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1 — 50 / 451
  1. added 2020-06-19
    Skeptical Appeal: The Source-Content Bias.John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (2):307-324.
    Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing, or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-18
    Knowledge and Truth: A Skeptical Challenge.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):93-101.
    It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of our beliefs are only approximately true, and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the skeptical (...)
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  3. added 2020-06-16
    Skepticism, Normativity, and Practical Identity.Michael S. Brady - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):403-412.
  4. added 2020-02-12
    Cogito Ergo Sum.Jim Stone - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (9):462-468.
  5. added 2020-02-12
    Reason and Scepticism.Fred I. Dretske - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):47-53.
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  6. added 2020-02-11
    The Sceptical Challenge.Charles Landesman - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):503-506.
  7. added 2020-02-08
    Knowledge of the External World.Panayot Butchvarov - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):490-492.
  8. added 2019-10-25
    My Ordinary Anti-Sceptical Beliefs Are Not Insensitive.Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 14 (3):469-489.
    An orthodox sceptical hypothesis claims that one’s belief that “I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” (or any other ordinary anti-sceptical belief) is insensitive. A form of sensitivity-based scepticism, can thus be constructed by combining this orthodox hypothesis with the sensitivity principle and the closure principle. Unlike traditional solutions to the sensitivity-based sceptical problem, this paper will propose a new solution—one which does not reject either closure or sensitivity. Instead, I argue that sceptics’ assumption that one’s ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs are insensitive (...)
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  9. added 2019-10-14
    Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Table of Contents -/- 1. Introduction and Overview: Two Entitlement Projects, Peter J. Graham, Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen, Zachary Bachman, and Luis Rosa -/- Part I. Engaging Burge's Project -/- 2. Entitlement: The Basis of Empirical Warrant, Tyler Burge 3. Perceptual Entitlement and Scepticism, Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul 4. Epistemic Entitlement Its Scope and Limits, Mikkel Gerken 5. Why Should Warrant Persist in Demon Worlds?, Peter J. Graham -/- Part II. Extending the Externalist Project -/- 6. Epistemic Entitlement and Epistemic (...)
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  10. added 2019-10-14
    Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.
    We review the "Entitlement" projects of Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright in light of recent work from and surrounding both philosophers. Our review dispels three misunderstandings. First, Burge and Wright are not involved in a common “entitlement” project. Second, though for both Wright and Burge entitlement is the new notion, “entitlement” is not some altogether third topic not clearly connected to the nature of knowledge or the encounter with skepticism. Third, entitlement vs. justification does not align with the externalism vs. (...)
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  11. added 2019-09-26
    « Dousir » et « plaileur » l'énigme de l'attribution d'expériences.Alexandre Billon - 2010 - Philosophie 105 (2):64.
    Cet article aborde le problème de la justification des attributions d'expérience à autrui (problem of other minds). Je compare ce problème à d'autres problèmes sceptiques contemporains dus à Nelson Goodman et Saoül Kripke et je montre qu'il constitue un défi plus pressant et auquel il est plus difficile de répondre de manière modeste. Je propose une solution radicale à ce problème, qui repose sur l'idée, avérée empiriquement, selon laquelle nous disposons de deux formes d'empathie distinctes pour accéder à autrui. Très (...)
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  12. added 2019-09-20
    External World Skepticism, Confidence and Psychologism About the Problem of Priors.Sharon Berry - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):324-346.
    In this paper I will draw attention to an important route to external world skepticism, which I will call confidence skepticism. I will argue that we can defang confidence skepticism (though not a meeker ‘argument from might’ which has got some attention in the 20th century literature on external world skepticism) by adopting a partially psychologistic answer to the problem of priors. And I will argue that certain recent work in the epistemology of mathematics and logic provides independent support for (...)
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  13. added 2019-09-12
    Doubting Pritchard’s Account of Hinge Propositions.Jonathan Nebel - 2019 - Synthese:1-13.
    In On Certainty, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forth a unique defense against skepticism. According to Wittgenstein, “we just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.” These hinges provide the necessary framework for epistemic evaluation. The question is how to understand Wittgenstein’s language here. Duncan Pritchard puts forward a non-belief reading whereby one has a non-belief propositional attitude towards hinge propositions. In this (...)
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  14. added 2019-09-09
    I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted.Ofra Magidor - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):151-181.
    Epistemic externalism offers one of the most prominent responses to the sceptical challenge. Externalism has commonly been interpreted as postulating a crucial asymmetry between the actual-world agent and their brain-in-a-vat counterpart: while the actual agent is in a position to know she is not envatted, her biv counterpart is not in a position to know that she is envatted, or in other words, only the former is in a position to know whether or not she is envatted. In this paper, (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction. By Barry Stroud. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 184. Price £32.50.).Matthew Parrott - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):883-886.
  16. added 2019-06-06
    Reply to Baize on “The Skeptic’s Predicament”.Brian Hutchinson - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):67-70.
