Representation

Edited by Zoe Drayson (University of California, Davis)
About this topic
Summary In representation, one thing stands in for, designates, or is about something else. The relation between the mind and the world has long been characterised as representational: Aristotle, the Scholastics, Descartes, and Locke held some form of representational theory of mind, and Brentano’s concept of intentionality is often understood in representational terms. Contemporary naturalistic philosophy of mind has focused on explaining how the semantic property of representing something can play a causal role in producing behaviour. This project was aided by the development of computational theory in the twentieth century, which showed how physically-implemented states could participate in causal processes preserving the semantic interpretation of those states. These ‘vehicles’ of representation are the theoretical posits of cognitive science. Key debates concern what sorts of things can be representations (e.g. symbols, activation patterns), the format in which representations bear their contents (e.g. linguistically, pictorially), and the legitimacy of representation-talk beyond the realm of traditional mental states.
Key works The first attempt at a theory of representation is probably Peirce’s theory of signs (Peirce 1940). Contemporary approaches to representation such as Fodor 1975, Millikan 1984, and Dretske 1988 tend to incorporate both an account of representation and a theory of how representations acquire their contents. Not all theories of representation aim to underwrite the propositional attitudes of folk-psychology: Cummins 1989 focuses on representation as an explanatory posit in computational cognitive science; similar approaches are the subject of a dialogue between Daniel Dennett, Andy Clark and others in Clapin 2002. Haugeland 1998 looks at the distinctions between several ‘representational genera’ such as iconic versus linguistic, discrete versus distributed. Egan 1995 explores the relation between representation, computation, and cognition, and Ramsey 2007 questions the role of representation in current theories of cognition.
Introductions Crane 2003 is an accessible introduction to mental representation. Stich & Warfield 1994 is a collection of articles on the topic including the introductory essay Stich 1992. Pitt 2020 is an encyclopedia entry on mental representation, and Ryder 2009 is an overview of representation in the philosophy of psychology.
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  1. The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non-Intentional Awareness.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The (...)
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  2. Against Teleological Essentialism.Eleonore Neufeld - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (4):e12961.
    In two recent papers, Rose and Nichols present evidence in favor of the view that humans represent category essences in terms of a telos, such as honey-making, and not in terms of scientific essences, such as bee DNA. In this paper, I challenge their interpretation of the evidence, and show that it is directly predicted by the main theory they seek to undermine. I argue that their results can be explained as instances of diagnostic reasoning about scientific essences.
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  3. Cognitive Structuralism: Explaining the Regularity of the Natural Numbers Progression.Paula Quinon - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    According to one of the most powerful paradigms explaining the meaning of the concept of natural number, natural numbers get a large part of their conceptual content from core cognitive abilities. Carey’s bootstrapping provides a model of the role of core cognition in the creation of mature mathematical concepts. In this paper, I conduct conceptual analyses of various theories within this paradigm, concluding that the theories based on the ability to subitize, or on the ability to approximate quantities, or both, (...)
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  4. Sign and Language in Anton Marty: Before and After Brentano.Hélène Leblanc - 2021 - In C. Gauvry A. Dewalque (ed.), Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School: Reassessing the Brentanian Legacy. pp. 119-140.
    On the basis of Anton Marty’s 1867 Preisschrift, this article offers a reconstruction of the semiotic and linguistic investigations the Swiss philosopher develops just before becoming a student of Brentano. The paper then compares this account with the view on signs that will be given in Marty’s later work, as well as within the Austro-German tradition.
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  5. Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the ‘Here- Replacement’ Account.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    According to the Self-Location Thesis certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person (or de se), spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-reflexive visual experiences, which involve the movement of an object toward the location of the perceiving subject. The main aim of (...)
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  6. 4E Cognition and the Dogma of Harmony.Jesper Aagaard - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):165-181.
    In recent years, we have witnessed the rise of a contemporary approach to cognitive psychology known as 4E cognition. According to this ‘extracranial’ view of cognition, the mind is not ensconced in the head, but dynamically intertwined with a host of different entities, social as well as technological. The purpose of the present article is to raise a concern about 4E cognition. The concern is not about whether the mind is in fact extended, but about how this condition is currently (...)
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  7. From Event Representation to Linguistic Meaning.Ercenur Ünal, Yue Ji & Anna Papafragou - 2021 - Wiley: Topics in Cognitive Science 13 (1):224-242.
    A fundamental aspect of human cognition is the ability to parse our constantly unfolding experience into meaningful representations of dynamic events and to communicate about these events with others. How do we communicate about events we have experienced? Influential theories of language production assume that the formulation and articulation of a linguistic message is preceded by preverbal apprehension that captures core aspects of the event. Yet the nature of these preverbal event representations and the way they are mapped onto language (...)
