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  1. added 2020-01-28
    A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback) 106 (3):381-390.
    The most prominent arguments for scepticism in modern epistemology employ closure principles of some kind. To begin my discussion of such arguments, consider Simple Knowledge Closure (SKC): (SKC) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Kxt[q].1 Assuming its truth for the time being, the sceptic can use (SKC) to reason from the two assumptions that, firstly, we don’t know ¬sh and that, secondly, op entails ¬sh to the conclusion that we don’t know op, where ‘op’ and ‘sh’ are shorthand for ‘ordinary (...)
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  2. added 2019-10-12
    Descartes Foundationalism: An Answer to the Skeptics’ or A Way Out?Ncha Gabriel Bubu - 2019 - Social Sciences Studies Journal 5 (44):5232-5237.
    The phenomenon of knowledge is a fundamental issue in epistemology as a main branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge related problems. Over time, epistemologists attempted to give us or provide clues as to what reality actually is, that is the question of the certainty of knowledge has always been topical in any epistemic enterprise. The search for knowledge becomes more cumbersome when one considers the challenge of the skeptics and sophists about the ability of man knowing anything for certain. To (...)
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  3. added 2018-06-03
    Dismissing Skeptical Possibilities.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):235 - 250.
  4. added 2018-03-02
    Comment on John Greco’s Putting Skeptics in Their Place.Reza Lahroodi & Frederick F. Schmitt - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):457-465.
    In this comment, we will focus on Greco’s brief for agent reliabilism in preference to simple reliabilism. Agent reliabilism differs from simple reliabilism primarily in requiring, not merely belief that results from a reliable process, but belief grounded in stable dispositions that make up the subject’s character.
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  5. added 2018-01-06
    Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach.Patrick Rysiew - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):259-279.
    But it’s not the mere fact that the RA theorist needs an account of ‘ruling out’ and ‘relevance’ that has tended to lead people to regard the RA approach with suspicion. In itself, this simply means that the RA theorist has some further work to do; and what theorist doesn’t? No; the principal source of scepticism regarding the ability of the RA theorist to come up with a complete and satisfactory account of knowing stems, rather, from an unhappiness with the (...)
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  6. added 2018-01-06
    Reliability and Relevant Alternatives.David Shatz - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (4):393 - 408.
  7. added 2017-05-15
    Contextualism and the Problem of Known Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 104.
  8. added 2017-05-15
    A Noncontextualist Account of Contextualist Linguistic Data.Mylan Engel - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):56-79.
    The paper takes as its starting point the observation that people can be led to retract knowledge claims when presented with previously ignored error possibilities, but offers a noncontextualist explanation of the data. Fallibilist epistemologies are committed to the existence of two kinds of Kp -falsifying contingencies: (i) Non-Ignorable contingencies [NI-contingencies] and (ii) Properly-Ignorable contingencies [PI-contingencies]. For S to know that p, S must be in an epistemic position to rule out all NI-contingencies, but she need not be able to (...)
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  9. added 2017-05-15
    Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects.Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.
    In this paper we survey some main arguments for and against epistemological contextualism. We distinguish and discuss various kinds of contextualism, such as attributer contextualism (the most influential version of which is semantic, conversational, or radical contextualism); indexicalism; proto-contextualism; Wittgensteinian contextualism; subject, inferential, or issue contextualism; epistemic contextualism; and virtue contextualism. Starting with a sketch of Dretske's Relevant Alternatives Theory and Nozick's Tracking Account of Knowledge, we reconstruct the history of various forms of contextualism and the ways contextualists try to (...)
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  10. added 2017-05-15
    The Relevant Alternatives Theory and Missed Clues.T. Black - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):96 – 106.
    According to the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge (RA), I know that p only if my evidence eliminates all relevant alternatives to p . Jonathan Schaffer has recently argued that David Lewis's version of RA, which is perhaps the most detailed version yet provided, cannot account for our failure to know in cases involving missed clues, that is, cases in which we see but fail to appreciate decisive evidence. I argue, however, that Lewis's version of RA survives exposure to missed (...)
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  11. added 2017-05-15
    Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions.Keith Derose - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):193 - 197.