  17. added 2019-06-06
    Sosa's Responses to Dreaming Skepticism.Claudia Lorena García - 2010 - Critica 42 (125):3-25.
    Ernest Sosa has proposed two different ways to respond to dreaming skepticism. In this paper I argue that Sosa's first response —which centers on holding that we have no beliefs in dreams— does not appear to be successful against either the hyperbolic or the realistic dreaming skeptic. I also argue that his second attempt to respond to the dreaming skeptic by arguing that perceptual knowledge indeed counts as what he calls "animal knowledge", may succeed but requires us to perform what (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    Greco on Scepticism – A Critical Discussion.Duncan Pritchard & Cornelis Van Putten - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):277-284.
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    Replies to Hanson and Migotti.Michael Hymers - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):595-606.
    I respond to criticisms of my book, Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses (Westview, 2000), by Mark Migotti and Phil Hanson.
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    Anti-Cartesian Epistemology: Davidson’s Naturalism.Deborah Hansen Soles - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):1-22.
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  21. added 2019-06-06
    An Internalist Rejoinder to Skepticism.Greg Ten Elshof - 2003 - International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):105-114.
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  22. added 2019-06-06
    Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, the Woodbridge Lectures 1983. [REVIEW]Peter Lipton - 1987 - Idealistic Studies 17 (3):271-273.
    In these elegant, accessible, and provocative lectures, Sir Peter Strawson considers the prospects for a unified approach to apparently diverse philosophical debates. In each debate one side is skeptical, in a broad sense of the term that includes denial as well as doubt, while the other holds a more liberal or commonsense position. The unified approach comes into play by asking, for each debate, whether we could actually occupy both sides. If one side promotes a position we could only feign (...)
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  24. added 2019-06-06
    Our Knowledge of the External World.Bertrand Russell - 1929 - Routledge.
    _'Philosophy, from the earliest times, has made greater claims, and acheived fewer results than any other branch of learning... I believe that the time has now arrived when this unsatisfactory state of affairs can be brought to an end'_ - _Bertrand Russell_ So begins _Our Knowledge of the Eternal World_, Bertrand Russell's classic attempt to show by means of examples, the nature, capacity and limitations of the logico-analytical method in philosophy.
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  25. added 2019-06-05
    Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst.John Greco - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):51-61.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 51 - 61 _Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing_. By Duncan Pritchard. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 239. ISBN 978-0-691-16723-7.
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  26. added 2019-06-05
    Zalabardo. 2012. Scepticism and Reliable Belief.Tobies Grimaltos - 2014 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 29 (3):439-441.
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  27. added 2019-06-05
    La Naturalidad Del Escepticismo.Jesús Antonio Coll Mármol - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (2):277-295.
    In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is (...)
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  28. added 2019-06-05
    Davison on Skepticism: How Not to Respond to the Skeptic.Otávio Bueno - 2005 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2):1-18.
    In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and given the nature of beliefs, most of our be-liefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoher-ent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a co-herence theory has, a (...)
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  29. added 2019-05-02
    Brains in Vats? Don't Bother!Peter Baumann - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):186-199.
    Contemporary discussions of epistemological skepticism - the view that we do not and cannot know anything about the world around us - focus very much on a certain kind of skeptical argument involving a skeptical scenario (a situation familiar from Descartes’ First Meditation). According to the argument, knowing some ordinary proposition about the world (one we usually take ourselves to know) requires knowing we are not in some such skeptical scenario SK; however, since we cannot know that we are not (...)
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  30. added 2019-03-18
    On “biscopic” approach to the sceptical paradox. [].Francois-Igor Pris - 2015 - Философия И Социальные Науки (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 2:32-37.
  31. added 2019-02-26
    Closure, Credence and Rationality: A Problem for Non-Belief Hinge Epistemology.Matt Jope - 2019 - Synthese:1-11.
    Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments. In order to do this, it appeals to a Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation, the overarching theme of which is that it neither makes sense to doubt nor to believe in our anti-sceptical hinge commitments. The purpose of this paper is to show that the argument for the claim that there can be no rational (...)
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  32. added 2019-01-03
    The Problem of the Criterion and Hegel's Model for Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (4).
  33. added 2018-12-29
    Non-Evidentialist Epistemology.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Luca Moretti (eds.) - forthcoming - Brill.
  34. added 2018-12-19
    On the Nature of Hinge Commitments.Eros Carvalho - 2019 - Sképsis 10 (19):55-66.
    This is a critical commentary on Pritchard's book Epistemic Angst. In Section 2, I present the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of these commitments.
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  35. added 2018-10-02
    The Plain Inquirer’s Plain Evidence Against the Global Skeptical Scenarios.Adam Leite - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):208-222.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 208 - 222 Penelope Maddy claims that we can have no evidence that we are not being globally deceived by an evil demon. However, Maddy’s Plain Inquirer holds that she has good evidence for a wide variety of claims about the world and her relation to it. She rejects the broadly Cartesian idea that she can’t be entitled to these claims, or have good evidence for them, or know them, unless she can provide (...)
