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  1. The Poetic Experience of the World.Mathew Abbott - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (4):493-516.
    In this article I develop Heidegger's phenomenology of poetry, showing that it may provide grounds for rejecting claims that he lapses into linguistic idealism. Proceeding via an analysis of the three concepts of language operative in the philosopher's work, I demonstrate how poetic language challenges language's designative and world-disclosive functions. The experience with poetic language, which disrupts Dasein's absorption by emerging out of equipmentality in the mode of the broken tool, brings Dasein to wonder at the world's existence in such (...)
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  2. A Note on Defeasibility and Skepticism.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Philosophia 12 (3-4):299-305.
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  3. Weak Inferential Internalism.David J. Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
    Inferential internalism holds that for one to be inferentially justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing that E makes probable P. Inferential internalism has long been accused of generating a vicious regress on inferential justification that has drastic skeptical consequences. However, recently Hookway and Rhoda have defended a more modest form of internalism that avoids this problem. They propose a form of weak inferential internalism according to which internalist conditions are restricted to (...)
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  4. Review: Claudine Tiercelin. Le Doute En Question: Parades Pragmatistes au D�Fi Sceptique (Doubt in Question: Pragmatist Responses to the Challenge of Skepticism). Paris & Tel-Aviv: Editions de l'Eclat, 2005. [REVIEW]Robert Almeder - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):282-289.
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  5. Do We Know (Almost) Nothing? Global Scepticism and Justification.Maria Cristina Amoretti & Nicla Vassallo - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):91-109.
    According to the minimal version of the traditional analysis of knowledge, there are (at least) three necessary components to knowledge, that is, truth, belief and justification. In this paper we will argue that even in a global sceptical scenario, all three conditions minimally necessary for knowledge can be satisfied. In particular, we will focus on the justification requirement and analyse two “traditional” theories of justification, i.e., coherentism and foundationalism, as well as a more “innovative” one, i.e., reliabilism. Then, we will (...)
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  6. The Refutation of Scepticism.Michael Andolina - 1987 - Idealistic Studies 17 (3):278-279.
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  7. How to Do Things with Candrakirti: A Comparative Study in Anti-Skepticism.Dan Arnold - 2001 - Philosophy East and West 51 (2):247-279.
    Two strikingly similar critiques of epistemological foundationalism are examined: J. L. Austin's critique of A. J. Ayer in the former's "Sense and Sensibilia," and part of Candrakīrti's critique of Dignāga in the first chapter of the "Prasannapadā." With respect to Austin, it is argued that his writings on epistemology in fact relate quite closely to his better-known philosophy of speech acts, and that the appeal to ordinary language is part of a transcendental argument against the possibility of radical skepticism. It (...)
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  8. Rules, Scepticism and Rule-Scepticism.J. Atkins - unknown
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  9. Truth and Skepticism: On the Limits of a Philosophical Refutation of Skepticism.P. Aubenque & R. S. Walker - 1985 - Diogenes 33 (132):95-106.
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  10. Knowledge of the External World.Bruce Aune - 2014 - Routledge.
    Many philosophers believe that the traditional problem of our knowledge of the external world was dissolved by Wittgestein and others. They argue that it was not really a problem - just a linguistic `confusion' that did not actually require a solution. Bruce Aune argues that they are wrong. He casts doubt on the generally accepted reasons for putting the problem aside and proposes an entirely new approach. By considering the history of the problem from Descartes to Kant, Aune shows that (...)
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  11. Closure Reconsidered.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12 (9).
    Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of justification is that (...)
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  12. An Old Problem for the New Rationalism.Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):175-185.
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  13. No Closure On Skepticism.Yuval Avnur, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.
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  14. Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism.Guy Axtell - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the responses that proponents of virtue epistemology (VE) make to radical skepticism and particularly to two related forms of it, Pyrrhonian skepticism and the “underdetermination-based” argument, both of which have been receiving widening attention in recent debate. Section 1 of the chapter briefly articulates these two skeptical arguments and their interrelationship, while section 2 explains the close connection between a virtue-theoretic and a neo-Moorean response to them. In sections 3 and 4 I advance arguments for improving (...)
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  15. Blind Man's Bluff: Examining the Basic Belief Apologetic.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131--152.
    Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by `scientific' and `theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...)
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  16. Blind Man’s Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-Skeptical Stratagem.Guy Axtell - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131-152.
    Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by 'scientific' and 'theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...)
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  17. Scepticism, Rules and Language.Gordon P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker - 1984 - Blackwell.
  18. Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism.Frank Barel - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):21-43.
    This paper explores the bearing of Tyler Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement on the problem of scepticism. Perceptual entitlement is an external form of warrant, connected with his perceptual anti-individualism. According to his view, an individual can be entitled to a perceptual belief without having reasons warranting the belief. On the face of it, this suggests that the view may have anti-sceptical resources. In short, the question is whether Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement allows us to outright deny that we (...)
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  19. CAMPBELL, C. A. -Scepticism and Construction. [REVIEW]H. Barker - 1932 - Mind 41:242.
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  20. Unger's Defense of Skepticism.Gerald W. Barnes - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (2):119 - 124.
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  21. Scepticism and Reliable Belief.Kelly Becker - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):241-244.
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  22. Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and Semantic Externalism.Helen Beebee - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.
  23. Skolem and the Skeptic.Paul Benacerraf & Crispin Wright - 1985 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1):85-138.
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  24. Gupta's Gambit.Selim Berker - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
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  25. Skeptical Rationalism.William Berkson - 1979 - Inquiry 22 (1-4):281 – 320.
