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  1. added 2019-01-03
    The Problem of the Criterion and Hegel's Model for Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (4).
  2. added 2018-12-29
    Non-Evidentialist Epistemology.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Luca Moretti (eds.) - forthcoming - Brill.
  3. added 2018-12-19
    On the Nature of Hinge Commitments.Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    This is a critical commentary on Pritchard's book Epistemic Angst. In Section 2, I present the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of these commitments.
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  4. added 2018-10-02
    Comments on Penelope Maddy’s What Do Philosophers Do?Barry Stroud - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):223-230.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 223 - 230 I here offer a discussion of some of Penelope Maddy’s responses to philosophical scepticism in her recent book, _What Do Philosophers Do?_ Among other things, I suggest that philosophers who take an interest in human knowledge are not primarily concerned with _whether_ anyone knows anything about the world, but rather with understanding _how_ we know the things we do in the face of the difficulties that seem naturally to arise in (...)
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  5. added 2018-10-02
    The Plain Inquirer’s Plain Evidence Against the Global Skeptical Scenarios.Adam Leite - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):208-222.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 208 - 222 Penelope Maddy claims that we can have no evidence that we are not being globally deceived by an evil demon. However, Maddy’s Plain Inquirer holds that she has good evidence for a wide variety of claims about the world and her relation to it. She rejects the broadly Cartesian idea that she can’t be entitled to these claims, or have good evidence for them, or know them, unless she can provide (...)
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  6. added 2018-10-02
    Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism.Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Ordinarily, people take themselves to know a lot. I know where I was born, I know that I have two hands, I know that two plus two equals four, and I also think I know a lot of other stuff too. However, the project of trying to provide a philosophically satisfying account of knowledge, one that holds up against skeptical challenges, has proven surprisingly difficult. Either one aims for an account of justification (and knowledge) that is epistemologically demanding, in an (...)
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  7. added 2018-10-02
    Keith Lehrer's "Knowledge". [REVIEW]Robert Binkley - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (2):268.
  8. added 2018-06-12
    A New Epistemic Argument for Idealism.Robert Smithson - 2018 - In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-33.
    Many idealists have thought that realism raises epistemological problems. The worry is that, if it is possible for truths about ordinary objects to outstrip our experiences in the ways that realists typically suppose, we could never be justified in our beliefs about objects. Few contemporary theorists find this argument convincing; philosophers have offered a variety of responses to defend the epistemology of our object judgments under the assumption of realism. But in this paper, I offer a new type of epistemic (...)
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  9. added 2018-06-03
    Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Scepticism.Luca Moretti - manuscript
    Crispin Wright maintains that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this fact doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper (...)
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  10. added 2018-06-03
    Disjuntivismo epistemológico e ceticismo radical - uma proposta anticética conciliatória.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2017 - Dissertation,
    This work aims to present and discuss recent developments in epistemology that seek for satisfactory formulations and responses to the problem of radical skepticism. Its main goal is to understand how the skeptical problem can be properly characterized, how it can be viewed as inserted in the traditional dispute in epistemology between externalism and internalism, and to which extent antiskeptical theories are situated within this dispute. After identifying their place in the dispute, another antiskeptical proposal is discussed, one that suggests (...)
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  11. added 2018-06-03
    Judgment and Agency. [REVIEW]Matthew McGrath - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):399-404.
  12. added 2018-06-03
    No Closure on Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure‐based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.
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  13. added 2018-06-03
    Epistemology and External World Skepticism.Roger Vasquez - 2008 - Questions: Philosophy for Young People 8:13-13.
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  14. added 2018-06-03
    Rational Resistance to Skepticism.Wai-Hung Wong - 2001 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    Some epistemologists resist skepticism about the external world even though they admit that it is supported by apparently convincing arguments that they do not see how to refute. I argue that such a seemingly irrational attitude towards skepticism is justified. The justification I offer consists in showing that anyone who accepts skepticism is in a patently irrational position, whereas we do not have to refute skepticism to have some reason to believe that we have knowledge of the world. Although this (...)
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  15. added 2018-06-03
    Evaluational Illusions and Skeptical Arguments.Steven L. Reynolds - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):529-558.
    A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the direct realist view of (...)
