Representation, Misc

After discussing the manifest inconveniences of Galilean physicalism for both science and common sense, I propose an alternate, Aristotelian ontology of material things and show how it solves the epistemological problems engendered by the New Science. Read at the annual POH Symposium in Lake Wenatchee, WA, May 2011.

Is there some general reason to expect organisms that have beliefs to have false beliefs? And after you observe that an organism occasionally occupies a given neural state that you think encodes a perceptual belief, how do you evaluate hypotheses about the semantic content that that state has, where some of those hypotheses attribute beliefs that are sometimes false while others attribute beliefs that are always true? To address the first of these questions, we discuss evolution by natural selection and (...) show how organisms that are risk-prone in the beliefs they form can be fitter than organisms that are risk-free. To address the second question, we discuss a problem that is widely recognized in statistics – the problem of over-fitting – and one influential device for addressing that problem, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). We then use AIC to solve epistemological versions of the disjunction and distality problems, which are two key problems concerning what it is for a belief state to have one semantic content rather than another. (shrink)

It is widely thought that philosophical behaviorism is an untenable and outdated theory of mind. It is generally agreed, in particular, that the view generates a vicious circularity problem. There is a standard solution to this problem for functionalism, which utilizes the formulation of Ramsey sentences. I will show that this solution is also available for behaviorism if we allow quantification over the causal bases of behavioral dispositions. Then I will suggest that behaviorism differs from functionalism mainly in its commitment (...) to anti-representationalism, and I will offer two new objections to anti-representationalism. The first will be based on considerations concerning the contents of desires and intentions. The second objection concerns inner speech and mental imagery. We will see that the objections are of relevance to contemporary debates, as they apply with equal force to the currently popular anti-representationalist versions of embodied and enactive cognition. (shrink)

This is a response to Marie McGinn, who, roughly, lined me up with J. L. Austin over against GEM Anscombe and Wittgenstein on the issue whether perception is (or can be) intentional. I do not mind being aligned with Austin, but argue that this is the wrong way to line things up. I stand equally with Wittgenstein. Anscombe turns out to be odd man out on this one.

Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, (...) on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of intentionality, ‘no’. (shrink)

The teleosemantic theory of representational content is held by some philosophers to imply that genes carry semantic information about whole-organism phenotypes. In this paper, I argue that this position is not supported by empirical findings. I focus on one of the most elaborate defenses of this position: Shea’s view that genes represent whole-organism phenotypes. I distinguish between two ways of individuating genes in contemporary biological science as possible vehicles of representational content—as molecular genes and as difference-maker genes. I show that (...) given either of these ways of individuating genes, genes fail to meet conditions which the teleosemantic theory requires an entity to meet if that entity is to qualify as a representational vehicle that represents a whole-organism phenotype. The considerations I present against Shea’s view generalize to other attempts to use the teleosemantic theory in support of the claim that genes represent whole-organism phenotypes. (shrink)

本にコメントする前に、私はヴィトゲンシュタインとサールと合理性の論理的構造に関するコメントを提供します。ここでのエッセイは、主に過去10年間にすでに出版されています(いくつかは更新されましたが)、1つ の未発表のアイテムと一緒に、ここで何も彼の仕事に追いついてきた人には驚きではありません。Wと同様に、彼は彼の時代の最高のスタンドアップ哲学者とみなされ、彼の書かれた作品は岩と画期的な全体として固体です 。しかし、後のWを真剣に受け止めなかったことは、いくつかの間違いや混乱につながります。ほんの一例:p7では、基本的な事実に関する私たちの確実性は、私たちの主張を支持する理性の圧倒的な重みによるものだと 2回指摘していますが、Wは「確実に」で、システム1の認識、記憶、思考の真の唯一の公理構造を疑う可能性はないと明確に示しました。p8の最初の文では、彼は確実性が改訂可能であることを教えてくれますが、私た ちが確実性2と呼ぶかもしれないこの種の「確実性」は、経験を通じて公理的で修正不可能な確実性(確実性)を拡張した結果であり、提案(真または偽)として全く異なります。これはもちろん、Wが何度も何度も実証し た「言語による私たちの知性の妖艶との戦い」の典型的な例です。1 つの単語 - 2 つ (または多くの) 異なる使用。 彼の最後の章「命題の統一」(以前は未発表)はまた、S1を記述する真の唯一の文章とS2を記述する真または偽の命題の違いを明確にするので、Wの「確実性について」またはDMSのOCに関する2冊の本(私のレビ ューを参照)を読むことからも大きな利益を得るでしょう。これは、S2で彼らについて考え始めた後にのみTまたはFになるので、S1の認識を命題として受け取ることに対するはるかに優れたアプローチとして私を襲い ます。しかし、命題は、過去と未来とファンタジーの実際または潜在的な真実と虚偽の記述を許可し、したがって、前言語学的または原語社会に対する大きな進歩を提供するという彼の指摘は、誠実です。彼が言うように、 「命題は満足の条件を決定することができるものです。満足の条件.それはそうであるということです。あるいは、追加する必要があります。 全体として、PNCはSの半世紀の仕事に起因するヴィトゲンシュタインに対する多くの実質的な進歩の良い要約ですが、私の見解では、Wは彼が言っていることを理解すると、まだ不平等です。理想的には、彼らは一緒に 読む必要があります:明確な一貫した散文と一般化のためのサールは、Wの厄介な例と華麗な格言で示されています。もし私がずっと若かったら、まさにそれをやっている本を書くだろう。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

