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  1. added 2020-04-15
    Hard, Harder, and the Hardest Problem: The Society of Cognitive Selves.Venkata Rayudu Posina - 2020 - Tattva - Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):75-92.
    The hard problem of consciousness is explicating how moving matter becomes thinking matter. Harder yet is the problem of spelling out the mutual determinations of individual experiences and the experiencing self. Determining how the collective social consciousness influences and is influenced by the individual selves constituting the society is the hardest problem. Drawing parallels between individual cognition and the collective knowing of mathematical science, here we present a conceptualization of the cognitive dimension of the self. Our abstraction of the relations (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-15
    Functorial Semantics for the Advancement of the Science of Cognition.Venkata Posina, Dhanjoo N. Ghista & Sisir Roy - 2017 - Mind and Matter 15 (2):161{184.
    Cognition involves physical stimulation, neural coding, mental conception, and conscious perception. Beyond the neural coding of physical stimuli, it is not clear how exactly these component processes constitute cognition. Within mathematical sciences, category theory provides tools such as category, functor, and adjointness, which are indispensable in the explication of the mathematical calculations involved in acquiring mathematical knowledge. More speci cally, functorial semantics, in showing that theories and models can be construed as categories and functors, respectively, and in establishing the adjointness (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-28
    A memória episódica, o problema da cotemporalidade, e o senso comum.César Schirmer Dos Santos - forthcoming - In Gerson Albuquerque de Araújo Neto & Giovanni Rolla (eds.), Ciência e Conhecimento. Teresina: Editora da Universidade Federal do Piauí. pp. 101-123.
    Os realistas diretos sobre a memória episódica alegam que um sujeito que lembra está em contato direto com um evento passado. No entanto, como seria possível estar em contato direto com um evento que deixou de existir? Este é o assim-chamado problema da cotemporalidade. A solução padrão para este problema, a qual foi proposta por Sven Bernecker, consiste em distinguir entre, por um lado, a ocorrência de um evento, e, por outro lado, a existência de um evento, de modo que (...)
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  4. added 2020-03-17
    Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Acheivement.Kirk Ludwig & Wade Munroe - 2020 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 15-39.
    This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievement are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of representation, but that once we give cash-value definitions of the relevant notions of representation and inference, there is little left of the ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, such as about illusions, and (b) their providing (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-10
    Introduction: Gestalt Phenomenology and Embodied Cognitive Science.Alistair M. C. Isaac & Dave Ward - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    Several strands of contemporary cognitive science and its philosophy have emerged in recent decades that emphasize the role of action in cognition, resting their explanations on the embodiment of cognitive agents, and their embedding in richly structured environments. Despite their growing influence, many foundational questions remain unresolved or underexplored for this cluster of proposals, especially questions of how they can be extended beyond straightforwardly visuomotor cognitive capacities, and what constraints the commitment of embodiment places on the ontology of explanations. This (...)
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  6. added 2020-03-10
    Resisting Aliefs: Gendler on Belief-Discordant Behaviors.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):77 - 91.
    This paper challenges T. S. Gendler's notion of aliefs, a novel kind of mental state which she introduces to explain a wide variety of belief-discordant behaviors. In particular, I argue that many of the cases which she uses to motivate such a mental state can be fully explained by accounts that make use only of commonplace attitudes such as beliefs and desires.
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  7. added 2020-02-22
    O desafio da integração explanatória para o enativismo: escalonamento ascendente ou descendente.Eros Carvalho & Giovanni Rolla - manuscript
    Enactivism is a family of theories that construe action as constitutive of cognition and reject the need to postulate representations in order to explain all cognitive activities. Acknowledging a biologically basic, non-representational mode of cognition, however, raises the question of how to explain higher or more complex cognitive acts, what we call explanatory integration challenge. In this paper, we critically discuss some attempts to meet that challenge through scaling up basic cognition and through scaling down complex cognition within the enactivist (...)