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  36. added 2018-10-02
    Comments on Penelope Maddy’s What Do Philosophers Do?Barry Stroud - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):223-230.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 223 - 230 I here offer a discussion of some of Penelope Maddy’s responses to philosophical scepticism in her recent book, _What Do Philosophers Do?_ Among other things, I suggest that philosophers who take an interest in human knowledge are not primarily concerned with _whether_ anyone knows anything about the world, but rather with understanding _how_ we know the things we do in the face of the difficulties that seem naturally to arise in (...)
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  37. added 2018-10-02
    Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism.Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Ordinarily, people take themselves to know a lot. I know where I was born, I know that I have two hands, I know that two plus two equals four, and I also think I know a lot of other stuff too. However, the project of trying to provide a philosophically satisfying account of knowledge, one that holds up against skeptical challenges, has proven surprisingly difficult. Either one aims for an account of justification (and knowledge) that is epistemologically demanding, in an (...)
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  38. added 2018-10-02
    Keith Lehrer's "Knowledge". [REVIEW]Robert Binkley - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (2):268.
  39. added 2018-06-12
    A New Epistemic Argument for Idealism.Robert Smithson - 2018 - In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-33.
    Many idealists have thought that realism raises epistemological problems. The worry is that, if it is possible for truths about ordinary objects to outstrip our experiences in the ways that realists typically suppose, we could never be justified in our beliefs about objects. Few contemporary theorists find this argument convincing; philosophers have offered a variety of responses to defend the epistemology of our object judgments under the assumption of realism. But in this paper, I offer a new type of epistemic (...)
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  40. added 2018-06-03
    Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Scepticism.Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Episteme:1-11.
    Crispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to (...)
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  41. added 2018-06-03
    Disjuntivismo epistemológico e ceticismo radical - uma proposta anticética conciliatória.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2017 - Dissertation,
    This work aims to present and discuss recent developments in epistemology that seek for satisfactory formulations and responses to the problem of radical skepticism. Its main goal is to understand how the skeptical problem can be properly characterized, how it can be viewed as inserted in the traditional dispute in epistemology between externalism and internalism, and to which extent antiskeptical theories are situated within this dispute. After identifying their place in the dispute, another antiskeptical proposal is discussed, one that suggests (...)
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  42. added 2018-06-03
    Judgment and Agency. [REVIEW]Matthew McGrath - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):399-404.
  43. added 2018-06-03
    No Closure on Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure‐based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.
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  44. added 2018-06-03
    Epistemology and External World Skepticism.Roger Vasquez - 2008 - Questions: Philosophy for Young People 8:13-13.
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  45. added 2018-06-03
    Rational Resistance to Skepticism.Wai-Hung Wong - 2001 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    Some epistemologists resist skepticism about the external world even though they admit that it is supported by apparently convincing arguments that they do not see how to refute. I argue that such a seemingly irrational attitude towards skepticism is justified. The justification I offer consists in showing that anyone who accepts skepticism is in a patently irrational position, whereas we do not have to refute skepticism to have some reason to believe that we have knowledge of the world. Although this (...)
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  46. added 2018-06-03
    Evaluational Illusions and Skeptical Arguments.Steven L. Reynolds - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):529-558.
    A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the direct realist view of (...)
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  47. added 2018-06-03
    Fallibilism is Not a Thesis.Mark O. Webb - 1996 - Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1):45-51.
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  48. added 2018-06-03
    The Power and Value of Philosophical Skepticism.Jeffrey P. Whitman - 1996 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    How should we react to philosophical skepticism? Whitman answers this question by examining analytic and post-analytic responses to the problem. He tests analytic theories of knowledge and the post-analytic responses of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty against skeptical arguments. Whitman concludes that embracing a theoretical version of philosophical skepticism has advantages over post-analytic responses—both in the realm of philosophical inquiry and in everyday life.
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  49. added 2018-03-05
    Epistemic Closure, Home Truths, and Easy Philosophy.Walter Horn - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (1):34-51.
    In spite of the intuitiveness of epistemic closure, there has been a stubborn stalemate regarding whether it is true, largely because some of the “Moorean” things we seem to know easily seem clearly to entail “heavyweight” philosophical things that we apparently cannot know easily—or perhaps even at all. In this paper, I will show that two widely accepted facts about what we do and don’t know—facts with which any minimally acceptable understanding of knowledge must comport—are jointly inconsistent with the truth (...)
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  50. added 2018-03-03
    Skeptical Reason and Inner Experience: A Re-Examination of the Problem of the External World.David Macarthur - 1999 - Dissertation, Harvard University
    In contrast to the recent trend of taking external world skepticism as a narrow problem for a demanding conception of "objective" or "certain" knowledge about the world, my thesis offers a re-examination of the distinctively perceptual basis of the skeptical problem. On my view the skeptic challenges the very possibility of rationally justifying beliefs in so far as they are based on sense experience, a characterization that helps to explain the continuity into the modern period of the ancient skeptical challenge (...)
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