    In “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” I argue that advocates of the “Relevant Alternatives” theory of knowledge fall into certain mistakes result if they tie the content of a knowledge attribution, on a given occasion of use, too tightly to what the range of relevant alternatives is on that occasion, and I sketch an alternative approach to the issues involved that avoids such mistakes. In “The Shifting Content of Knowledge Attributions,” Anthony Brueckner charges that my own account of these matters falls (...)
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  12. added 2017-02-03
    Scepticism and Contrast Classes.A. Bird - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):97-107.
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  13. added 2017-01-18
    Relevant Alternatives and Closure.Mark Heller - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):196 – 208.
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  14. added 2016-12-08
    The Virtues of Epistemic Conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):185-200.
    Although several important methodologies implicitly assume the truth of epistemic conservatism, the view that holding a belief confers some measure of justification on the belief, recent criticisms have led some to conclude that epistemic conservatism is an implausible view. That conclusion is mistaken. In this article, I propose a new formulation of epistemic conservatism that is not susceptible to the criticisms leveled at earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism. In addition to withstanding these criticisms, this formulation of epistemic conservatism has several (...)
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  15. added 2016-12-08
    Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140.
    Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure (...)
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  16. added 2016-12-08
    Relevant Alternatives, Presuppositions, and Skepticism.Jonathan E. Adler - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):653-654.
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  17. added 2016-12-08
    Relevant Alternatives and Demon Skepticism.Bredo C. Johnsen - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):643-653.
  18. added 2016-09-14
    Certezza e volontà. Saggio sull'etica cartesiana.Antonio Malo (ed.) - 1994 - Armando.
    L'analisi particolareggiata della morale cartesiana rileva il ruolo essenziale che la volontà riveste tanto nella morale provvisoria quanto nella cosiddetta morale definitiva o scientifica. Nella morale provvisoria l'influenza della volontà si rispecchia sulle due logiche opposte che vi convivono: quella pragmatica e quella intellettualista. Apparentemente, l'etica provvisoria ottiene di rendere compatibili le due logiche perché l'azione che momentaneamente è sufficiente a se stessa, nel futuro sarà subordinata alle verità teoriche scoperte; in realtà, è soltanto la volontà a far sì che (...)
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  19. added 2016-03-15
    What Missed Clues Cases Show.Anthony Brueckner - 2003 - Analysis 63 (4):303–305.
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  20. added 2016-02-08
    Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure.Peter Hawke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2759-2784.
    Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus (...)
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  21. added 2016-01-23
    The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body.Douglas C. Long - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (July):321-337.
    I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution. The concept of a "body" which may or may not be the (...)
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  22. added 2015-08-31
    Relevant Alternatives.Mark Heller - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):23 - 40.
  23. added 2015-08-26
    Externalism, Skepticism, and Relevant Alternatives.Raymond Jerome Vanarragon - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Externalist theories of knowledge often claim that whether a person's true belief is knowledge depends on the reliability of the faculties that produced the belief. Some philosophers think that the force of Cartesian skeptical arguments presents a problem for these theories. Externalism seems to entail a too-easy response to skepticism: since whether we know depends mainly on the reliability of our faculties, and skeptical arguments give us no reason to think our faculties unreliable, such arguments do not threaten our knowledge. (...)
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  24. added 2015-08-25
    Cartesian Scepticism and Relevant Alternatives.P. Schreck - unknown - Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 8.
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  25. added 2015-08-24
    Meanings, Manners, and Scepticism.Sarah Black Jones - 2002 - Dissertation, Michigan State University
    In Meanings, Manners, and Scepticism, I argue that the ordinary language philosopher, the relevant alternativist, and the contextualist fail to refute the sceptic. I argue that they fail to refute the sceptic because their arguments critically rest on a number of both dogmatic and erroneous assumptions. In particular they rest on the dogmatic and erroneous assumptions that common sense is threatened by skepticism, that ordinary linguistic behaviour is of epistemic significance, and that the sceptic's departure from the linguistic norm suffices (...)
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  26. added 2015-04-25
    A Critical Introduction to Skepticism.Allan Hazlett - 2014 - Bloomsbury Academic.