    To improve our methods of rational inquiry and decision-making we need to recognize that such methods should guide but not fully determine the choices of individuals. Failure to acknowledge the essential incompleteness of rational methods made the methods of Classical Rationalism quite impractical and opened them to skeptical refutation. Mitigated Skepticism and Fideism failed to correct the error, and as a result put undesirable limits on rational inquiry. When the guiding character of rational methods is recognized, existing methods of scientific (...)
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  26. Dubito Ergo Non Sum or the Logic of Skepticism.Andrzej Biłat - 2012 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):7-14.
    The paper analyses three versions of skepticism: the attitude of a general withholding of belief; the attitude of general doubt and the view that all beliefs are unjustified. It is shown on the basis of epistemic logic that only the first of these versions can be deemed not to be self-contradictory.
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  27. Defending Contrastivism.Martijn Blaauw - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):59-64.
    One of the most interesting anti-skeptical theories that has been proposed in the recent literature is epistemological contrastivism. In this paper, I answer some important objections to contrastivism that have been put forward by Steven Luper. The upshot of this paper is that Luper’s objections fail to damage contrastivism.
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  28. A Criticism of Scepticism and Relativism.Ralph Mason Blake - 1924 - Journal of Philosophy 21 (10):253-272.
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  29. Conclusive Reasons and Scepticism.William S. Boardman - 1978 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):32 – 40.
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  30. Traditional Epistemology and Naturalistic Replies to its Skeptical Critics.James Bogen - 1985 - Synthese 64 (2):195 - 224.
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  31. Reply to Amini and Caldwell, Boghossians Refutation of Relativism.Paul Boghossian - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):45-49.
    Majid Amini and Christopher Caldwell charge that I misconstrue the relation between relativism and constructivism, on the one hand, and between relativism and skepticism, on the other. In this brief response, I rebut their charges.
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  32. The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon.Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Descartes’ demon is a deceiver: the demon makes things appear to you other than as they really are. However, as Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation, not all knowledge is imperilled by this kind of deception. You still know you are a thinking thing. Perhaps, though, there is a more virulent demon in epistemic hell, one from which none of our knowledge is safe. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) thinks so. The “Debasing Demon” he imagines threatens knowledge not via the (...)
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  33. Nozick, Externalism, and Skepticism.Laurence BonJour - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  34. Review of James Cornman, Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation. [REVIEW]Laurence BonJour - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):612-615.
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  35. Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation.Laurence BonJour & James W. Cornman - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):612.
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  36. The Life and Learning of Arne Naess: Scepticism as a Survival Strategy.Inga Bostad - 2011 - Inquiry 54 (1):42-51.
    ABSTRACT It is obvious that Arne Naess had his most important philosophical experience, and quite possibly made his most significant achievement, in confrontation with the variety of philosophical scepticism known as Pyrrhonism. Naess maintained, however, that he did not defend scepticism as a philosophical position, and he was concerned to distinguish Pyrrhonism from the inverse form of dogmatism often associated with the term ?scepticism?. Naess was primarily preoccupied with the practical implications of this radical form of scepticism, in which he (...)
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  37. Skepticism, Normativity, and Practical Identity.Michael S. Brady - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):403-412.
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  38. Rule-Following Skepticism, Properly So Called.Jason Bridges - 2014 - In Andrea Kern & James Conant (eds.), Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. De Gruyter. pp. 249-288.
  39. The Coherence of Scepticism About Self-Knowledge.A. Brueckner - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):41-48.
  40. A Defense of Burge's "Self-Verifying Judgments".Anthony Brueckner - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):27-32.
    People have worried about the compatibility of anti-individualism and knowledge of the contents of one's thoughts. Skepticism about such knowledge rears its ugly head. The first—classic—response to such worries was Tyler Burge's contention that a subclass of judgments about one's own mental states are cogito-like: they are self-verifying, thereby guaranteed to be true. Finn Spicer has recently put forward an interesting argument against Burge's claim. In this paper, I defend Burge's account of self-verification against Spicer's argument.
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  41. Idealism and Scepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):368-371.
    It is argued that contrary to appearances, Berkeleyan Idealism lacks anti-sceptical force. The problem stems from the way in which the idealist draws the appearance/reality distinction.
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  42. Essays on Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    The guiding questions of this volume are: Can we have knowledge of the external world of things outside our minds?
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  43. Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):733–736.
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  44. Review: Skepticism and Foundationalism. [REVIEW]Anthony Brueckner - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):533 - 547.
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  45. Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent?Anthony L. Brueckner - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):287-90.
    Gary Ebbs has argued that skepticism regarding knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states cannot even be coherently formulated. This articles is a reply to that argument.
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  46. Begging the Skeptic's Question.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (4):523-529.
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  47. Why Nozick is a Sceptic.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1984 - Mind 93 (370):259-264.
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  48. Natural Doubts: Williams's Diagnosis of Scepticism.Reid Buchanan - 2002 - Synthese 131 (1):57-80.
    Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the externalworld seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thoughtto be ``mere platitudes'''' about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence,that if it shown through a ``theoretical diagnosis'''' that it does not rest upon suchplatitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound toaccept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues thatscepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, however, he admits thatif these doctrines (...)
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  49. Natural Doubts: Williams's Diagnosis Of Scepticism.Reid Buchanan - 2002 - Synthese 131 (1):57-80.
    Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the external world seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thought to be "mere platitudes" about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence, that if it shown through a "theoretical diagnosis" that it does not rest upon such platitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound to accept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues that scepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, (...)
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  50. Davidson and Skepticism: How Not to Respond to the Skeptic.Otávio Bueno - 2010 - Principia 9 (1-2):1-18.
    In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our beliefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoherent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a coherence theory (...)
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