of Metaphysics 22 (3):556-559.
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  21. Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity.Peter Thomas Geach - 1973 - In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology. New York: New York University Press.
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  22. Weak Relative Identity and the General Partnership Model of the Trinity.James Goetz - manuscript
    This paper briefly proposes a weak relative identity strategy for the doctrine of the Trinity called the general partnership model. This model develops a logically consistent metaphysical constitution for the orthodox Christian doctrines of one divine substance and three divine persons. Moreover, the model rejects the rigid use of absolute identity in Trinitarian doctrine while modeling relative identity with an analogy of general partnerships in the United States.
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  23. Identical Legal Entities and the Trinity: Relative-Social Trinitarianism.James Goetz - 2016 - Journal of Analytic Theology 4 (1):128-146.
    Goetz outlined legal models of identical entities that include natural persons who are identical to a coregency and natural persons who are identical to a general partnership. Those entities cohere with the formula logic of relative identity. This essay outlines the coexistence of relative identity and numerical identity in the models of identical legal entities, which is impure relative identity. These models support the synthesis of Relative Trinitarianism and Social Trinitarianism, which I call Relative-Social Trinitarianism.
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  24. Natural Unity and Paradoxes of Legal Persons.James Goetz - 2014 - Journal Jurisprudence 21:27-46.
    This essay proposes an ontological model in which a legal person such as a polity possesses natural unity from group properties that emerge in the self-organization of the human population. Also, analysis of customary legal persons and property indicates noncontradictory paradoxes that include Aristotelian essence of an entity, relative identity over time, ubiquitous authority, coinciding authorities, and identical entities. Mathematical modeling helps to explain the logic of the paradoxes.
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  25. Relative Identity Relations: A Reply to Dr. Noonan.Nicholas Griffin - 1978 - Mind 87 (348):576-581.
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  26. Relative Identity.Nicholas Griffin - 1977 - Clarendon Press.
    The author attacks the view that identity, Like largeness, Is a relative relation. The primary advocate of the view that identity is relative is p.T. Geach. It is argued that geach has not shown that the failure of the identity of indiscernibles principle, As a truth of logic, Forces us to stop taking indiscernibility within particular formal theories or languages as a sufficient condition for identity. The author also argues that the whole notion of relative identity, As explicated by geach, (...)
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  27. Ayers on Relative Identity.Nicholas Griffin - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):579 - 594.
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  28. Towards a Logic of Relative Identity.Nicholas Griffin & Richard Routley - 1979 - Logique Et Analyse 22 (85):65.
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  29. "Relative Identity," by Nicholas Griffin.Herbert E. Hendry - 1978 - Modern Schoolman 55 (4):406-407.
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  30. Relative Identity Reconsidered.Olin Hills Joynton - 1976 - Dissertation, Rice University
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  31. Almost Indiscernible Objects and the Suspect Strategy.Kathrin Koslicki - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):55 - 77.
    This paper examines a variety of contexts in metaphysics which employ a strategy I consider to be suspect. In each of these contexts, ‘The Suspect Strategy’ (TSS) aims at excluding a series of troublesome contexts from a general principle whose truth the philosopher in question wishes to preserve. We see (TSS) implemented with respect to Leibniz’s Law (LL) in the context of Gibbard’s defense of contingent identity, Myro and Gallois’ defense of temporary identity, as well as Terence Parsons’ defense of (...)
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  32. Zagadnienie Tożsamości Bytu W Filozofii Buddyjskiej.Jakubczak Krzysztof - 2015 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 5 (1):171-178.
    The problem of identity of being in Buddhist philosophy: The Buddhist philosophical school of Madhyamaka is famous for its statement that things do not have their own inherent nature, essence or self‑nature (svabhāva). As a result, it is said that there is no objective foundation of the identity of things. Thus, the identity of things is not grounded in things themselves but is solely imputed and externally imposed on them. Things are what they are only for us, whereas for themselves, (...)
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  33. Locke and the Relativisation of Identity.Bruce Langtry - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (6):401 - 409.