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  8. Reference, Predication, Judgment, and Their Relations.Indrek Reiland - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Over the course of the past ten-plus years, Peter Hanks and Scott Soames have developed detailed versions of Act-Based views of propositions which operate with the notions of reference to objects, indicating properties, predication, and judgment (or entertaining). In this paper I discuss certain foundational aspects of the Act-Based approach having to do with the relations between these notions. In particular, I argue for the following three points. First, that the approach needs both an atomistically understood thin notion of reference, (...)
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  9. Much Ado About Nothing: The Mental Representation of Omissive Relations.Sangeet Khemlani, Paul Bello, Gordon Briggs, Hillary Harner & Christina Wasylyshyn - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    When the absence of an event causes some outcome, it is an instance of omissive causation. For instance, not eating lunch may cause you to be hungry. Recent psychological proposals concur that the mind represents causal relations, including omissive causal relations, through mental simulation, but they disagree on the form of that simulation. One theory states that people represent omissive causes as force vectors; another states that omissions are representations of contrasting counterfactual simulations; a third argues that people think about (...)
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  10. Shaping Your Own Mind: The Self-Mindshaping View on Metacognition.Víctor Fernández-Castro & Fernando Martínez-Manrique - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):139-167.
    Starting from Proust’s distinction between the self-attributive and self-evaluative views on metacognition, this paper presents a third view: self-mindshaping. Based on the notion of mindshaping as the core of social cognition, the self-mindshaping view contends that mindshaping abilities can be turned on one’s own mind. Against the self-attributive view, metacognition is not a matter of accessing representations to metarepresent them but of giving shape to those representations themselves. Against the self-evaluative view, metacognition is not blind to content but relies heavily (...)
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  11. UTILIZATION OF SEMIOTICS IN URBAN PLANNING.Bita Jamalpour - 2006 - Honar 24:12-28.
    Semiotics is an innovative science that has latterly entered the field of contemporary research. This knowledge application has become more or less common in urban planning, although gradually and not directly. Various urban phenomena tend to be hidden based on their characteristics, and only their effects can be studied in the city, so semiotics can be an efficient and accurate mechanism to generate qualitative data from cities. This article consists of three sections; First, with an initial review of the fundamental (...)
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  12. Representation in Models of Epistemic Democracy.Patrick Grim, Aaron Bramson, Daniel J. Singer, William J. Berger, Jiin Jung & Scott E. Page - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):498-518.
    Epistemic justifications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different aspects of decision-making: voting and deliberation, or ‘votes’ and ‘talk.’ The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justification in terms votes, and the Hong-Page “Diversity Trumps Ability” result is appealed to as a justification in terms of deliberation. Both of these, however, are most plausibly construed as models of direct democracy, with full and direct participation across the population. In this paper, we explore how these results (...)
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  13. A Momentum Effect in Temporal Arithmetic.Mario Bonato, Umberto D'Ovidio, Wim Fias & Marco Zorzi - 2021 - Cognition 206:104488.
    The mental representation of brief temporal durations, when assessed in standard laboratory conditions, is highly accurate. Here we show that adding or subtracting temporal durations systematically results in strong and opposite biases, namely over-estimation for addition and under-estimation for subtraction. The difference with respect to a baseline temporal reproduction task changed across durations in an operation-specific way and survived correcting for the effect due to operation sign alone, indexing a reliable signature of arithmetic processing on time representation. A second experiment (...)
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  14. That‐Clauses: Some Bad News for Relationalism About the Attitudes.Robert J. Matthews - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Propositional relationalists about the attitudes claim to find support for their view in what they assume to be the dyadic relational logical form of the predicates by which we canonically attribute propositional attitudes. In this paper I argue that the considerations that they adduce in support of this assumption, specifically for the assumption that the that-clauses that figure in these predicates are singular terms, are suspect on linguistic grounds. Propositional relationalism may nonetheless be true, but the logical form of attitude (...)
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  15. Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency.Oliver Lukitsch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):955-975.
    Orthodox neurocognitive accounts of the bodily sense of agency suggest that the experience of agency arises when action-effects are anticipated accurately. In this paper, I argue that while successful anticipation is crucial for the sense of agency, the role of unsuccessful prediction has been neglected, and that inefficacy and uncertainty are no less central to the sense of agency. I will argue that this is reflected in the phenomenology of agency, which can be characterized both as the experience of efficacy (...)
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  16. Social-Eyes: Rich Perceptual Contents and Systemic Oppression.Dylan Ludwig - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):939-954.