Horwichはウィトゲンシュタイン(W)の細かい分析を行い、Wの第一人者ですが、私の見解では、このレビューや他の多くの人が長々と説明しているように、それらはすべて完全な感謝に満ち不足しています。W( そして好ましくはサールも)を理解していないならば、私は哲学と高次思考、したがってすべての複雑な行動(心理学、社会学、人類学、歴史、文学、社会)の表面的な理解以上のものを持つことができる方法を見ません。 一言で言えば、Wは、あなたが興味のある文脈で文がどのように使用されているかを示したとき、これ以上言うことは何もあることを実証しました。私はいくつかの注目すべき引用から始め、その後、私はウィトゲンシュタ イン、哲学と人間の行動を理解するために必要な最小限の考慮事項であると思うものを与えます。 まず、単語の前に「meta」を置くことは疑わしいはずです。Wは、例えば、メタ数学は他の数学と同様に、言った。哲学の外に出ることができるという考え(すなわち、高次思考の記述心理学)は、それ自体が深い混乱 です。ここでのもう一つのいらだちは、「彼女」と「彼女」と「彼女」や「彼女/彼女」などの絶え間ない逆言語的性差別です。同様に、英語の「レパートリー」がうまくいくフランス語の「レパートリー」の使用もうまく いくでしょう。大きな欠陥は、私が上記で概説したHOTとサールのフレームワークの非常に強力で直感的な2つのシステムビューとして私が見ているものを採用する完全な失敗(非常に一般的ですが)です。これは、特に 意味p111 et seq.(特に脚注2-7)に関する章では、自動化された真のS1、命題の処分S2、COSなどの枠組みなしで非常に泥だらけの水の中で泳ぎます。ジョンストンやバッド(私のレビューを参照)などを読むことで、内 側と外側のより良いビューを得ることもできます。しかし、ホーウィッチは多くの切迫したコメントをします。私は特にp65に対するWの反理論的スタンスの輸入の彼の要約が好きでした。彼は最近、ダニエレ・モヤル・ シャーロック、コリバなどによる多くの努力の主題である「確実性について」にもっと重点を置く必要があり、私の最近の記事で要約されています。 ホーウィッチは一流であり、彼の仕事は努力の価値があります。彼(そして誰もが)サールといくつかの現代心理学だけでなく、ハット、リード、ハッチンソン、スターン、モヤアル・シャーロック、ストロール、ハッカー 、ベイカーなどを研究し、幅広い現代的な行動観を達成することを望んでいます。彼らの論文のほとんどはacademia dot eduとphilpapers dot orgにありますが、PMSハッカーにとってはhttp: slash slash info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk slash scr slash hacker slash DownloadPapers dot htmlを参照してください。 彼はウィトゲンシュタインの理解が私が今まで見た私たちを残す場所の最も美しい要約の一つを与えます。 「フレージの論理への算術の削減のように、言語的/概念的な活動(PI 126)を説明する試みがあってはならない。それを認識論的基盤(PI 124)に与える試みはありません。.意味論理のように理想化された形式(PI 130)を特徴付けようとする試みはありません。マッキーの誤り理論やダメットの直感のように、それを改革する試み(PI 124、132)はありません。クインの存在のアカウントのようにそれを合理化する試みはありません (PI 133)。嘘つきのパラドックスに対するタルスキーの反応のように、それをより一貫させる試み(PI 132)を作る試みはありません。奇妙な仮説的な「テレポーテーション」シナリオのための個人的なアイデンティティの質問の解決のように、それをより完全に(PI 133)にしようとする試みはありません。 最後に、私がここで奨励した視点で、Wは現代哲学と心理学の中心にあり、あいまいで困難でも無関係でもありませんが、シンチレーション、深遠でクリスタルクリアであり、彼を見逃すのは可能な限り最大の知的冒険の1 つを逃すということです。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

