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  1. William P. Alston (1980). Level-Confusions in Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):135-150.
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  2. Cameron Jeffrey Boult, Epistemic Responsibility and Radical Scepticism.
    This thesis has two aims. One is to motivate the claim that challenging what I call a “sameness of evidence thesis” is a particularly promising approach to external world scepticism. The other is to sharpen an underexplored issue that arises when challenging the sameness of evidence thesis. The second aim is the primary aim of the thesis. Pursuing the first aim, I start by examining a predominant formulation of external world scepticism known as the “closure argument” for knowledge. I examine (...)
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  3. A. Brueckner (2007). Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Redux. Analysis 67 (4):311-315.
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  4. A. Brueckner (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-290.
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  5. W. L. Craig (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):291-295.
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  6. G. Ebbs (2005). Why Scepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining. Analysis 65 (3):237-244.
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  7. Robert J. Fogelin (1999). The Sceptic's Burden. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2):159 – 172.
    The basic thesis ofMichaelWilliams'book Unnatural Doubts is that sceptical doubts, at least of a Cartesian variety, are neither natural nor intuitive, but are, instead, the product of 'contentious and possibly dispensable theoretical preconceptions'. In particular, for Williams, scepticism arises because of a commitment to what he calls 'epistemic realism'. A fundamental thesis of my book Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification is that scepticism (in its most challenging forms) is not based upon such prior theoretical commitments, but rather is the (...)
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  8. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 15. Closure and Skepticism. In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 81-85.
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  9. Graeme Forbes (1984). XIII—Scepticism and Semantic Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84 (1):223-240.
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  10. Paul Forster (2008). Neither Dogma nor Common Sense: Moore's Confidence in His 'Proof of an External World'. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):163 – 195.
    (2008). Neither Dogma nor Common sense: Moore's confidence in his ‘proof of an external world’1. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 163-195.
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  11. Marco Antonio Franciotti (2009). Once More Unto The Breach: Strawson's Anti-Sceptical View. Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (2).
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  12. G. Galloway (1920). Idealism and the External World. Mind 29 (113):72-76.
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  13. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Skepticism About Other Minds. In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.
    In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.
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  14. John Greco (2009). Skepticism and Internalism. Iris 1 (2):429-438.
    This paper explores a familiar skeptical problematic and considers some strategies for responding to it. Section 1 reconstructs and disambiguates the skeptical problematic, distinguishing between some importantly different lines of skeptical reasoning. Section 2 distinguishes two kinds of anti-skeptical strategy. “Cooperative strategies” accept the conditions on knowledge that are laid down by a target skeptical argument, and argue that those conditions can be satisfied in a relevant domain. “Critical strategies” respond to a skeptical argument by rejecting some condition on knowledge (...)
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  15. John Greco (2008). What's Wrong with Contextualism? Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):416-436.
    This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interestdependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over-stated in any case. Finally, the paper offers (...)
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  16. Susan Haack (1979). Fallibilism and Necessity. Synthese 41 (1):37 - 63.
    Part of an early version of this paper was read at the University of Warwick in October 1977, and a later version was read at the Newcastle Royal Institute of Philosophy in November 1977 and at Aberystwyth and Oxford in early 1978. Thanks are due to the many colleagues and friends who made helpful comments on early drafts; special thanks to Hugh Mellor, Rita Nolan and Paul Weiss for detailed written criticisms, and to Don Locke, for very helpful discussions.
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  17. Gilbert Harman (2016). Skepticism and the Definition of Knowledge. Routledge.
    Originally published in 1990. This study argues that scepticism is an intelligible view and that the issue scepticism raises is whether or not certain sceptical hypotheses are as plausible as the ordinary views we accept. It discusses psychological concepts, definitions of knowledge, belief and hypothetic inference. Starting from ‘Is skepticism a problem for epistemology’, the book takes us through the argument for the possibility of scepticism, including looking at sense data and considering memory and perception.
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  18. Mark Heller (1999). Relevant Alternatives and Closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):196 – 208.
  19. Jon Hendrix (2007). Wittgenstein, Kripkenstein, and the Skeptical Paradox. Dissertation, University of Florida
    Title from title page of source document.
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  20. Christopher Hookway (1999). Modest Transcendental Arguments and Sceptical Doubts: A Reply to Stroud. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press. pp. 173--87.
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  21. Bredo C. Johnsen (2009). The Argument for Radical Skepticism Concerning the External World. Journal of Philosophy 106 (12):679-693.