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  8. added 2020-01-19
    Entity Realism About Mental Representations.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    The concept of mental representation has long been considered to be central concept of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. But not everyone agrees. Neo-behaviorists aim to explain the mind without positing any representations. My aim here is not to assess the merits and demerits of neo-behaviorism, but to take their challenge seriously and ask the question: What justifies the attribution of representations to an agent? Both representationalists and neo-behaviorists tend to take it for granted that the real question about (...)
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  9. added 2019-12-29
    The Mind Beyond Itself.Robert A. Wilson - 2000 - In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 31-52.
    This paper argues that the metarepresentational systems we posses are wide or extended, rather than individualistic. There are two basic ideas. The first is that metarepresentation inherits its width from the mental representation of its objects. The second is that mental processing often operates on internal and external symbols, and this suggests that cognitive systems extend beyond the heads that house them.
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  10. added 2019-12-23
    Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):309-329.
    Philosophers have traditionally held that propositions mark the domain of rational thought and inference. Many philosophers have held that only conceptually sophisticated creatures like us could have propositional attitudes. But in recent decades, philosophers have adopted increasingly liberal views of propositional attitudes that encompass the mental states of various non-human animals. These views now sit alongside more traditional views within the philosophical mainstream. In this paper I argue that liberalized views of propositional attitudes are so liberal that they encompass states (...)
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  11. added 2019-12-21
    The Problem of Cognitive Domains.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    The problem of cognitive domains is that one can conceive the territory only as it is portrayed in the map. It involves conflating the domain of representation with the domain of what it represents. This is a category mistake: there are essential qualitative and quantitative differences between map and territory. The output of cognitive processes, both perceptual and scientific, is recycled as the input.
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  12. added 2019-11-21
    What Do Philosophers Disagree About When They Disagree About Toad-Representation?Adam Pautz - manuscript
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  13. added 2019-11-02
    Informational Theories of Content and Mental Representation.Marc Artiga & Miguel Ángel Sebastián - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-15.
    Informational theories of semantic content have been recently gaining prominence in the debate on the notion of mental representation. In this paper we examine new-wave informational theories which have a special focus on cognitive science. In particular, we argue that these theories face four important difficulties: they do not fully solve the problem of error, fall prey to the wrong distality attribution problem, have serious difficulties accounting for ambiguous and redundant representations and fail to deliver a metasemantic theory of representation. (...)
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  14. added 2019-11-02
    Teleosemantic Modeling of Cognitive Representations.Marc Artiga - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (4):483-505.
    Naturalistic theories of representation seek to specify the conditions that must be met for an entity to represent another entity. Although these approaches have been relatively successful in certain areas, such as communication theory or genetics, many doubt that they can be employed to naturalize complex cognitive representations. In this essay I identify some of the difficulties for developing a teleosemantic theory of cognitive representations and provide a strategy for accommodating them: to look into models of signaling in evolutionary game (...)
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  15. added 2019-11-02
    Teleosemantics, Infotel-Semantics and Circularity.Marc Artiga - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):583-603.
    Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render explanations of successful behavior by appealing to true beliefs circular and, consequently, non-explanatory. As an alternative, Shea has recently suggested an original teleosemantic account (that he calls ?Infotel-semantics?), which is supposed to be immune to the problem of circularity. The paper argues that the standard version of teleosemantics has a satisfactory reply to the circularity objection and that, in any case, Infotel-semantics is not better off than standard (...)
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  16. added 2019-09-19
    Cognition in Practice: Conceptual Development and Disagreement in Cognitive Science.Mikio Akagi - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition—e.g. whether cognition is necessarily representational, whether cognitive processes extend outside the brain or body, and whether plants or microbes have them. Whereas previous philosophical work aimed to settle these disputes, I aim to understand what conception of cognition scientists could share given that they disagree so fundamentally. To this end, I develop a number of variations on traditional conceptual explication, and defend a (...)
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  17. added 2019-09-09
    What is Cognition? Angsty Monism, Permissive Pluralism(s), and the Future of Cognitive Science.Cameron Buckner & Ellen Fridland - 2017 - Synthese (11):4191-4195.