    There is ongoing philosophical debate about the kinds of properties that are represented in visual perception. Both “rich” and “thin” accounts of perceptual content are concerned with how prior assumptions about the world influence the construction of perceptual representations. However, the idea that biased assumptions resulting from oppressive social structures contribute to the contents of perception has been largely neglected historically in this debate in the philosophy of perception. I draw on neurobiological evidence of the role of the amygdala in (...)
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  17. Unfollowed Rules and the Normativity of Content.Eric V. Tracy - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):323-344.
    Foundational theories of mental content seek to identify the conditions under which a mental representation expresses, in the mind of a particular thinker, a particular content. Normativists endorse the following general sort of foundational theory of mental content: A mental representation r expresses concept C for agent S just in case S ought to use r in conformity with some particular pattern of use associated with C. In response to Normativist theories of content, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin and Åsa Wikforss propose a (...)
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  18. Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Themes From the Philosophy of Lynne Rudder Baker. Oxford, UK: Routledge. pp. 54-74.
    According to Lynne Rudder Baker’s Practical Realism, we know that we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a self-ascriptivist view, on which we have propositional attitudes in virtue of ascribing (...)
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  19. Review of Culioli, Liddle & Stonham (1995): Cognition and Representation in Linguistic Theory. [REVIEW]Thomas Bearth - 2001 - Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (1):135-147.
  20. Review of Pilkington (2000): Poetic Effects: A Relevance Theory Perspective. [REVIEW]Motti Benari - 2004 - Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (1):181-189.
  21. Concepts and Predication From Perception to Cognition.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):273-292.
  22. Enriching the Cognitive Account of Common Ground Kinds of Shared Information and Cognitive Processes.Leda Berio & Gottfried Vosgerau - 2020 - Grazer Philosophischen Studien 97 (3):495–527.
    Classical notions of Common Ground have been criticized for being cognitively demanding given their appeal to complex meta-representations. The authors here propose a distinction between Immediate Common Ground, containing information specific to the communicative situation, and General Common Ground, containing information that is not situation-specific. This distinction builds on previous work by ], extending the idea that common cognitive processes are part of the establishment and use of common ground. This is in line with the idea that multiple cognitive resources (...)
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  23. Awful Noises: Evaluativism and the Affective Phenomenology of Unpleasant Auditory Experience.Tom Roberts - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    According to the evaluativist theory of bodily pain, the overall phenomenology of a painful experience is explained by attributing to it two types of representational content – an indicative content that represents bodily damage or disturbance, and an evaluative content that represents that condition as bad for the subject. This paper considers whether evaluativism can offer a suitable explanation of aversive auditory phenomenology – the experience of awful noises – and argues that it can only do so by conceding that (...)
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  24. Anti-Intellectualism for the Learning and Employment of Skill.Daniel C. Burnston - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    I draw on empirical results from perceptual and motor learning to argue for an anti-intellectualist position on skill. Anti-intellectualists claim that skill or know-how is non-propositional. Recent proponents of the view have stressed the flexible but fine-grained nature of skilled control as supporting their position. However, they have left the nature of the mental representations underlying such control undertheorized. This leaves open several possible strategies for the intellectualist, particularly with regard to skill learning. Propositional knowledge may structure the inputs to (...)
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  25. Perceptual Co-Reference.Michael Rescorla - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):569-589.
    The perceptual system estimates distal conditions based upon proximal sensory input. It typically exploits information from multiple cues across and within modalities: it estimates shape based upon visual and haptic cues; it estimates depth based upon convergence, binocular disparity, motion parallax, and other visual cues; and so on. Bayesian models illuminate the computations through which the perceptual system combines sensory cues. I review key aspects of these models. Based on my review, I argue that we should posit co-referring perceptual representations (...)
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  26. Two Kinds of Information Processing in Cognition.Mark Sprevak - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):591-611.
    What is the relationship between information and representation? Dating back at least to Dretske, an influential answer has been that information is a rung on a ladder that gets one to representation. Representation is information, or representation is information plus some other ingredient. In this paper, I argue that this approach oversimplifies the relationship between information and representation. If one takes current probabilistic models of cognition seriously, information is connected to representation in a new way. It enters as a property (...)
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  27. Mental Representation and the Cognitive Architecture of Skilled Action.Thomas Schack & Cornelia Frank - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    The aim of this paper is to understand the functional role of mental representations and intentionality in skilled actions from a systems related perspective. Therefore, we will evaluate the function of representation and then discuss the cognitive architecture of skilled actions in more depth. We are going to describe the building blocks and levels of the action system that enable us to control movements such as striking the tennis ball at the right time, or grasping tools in manual action. Based (...)