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  22. Jr August Piper (1999). A Skeptic Considers, Then Responds to Cheit. Ethics and Behavior 9 (4):277 – 293.
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  23. John Kekes (1976). A Justification of Rationality. State University of New York Press.
    I "Things /a/I apart; the center cannot hold; Mere anarchy is looted upon the world, The hlood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere The ceremony of ...
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  24. John Kekes (1971). Skepticism and External Questions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (3):325-340.
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  25. Kristijan Krkač (2002). Michael Williams: Problems of Knowledge. Prolegomena 1 (1):78-81.
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  26. Lahroodi Reza & F. Schmitt Frederick (2003). Comment on John Greco's Putting Skeptics in Their Place. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):457-465.
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  27. Charles Landesman (2008). Skepticism: The Central Issues. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book presents and analyzes the most important arguments in the history of Western philosophy's skeptical tradition. It demonstrates that, although powerful, these arguments are quite limited and fail to prove their core assertion that knowledge is beyond our reach. Argues that skepticism is mistaken and that knowledge is possible Dissects the problems of realism and the philosophical doubts about the accuracy of the senses Explores the ancient argument against a criterion of knowledge, Descartes' skeptical arguments, and skeptical arguments applied (...)
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  28. Eunjin Lee (2008). Pryor's Dogmatism Against The Skeptic. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:155-161.
    My aim in this paper is to show the difficulty James Pryor faces in attempting to overcome the skeptic’s challenge. According to the skeptic, we can never know anything about the external world, because of our cognitive limitation that cannot distinguish real perceptions from false ones in the skeptical scenarios. Thus, the skeptic requires us having antecedent justification to rule out all possible hypotheses. In opposition to the skeptic, Pryor argues that as long as we remain dogmatic about perception, we (...)
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  29. Keith Lehrer (2000). Reid, God and Epistemology. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):357-372.
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  30. Adam Leite (2004). Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):232 - 251.
    A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for 'knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of (...)
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  31. Adam Joaquim Leite (2000). Reasonable Doubts: Skepticism and the Structure of Empirical Justification. Dissertation, Harvard University
    My dissertation aims to understand external world skepticism and its place in our epistemic lives. I propose that the best way to investigate skepticism is to seek the strongest possible argument in its favor. In order to determine what requirements such an argument would have to meet, I develop and defend a novel contextualist account of empirical justification. This account involves four theses. In order to be justified in holding a belief, one must ordinarily be able to justify holding it, (...)
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  32. Clayton Littlejohn (2014). Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism. Symposion 1 (1):77-87.
    According to the explanationist, we can rely on inference to best explanation to justifiably believe familiar skeptical hypotheses are false. On this view, commonsense beliefs about the existence and character of familiar, medium-sized dry goods provides the best explanation of our evidence and so justifies our belief that we're not brains-in-vats. This explanationist approach seems prima facie plausible until we press the explanationist to tell us what the data is that we're trying to explain by appeal to our beliefs about (...)
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  33. Douglas C. Long (1975). Other Minds. Teaching Philosophy 1 (2):179-181.
    D. C. Long’s review of a monograph Godfrey Vesey prepared on the problem of our knowledge of other minds for the Open University series on problems of philosophy. Vesey discusses philosophers’ disenchantment with the traditional argument from analogy as a solution to the problem. This has been fostered by Wittgensteinian objections to the idea that psychological words get their meaning by reference to our own “private” experiences. Vesey similarly argues for the thesis that a person cannot be said to understand (...)
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  34. David Macarthur (1999). Skeptical Reason and Inner Experience: A Re-Examination of the Problem of the External World. Dissertation, Harvard University
    In contrast to the recent trend of taking external world skepticism as a narrow problem for a demanding conception of "objective" or "certain" knowledge about the world, my thesis offers a re-examination of the distinctively perceptual basis of the skeptical problem. On my view the skeptic challenges the very possibility of rationally justifying beliefs in so far as they are based on sense experience, a characterization that helps to explain the continuity into the modern period of the ancient skeptical challenge (...)
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  35. Alastair M. Macleod (1965). Moore's Proof. Analysis 25 (4):154 - 160.
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  36. P. D. Magnus (2008). Reid's Defense of Common Sense. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (3):1-14.