    Skepticism remains a central and defining issue in epistemology, and in the wider tradition of Western philosophy. To better understand the contemporary position of this important philosophical subject, Allan Hazlett introduces a range of topics, including: -/- • Ancient skepticism • skeptical arguments in the work of Hume and Descartes • Cartesian skepticism in contemporary epistemology • anti-skeptical strategies, including Mooreanism, nonclosure, and contextualism • additional varieties of skepticism • the practical consequences of Cartesian skepticism -/- Presenting a comprehensive survey (...)
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  27. added 2015-02-28
    Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.G. C. Sane - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 263.
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  28. added 2015-01-23
    A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self-Knowledge Problems.Darren Bradley - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (7):379-393.
    The main argument given for relevant alternatives theories of knowledge has been that they answer scepticism about the external world. I will argue that relevant alternatives also solve two other problems that have been much discussed in recent years, a) the bootstrapping problem and b) the apparent conflict between semantic externalism and armchair self-knowledge. Furthermore, I will argue that scepticism and Mooreanism can be embedded within the relevant alternatives framework.
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  29. added 2014-11-04
    A Logical Transmission Principle for Conclusive Reasons.Charles B. Cross - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):353-370.
    Dretske's conclusive reasons account of knowledge is designed to explain how epistemic closure can fail when the evidence for a belief does not transmit to some of that belief's logical consequences. Critics of Dretske dispute the argument against closure while joining Dretske in writing off transmission. This paper shows that, in the most widely accepted system for counterfactual logic , conclusive reasons are governed by an informative, non-trivial, logical transmission principle. If r is a conclusive reason for believing p in (...)
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  30. added 2014-04-25
    Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
    A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of not as (...)
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  31. added 2014-04-02
    Defeating Skepticism.Robert F. Almeder - 2003 - Philosophical Inquiry 25 (1-2):245-254.
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  32. added 2014-03-25
    Scepticism de Se.T. E. Zimmermann - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):267-275.
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  33. added 2014-03-24
    RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND THE SHIFTING STANDARDS OF KNOWLEDGE.Tim Black - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):23-32.
    So, C. I don’t know that T. Premises 1 and 2 are both plausible. However, C seems false—I do seem to know that there is a tree before me. AI presents a puzzle because its two plausible premises yield a conclusion whose negation is plausible. And no matter whether we accept or reject AI, we find that we must give up something plausible—either premise 1, premise 2, or the negation of C. But which of these should we give up? I (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-23
    Skepticism and Contrastive Explanation.Steven Rieber - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):189-204.
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  35. added 2014-03-22
    The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:155-180.
  36. added 2014-03-14
    Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):305 – 323.
    I offer a critical treatment of the contrastivist response to the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, I argue that if contrastivism is understood along externalist lines then it is unnecessary, while if it is understood along internalist lines then it is intellectually dissatisfying. Moreover, I claim that a closer examination of the conditions under which it is appropriate to claim knowledge reveals that we can accommodate many of the intuitions appealed to by contrastivists without having to opt for this (...)
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  37. added 2014-03-09
    Contrastivism and Lucky Questions.Kelly Becker - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):245-260.
    There’s something deeply right in the idea that knowledge requires an ability to discriminate truth from falsity. Failing to incorporate some version of the discrimination requirement into one’s epistemology generates cases of putative knowledge that are at best problematic. On the other hand, many theories that include a discrimination requirement thereby appear to entail violations of closure. This prima facie tension is resolved nicely in Jonathan Schaffer’s contrastivism, which I describe herein. The contrastivist take on relevant alternatives is implausible, however, (...)
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  38. added 2014-03-06
    The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Quantifying Over Everything.Iris Einheuser - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):237-246.
    A variant of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism appears to show that our quantifiers do not determinately range over absolutely everything. This paper argues that some recent attempts to respond to the quantificational skeptic are unsuccessful and offers an alternative response: the key to answering the skeptic is not to refute her argument but to realize that the argument's setup prevents it from being convincing to those it is directed at.
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  39. added 2014-02-20
    Explicating a Standard Externalist Argument Against the KK Principle.Simon D'Alfonso - 2013 - Logos and Episteme (4):399-406.
    The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how (...)
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  40. added 2014-02-10
    Antiskeptical Conditionals.Theodore J. Everett - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):505–536.