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  16. added 2018-06-03
    The Power and Value of Philosophical Skepticism.Jeffrey P. Whitman - 1996 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    How should we react to philosophical skepticism? Whitman answers this question by examining analytic and post-analytic responses to the problem. He tests analytic theories of knowledge and the post-analytic responses of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty against skeptical arguments. Whitman concludes that embracing a theoretical version of philosophical skepticism has advantages over post-analytic responses—both in the realm of philosophical inquiry and in everyday life.
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  17. added 2018-06-03
    Fallibilism is Not a Thesis.Mark O. Webb - 1996 - Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1):45-51.
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  18. added 2018-03-05
    Epistemic Closure, Home Truths, and Easy Philosophy.Walter Horn - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (1):34-51.
    In spite of the intuitiveness of epistemic closure, there has been a stubborn stalemate regarding whether it is true, largely because some of the “Moorean” things we seem to know easily seem clearly to entail “heavyweight” philosophical things that we apparently cannot know easily—or perhaps even at all. In this paper, I will show that two widely accepted facts about what we do and don’t know—facts with which any minimally acceptable understanding of knowledge must comport—are jointly inconsistent with the truth (...)
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  19. added 2018-03-03
    Skeptical Reason and Inner Experience: A Re-Examination of the Problem of the External World.David Macarthur - 1999 - Dissertation, Harvard University
    In contrast to the recent trend of taking external world skepticism as a narrow problem for a demanding conception of "objective" or "certain" knowledge about the world, my thesis offers a re-examination of the distinctively perceptual basis of the skeptical problem. On my view the skeptic challenges the very possibility of rationally justifying beliefs in so far as they are based on sense experience, a characterization that helps to explain the continuity into the modern period of the ancient skeptical challenge (...)
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  20. added 2018-03-02
    External World Skepticism, Confidence and Psychologism About the Problem of Priors.Sharon Berry - manuscript
    In this paper I will draw attention to an important route to external world skepticism, which I will call confidence skepticism. I will argue that we can defang confidence skepticism (though not a meeker ‘argument from might’ which has got some attention in the 20th century literature on external world skepticism) by adopting a partially psychologistic answer to the problem of priors. And I will argue that certain recent work in the epistemology of mathematics and logic provides independent support for (...)
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  21. added 2018-03-02
    Minimal Epistemology: BeyondTerminal Philosophy to Truth (Latest Working Title).John Post - unknown
    . In whatever form, terminal philosophy holds that some matters are so fundamental that they are presupposed in any practice of reason-giving; accordingly, if reason-giving were applied to such matters in order to justify them, or even to criticize, then the very attempt to do so would necessarily assume what is at issue, a fatal circularity . No further argumentative recourse is possible at this level of fundamentality ; rational reason-giving must terminate.
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  22. added 2018-03-02
    Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):70-90.
    Support is canvassed for a novel solution to the sceptical problem regarding our knowledge of the external world. Key to this solution is the claim that what initially looks like a single problem is in fact two logically distinct problems. In particular, there are two putative sceptical paradoxes in play here, which each trade on distinctive epistemological theses. It is argued that the ideal solution to radical scepticism would thus be a biscopic proposal—viz., a two-pronged, integrated, undercutting treatment of both (...)
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  23. added 2018-03-02
    Epistemic Responsibility and Radical Scepticism.Cameron Jeffrey Boult - unknown
    This thesis has two aims. One is to motivate the claim that challenging what I call a “sameness of evidence thesis” is a particularly promising approach to external world scepticism. The other is to sharpen an underexplored issue that arises when challenging the sameness of evidence thesis. The second aim is the primary aim of the thesis. Pursuing the first aim, I start by examining a predominant formulation of external world scepticism known as the “closure argument” for knowledge. I examine (...)
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  24. added 2018-03-02
    Meaning and Conversational Impropriety in Sceptical Contexts.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):431-448.
    According to “disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism”—a position Duncan Pritchard develops in a recent book—it is possible to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, even though it is conversationally inappropriate to claim such knowledge. In a recent paper, on the other hand, Pritchard expounds an “überhinge” strategy, according to which one cannot know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, as “hinge propositions” are necessarily groundless. The present article argues that neither strategy is entirely successful. For if a proposition can be known, it can (...)
