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  1. added 2019-01-25
    Liars, Tigers, and Bearers of Bad News, Oh My!: Towards a Reasons Account of Defeat.Emelia Miller - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):82-99.
    The standard reliabilist line on defeat is open to counterexamples regarding its necessity and sufficiency. In this paper, I present three problems for the standard reliabilist line from the recent literature on defeat before arguing that reliabilists can solve those problems by adopting an account of justification that ties defeat to the evidence possessed by the relevant agent. In doing so, I show that there is a conception of having evidence that reliabilists can adopt without giving up on the core (...)
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  2. added 2019-01-10
    Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill, and the Regress Problem.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    A novel solution is offered for how emotional experiences can function as sources of immediate prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs, and in such a way that suffices to halt a justificatory regress. Key to this solution is the recognition of two distinct kinds of emotional skill (what I call generative emotional skill and doxastic emotional skill) and how these must be working in tandem when emotional experience plays such a justificatory role. The paper has two main parts, the first (...)
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  3. added 2018-12-28
    Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2018 - In Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer. pp. 307-25.
    Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. More recently, other authors have argued that the resulting theory is well- placed to deal with fine-grained doxastic attitudes (credences). In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of (...)
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  4. added 2018-12-17
    Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
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  5. added 2018-12-17
    What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.
    It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
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  6. added 2018-12-17
    Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response.Rebecca Copenhaver - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):574-577.
  7. added 2018-12-17
    Greco’s Agent Reliabilism. [REVIEW]Stewart Cohen - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):437–443.
  8. added 2018-12-17
    Reliabilism and the Meliorative Project.Murray Clarke - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:75-82.
    It has been suggested, recently and not so recently, by a number of analytic epistemologists that reliabilist and externalist accounts of justification and knowledge are inadequate responses to the goals of traditional epistemology and other goals of inquiry. But philosophers of science decry reliabilism and externalism because they are connected to traditional, analytic epistemology, an outmoded and utopian form of inquiry. Clearly, both groups of critics cannot be right. I think both groups are guilty of conceptual confusions that, once clarified, (...)
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  9. added 2018-12-17
    Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition Reviewed By.Lorraine Code - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8 (10):398-401.
  10. added 2018-12-17
    Alvin T. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Andy Clark - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (53):526.
  11. added 2018-12-17
    Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Lorraine Code - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8:398-401.
  12. added 2018-12-16
    Memory in Analytic Philosophy.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Dmitri Nikulin (ed.), Memory: A History. Oxford University Press. pp. 298-315.
  13. added 2018-12-10
    Two Legacies of Goldman’s Epistemology.Ram Neta - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (1):121-136.
    Goldman’s epistemology has been influential in two ways. First, it has influenced some philosophers to think that, contrary to erstwhile orthodoxy, relations of evidential support, or confirmation, are not discoverable a priori. Second, it has offered some philosophers a powerful argument in favor of methodological reliance on intuitions about thought experiments in doing philosophy. This paper argues that these two legacies of Goldman’s epistemology conflict with each other.
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  14. added 2018-11-21
    Justification Épistémique.Arturs Logins - 2018 - L’Encyclopédie Philosophique (Version Grand Public).
    Certaines croyances sont justifiées tandis que d’autres ne le sont pas. Si je crois que la Terre est ronde, on peut considérer que ma croyance est justifiée, alors que si je crois qu’elle est plate, elle ne l’est pas. Qu’est-ce qui différencie les unes des autres ? Une croyance justifiée doit-elle toujours être fondée sur une autre croyance justifiée ? Comment pouvons-nous éviter la conclusion sceptique selon laquelle nous ne sommes pas justifiés à croire quoi que ce soit ? Ces (...)
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  15. added 2018-10-04
    Metacognition as Evidence for Evidentialism.Matthew Frise - 2018 - In Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Springer. pp. 91-107.
    Metacognition is the monitoring and controlling of cognitive processes. I examine the role of metacognition in ‘ordinary retrieval cases’, cases in which it is intuitive that via recollection the subject has a justified belief. Drawing on psychological research on metacognition, I argue that evidentialism has a unique, accurate prediction in each ordinary retrieval case: the subject has evidence for the proposition she justifiedly believes. But, I argue, process reliabilism has no unique, accurate predictions in these cases. I conclude that ordinary (...)
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  16. added 2018-09-29
    Goodbye, Justification. Hello World.Michael Bishop & Benett Bootz - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):269-285.