  18. added 2019-08-23
    Explaining Representation: A Reply to Matthen.Frances Egan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):137-142.
    Mohan Matthen has failed to understand the position I develop and defend in “How to Think about Mental Content.” No doubt some of the fault lies with my exposition, though Matthen often misconstrues passages that are clear in context. He construes clarifications and elaborations of my argument to be “concessions.” Rather than dwell too much on specific misunderstandings of my explanatory project and its attendant claims, I will focus on the main points of disagreement.RepresentationalismMy project in the paper is to (...)
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  19. added 2019-07-27
    Is Iconic Memory Iconic?Jake Quilty‐Dunn - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Short‐term memory in vision is typically thought to divide into at least two memory stores: a short, fragile, high‐capacity store known as iconic memory, and a longer, durable, capacity‐limited store known as visual working memory (VWM). This paper argues that iconic memory stores icons, i.e., image‐like perceptual representations. The iconicity of iconic memory has significant consequences for understanding consciousness, nonconceptual content, and the perception–cognition border. Steven Gross and Jonathan Flombaum have recently challenged the division between iconic memory and VWM by (...)
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  20. added 2019-07-02
    The Small Number System.Eric Margolis - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (1):113-134.
    I argue that the human mind includes an innate domain-specific system for representing precise small numerical quantities. This theory contrasts with object-tracking theories and with domain-general theories that only make use of mental models. I argue that there is a good amount of evidence for innate representations of small numerical quantities and that such a domain-specific system has explanatory advantages when infants’ poor working memory is taken into account. I also show that the mental models approach requires previously unnoticed domain-specific (...)
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  21. added 2019-07-02
    Blended Cognition.Jordi Vallverdú & Vincent C. Müller (eds.) - 2019 - Cham: Springer.
    The central concept of this edited volume is "blended cognition", the natural skill of human beings for combining constantly different heuristics during their several task-solving activities. Something that was sometimes observed like a problem as “bad reasoning”, is now the central key for the understanding of the richness, adaptability and creativity of human cognition. The topic of this book connects in a significant way with the disciplines of psychology, neurology, anthropology, philosophy, logics, engineering, logics, and AI. In a nutshell: understanding (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-06
    Cognitive Foundations of Arithmetic: Evolution and Ontogenisis.Susan Carey - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (1):37-55.
    Dehaene articulates a naturalistic approach to the cognitive foundations of mathematics. Further, he argues that the ‘number line’ system of representation is the evolutionary and ontogenetic foundation of numerical concepts. Here I endorse Dehaene’s naturalistic stance and also his characterization of analog magnitude number representations. Although analog magnitude representations are part of the evolutionary foundations of numerical concepts, I argue that they are unlikely to be part of the ontogenetic foundations of the capacity to represent natural number. Rather, the developmental (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-05
    Representing Without Representations.Mark Rowlands - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):133-144.
    There is a problem of representation and an apparatus of representations that was devised to solve this problem. This paper has two purposes. First, it will show why the problem of representation outstrips the apparatus of representations in the sense that the problem survives the demise of the apparatus. Secondly, it will argue that the question of whether cognition does or not involve representations is a poorly defined question, and far too crude to be helpful in understanding the nature of (...)
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  24. added 2019-06-05
    Phantom Body as Bodily Self-Consciousness.Przemysław Nowakowski - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (1):135–149.
    In the article, I propose that the body phantom is a phenomenal and functional model of one’s own body. This model has two aspects. On the one hand, it functions as a tacit sensory representation of the body that is at the same time related to the motor aspects of body functioning. On the other hand, it also has a phenomenal aspect as it constitutes the content of conscious bodily experience. This sort of tacit, functional and sensory model is related (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-05
    Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence , Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press , 358 Pp., $49.95. [REVIEW]Pieter Vermaas - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (4):473-477.
  26. added 2019-06-03
    Reasoning About Uncertain Conditionals.Niki Pfeifer - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):849-866.