A number of recent theories of quantum gravity lack a one-dimensional structure of ordered temporal instants. Instead, according to many of these views, our world is either best represented as a single three-dimensional object, or as a configuration space composed of such three-dimensional objects, none of which bear temporal relations to one another. Such theories will be empirically self-refuting unless they can accommodate the existence of conscious beings capable of representation. For if representation itself is impossible in a timeless world, (...) then no being in such a world could entertain the thought that a timeless theory is true, let alone believe such a theory or rationally believe it. This paper investigates the options for understanding representation in a three-dimensional, timeless, world. Ultimately it concludes that the only viable option is one according to which representation is taken to be deeply non-naturalistic. Ironically then we are left with two seemingly very unattractive options. Either a very naturalistic motivation—taking seriously a live view in fundamental physics—leads us to a very non-naturalistic view of the mental, or else views in the philosophy of mind partly dictate what is an acceptable theory in physics. (shrink)

Tool making has been proposed as a key force in driving the complexity of human material culture. The ontogeny of tool‐related behaviors hinges on social, representational, and creative factors. In this study, we test the associations between these factors in development across two different cultures. Results of Study 1 with 5‐to‐6‐year‐old Turkish children in dyadic or individual settings show that tool making is facilitated by social interaction, hierarchical representation, and creative abilities. Results of a second explorative study comparing the Turkish (...) sample with a sample of 5‐to‐6‐year‐old children in New Zealand suggest that tool innovation might be affected by culture, and that the role of cognitive and creative factors diminishes through social interaction in tool making. (shrink)

According to the classical account, propositions are sui generis, abstract, intrinsically-representational entities and our cognitive attitudes, and the token states within us that realize those attitudes, represent as they do in virtue of their propositional objects. In light of a desire to explain how it could be that propositions represent, much of the recent literature on propositions has pressured various aspects of this account. In place of the classical account, revisionists have aimed to understand propositions in terms of more familiar (...) entities such as facts, types of mental or linguistic acts, and even properties. But we think that the metaphysical story about propositions is much simpler than either the classical theorist or the revisionist would have you believe. In what follows, we argue that a proper understanding of the nature of our cognitive relations to propositions shows that the question of whether propositions themselves represent is, at best, a distraction. We will argue that once this distraction is removed, the possibility of a very pleasing, minimalist story of propositions emerges; a story that appeals only to assumptions that are shared by all theorists in the relevant debate. (shrink)

Brogaard's book is extremely informative about the grammar of perceptual verbs, and questions that it indicates representationalism (as opposed to naive realism). As useful as this is, I question how much grammar tells us much about perception.

The neural vehicles of mental representation play an explanatory role in cognitive psychology that their realizers do not. In this paper, I argue that the individuation of realizers as vehicles of representation restricts the sorts of explanations in which they can participate. I illustrate this with reference to Rupert’s (2011) claim that representational vehicles can play an explanatory role in psychology in virtue of their quantity or proportion. I propose that such quantity-based explanatory claims can apply only to realizers and (...) not to vehicles, in virtue of the particular causal role that vehicles play in psychological explanations. (shrink)