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  28. The ‘Magical World’ of Emotions and Its Triumph: On the Ontological Inconsistency in Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions.Renxiang Liu - 2020 - Sophia 59 (2):333-343.
    In this paper, I explore the ontological implication of Sartre’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological accounts of emotion. I start by looking at Sartre’s notion of the ‘magical world’ in his booklet Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, showing how emotion, for him, reveals the overall structure of ‘human reality’ rather than a dispensable aspect of it. Discussing experiences of the magical world allowed Sartre to ‘bracket’ what he called ‘the determinism of the world’, which predominated naturalist-representationalist psychology of emotion in (...)
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  29. Kindhood and Essentialism: Evidence From Language.Katherine Ritchie & Joshua Knobe - 2020 - In Marjorie Rhodes (ed.), Advances in Child Development and Behavior.
    A large body of existing research suggests that people think very differently about categories that are seen as kinds (e.g., women) and categories that are not seen as kinds (e.g., people hanging out in the park right now). Drawing on work in linguistics, we suggest that people represent these two sorts of categories using fundamentally different representational formats. Categories that are not seen as kinds are simply represented as collections of individuals. By contrast, when it comes to kinds, people have (...)
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  30. Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation.Donna Rose Addis - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):233-259.
    Mental time travel is defined as projecting the self into the past and the future. Despite growing evidence of the similarities of remembering past and imagining future events, dominant theories conceive of these as distinct capacities. I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process – constructive episodic simulation – and demonstrate that the ‘simulation system’ meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system. Irrespective of whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation system: acts on the same (...)
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  31. Editorial: Memory as Mental Time Travel.André Sant’Anna, Kourken Michaelian & Denis Perrin - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):223-232.
    Originally understood as memory for the “what”, the “when”, and the “where” of experienced past events, episodic memory has, in recent years, been redefined as a form of past-oriented mental time travel. Following a brief review of empirical research on memory as mental time travel, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, which explore the theoretical implications of that research.
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  32. Mental Time Travel and Disjunctivism.István Aranyosi - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):367-384.
    The paper discusses radical constructivism about episodic memory as developed by Kourken Michaelian under the name of “simulationism”, a view that equates episodic memory with mental time travel. An alternative, direct realist view is defended, which implies disjunctivism about the appearance of remembering. While admitting the importance of mental time travel as an underlying cognitive mechanism in episodic memory, as well as the prima facie reasonableness of the simulationist’s critique of disjunctivism, I formulate three arguments in defense of disjunctivism, which (...)
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  33. The Experience of Being Oneself in Memory: Exploring Sense of Identity via Observer Memory.Ying-Tung Lin - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):405-422.
    Every episodic memory entails a sense of identity, which allows us to mentally travel through time. There is a special way by which the subject who is remembering comes into contact with the self that is embedded in the episodic simulation of memory: we can directly and robustly experience the protagonist in memory as ourselves. This paper explores what constitutes such experience in memory. On the face of it, the issue may seem trivial: of course, we are able to entertain (...)
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  34. Defending Discontinuism, Naturally.Sarah Robins - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):469-486.
    The more interest philosophers take in memory, the less agreement there is that memory exists—or more precisely, that remembering is a distinct psychological kind or mental state. Concerns about memory’s distinctiveness are triggered by observations of its similarity to imagination. The ensuing debate is cast as one between discontinuism and continuism. The landscape of debate is set such that any extensive engagement with empirical research into episodic memory places one on the side of continuism. Discontinuists concerns are portrayed as almost (...)
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  35. Self-Referential Memory and Mental Time Travel.Jordi Fernández - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):283-300.
    Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can (...)
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  36. Why Does the Brain-Mind (Consciousness) Problem Seem So Hard?J. F. Storm - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):174-189.
    Why is there a 'hard problem' of consciousness? Why do we seem unable to grasp intuitively that physical brain processes can be identical to experiences? Here I comment on the 'meta-problem' (Chalmers, 2018), based on previous ideas (Storm, 2014; 2018). In short: humans may be 'inborn dualists' ('neuroscepticism'), because evolution gave us two (types of) brain systems (or functional modes): one (Sp) for understanding relatively simple physical phenomena, and another (Sm) specialized for mental phenomena. Because Sp cannot deal with the (...)
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  37. On the Non-Conceptual Content of Affective-Evaluative Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3087-3111.
    Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I also (...)
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  38. Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):505-523.
    This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as (...)
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  39. Pain and Spatial Inclusion: Evidence From Mandarin.Michelle Liu & Colin Klein - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):262-272.