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  25. added 2018-03-02
    The Skeptic’s Passion.Maybelle Padua - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1).
    This paper aims at understanding the condition of the skeptic as skeptical. Using the mechanism of cognition argued by Aquinas, which explains how cognitions are connected with dispositions and affections, it tries to unlock the skeptic’s disposition to doubt as something willed. Culling insights from Wittgenstein, this essay points to certainty as a necessity for the person who wishes to live without the constant apprehension of doubt and pervasive suspicion of others. It concludes with an analysis of the skeptic’s need (...)
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  26. added 2018-03-02
    Chapter 15. Closure and Skepticism.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 81-85.
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  27. added 2018-03-02
    La naturalidad del escepticismo.Jesus Antonio Coll Mármol - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (2):277-295.
    In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is (...)
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  28. added 2018-03-02
    Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and the 'Metaepistemological' Challenge.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (2):187-214.
    It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued (...)
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  29. added 2018-03-02
    Dissolving the Skeptical Paradox of Knowledge Via Cartesian Skepticism Based on Wittgenstein.Ken Shigeta - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:241-247.
    There is an epistemological skepticism that I might be dreaming now, or I might be a brain in a vat (BIV). There is also a demonstration that derives the skeptical conclusion about knowledge of the external world from the premise C1, i.e., I do not know “I am not dreaming (not a BIV) now.” Pessimistic critics (e.g., F. Strawson, B. Stroud) consider that the refutation of C1 is impossible, whereas others have attempted the direct refutation of C1 (e.g., G. E. (...)
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  30. added 2018-03-02
    Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Redux.A. Brueckner - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):311-315.
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  31. added 2018-03-02
    Wittgenstein, Kripkenstein, and the Skeptical Paradox.Jon Hendrix - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Florida
    Title from title page of source document.
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  32. added 2018-03-02
    Clarke and Stroud on the Plane-Spotters.Brian Ribeiro - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):25-32.
    In an earlier paper ("Skeptical Parasitism and the Continuity Argument," 'Metaphilosophy' 2004: 714-732) I suggested that the well-known "plane-spotters" story-first proposed by Thompson Clarke and later developed by Barry Stroud-distorts the very skeptical view it aims to elucidate. However, considerations of space prohibited me from fleshing out my criticisms of the Clarke/Stroud story in that paper. In this paper I aim to fill in this lacuna by showing how the Clarke/Stroud story distorts the skeptic's view. I conclude the paper by (...)
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  33. added 2018-03-02
    The Impossibility of Local Skepticism.Stephen Maitzen - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (4):453-464.
    According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know even if they (...)
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  34. added 2018-03-02
    Humen pyrrhonismin kielto.Jani Hakkarainen - 2004 - In Heta Gylling, S. Albert Kivinen & Risto Vilkko (eds.), Kielto. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press. pp. 29-35.
    Title in English: Hume's Denial of Pyrrhonism.
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  35. added 2018-03-02
    Skepticism and Epistemic Agency.Jill Claudia Rusin - 2002 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
    Epistemic contextualists like David Lewis allow that we have substantially infallibilist reflective intuitions about knowledge even though our everyday talk accepts fallibilist attributions of knowledge. They give serious weight to both our everyday talk and our propensity to assent to the skeptic's conclusions, and give us a concept of knowledge that accommodates both. The skeptic would, of course, leverage such infallibilist intuitions in order to undermine the legitimacy of our everyday attributions. Most contemporary epistemologists would simply argue that our concept (...)
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  36. added 2018-03-02
    Evaluational Illusions and Skeptical Arguments.Steven L. Reynolds - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):529-558.
    A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking (perhaps not too clearly) that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the (...)
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  37. added 2018-03-02
    Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent?W. L. Craig - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):291-295.
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  38. added 2018-03-02
    The Instability of Skepticism.Ram Neta - 1997 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    According to "skepticism about the external world", one cannot know whether there are any things that have these two characteristics: they exist, or occur, at, or come from, some place, and they might have existed even had no one been conscious of them. In attempting to show that one cannot know whether or not there are any such things, the skeptic appeals to the alleged fact that one cannot rule out various possibilities, e.g., the possibility that one is dreaming. But, (...)
