About this topic

Reliabilism is a general approach to questions about knowledge and justification. It focuses on different ways of measuring and employing the property of truth-conduciveness. This general approach comes in four main varieties, each with alternative formulations. Process Reliabilism focuses on the truth-conduciveness of the type-process producing a certain belief. Anti-Luck Reliabilism focuses on the truth-conduciveness of the token-process producing a certain belief (these accounts make use of the modal notions of sensitivity and safety). Virtue Reliabilism focuses on the truth-conduciveness of an agent’s intellectual character traits, or of an agent's believing performance. And Proper Function Reliabilism adds to truth-conduciveness (in whichever guise) the requirement for a purposeful fit between mind and world. The main objections to Reliabilism come from the difficulties attending its proper formulation (counterexamples) and from four much-discussed problems: the Generality Problem, the New Evil Demon Problem, the Problem of Easy Knowledge (Bootstrapping), and the Swamping Problem.

Key works

Contemporary discussions of Reliabilism begin with Goldman 1967, Unger 1968, and Armstrong 1973. Process Reliabilism is developed in Goldman 1975, 1976, 1979, 1986, Kornblith 2002, 2008, and Lyons 2009. Anti-Luck Reliabilism is developed in Dretske 1971, Nozick 1981, Sosa 1999, Williamson 2000, and Pritchard 2005. Virtue Reliabilism is developed in Sosa 1980, 1991, 2007, and Greco 1999, 2007, 2003. And Proper Function Reliabilism is developed in Plantinga 1993 and Bergmann 2006. Influential counterexamples appear in BonJour 1980, Lehrer 1990, and Plantinga 1993 (see Lyons 2009 for replies). The classic statement of the Generality Problem appears in E. Conee & Feldman 1998 (see Beebe 2004 and Comesaña 2006 for replies). Early statements of the Problem of Easy Knowledge appear in Vogel 2000 and Cohen 2002 (see Kornblith 2009 for a reply). An early statement of the New Evil Demon Problem appears in Cohen 1984 (see Goldman 1988, Majors & Sawyer 2005, and Comesaña 2002 for replies). And detailed discussions of the Swamping Problem appear in Zagzebski 2003 and Kvanvig 2004 (see Goldman & Olsson 2009 for replies). Recently, Berker 2013, 2013 sparked a renewed critical interest on the consequentialist structure of Reliabilism (see Goldman 2015 and Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn 2014 for replies).