    The surface grammar of reports such as ‘I have a pain in my leg’ suggests that pains are objects which are spatially located in parts of the body. We show that the parallel construction is not available in Mandarin. Further, four philosophically important grammatical features of such reports cannot be reproduced. This suggests that arguments and puzzles surrounding such reports may be tracking artefacts of English, rather than philosophically significant features of the world.
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  40. Beyond Black Dots and Nutritious Things: A Solution to the Indeterminacy Problem.Marc Artiga - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    The indeterminacy problem is one of the most prominent objections against naturalistic theories of content. In this essay I present this difficulty and argue that extant accounts are unable to solve it. Then, I develop a particular version of teleosemantics, which I call ’explanation-based teleosemantics’, and show how this outstanding problem can be addressed within the framework of a powerful naturalistic theory.
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  41. Signals are minimal causes.Marc Artiga - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    Although the definition of ‘signal’ has been controversial for some time within the life sciences, current approaches seem to be converging toward a common analysis. This powerful framework can satisfactorily accommodate many cases of signaling and captures some of its main features. This paper argues, however, that there is a central feature of signals that so far has been largely overlooked: its special causal role. More precisely, I argue that a distinctive feature of signals is that they are minimal causes. (...)
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  42. The Language of Thought as a Logically Perfect Language.Andrea Bianchi - 2020 - In Vincenzo Idone Cassone, Jenny Ponzo & Mattia Thibault (eds.), Languagescapes: Ancient and Artificial Languages in Today's Culture. Canterano (RM): pp. 159-168.
    Between the end of the nineteenth century and the first twenty years of the twentieth century, stimulated by the impetuous development of logical studies and taking inspiration from Leibniz's idea of a characteristica universalis, the three founding fathers of the analytic tradition in philosophy, i.e., Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, started to talk of a logically perfect language, as opposed to natural languages, all feeling that the latter were inadequate to their (different) philosophical purposes. In the second half of the twentieth (...)
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  43. The Art Experience.Kate McCallum, Scott Mitchell & Thom Scott-Phillips - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):21-35.
    Art theory has consistently emphasised the importance of situational, cultural, institutional and historical factors in viewers’ experience of fine art. However, the link between this heavily context-dependent interpretation and the workings of the mind is often left unexamined. Drawing on relevance theory—a prominent, cogent and productive body of work in cognitive pragmatics—we here argue that fine art achieves its effects by prompting the use of cognitive processes that are more commonly employed in the interpretation of words and other stimuli presented (...)
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  44. Harman on Mental Paint and the Transparency of Experience.Erhan Demircioglu - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (1):56-81.
    Harman famously argues that a particular class of antifunctionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing “properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object” and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties (...)
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  45. Representational Kinds.Joulia Smortchkova & Michael Murez - forthcoming - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dolega & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), What are Mental Representations? New York, État de New York, États-Unis:
    Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A potentially interesting type of kind is: kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In this chapter we outline a proposal for a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. We argue that the explanatory role of representational kinds in scientific theories, in conjunction with a mainstream approach to explanation in cognitive (...)
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  46. Words and Representations.Bence Nanay - 1997 - Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 41:805-826.
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  47. Repräsentation, Innerlichkeit Und Normalität.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (4):702-13.
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  48. Brain and the Lexicon: The Neural Basis of Inferential and Referential Competence.Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2019 - Springer International Publishing.
    This monograph offers a novel, neurocognitive theory concerning words and language. It explores the distinction between inferential and referential semantic competence. The former accounts for the relationship of words among themselves, the latter for the relationship of words to the world. The author discusses this distinction at the level of the human brain on both theoretical and neuroscientific grounds. In addition, this investigation considers the relation between the inf/ref neurocognitive theory and other accounts of semantic cognition proposed in the field (...)
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  49. Mapping the Minds of Others.Alexandria Boyle - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):747-767.
    Mindreaders can ascribe representational states to others. Some can ascribe representational states – states with semantic properties like accuracy-aptness. I argue that within this group of mindreaders, there is substantial room for variation – since mindreaders might differ with respect to the representational format they take representational states to have. Given that formats differ in their formal features and expressive power, the format one takes mental states to have will significantly affect the range of mental state attributions one can make, (...)
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  50. The Empirical Status of the Pictorial View of Meaning.F. Calzavarini - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (11-12):33-59.
    Advocates of the pictorial theory of meaning claimed that the meaning of a word is a mental picture and that lexical semantic competence --i.e. knowledge of word meaning -- is closely connected to visual imagery. As a philosophical theory of meaning, the pictorial theory was discredited in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, there is evidence that visual imagery -- the generation of visual mental images -- does play a role in semantic processing and is not just a possible side effect of (...)
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