    There is a long tradition in formal epistemology and in the psychology of reasoning to investigate indicative conditionals. In psychology, the propositional calculus was taken for granted to be the normative standard of reference. Experimental tasks, evaluation of the participants’ responses and psychological model building, were inspired by the semantics of the material conditional. Recent empirical work on indicative conditionals focuses on uncertainty. Consequently, the normative standard of reference has changed. I argue why neither logic nor standard probability theory provide (...)
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  27. added 2019-05-10
    The Logical Problem and the Theoretician's Dilemma.Hayley Clatterbuck - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):322-350.
    The theory-theory of human uniqueness posits that the capacity to theorize, in a way strongly analogous to theorizing in scientific practice, was a key innovation in the hominid lineage and was responsible for many of our unique cognitive traits. One of the central arguments that its proponents have used to support the claim that animals are not theorists, the logical problem, bears strong similarities to Hempel's theoretician's dilemma, which purports to show that theories are unnecessary. This similarity threatens to undermine (...)
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  28. added 2019-04-29
    Representation and Mental Representation.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):204-225.
    This paper engages critically with anti-representationalist arguments pressed by prominent enactivists and their allies. The arguments in question are meant to show that the “as-such” and “job-description” problems constitute insurmountable challenges to causal-informational theories of mental content. In response to these challenges, a positive account of what makes a physical or computational structure a mental representation is proposed; the positive account is inspired partly by Dretske’s views about content and partly by the role of mental representations in contemporary cognitive scientific (...)
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  29. added 2019-04-05
    Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content, by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin: Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017, Pp. Xxvii + 328, $US35. [REVIEW]Evan Westra - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):210-210.
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  30. added 2019-03-18
    The Architecture of Mind as a Network of Networks of Natural Computational Processes.Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic - 2016 - Philosophies 1 (1):111--125.
    In discussions regarding models of cognition, the very mention of “computationalism” often incites reactions against the insufficiency of the Turing machine model, its abstractness, determinism, the lack of naturalist foundations, triviality and the absence of clarity. None of those objections, however, concerns models based on natural computation or computing nature, where the model of computation is broader than symbol manipulation or conventional models of computation. Computing nature consists of physical structures that form layered computational architecture, with computation processes ranging from (...)
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  31. added 2019-03-12
    Perception is Analog: The Argument From Weber's Law.Jacob Beck - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (6):319-349.
    In the 1980s, a number of philosophers argued that perception is analog. In the ensuing years, these arguments were forcefully criticized, leaving the thesis in doubt. This paper draws on Weber’s Law, a well-entrenched finding from psychophysics, to advance a new argument that perception is analog. This new argument is an adaptation of an argument that cognitive scientists have leveraged in support of the contention that primitive numerical representations are analog. But the argument here is extended to the representation of (...)
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  32. added 2019-03-12
    Aesthetics, Cognition, and Creativity.Jennifer A. McMahon - 1996 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    This thesis constructs an Interactive Theory of Beauty to change the way we think about beauty and aesthetic form, in order to resolve the conceptual discrepancies between the features that characterize the traditional concept of beauty and the features of the phenomenology of beauty. The assumptions that underlie these discrepancies are identified. I hypothesize an alternative assumption that would need to be the case to resolve the tensions between the traditional concept and the phenomenology. This involves rejecting the idea that (...)
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  33. added 2019-03-07
    Approaching Truth in Conceptual Spaces.Gustavo Cevolani - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Knowledge representation is a central issue in a number of areas, but few attempts are usually made to bridge different approaches accross different fields. As a contribution in this direction, in this paper I focus on one such approach, the theory of conceptual spaces developed within cognitive science, and explore its potential applications in the fields of philosophy of science and formal epistemology. My case-study is provided by the theory of truthlikeness, construed as closeness to “the whole truth” about a (...)
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  34. added 2019-03-01
    Teleological Essentialism.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2019 - Cognitive Science 43 (4):e12725.