During the last decade, the ontogeny of tool making has received growing attention in the literature on tool-related behaviors. However, the cognitive demands underlying tool making are still not clearly understood. In this cross-sectional study of 52 Turkish preschool children from 3 to 6 years of age, the roles of executive function (response inhibition), ability to form hierarchical representations (hierarchical structuring), and social learning were investigated with the hook task previously used with children and animals. In this task, children needed (...) to bend a pipe cleaner to fetch a small bucket with a sticker out of a tall jar. This study replicated earlier findings that preschoolers have great difficulty in tool innovation. However, social learning facilitates tool making, especially after 5 years of age. Capacities to form hierarchical representations and to inhibit prepotent responses were significant positive predictors of tool making after social learning. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper is about the relevance of attitude-ascriptions to debates about singular thought. It examines a methodology reject this methodology, the literature lacks a detailed examination of its implications and the challenges faced by proponents and critics. I isolate an assumption of the methodology, which I call the tracking assumption: that an attitude-ascription which states that s Φ's that P is true iff s has an attitude, of Φ-ing, which is an entertaining of the content P. I argue that the (...) tracking assumption must be rejected, not because it has deflationary consequences, but because it leads to unstable commitments. I also show that there are independent reasons to reject it, because ordinary attitude ascriptions underdetermine even the truth-conditions of the mental-states they ascribe. However, I argue, this does not involve rejecting the claim that attitude-ascriptions express relations between agents and contents. Instead, they state different relations depending on contextual factors other than the nature of the mental-states ascribed. (shrink)

Saul Kripke's influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers cannot have any justification for using a word one way rather than another. If it is correct, there can be no such thing as meaning anything by a word. I argue that the paradox fails to undermine meaning. Kripke never adequately motivates its excessively strict standard for the justified use of words. The paradox lacks the resources to show that its standard is truly mandatory or that speakers do not (...) frequently satisfy the well-motivated competitor I offer. So the paradox fails. (shrink)

Adverbialist theories of thought such as those advanced by Hare and Sellars promise an ontologically sleek understanding of a variety of intentional states, but such theories have been largely abandoned due to the ‘many-property problem’. In an attempt to revitalize this otherwise attractive theory, in a series of papers as well as his recent book, Uriah Kriegel has offered a novel reply to the ‘many-property problem’ and on its basis he argues that ‘adverbialism about intentionality is alive and well’. If (...) true, Kriegel will have shown that the logical landscape has long been unnecessarily constrained. His key idea is that the many-property problem can be overcome by appreciating that mental states stand in the determinable–determinate relation to one another. The present paper shows that this relation can’t save adverbialism because it would require thinkers to think more thoughts than they need be thinking. (shrink)

BOOK REVIEW: Davor Pećnjak, Tomislav Janović PREMA DUALIZMU. OGLEDI IZ FILOZOFIJE UMA (Towards Dualism: Essays in Philosophy of Mind) Ibis grafika: Zagreb, 2016.

According to radical versions of embodied cognition, human cognition and agency should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. According to a standard reply, accounts of embodied cognition can explain only instances of cognition and agency that are not “representation-hungry”. Two main types of such representation-hungry phenomena have been discussed: cognition about “the absent” and about “the abstract”. Proponents of representationalism have maintained that a satisfactory account of such phenomena requires the ascription of mental representations. Opponents have denied (...) this. I will argue that there is another important representation-hungry phenomenon that has been overlooked in this debate: temporally extended planning agency. In particular, I will argue that it is very difficult to see how planning agency can be explained without the ascription of mental representations, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that cognition about the absent and abstract can. We will see that this is a serious challenge for the radical as well as the more modest anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition, and we will see that modest anti-representationalism is an unstable position. (shrink)

Unpleasant sensations possess a unique ability to make certain aversive actions seem reasonable to us. But what is it about these experiences that give them that ability? According to some recent evaluationist accounts, it is their representational content: unpleasant sensations represent a certain event as bad for one. Unfortunately evaluationism seems unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves, for it appears to entail that taking a painkiller is akin to shooting the messenger, and is every (...) bit as unreasonable. In this paper I distinguish two versions of the shooting-the-messenger challenge: First, how do we account for the badness of unpleasant sensation? And second, how do we account for our access to that badness? I suggest plausible responses to the first question, but I also argue that the seriousness of the second has not been appreciated. I then propose a solution to the second: when we introspect our pains we also turn our emotional distress inwards, enabling them to represent our pains as bad. (shrink)

I defend the view that it is not impossible to see the impossible. I provide two examples in which one sees the impossible and defend these examples from potential objections. Theories of depiction should make room for impossible depictions.