    Arc there cases in which an object x is thc same F as an object y but x is not the same G as y, cvcn though x is a G? A11 aihrmativc answer will have drastic repercussions 011 0ne’s account of identity and on one’s quantification theory. For suppose that the expression ‘x is the same F as y’ can be understood as ‘x is an F and y is an F and x is identical with y’, and that (...)
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  34. Plausibility, Necessity and Identity: A Logic of Relative Plausibility. [REVIEW]Xiaowu Li & Xuefeng Wen - 2007 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):629-644.
    We construct a Hilbert style system RPL for the notion of plausibility measure introduced by Halpern J, and we prove the soundness and completeness with respect to a neighborhood style semantics. Using the language of RPL, we demonstrate that it can define well-studied notions of necessity, conditionals and propositional identity.
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  35. Sortal Terms and Absolute Identity.E. J. Lowe - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):64 – 71.
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  36. Arguments by Leibniz’s Law in Metaphysics.Ofra Magidor - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (3):180-195.
    Leibniz’s Law (or as it sometimes called, ‘the Indiscerniblity of Identicals’) is a widely accepted principle governing the notion of numerical identity. The principle states that if a is identical to b, then any property had by a is also had by b. Leibniz’s Law may seem like a trivial principle, but its apparent consequences are far from trivial. The law has been utilised in a wide range of arguments in metaphysics, many leading to substantive and controversial conclusions. This article (...)
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  37. Instantiation is Not Partial Identity.Nicholas Mantegani - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):697-715.
    In order to avoid the problems faced by standard realist analyses of the “relation” of instantiation, Baxter and, following him, Armstrong each analyze the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of their partial identity. I introduce two related conceptions of partial identity, one mereological and one non-mereological, both of which require at least one of the relata of the partial identity “relation” to be complex. I then introduce a second non-mereological conception of partial identity, which allows for (...)
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  38. Relative Identity.Colin McGinn & Nicholas Griffin - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):137.
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  39. Review: The Rationality of (A Form of) Relative Identity. [REVIEW]Uwe Meixner - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):449 - 455.
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  40. The Rationality of (a Form of) Relative Identity. [REVIEW]Uwe Meixner - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):449–455.
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  41. Identificational Sentences.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Natural Language Semantics 21 (1):43-77.
    Based on the notion of a trope, this paper gives a novel analysis of identificational sentences such as 'this is Mary','this is a beautiful woman', 'this looks like Mary', or 'this is the same lump of clay, but not the same statue as that'.
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  42. Tropes, Bare Demonstratives, and Apparent Statements of Identity.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):346-370.
    Philosophers who accept tropes generally agree that tropes act as the objects of reference of nominalizations of adjectives, such as 'Socrates’ wisdom' or 'the beauty of the landscape'. This paper argues that tropes play a further important role in the semantics of natural language, namely in the semantics of bare demonstratives like 'this' and 'that' in what in linguistics is called identificational sentences.
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  43. Relative Identity.Jack Nelson - 1970 - Noûs 4 (3):241-260.
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  44. Relative Identity: A Reply to Nicholas Griffin.H. W. Noonan - 1980 - Mind 89 (353):96-98.
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  45. GRIFFIN, N. "Relative Identity". [REVIEW]H. W. Noonan - 1979 - Mind 88:299.
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  46. Moderate Monism, Sortal Concepts, and Relative Identity.Harold Noonan - 2013 - The Monist 96 (1):101-130.
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  47. Relative Identity.Harold W. Noonan - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):52-71.
    Examples suggest that one and the same A may be different Bs, and hence that there is some sort of incompleteness in the unqualified statement that x and y are the same which needs to be eliminated by answering the question “the same what?” One way to make this more precise is by appeal to Geach's idea that identity is relative. In this paper I evaluate Geach's relative identity thesis.
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  48. Reply to Lowe.Harold W. Noonan - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):218 - 221.
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  49. Relative Identity: A Reconsideration.Harold W. Noonan - 1986 - Analysis 46 (1):6 - 10.
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  50. Objects and Identity: An Examination of the Relative Identity Thesis and its Consequences.Harold W. Noonan - 1980 - Distributors for the U.S. And Canada [by] Kluwer Boston.
    ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IDENTITY On the classical, or Fregean, view of identity it is an equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law (so<alled), ...
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