    Placeholder essentialism is the view that there is a causal essence that holds category members together, though we may not know what the essence is. Sometimes the placeholder can be filled in by scientific essences, such as when we acquire scientific knowledge that the atomic weight of gold is 79. We challenge the view that placeholders are elaborated by scientific essences. On our view, if placeholders are elaborated, they are elaborated Aristotelian essences, a telos. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments (...)
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  35. added 2019-02-04
    An Efficient Coding Approach to the Debate on Grounded Cognition.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5245-5269.
    The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory systems. The problem is that there is no clear characterization of format or its neural correlate. In order to make the disagreement empirically meaningful and move forward in the discussion we need a neurocognitive criterion (...)
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  36. added 2019-01-31
    Using Neural Response Properties to Draw the Distinction Between Modal and Amodal Representations.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):301-331.
    Barsalou has recently argued against the strategy of identifying amodal neural representations by using their cross-modal responses (i.e., their responses to stimuli from different modalities). I agree that there are indeed modal structures that satisfy this “cross-modal response” criterion (CM), such as distributed and conjunctive modal representations. However, I argue that we can distinguish between modal and amodal structures by looking into differences in their cross-modal responses. A component of a distributed cell assembly can be considered unimodal because its responses (...)
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  37. added 2019-01-30
    Intellectualism and the Argument From Cognitive Science.Arieh Schwartz & Zoe Drayson - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):662-692.
    Intellectualism is the claim that practical knowledge or ‘know-how’ is a kind of propositional knowledge. The debate over Intellectualism has appealed to two different kinds of evidence, semantic and scientific. This paper concerns the relationship between Intellectualist arguments based on truth-conditional semantics of practical knowledge ascriptions, and anti-Intellectualist arguments based on cognitive science and propositional representation. The first half of the paper argues that the anti-Intellectualist argument from cognitive science rests on a naturalistic approach to metaphysics: its proponents assume that (...)
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  38. added 2019-01-17
    Semantic and Pragmatic Integration in Vision for Action.Silvano Zipoli Caiani & Gabriele Ferretti - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:40-54.
    According to an influential view, the detection of action possibilities and the selection of a plan for action are two segregated steps throughout the processing of visual information. This classical approach is committed with the assumption that two independent types of processing underlie visual perception: the semantic one, which is at the service of the identification of visually presented objects, and the pragmatic one which serves the execution of actions directed to specific parts of the same objects. However, as our (...)
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  39. added 2019-01-11
    Content in Simple Signalling Systems.Nicholas Shea, Peter Godfrey-Smith & Rosa Cao - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1009-1035.
    Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly through the study of simple models involving interacting senders and receivers of signals. Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory are all that are needed to capture the meaning or content that is being communicated in these systems. However, the way theorists routinely talk about the models implicitly draws on a conception of content that is richer than bare informational content, especially in contexts where false content (...)
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  40. added 2018-12-24
    Introduction.Krzysztof Dołęga, Luke Roelofs & Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):179-186.
    The papers in this special issue make important contributions to a longstanding debate about how we should conceive of and explain mental phenomena. In other words, they make a case about the best philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. The two main competing approaches, hotly debated for several decades, are representationalism and enactivism. However, recent developments in disciplines such as machine learning and computational neuroscience have fostered a proliferation of intermediate approaches, leading to the emergence of completely new positions, in particular (...)
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  41. added 2018-12-24
    Why Imagining Requires Content: A Reply to a Reply to an Objection to Radical Enactive Cognition.Luke Roelofs - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):246-254.
    ‘Radical enactivism’ (Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017) eschews representational content for all ‘basic’ mental activities. Critics have argued that this view cannot make sense of the workings of the imagination. In their recent book (2017), Hutto and Myin respond to these critics, arguing that some imaginings can be understood without attributing them any representational content. Their response relies on the claim that a system can exploit a structural isomorphism between two things without either of those things being a semantically evaluable (...)
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  42. added 2018-11-13
    Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):309-329.