Throughout the history of analytic philosophy the notion of the ‘phenomenological fallacy’ originally formulated by Place, has been used to criticize reification of the mental. Although this fallacy was originally not used to criticize the phenomenological tradition, it has popped up recently in debates between analytic philosophers and phenomenologists. However, a study of the history of both traditions reveals that a polemical notion similar, if not identical, to the phenomenological fallacy can be found within the phenomenological tradition, namely Sartre’s ‘illusion (...) of immanence’. In this article, I will explicate these two polemical notions and place them in the context of their respective traditions. This will reveal that both notions must be understood as a criticism of a certain form of representationalism I will call ‘dual-world representationalism’. This deep-rooted similarity between the analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenology, in turn, sheds a new light on current discussions between the two traditions. (shrink)

Mental representations—like many other things—seem to have parts. However, it isn’t clear how to properly understand the idea of a part of a representation. In this paper I shed new light on how representations can have a mereology. In particular, it has been recognized that there is a mereological element to Kant’s distinction between two kinds of representations: intuitions and concepts. A concept depends upon its parts, whereas an intuition is prior to its parts. The paper thus focuses on an (...) exploration of how to make sense of the parts and wholes of intuitions and concepts. (shrink)

Im Jahre 1998 verblüfften Andy Clark und David Chalmers die philosophische Gemeinschaft mit der so genannten These des erweiterten Geistes, die im Kern besagt, dass kognitive Systeme nicht-biologische Komponenten enthalten können und sich damit über die Grenzen biologischer Organismen hinaus erstrecken können. Die These wird seitdem nicht nur von Philosophen, sondern auch von Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaftlern intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert. In den Beiträgen, die in dem vorliegenden ersten deutschsprachigen Band zur These des erweiterten Geistes versammelt sind, werden u.a. die folgenden (...) Fragen behandelt: Was soll es heißen, dass der Geist nicht (nur) im Kopf ist? In welchem Sinne könnte er erweitert sein, und welche Möglichkeiten der Erweiterung gibt es? Welche Zusammenhänge bestehen zwischen Geist und Kognition sowie zwischen Kopplung und Konstitution? Was genau besagt der von Clark und Chalmers vorgebrachte aktive Externalismus? Welche Bedeutung hat die These des erweiterten Geistes für repräsentationalistische und für funktionalistische Theorien des Geistes sowie für Theorien kollektiver Intentionalität und sozialer Kognition? Welche Anwendungen der These könnte es geben? (shrink)

In An Inquiry into the Human Mind and in Essays on Intellectual Powers, Thomas Reid discusses what kinds of things perceivers are related to in perception. Are these things qualities of bodies, the bodies themselves, or both? This question places him in a long tradition of philosophers concerned with understanding how human perception works in connecting us with the external world. It is still an open question in the philosophy of perception whether the human perceptual system is providing us with (...) representations as of bodies, or only as of their properties. My project in this article is to explain how, on Reid's view, we can have perceptual representations as of bodies. This, in turn, enables him to argue that we have a robust understanding of the world around us, an understanding that would be missing if our perceptual system only supplied us with representations as of free-floating properties of bodies. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories of Representation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) reject construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself (the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the function that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly speaking, according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what is constitutive (...) of it being a representation) is its being functionally involved in preselecting or guiding the actions of cognitive systems. I intend to argue that while definitely valuable, ACToRs are underconstrained and thus not entirely satisfying, since there exist structures that would count as representations according to ACToRs, but which do not play functional roles that could be nontrivially or in an explanatorily valuable way classified as representing something for a cognitive system. I outline a remedy for this theoretical situation by postulating that a fully satisfying theory of representation in cognitive science should have two factors; i.e., it should combine the pragmatic, action-oriented aspect present in ACToRs with an element that emphasizes the importance of the relation holding between a representational vehicle and what is represented. (shrink)

In this chapter, I turn to the claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective. I start out by presenting the objection from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell (Mind and world, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994a). I then discuss the following replies: First, even if objective perceptual experience requires the perceiver to have an objective world-view, the (...) experience’s own content may be nonconceptual; second, perceptual objectivity can be had in virtue of mere nonconceptual personal-level abilities; third, a weaker kind of perceptual objectivity that does not even require personal-level capacities is substantial enough to provide for genuine perceptual content. The last reply is the one championed by Modest Nonconceptualism. All that genuine perceptual content presupposes is that the world is perceptually presented to the subject. This requirement can be elucidated via a subpersonal account of how the perceptual systems generate representations underlying her experiences that are poised to influence her central behavior-guiding system. (shrink)

The icon is the type of sign connected to efficient representational features, and its manipulation reveals more information about its object. The London Underground Diagram (LUD) is an iconic artifact and a well-known example of representational efficiency, having been copied by urban transportation systems worldwide. This paper investigates the efficiency of the LUD in the light of different conceptions of iconicity. We stress that a specialized representation is an icon of the formal structure of the problem for which it has (...) been specialized. By embedding such rules of action and behavior, the icon acts as a semiotic artifact distributing cognitive effort and participating in niche construction. (shrink)

Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, where Dennett's (...) distinction has been presumed to be equivalent to Stephen Stich's distinction between doxastic and subdoxastic states. Both these interpretations of the personal/subpersonal distinction, and also Dennett's own philosophical views of the mind, go beyond the personal/subpersonal distinction itself. They each involve supplementing the distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations with metaphysical claims about the relationship between the two kinds of explanation and the entities they posit. (shrink)

Das Verhältnis von Emotionen, Gefühl, Sprache und Bewusstsein wird aus verschiedenen Perspektiven betrachtet. Zum einen aus zweien, die versuchen, einen repräsentationstheoretischen Ansatz mit Sprache zu verbinden, wobei exemplarisch für einen neurowissenschaftlichen Ansatz Antonio Damasios Theorie betrachtet wird, und für die sprachanalytische Perspektive die von Michael Tye und Fred Dretske. Das Zusammenspiel von Empfindung, Gefühl und Bewusstsein wird dabei aus neurowissenschaftlicher und aus analytischer Sicht jeweils ganz unterschiedlich konzipiert, aber es wird deutlich, dass die Klärung des Zusammenwirkens dieser Aspekte zentral ist (...) für phänomenales Bewusstsein. Gemeinsam ist den beiden Ansätzen jedoch, dass sie weder die Rolle von Handlungszusammenhängen noch die Rolle des Anderen in ihre Überlegungen mit einbeziehen. (shrink)

The classifications of signs are among the most important topics of Peirce's theory of signs. The 10 classes of signs were developed from 1903 and represent an important refinement of the fundamental division of signs into icons, indexes, and symbols. In this paper we present two diagrammatic models for 10 classes, proposed by Peirce, and an interpretation of the reasoning behind their development, based on the analysis of preparatory versions of these models.

This article addresses a profound anthropological issue: how do representation and the represented relate? What motivates or warrants the inevitable disconnection? It is a mistake to dismiss representation as misguided, oppressive, or misleading. Representation is part of cognition generally and natural language in particular. As such it is inescapable and part of how we think and talk about the world. Moving between visual and linguistic anthropology I suggest that photographs and portraits provide a rich basis for thinking about the particular (...) sorts of warrants for anthropological representations. The general conclusion is that anthropological representation may be conceived of as a form of ekphrasis (a verbal account or evocation of a typically non-present image or object) providing the indexical or deictic bridge between representation and the object represented. As “similarity implies difference” so “representation implies ekphrasis.” -/- Les Antinomies de la représentation: Anthropologie d'un procédé ekphrastique -/- Résumé: Cet article s'intéresse à une question anthropologique majeure: quel est le lien entre la représentation et le représenté? Qu'est-ce qui motive ou justifie leur inévitable déconnexion? Ce serait une erreur de ne pas prendre au sérieux la représentation sous prétexte qu'elle est erronée, oppressive, ou parce qu'elle prête à confusion. La représentation fait partie de la cognition en général et du langage naturel en particulier. Pour cette raison, elle est inévitable et elle fait partie de la manière dont nous pensons et parlons du monde. En invoquant tour à tour des éléments d'anthropologie visuelle et linguistique, je propose l'hypothèse que les photographies et les portraits constituent une riche archive à partir de laquelle on peut penser les différents types de mandats impartis aux représentations anthropologiques. La conclusion générale de ce propos est que la représentation anthropologique peut être conçue comme une forme d'ekphrasis (un récit ou l’évocation d'une image ou d'un objet typiquement non-présent) fournissant le lien indexical et déictique entre la représentation et l'objet représenté. De même que la “similarité engendre la différence”, “la représentation engendre l'ekphrasis.”. (shrink)

This paper explores Victoria Welby's fundamental assumption of meaning process (“semiosis” sensu Peirce) as translation, and some implications for the development of a general model of intersemiotic translation.

