Relevant logics are a group of logics which attempt to block irrelevant conclusions being drawn from a set of premises. The following inferences are all valid in classical logic, where A and B are any sentences whatsoever: from A to B → A, B → B and B ∨ ¬B; from ¬A to A→B; and from A ∧ ¬A to B. But if A and B are utterly irrelevant to one another, many feel reluctant to call these inferences acceptable. Similarly for the validity of the corresponding material implications, often called ‘paradoxes’ of material implication. Relevant logic can be seen as the attempt to avoid these ‘paradoxes’.
|Key works||Many trace the beginnings of relevant logic to Anderson & Belnap 1962. Anderson & Belnap 1975 is a key early book-length exposition of relevant logics. Routley & Meyer 1972 and Routley & Meyer 1972 develop the relational ‘Routley-Meyer’ semantics for relevant implication, which has proved vital to the success of relevant logics. Read 1988 and Mares 2004 set out the philosophy of relevant logics. Brady 2006 contains much of Brady's work on relevant logics (which has been important throughout their development). Restall 1995 explores using 4-valued semantics for relevant logics.|
|Introductions||Mares 2012 is a recent introduction to the area. Jago 2013 surveys some of the most important recent work (2003–13) in relevant logic. The chapter on relevant logic in Priest 2001 introduces the logical details in a concise way.|
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aness Kim Webster
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