    There are simple rules for making important judgments that are more reliable than experts, but people refuse to use them People refuse even when they are told that these rules are more reliable than they are. When we say that people “refuse” to use the rule, we do not mean that people stubbornly refuse to carry out the steps indicated by the rule. Rather, people defect from the rule (i.e., they overturn the rule’s judgment) so often that they end up (...)
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  17. added 2018-09-27
    Gettier and Externalism.Rodrigo Borges - forthcoming - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem.
  18. added 2018-09-23
    How to Explain the Rationality of Perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):500-512.
    In her book The Rationality of Perception, Susanna Siegel argues for the interesting idea that perceptual experiences are in an important epistemic sense much more like beliefs than has previously been supposed. Like beliefs, perceptual experiences themselves already manifest a certain epistemic status, and, like beliefs, the way in which those experiences are formed will impact what that epistemic status will be. In what follows, I will first contrast this view of the rationality of perception with the usual way of (...)
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  19. added 2018-09-22
    Justification, Epistemic.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2016
    Epistemic Justification We often believe what we are told by our parents, friends, doctors, and news reporters. We often believe what we see, taste, and smell. We hold beliefs about the past, the present, and the future. Do we have a right to hold any of these beliefs? Are any supported by evidence? Should we … Continue reading Justification, Epistemic →.
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  20. added 2018-09-22
    Reidian Externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    What distinguishes Reidian externalism from other versions of epistemic externalism about justification is its proper functionalism and its commonsensism, both of which are inspired by the 18th century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Its proper functionalism is a particular analysis of justification; its commonsensism is a certain thesis about what we are noninferentially justified in believing.
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  21. added 2018-09-22
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Marina Bakalova - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):363-368.
  22. added 2018-09-22
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.
  23. added 2018-09-22
    A Reliability Theory of Epistemic Justification.Ralph Neil Baergen - 1990 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
    The claim that the epistemic status of a belief corresponds to the reliability of the process by which it was formed is developed and defended. In the course of this, a variety of conceptual and methodological matters are addressed. Notably, the role of the sciences, particularly experimental psychology and cognitive science, in epistemology is explored, and the claim that factual disciplines can have no bearing upon a normative project is considered and rejected. Also, the suggestion that psychology should entirely replace (...)
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  24. added 2018-09-22
    "Epistemology and Cognition" by Alvin I. Goldman. [REVIEW]Robert Audi - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (4):733.
    This book is a massive study of epistemology and its connections with cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. Its aim is to redirect the field of epistemology, which “should be a multidisciplinary affair, not the province of pure, a priori philosophy.”.
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  25. added 2018-09-22
    Spectrum Epistemology: The BonJour - Goldman Debate.Andrew Morgan - unknown
    Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in (...)
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  26. added 2018-09-21
    How to Think About Reliability.William P. Alston - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):1-29.
  27. added 2018-09-14
    The Circularity of a Self-Supporting Inductive Argument.Peter Achinstein - 1962 - Analysis 22 (6):138 - 141.
  28. added 2018-09-06
    Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly—that is, its fundamental epistemic value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. The Swamping Problem says that Veritism is incompatible with two pre-theoretic beliefs about epistemic value (Zagzebski, 2003; Kvanvig, 2003): -/- (I) a true justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a true unjustified belief; -/- (II) a false justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than (...)
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  29. added 2018-08-31
    Replies to Begby, Ghijsen and Samoilova.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):523-536.
    I’m grateful to Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova for engaging with The Rationality of Perception and for writing such interesting and productive commentaries. Taken together, the three commentaries cover a diverse range of topics.
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  30. added 2018-06-21
    Spirit Beliefs Debunked?Hans Van Eyghen - 2018 - Science, Religion and Culture 5 (1):73-82.
    I discuss and criticize an argument for the conclusion that belief in spirits is unreliably formed and hence unjustified. The argument is based on three scientific explanations for spirit-beliefs; hyperactive agency detection device, infrasound, and magnetic stimulation of the temporal lobe. I argue that the argument fails because the explanations are of too limited scope.
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  31. added 2018-06-20
    Thinking Twice About Virtue and Vice: Philosophical Situationism and the Vicious Minds Hypothesis.Guy Axtell - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):7-39.
    This paper provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Mark Alfano’s challenges to them based on his theses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of cognitive success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between virtue epistemologies qua credit theories, and dual-process theories in cognitive psychology. It also a response to Lauren Olin and John Doris’ “vicious minds” thesis, (...)