Descartes’ accounts of sensory perception have long troubled his interpreters, for their lack of clear and explicit statements on some fundamental issues. His readers have wondered whether he allows spatial sensory ideas (spatial qualia); whether sensory ideas such as color or pain are representations and, if so, what they represent; and what cognitive value Descartes attributed to sense perception. Recent discussions take differing stands on the questions just mentioned, and also disagree over Descartes’ account of the externalization of sensory qualities, (...) on the origin and correct analysis of the “material falsity” he attributes to some sensory ideas, and on the value of the “teachings of nature.” Such disagreement should not be surprising, for although sensory perception was an important topic for Descartes, his treatment of these particular issues is not systematic – or at least not apparently so. Generally, there are no proof texts that unequivocally settle questions about Descartes’ views on spatial qualia, the representationality of sensory ideas, their cognitive value, externalization, material falsity, and the status of the teachings of nature. Yet these questions and topics naturally arise from matters about which Descartes is explicit and (reasonably) consistent, regarding the role of the senses in philosophy and everyday life and concerning the nature of minds and ideas. It is, therefore, worthwhile to ask what his positions might have been. This chapter develops answers by considering Descartes’ systematic doctrines on the nature of the mind and its ideas and by combing his statements on sensation and perception for hints about how to apply such principles. The first section reviews some key texts. Succeeding sections develop positions on representationality, cognitive value, externalization, material falsity, and the teachings of nature. Ultimately, I favor an interpretation in which, for Descartes, all sensory ideas represent by resemblance, different kinds of sensory ideas vary in cognitive value, externalization arises through spatial localization, and, with sensory ideas of color and the like, as materially false they do not intrinsically misrepresent but afford occasion for false judgments, which arise as merely apparent, and so not actually legitimate, teachings of nature. (shrink)

Objectives: Medical decision support and other intelligent applications in the life sciences depend on increasing amounts of digital information. Knowledge bases as well as formal ontologies are being used to organize biomedical knowledge and data. However, these two kinds of artefacts are not always clearly distinguished. Whereas the popular RDF(S) standard provides an intuitive triple-based representation, it is semantically weak. Description logics based ontology languages like OWL-DL carry a clear-cut semantics, but they are computationally expensive, and they are often misinterpreted (...) to encode all kinds of statements, including those which are not ontological. Method: We distinguish four kinds of statements needed to comprehensively represent domain knowledge: universal statements, terminological statements, statements about particulars and contingent statements. We argue that the task of formal ontologies is solely to represent universal statements, while the non-ontological kinds of statements can nevertheless be connected with ontological representations. To illustrate these four types of representations, we use a running example from parasitology. Results: We finally formulate recommendations for semantically adequate ontologies that can efficiently be used as a stable framework for more context-dependent biomedical knowledge representation and reasoning applications like clinical decision support systems. (shrink)

This fascinating collection on artifacts brings together seven papers by philosophers with nine by psychologists, biologists, and an archaeologist. The psychological papers include two excellent discussions of empirical work on the mental representation of artifact concepts – an assessment by Malt and Sloman of a large variety of studies on the conflicting ways we classify artifacts and extend our applications of artifact categories to new cases, and a review by Mahon and Caramazza of data from semantically impaired patients and from (...) neuroimaging on concepts of living kinds versus artifact kinds. Following these are three papers on the development of artifact concepts in children, including a short but provocative piece by Keil, Greif, and Kerner arguing that there is a mismatch between the patterns of development for our concepts of artifacts and the patterns of representation we end up developing. The final part of the book includes authoritative papers on artifact use by insects, birds, and mammals, by primates, and by Australopithecines and Neanderthals. (shrink)

Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do (...) so not in virtue of relating them to propositions. I reach this conclusion by not only showing that attempted analyses of apparently non-propositional attitudes in terms of the propositional fail, but that some non-propositional attitudes don’t even supervene on propositional attitudes. If this is correct, then the common discussions of intentionality that address only propositional attitudes are incomplete and those who hold that all intentional states are propositional are mistaken. (shrink)

Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this paper, I reject (...) their accounts. Against Klein, I use dissociation cases to argue that possession of ‘imperative content’ cannot wholly constitute pain. Against them both, I further claim that possession of such content cannot even constitute pain’s unpleasant, motivational aspect. For, even if it were possible to specify the relevant imperative content—which is far from clear—the idea of a command cannot bear the explanatory weight Klein and Hall place on it. (shrink)