    Philosophers have traditionally held that propositions mark the domain of rational thought and inference. Many philosophers have held that only conceptually sophisticated creatures like us could have propositional attitudes. But in recent decades, philosophers have adopted increasingly liberal views of propositional attitudes that encompass the mental states of various non-human animals. These views now sit alongside more traditional views within the philosophical mainstream. In this paper I argue that liberalized views of propositional attitudes are so liberal that they encompass states (...)
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  43. added 2018-11-13
    Mindless Accuracy: On the Ubiquity of Content in Nature.Alex Morgan - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5403-5429.
    It is widely held in contemporary philosophy of mind that states with underived representational content are ipso facto psychological states. This view—the Content View—underlies a number of interesting philosophical projects, such as the attempt to pick out a psychological level of explanation, to demarcate genuinely psychological from non-psychological states, and to limn the class of states with phenomenal character. The most detailed and influential theories of underived representation in philosophy are the tracking theories developed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan and others. (...)
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  44. added 2018-10-28
    Representation Re-Construed: Construal-Based Norms for Ascribing Natural Representations.Akagi Mikio - manuscript
    Many philosophers worry that cognitive scientists apply the concept REPRESENTATION too liberally. For example, William Ramsey argues that scientists often ascribe natural representations according to the “receptor notion,” a causal account with absurd consequences. I rehabilitate the receptor notion by augmenting it with a background condition: that natural representations are ascribed only to systems construed as organisms. This Organism-Receptor account rationalizes our existing conceptual practice, including the fact that scientists in fact reject Ramsey’s absurd consequences. The Organism-Receptor account raises some (...)
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  45. added 2018-09-27
    Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. In light of pioneering research, Nicholas Shea develops a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation with a firm focus on the subpersonal representations that pervade the cognitive sciences.
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  46. added 2018-09-24
    Representation and the Active Consumer.Patrick Butlin - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    One of the central tasks for naturalistic theories of representation is to say what it takes for something to be a representation, and some leading theories have been criticised for being too liberal. Prominent discussions of this problem have proposed a producer-oriented solution; it is argued that representations must be produced by systems employing perceptual constancy mechanisms. However, representations may be produced by simple transducers if they are consumed in the right way. It is characteristic of representations to be consumed (...)
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  47. added 2018-09-06
    Content and Misrepresentation in Hierarchical Generative Models.Alex Kiefer & Jakob Hohwy - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2387-2415.
    In this paper, we consider how certain longstanding philosophical questions about mental representation may be answered on the assumption that cognitive and perceptual systems implement hierarchical generative models, such as those discussed within the prediction error minimization framework. We build on existing treatments of representation via structural resemblance, such as those in Gładziejewski :559–582, 2016) and Gładziejewski and Miłkowski, to argue for a representationalist interpretation of the PEM framework. We further motivate the proposed approach to content by arguing that it (...)
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  48. added 2018-08-23
    Keeping Track With Things.Richard Menary - 2018 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 305-330.
    Humans look at, think about, and manipulate things with tools.1 Some tools are largely pragmatic in nature, and they have a long history in our lineage, but more recently, humans have innovated tools for keeping track of features of the environment. Epistemic tracking tools (as I shall dub them) allow us to think, perceive and manipulate the world with a precision that we would otherwise lack. These epistemic tracking tools (henceforth ETTs) will be the focus of this chapter. ETTs track (...)
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  49. added 2018-08-23
    Embodying Culture.Richard Menary & Alexander Gillett - 2017 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. London: Routledge. pp. 72-87.
    The Cognitive Integration (henceforth CI) framework posits the existence of integrated cognitive systems (henceforth ICS). In this chapter we outline the nature of ICS and their phylogenetic history. We shall argue that phylogenetically earlier forms of cognition are built upon by more recent cultural innovations. Many of the phylogenetically earlier components are forms of sensorimotor interactions with the environment (Menary 2007a, 2010a, 2016). These sensorimotor interactions are redeployed (or retrained) to service more recent cultural innovations (Dehaene & Cohen 2007). The (...)
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  50. added 2018-08-17
    The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples.Thomas Metzinger - 2010 - Humana Mente 4 (14):1-28.
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