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  32. added 2018-05-29
    What is Justified Credence?Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    In this paper, we seek a reliabilist account of justified credence. Reliabilism about justified beliefs comes in two varieties: process reliabilism (Goldman, 1979, 2008) and indicator reliabilism (Alston, 1988, 2005). Existing accounts of reliabilism about justified credence comes in the same two varieties: Jeff Dunn (2015) proposes a version of process reliabilism, while Weng Hong Tang (2016) offers a version of indicator reliabilism. As we will see, both face the same objection. If they are right about what justification is, it (...)
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  33. added 2018-05-08
    One Standard to Rule Them All?Marc‐Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):12-21.
    It has been argued that an epistemically rational agent’s evidence is subjectively mediated through some rational epistemic standards, and that there are incompatible but equally rational epistemic standards available to agents. This supports Permissiveness, the view according to which one or multiple fully rational agents are permitted to take distinct incompatible doxastic attitudes towards P (relative to a body of evidence). In this paper, I argue that the above claims entail the existence of a unique and more reliable epistemic standard. (...)
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  34. added 2018-05-04
    Does Reliabilism Have a Temporality Problem?Jeffrey Tolly - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Matthew Frise claims that reliabilist theories of justification have a temporality problem—the problem of providing a principled account of the temporal parameters of a process’s performance that determine whether that process is reliable at a given time. Frise considers a representative sample of principled temporal parameters and argues that there are serious problems with all of them. He concludes that the prospects for solving the temporality problem are bleak. Importantly, Frise argues that the temporality problem constitutes a new reason to (...)
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  35. added 2018-04-30
    Is Supernatural Belief Unreliably Formed.Hans Van Eyghen - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-24.
    I criticize 5 arguments for the conclusion that religious belief is unreliably formed and hence epistemically tainted. The arguments draw on scientific evidence from Cognitive Science of Religion. They differ considerably as to why the evidence points to unreliability. Two arguments conclude to unreliability because religious belief is shaped by evolutionary pressures; another argument states that the mechanism responsible for religious belief produces many false god-beliefs; a similar argument claims that the mechanism produces incompatible god-beliefs; and a final argument states (...)
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  36. added 2018-04-11
    Method Coherence and Epistemic Circularity.Will Fleisher - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.
    Reliabilism is an intuitive and attractive view about epistemic justification. However, it has many well-known problems. I offer a novel condition on reliabilist theories of justification. This method coherence condition requires that a method be appropriately tested by appeal to a subject’s other belief-forming methods. Adding this condition to reliabilism provides a solution to epistemic circularity worries, including the bootstrapping problem.
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  37. added 2018-03-19
    Reason Dethroned; Knowledge Regained.James Arthur Moore - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Hume held that we have no rational justification for our inductive beliefs. A more radical view is that we have no rational justification for any of our beliefs. This dissertation has two goals pertaining to this more radical view. // The first goal is to find a basis for constructive epistemology that is consistent with this view. This goal is first sought by considering externalist theories of knowledge since these do not require rational justification for knowledge. Externalist theories are defended (...)
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  38. added 2018-03-19
    Knowledge, Society, Power, and the Promise of Epistemological Externalism.James A. Moore - 1991 - Synthese 88 (3):379 - 398.
    This paper has two aims. The first is to criticize epistemological externalism in a way different from most other criticisms. Most criticisms claim externalism fails because it does not adequately explicate ordinary notions of knowledge and justification. Such criticisms are often unhelpful to the externalist because he may not even intend his theory to be such an explication. The criticism presented here avoids this difficulty. The other aim, achieved en route to this criticism, is to explode a dogma of contemporary (...)
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  39. added 2018-02-17
    Response to Critics.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):477-488.
    Response to Horgan, Goldman, and Graham. Part of a book symposium on my _Perception and Basic Beliefs_.
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  40. added 2018-02-17
    Three Questions About Leplin’s Reliabilism.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):43-50.
    This paper raises three critical questions about Jarrett Leplin's version of reliabilism.
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  41. added 2018-01-15
    Bootstrapping and Knowledge of Reliability.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):407–412.
    This is a critical discussion of a paper on the problem of bootstrapping by Jose Zalabardo.
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  42. added 2018-01-10
    The Puzzle of Perceptual Justification: Conscious Experience, Higher-Order Beliefs, and Reliable Processes.Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Switzerland: Springer.