Related categories

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Material to categorize
  1. Appropriate Attitudes and the Value Problem.Michael S. Brady - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):91 - 99.
  2. What Happens to Reliabilism When It Is Liberated From the Propositional Attitudes?Paul M. Churchland - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):91-112.
  3. Alvin T. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Andy Clark - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (53):526.
  4. Reliabilism and the Meliorative Project.Murray Clarke - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:75-82.
    It has been suggested, recently and not so recently, by a number of analytic epistemologists that reliabilist and externalist accounts of justification and knowledge are inadequate responses to the goals of traditional epistemology and other goals of inquiry. But philosophers of science decry reliabilism and externalism because they are connected to traditional, analytic epistemology, an outmoded and utopian form of inquiry. Clearly, both groups of critics cannot be right. I think both groups are guilty of conceptual confusions that, once clarified, (...)
  5. Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition Reviewed By.Lorraine Code - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8 (10):398-401.
  6. Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Lorraine Code - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8:398-401.
  7. Greco’s Agent Reliabilism. [REVIEW]Stewart Cohen - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):437–443.
  8. Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
  9. What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.
    It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
  10. Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response.Rebecca Copenhaver - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):574-577.
  11. Ultra-Strong Internalism and the Reliabilist Insight.Dan D. Crawford - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:311-328.
    When someone believes something that is justified for her, what part does the subject play in her state of being justified? I will answer this question by developing a strong internalist account of justification according to which the justification of a believing for a subject consists in her having grounds for her belief, and holding the belief in recognition of those grounds. But the internalist theory I defend incorporates key elements of reliabilism into its account. Using perception as a model (...)
  12. Review of Philip De Bary: Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response[REVIEW]Terence Cuneo - 2004 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 2 (2):194-199.
  13. Review of "Epistemology and Cognition" by Alvin Goldman.Jonathan Dancy - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):270-276.
  14. Reliabilism and the Extra Value of Knowledge.Wayne Davis & Christoph Jäger - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):93-105.
    Goldman and Olsson ( 2009 ) have responded to the common charge that reliabilist theories of knowledge are incapable of accounting for the value knowledge has beyond mere true belief. We examine their “conditional probability solution” in detail, and show that it does not succeed. The conditional probability relation is too weak to support instrumental value, and the specific relation they describe is inessential to the value of knowledge. At best, they have described conditions in which knowledge indicates that additional (...)
  15. Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response.Philip de Bary - 2002 - Routledge.
    This book bears witness to the current reawakening of interest in Reid's philosophy. It first examines Reid's negative attack on the Way of Ideas, and finds him to be a devastating critic of his predecessors.
  16. Plantinga's Reliabilism Between Teleology and Epistemic Naturalization.Margherita Di Stasio - 2008 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):13-24.
  17. Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
    This paper begins by raising a puzzle about what function our use of the word ‘rational’ could serve. To solve the puzzle, I introduce a view I call Epistemic Communism: we use epistemic evaluations to promote coordination among our basic belief-forming rules, and the function of this is to make the acquisition of knowledge by testimony more efficient.
  18. Proper Bootstrapping.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):171-185.
    According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type (...)
  19. Apistemology and Cognition by Alvin Goldman. [REVIEW]Fred Dretske - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (5):265-270.
  20. Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred Dretske - 1981 - MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning by viewing meaning as (...)
  21. Reliabilism, Foundationalism, and Naturalized Epistemic Justification Theory.Jane Duran - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (2):113–127.
  22. The Autonomy and Explanation of Mystical Perception.Christopher J. Eberle - 1998 - Religious Studies 34 (3):299-316.
    William Alston has articulated a powerful defence of the claim that mystical perception generates prima facie justified beliefs about God. At the heart of his defence is the claim that mystical perception is 'innocent until proven guilty'; that is, Alston claims that the practice of forming beliefs on the basis of putative perceptions of God should be accorded the same presumptive innocence we accord to other standard ways of forming beliefs like sense perception, memory and introspection. But Alston employs a (...)
  23. The Contextual Basis of Rationality.William Douglas Evans - 1992 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
    Among recent naturalistic epistemologies, one class of theories, 'rough psychologistic' theories, is the most promising. These claim that for our belief-formation processes to yield knowledge is for them to be sufficiently reliable. The study of cognition, then, is best conducted by dividing labor between two groups: psychologists, who should describe what, and how reliable, the processes we use to form beliefs are; and philosophers, who should formulate normative standards of reliability. ;One promising version of rough psychologism is Alvin Goldman's nativistic (...)