    Thomas Reid is often misread as defending common sense, if at all, only by relying on illicit premises about God or our natural faculties. On these theological or reliabilist misreadings, Reid makes common sense assertions where he cannot give arguments. This paper attempts to untangle Reid's defense of common sense by distinguishing four arguments: (a) the argument from madness, (b) the argument from natural faculties, (c) the argument from impotence, and (d) the argument from practical commitment. Of these, (a) and (...)
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  37. Stephen Maitzen (2006). The Impossibility of Local Skepticism. Philosophia 34 (4):453-464.
    According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know even if they (...)
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  38. Norman Malcolm (1977). Thought and Knowledge: Essays. Cornell University Press.
    Descartes' proof that his essence is thinking.--Thoughtless brutes.--Descartes' proof that he is essentially a non-material thing.--Behaviorism as a philosophy of psychology.--The privacy of experience.--Wittgenstein on the nature of mind.--The myth of cognitive processes and structures.--Moore and Wittgenstein on the sense of "I know."--The groundlessness of belief.
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  39. Jesus Antonio Coll Mármol (2012). La naturalidad del escepticismo. Principia 16 (2):277-295.
    In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is (...)
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  40. Kevin McCain (2016). The Nature of Scientific Knowledge: An Explanatory Approach. Springer.
    This book offers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the epistemology of science. It not only introduces readers to the general epistemological discussion of the nature of knowledge, but also provides key insights into the particular nuances of scientific knowledge. No prior knowledge of philosophy or science is assumed by The Nature of Scientific Knowledge. Nevertheless, the reader is taken on a journey through several core concepts of epistemology and philosophy of science that not only explores the characteristics of the (...)
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  41. Kevin McCain (2014). Skepticism and Elegance. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 14 Jonathan Vogel has argued in support of an explanationist response to skepticism in several works. Central to this explanationist response is the fact that our non-skeptical view of the world is a better explanation of our experiences than its skeptical rivals. Despite the plausibility of this response to skepticism, it is not without its critics. Recently, Matthew Gifford has argued that Vogel’s response has problems on two fronts. First, Gifford argues that Vogel’s strategy for showing (...)
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  42. Kevin McCain (2014). Skepticism and Elegance. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 14 Jonathan Vogel has argued in support of an explanationist response to skepticism in several works. Central to this explanationist response is the fact that our non-skeptical view of the world is a better explanation of our experiences than its skeptical rivals. Despite the plausibility of this response to skepticism, it is not without its critics. Recently, Matthew Gifford has argued that Vogel’s response has problems on two fronts. First, Gifford argues that Vogel’s strategy for showing (...)
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  43. Marie McGinn (1993). Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism by Michael Williams. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):211-215.
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  44. Abraham Meidan (1987). Arguments for Skepticism. In Joseph Agassi & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 17--20.
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  45. Mark Migotti (2001). Michael Hymers, Philosophy and its Epistemic Neuroses Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 21 (3):182-184.
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  46. Boaz Miller (2016). What is Hacking’s Argument for Entity Realism? Synthese 193 (3):991-1006.
    According to Ian Hacking’s Entity Realism, unobservable entities that scientists carefully manipulate to study other phenomena are real. Although Hacking presents his case in an intuitive, attractive, and persuasive way, his argument remains elusive. I present five possible readings of Hacking’s argument: a no-miracle argument, an indispensability argument, a transcendental argument, a Vichian argument, and a non-argument. I elucidate Hacking’s argument according to each reading, and review their strengths, their weaknesses, and their compatibility with each other.
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  47. G. E. Moore (2003). 23. Proof of an External World. In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 227.
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  48. Peter Murphy (forthcoming). Skeptical Effectiveness: A Reply to Buford and Brueckner. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 7 In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony Brueckner have replied to my objection. Here I review my original argument, criticize their replies, and highlight two important issues for further investigation.
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  49. Peter Murphy (forthcoming). Skeptical Effectiveness: A Reply to Buford and Brueckner. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 7 In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony Brueckner have replied to my objection. Here I review my original argument, criticize their replies, and highlight two important issues for further investigation.
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  50. Jennifer Nagel (2005). Contemporary Scepticism and the Cartesian God. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):465-497.
    Descartes claims that God is both incomprehensible and yet clearly and distinctly understood. This paper argues that Descartes’s development of the contrast between comprehension and understanding makes the role of God in his epistemology more interesting than is commonly thought. Section one examines the historical context of sceptical arguments about the difficulty of knowing God. Descartes describes the recognition of our inability to comprehend God as itself a source of knowledge of him; section two aims to explain how recognizing limits (...)
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