    This book provides an accessible and up-to-date discussion of contemporary theories of perceptual justification that each highlight different factors related to perception, i.e., conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes. The book’s discussion starts from the viewpoint that perception is not only one of our fundamental sources of knowledge and justification, but also plays this role for many less sophisticated animals. It proposes a scientifically informed reliabilist theory which can accommodate this fact without denying that some of our epistemic abilities (...)
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  43. added 2017-11-28
    What is Justified Credence?Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    In this paper, we seek a reliabilist account of justified credence. Reliabilism about justified beliefs comes in two varieties: process reliabilism (Goldman, 1979, 2008) and indicator reliabilism (Alston, 1988, 2005). Existing accounts of reliabilism about justified credence comes in the same two varieties: Jeff Dunn’s is a version of process reliabilism (Dunn, 2015) while Weng Hong Tang offers a version of indicator reliabilism (Tang, 2016). As we will see, both face the same objection. If they are right about what justification (...)
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  44. added 2017-11-27
    Reliabilism, Bootstrapping, and Epistemic Circularity.Jochen Briesen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.
    Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject (...)
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  45. added 2017-11-27
    Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?Berit Brogaard - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.
    Virtue reliabilism appears to have a major advantage over generic reliabilism: only the former has the resources to explain the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that this appearance is illusory. It is sustained only by the misguided assumption that a principled distinction can be drawn between those belief-forming methods that are grounded in the agent’s intellectual virtues, and those that are not. A further problem for virtue reliabilism is that of explaining why knowledge (...)
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  46. added 2017-08-28
    Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief: Response to Bernecker.Daniel Breyer & John Greco - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):173–184.
    This paper responds to Sven Bernecker’s argument that agent reliabilism cannot accommodate internalist intuitions about clarvoyance cases. In section 1 we clarify a version of agent reliabilism and Bernecker’s objections against it. In section 2 we say more about how the notion of cognitive integration helps to adjudicate clairvoyance cases and other proposed counterexamples to reliabilism. The central idea is that cognitive integration underwrites a kind of belief ownership, which in turn underwrites the sort of responsibility for belief required for (...)
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  47. added 2017-07-05
    Reliabilism and Demon World Victims.Jennifer Wilson Mulnix - 2013 - Tópicos 44:35-82.
    This paper defends reliabilism against the classic demon world victim thought experiment. In doing so, I underscore two of its key alleged intuitions. I then articulate a host of varied responses open to the reliabilist, arguing that these readily available responses provide the reliabilist with a way to either accommodate or reject these initial intuitions about the demon world victim thought experiment, and in a way consistent with reliabilism. Thus, I conclude that the demon world thought experiment does not undercut (...)
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  48. added 2017-06-09
    Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology.Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1049-1065.
    Strategic Reliabilism is a framework that yields relative epistemic evaluations of belief-producing cognitive processes. It is a theory of cognitive excellence, or more colloquially, a theory of reasoning excellence (where 'reasoning' is understood very broadly as any sort of cognitive process for coming to judgments or beliefs). First introduced in our book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment (henceforth EPHJ), the basic idea behind SR is that epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads in a robustly reliable fashion (...)
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  49. added 2017-06-09
    Reliabilism, Proper Function, and Serendipitous Malfunction.Adrian Bardon - 2007 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (1):45–64.
    Alvin Plantinga's externalist analysis of epistemic warrant centres on the proper function of the relevant belief-forming mechanism, where proper function is fixed relative to the design plan of the organism in question. He has set this analysis against reliabilism, the other leading externalist contender for the analysis of warrant. Though Plantinga's discussion advances the field of epistemology in a number of important ways, his treatment of warrant is limited by his assumption of creationism in his understanding of design and function. (...)
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  50. added 2017-06-09
    Reliabilism, Truth and Cognitive Science.James Robert Beebe - 2002 - Dissertation, Saint Louis University
    This dissertation project aims to defend and develop the philosophical theory of justified belief known as 'reliabilism.' Reliabilism is the view that beliefs are justified just when they are produced by reliable belief-forming cognitive processes---i.e., processes which would produce true beliefs most of the time. This view is opposed to more traditional views of epistemic justification, according to which beliefs are justified if they are supported by sufficient evidence, are self-evident, or are deducible from self-evident beliefs. Reliabilism has been the (...)
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