  24. Can Reliabilism and Consequentialism Be Used at the Same Time in a Theory of Knowledge: A Knotty Consideration.A. Fatic - 1996 - Communication and Cognition. Monographies 29 (1):131-145.
  25. Goldman on Epistemology and Cognitive Science.Richard Feldman - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (2-3):197-207.
  26. Reliability and Justification.Richard Feldman - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):159-174.
  27. Schmitt on Reliability, Objectivity, and Justification.Richard Feldman - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (3):354 – 360.
  28. Typing Problems.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):98-105.
    Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved.
  29. The Medieval Roots of Reliabilist Epistemology: Albert of Saxony's View of Immediate Apprehension.Michael J. Fitzgerald - 2003 - Synthese 136 (3):409-434.
    In the essay I first argue that Albert of Saxony's defense of perceptual "direct realism" is in fact a forerunner of contemporary forms of "process reliabilist" epistemologies. Second, I argue that Albert's defense of perceptual direct realism has an interesting consequence for his philosophy of language. His semantic notion of 'natural signification' does not require any semantic intermediary entity called a 'concept' or 'description', to function as the direct significatum of written or spoken terms for them to designate perceptual objects. (...)
  30. What's Wrong With Reliabilism?Richard Foley - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):188-202.
  31. No Easy Answers: Science and the Pursuit of Knowledge.Allan Franklin - 2007 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    In _No Easy Answers_, Allan Franklin offers an accurate picture of science to both a general reader and to scholars in the humanities and social sciences who may not have any background in physics. Through the examination of nontechnical case studies, he illustrates the various roles that experiment plays in science. He uses examples of unquestioned success, such as the discoveries of the electron and of three types of neutrino, as well as studies that were dead ends, wrong turns, or (...)
  32. Book Review:Epistemology and Cognition Alvin I. Goldman. [REVIEW]Bruce Freed - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (3):479-.
  33. Epistemology and Cognition.Bruce Freed - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):125-145.
  34. Reliability, Reasons, and Belief Contexts.R. Bruce Freed - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):681 - 696.
  35. Review: Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response. [REVIEW]Roger Gallie - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):518-521.
  36. Is "Simple Reliabilism" Adequately Motivated? [REVIEW]R. Douglas Geivett - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):444–450.
  37. Coverage-Reliability, Epistemic Dependence, and the Problem of Rumor-Based Belief.Axel Gelfert - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):763-786.
    Rumors, for better or worse, are an important element of public discourse. The present paper focuses on rumors as an epistemic phenomenon rather than as a social or political problem. In particular, it investigates the relation between the mode of transmission and the reliability, if any, of rumors as a source of knowledge. It does so by comparing rumor with two forms of epistemic dependence that have recently received attention in the philosophical literature: our dependence on the testimony of others, (...)
  38. Critical Study of Goldberg's Relying on Others. [REVIEW]Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):81-88.
    This critical study of Sanford Goldberg's Relying on Others focuses on the book's central claim, the extendedness hypothesis, according to which the processes relevant for assessing the reliability of a hearer's testimonial belief include the cognitive processes involved in the production of the testimony.
  39. Causal Theories in Epistemology.Carl Ginet - 1992 - In Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.
  40. Contra Reliabilism.Carl Ginet - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):175-187.
  41. The Trouble with Goldman's Reliabilism.Gary Gleb - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (4):382 – 394.
  42. The Generality of Predictions.William Godfrey-Smith - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):15 - 25.
  43. A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism.Sanford Goldberg - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
  44. Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world.
  45. Reliabilism in Philosophy.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.
    The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
  46. Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package.Alvin I. Goldman - unknown
    For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” He tries to show how each theory can (...)
  47. Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package.Alvin I. Goldman - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
  48. Recursive Tracking Versus Process Reliabilism. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):223-230.
    Sherrilyn Roush’s Tracking Truth (2005) is an impressive, precisioncrafted work. Although it sets out to rehabilitate the epistemological theory of Robert Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (1981), its departures from Nozick’s line are extensive and original enough that it should be regarded as a distinct form of epistemological externalism. Roush’s mission is to develop an externalism that averts the problems and counterexamples encountered not only by Nozick’s theory but by other varieties of externalism as well. Roush advances both a theory of knowledge (...)
  49. Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 63--82.
  50. Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public.Alvin I. Goldman - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    How can we know? How can we attain justified belief? These traditional questions in epistemology have inspired philosophers for centuries. Now, in this exceptional work, Alvin Goldman, distinguished scholar and leader in the fields of epistemology and mind, approaches such inquiries as legitimate methods or "pathways" to knowledge. He examines the notion of private and public knowledge, arguing for the epistemic legitimacy of private and introspective methods of gaining knowledge, yet acknowledging the equal importance of social and public mechanisms in (...)
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