While genomic and proteomic information describe the overall cellular machinery available to an organism, the metabolic profile of an individual at a given time provides a canvas as to the current physiological state. Concentration levels of relevant metabolites vary under different conditions, in particular, in the presence or absence of different disorders. Metabolite concentrations thus mediate an important link between chemistry and biology, contributing to a systems-wide understanding of biological processes and pathways. However, there are a number of challenges in (...) the ontological representation of such information. Firstly, concentration information is numeric and ranges over continuous values, while ontologies consist of discrete classes. Secondly, ontologies usually model only what is certain, and their logical formalisms are adapted to reasoning from certain axioms to logical deductions, however, the link between chemicals and diseases via concentration levels, like many threshold phenomena, is both uncertain and vague. In this paper we evaluate the representation of this knowledge using a combination of concrete domains and probabilistic reasoning. We parse concentration values from HMDB and create an ontology able to distinguish normal from abnormal concentrations and able to evaluate a probabilistic risk category for the presence of an associated disorder. (shrink)

In this book, Ilhan Inan questions the classical definition of curiosity as _a desire to know._ Working in an area where epistemology and philosophy of language overlap, Inan forges a link between our ability to become aware of our ignorance and our linguistic aptitude to construct terms referring to things unknown. The book introduces the notion of inostensible reference. Ilhan connects this notion to related concepts in philosophy of language: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the referential and the (...) attributive uses of definite descriptions; the _de re/de dicto_ distinction; and Kripke’s distinction between rigid and accidental designators. Continuing with a discussion of the conditions for curiosity and its satisfaction, Inan argues that the learning process—starting in curiosity and ending in knowledge—is always an effort to transform our inostensible terms into ostensible ones. A contextual account is adopted for the satisfaction of curiosity. It then discusses the conditions of successful reference to the object of curiosity and its presuppositions. The book concludes with a discussion on the limits of curiosity and its satisfaction. (shrink)

The article elucidates and assesses the Marburg School’s account of the cognition. The characteristic feature of epistemology from this School is the rejection of the mirroring and acceptance of the cognitive transformation. The criticism of the mirroring theory is implicitly contained in Paul Natorp’s and Hermann Cohen’s cognitive relationism. Ernst Cassirer articulated this critical epistemology in his philosophy of the symbolic form and his conception of the symbolic representation. The historical bases of this criticism has been reconstructed as a main (...) purpose of this article. (shrink)

This paper defends a reference-based approach to concept individuation against the objection that such an approach is unable to make sense of concepts that fail to refer. The main line of thought pursued involves clarifying how the referentialist should construe the relationship between a concept's (referential) content and its role in mental processes. While the central goal of the paper is to defend a view aptly titled Concept Referentialism , broader morals are drawn regarding reference-based approaches in general. The paper (...) closes by calling for a shift in the current debate between referentialists and their opponents. (shrink)

To what extent is the external world the way that it appears to us in perceptual experience? This perennial question in philosophy is no doubt ambiguous in many ways. For example, it might be taken as equivalent to the question of whether or not the external world is the way that it appears to be? This is a question about the epistemology of perception: Are our perceptual experiences by and large veridical representations of the external world? Alternatively, the question might (...) be taken as asking whether or not the external world is like its ways of appearing to us, where the expression “ways of appearing” is intended to pick out aspects of our perceptual experiences themselves. This is a metaphysical version of the question of the relationship between appearance and reality: What is the relationship between the phenomenal features that characterize perceptual experience, on the one hand, and the mind-independent features of the external objects of perception, on the other? There are some philosophers who might resist distinguishing between these two questions. For them, “ways of appearing” in the phenomenal sense just are the ways that things appear to be (let’s call the latter the “intentional sense” of “ways of appearing”).1 That is, the phenomenal character of an experience is nothing over and above its representational content. Phenomenal properties are represented properties—the properties that an experience attributes to the external objects of perception. The question of whether or not phenomenal properties can be identified with the represented properties of an experience mirrors traditional questions in the philosophy of perception. If they can be identified with each other, then in veridical perception we might be said to “directly grasp” features of the external world through perception. The properties that are present to the mind are the very same properties that belong to the external objects of perception. Such a view affords.... (shrink)

It commonly occurs that one person sees a particular colour chip B as saturated blue with no admixture of red or green (i.e., as “uniquely blue”), while another sees it as a somewhat greenish blue. Such a difference is often accompanied by agreement with respect to colour matching – the two persons may mostly agree when asked whether two chips are of the same colour, and this may be so across the whole range of colours. Asked whether B is the (...) same or different from other chips, they mostly agree – though they continue to disagree about whether B is uniquely blue. I shall argue that in such cases neither individual misperceives what colour B is. They differ, rather, in how they perceive the colour of B. (shrink)