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  39. added 2018-03-02
    Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent?A. Brueckner - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):287-290.
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  40. added 2018-03-02
    Stroud's Dream Argument Critique: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1993 - Philosophy 68 (266):473-482.
    In his recent work, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism , Barry Stroud proposes to carry out an in-depth critique of the attempt by philosophers to invalidate all knowledge of an external world on the basis of Descartes' dream argument. His more particular aims in this endeavour are to uncover significant features of any such scepticism and to disclose in the process fundamental aspects of ‘human knowledge’ itself. Thus, among other features of knowledge that his study discloses, he thinks, is, echoing (...)
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  41. added 2018-03-02
    Skepticism: An Overview.Esther Adouth Nepomechie - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Miami
    This is an historical account of epistemological skepticism. The first two chapters are expository in nature. To some degree, so is the third chapter. Chapter IV deals with Peter Unger's revival of skepticism. I argue against his views and conclude that on the one hand, his classical argument is no improvement over Descartes's skeptical argument of the First Meditation, and that his second and third arguments are flawed. Chapter V examines two different current strategies against the skeptic: a revival of (...)
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  42. added 2018-03-02
    Some Doubts About Skepticism.L. Resnick - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (2):141-148.
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  43. added 2018-03-02
    Idealism and the External World.G. Galloway - 1920 - Mind 29 (113):72-76.
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  44. added 2018-02-18
    Why Scepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining.Gary Ebbs - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):237-244.
    In two previous papers I explained why I believe that a certain sort of argument that seems to support skepticism about self-knowledge is actually self-undermining, in the sense that no one can justifiably accept all of its premises at once. Anthony Brueckner has recently tried to show that even if the central premises of my explanation are true, the skeptical argument in question is not self-undermining. He has also suggested that even if the skeptical argument is self-undermining, it can still (...)
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  45. added 2018-02-18
    Philosphical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism About Judgement.Timothy Williamson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):109–153.
    1. What are called ‘intuitions’ in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious inclinations to make judgements about some topic rather than facts about the topic itself. But the pressure should be resisted, for it (...)
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  46. added 2018-02-17
    Other Minds.Douglas C. Long - 1975 - Teaching Philosophy 1 (2):179-181.
    D. C. Long’s review of a monograph Godfrey Vesey prepared on the problem of our knowledge of other minds for the Open University series on problems of philosophy. Vesey discusses philosophers’ disenchantment with the traditional argument from analogy as a solution to the problem. This has been fostered by Wittgensteinian objections to the idea that psychological words get their meaning by reference to our own “private” experiences. Vesey similarly argues for the thesis that a person cannot be said to understand (...)
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  47. added 2018-02-16
    Epistemic Luck.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272-281.
    Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provide an account of how veritic epistemic luck (...)
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  48. added 2018-02-16
    Scepticism.Neil Gascoigne - 2001 - Routledge.
    The history of scepticism is assumed by many to be the history of failed responses to a problem first raised by Descartes. While the thought of the ancient sceptics is acknowledged, their principle concern with how to live a good life is regarded as bearing little, if any, relation to the work of contemporary epistemologists. In "Scepticism" Neil Gascoigne engages with the work of canonical philosophers from Descartes, Hume and Kant through to Moore, Austin, and Wittgenstein to show how themes (...)
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  49. added 2018-02-16
    Skepticism and the Definition of Knowledge.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Routledge.
    Originally published in 1990. This study argues that scepticism is an intelligible view and that the issue scepticism raises is whether or not certain sceptical hypotheses are as plausible as the ordinary views we accept. It discusses psychological concepts, definitions of knowledge, belief and hypothetic inference. Starting from ‘Is skepticism a problem for epistemology’, the book takes us through the argument for the possibility of scepticism, including looking at sense data and considering memory and perception.
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  50. added 2018-02-13
    Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering.Patrick Greenough - forthcoming - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Conceptual Engineering alleges that philosophical problems are best treated via revising or replacing our concepts (or words). The goal here is not to defend Conceptual Engineering but rather show that it can (and should) invoke Neutralism—the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. A neutralist treatment of one form of skepticism is used as a case study and is compared with various non-neutral rivals. Along (...)
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1 — 50 / 443