    Empirical knowledge exists in the form of antiskeptical conditionals, which are propositions like [if I am not undetectably deceived, then I am holding a pen]. Such conditionals, despite their trivial appearance, have the same essential content as the categorical propositions that we usually discuss, and can serve the same functions in science and practical reasoning. This paper sketches out two versions of a general response to skepticism that employs these conditionals. The first says that our ordinary knowledge attributions can safely (...)
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  41. added 2013-05-02
    Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.
    Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact that agents do (...)
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  42. added 2013-03-25
    Epistemic Logic, Relevant Alternatives, and the Dynamics of Context.Wesley H. Holliday - 2012 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7415:109-129.
    According to the Relevant Alternatives (RA) Theory of knowledge, knowing that something is the case involves ruling out (only) the relevant alternatives. The conception of knowledge in epistemic logic also involves the elimination of possibilities, but without an explicit distinction, among the possibilities consistent with an agent’s information, between those relevant possibilities that an agent must rule out in order to know and those remote, far-fetched or otherwise irrelevant possibilities. In this article, I propose formalizations of two versions of the (...)
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  43. added 2012-12-28
    Abstracts of Symposium Paper: Knowledge and Skepticism.Robert Nozick - 1978 - Noûs 12 (1):53 -.
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  44. added 2012-12-23
    Incarnating Kripke’s Skepticism About Meaning.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):277-291.
    Although Kripke’s skepticism leads to the conclusion that meaning does not exist, his argument relies upon the supposition that more than one interpretation of words is consistent with linguistic evidence. Relying solely on metaphors, he assumes that there is a multiplicity of possible interpretations without providing any strict proof. In his book The Taming of the True, Neil Tennant pointed out that there are serious obstacles to this thesis and concluded that the skeptic’s nonstandard interpretations are “will o’ wisps.” In (...)
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  45. added 2012-12-23
    Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.Palle Yourgrau - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):175 - 190.
    Traditionally, skeptics as well as their opponents have agreed that in order to know that p one must be able, by some preferred means, to rule out all the alternatives to p. Recently, however, some philosophers have attempted to avert skepticism not (merely) by weakening the preferred means but rather by articulating a subset of the alternatives to p — the so-called relevant alternatives — and insisting that knowledge that p requires only that we be able (by the preferred means) (...)
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  46. added 2012-12-20
    What's Wrong with Contextualism, and a Noncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox.Mylan Engel Jr - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):203 - 231.
    Skeptics try to persuade us of our ignorance with arguments like the following: 1. I don't know that I am not a handless brain-in-a-vat [BIV]. 2. If I don't know that I am not a handless BIV, then I don't know that I have hands. Therefore, 3. I don't know that I have hands. The BIV argument is valid, its premises are intuitively compelling, and yet, its conclusion strikes us as a absurd. Something has to go, but what? Contextualists contend (...)
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  47. added 2012-10-17
    Deliberative Alternatives.Dana K. Nelkin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):215-240.
    There are powerful skeptical challenges to the idea that we are free. And yet, it seems simply impossible for us to shake the sense that we really are free. Some are convinced that the skeptical challenges are insurmountable and resign themselves to living under an illusion, while others argue that the challenges can be met. Even among those who believe that our sense of ourselves as free is at least roughly accurate, there are deep differences of opinion concerning what freedom (...)
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  48. added 2012-10-12
    Rationalized Epistemology: Taking Solipsism Seriously.Albert A. Johnstone - 1991 - State University of New York Press.
    Roughly characterized, solipsism is the skeptical thesis that there is no reason to think that anything exists other than oneself and one’s present experience. Since its inception in the reflections of Descartes, the thesis has taken three broad and sometimes overlapping forms: Internal World Solipsism that arises from an account of perception in terms of representations of an external world; Observed World Solipsism that arises from doubts as to the existence of what is not actually present sensuously in experience; Unreal (...)
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  49. added 2012-10-10
    Memory.R. F. Harrod - 1942 - Mind 51 (January):47-68.
  50. added 2012-09-21
    Recent Work on Radical Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):215-257.
    This discussion surveys recent developments in the treatment of the epistemological problem of skepticism. These are arguments which attack our knowledge of certain truths rather than, say, our belief in the existence of certain entities. In particular, this article focuses on the radical versions of these skeptical arguments, arguments which purport to show that knowledge is, for the most part, impossible, rather than just that we lack knowledge in a particular discourse. Although most of the key recent developments in this (...)
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